The CHAIRMAN. You say the program was increased from a 24group program to a 54-group program. Subsequently that 54 was increased to 84?

General ARNOLD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any intention to exceed 84?

General ARNOLD. It is already further increased.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, your base and airfield program, which will reach its peak in December, provides for additional fields or for expansion of present fields?

General ARNOLD. We are doing both. We are expanding some of our present fields, and we are also building new fields. When you are flying, and particularly when you are carrying out training, there comes a time when the air gets saturated with airplanes, beyond which you have the danger of collisions and a high accident rate. So rather than go through any such unfortunate situation as that, we prefer to build new schools where we will not have that overlapping in the air. For your information, however, we have given out instructions that hereafter all construction carried out in the United States will be of the cheapest kind that will last us through the war. We are not even going to go into what we used to call temporary construction. It is the wartime construction that we are going to go into from now onjust enough to carry us through the war.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you following the same policy with reference to air fields and the geographical location of these fields that you do with the plants-locating them inland?

General ARNOLD. In general, most of our fields will be located in the central part of the United States. However, we must have a certain number of our combat fields on the coasts for combat purposes.

The CHAIRMAN. Has the saturation point been reached in the immediate vicinity of the District of Columbia?

General ARNOLD. No; I would not say that it had been, although along the Atlantic coast we are trying to have our bases so located that, in case of threat, we can concentrate the necessary number of combat planes in any locality, whether it will be the Boston locality, New York, Washington, Charleston, or wherever it may be.

STATEMENTS IN TRUMAN COMMITTEE REPORT-EFFICIENCY OF UNITED STATES PLANES

The CHAIRMAN. General, I have before me the report of the investigating committee, known as the Truman committee, for the investigation of the national defense program. If this were merely the opinion of some columnist or newspaper writer, I would hesitate to bring it up, but this is a committee, supposed to be free of partisanship, appointed by the Senate for the investigation of the national defense program, and these conclusions are agreed to by the members of the committee unanimously. As such, they carry weight, and they have had the attention of the press generally throughout the country. The report is an important one, and it seems to have been met with general approval. I note from this report of the Truman committee that they say that only a limited amount of our present production is of combat types considered to be equal to or superior to the best types produced abroad, and the statement is made elsewhere that only 25 percent of our

airplane production is of the best types, equal or superior to the planes produced by the Axis Powers. What would you say in regard to that statement?

General ARNOLD. I cannot concur in it at all. I am quoted in the report of the committee, but the quotation is one sentence out of a speech, and that one sentence is used as a text. You can take one sentence out of the Declaration of Independence and make it awful. You can take one sentence or one phrase from a statement and prove anything. Here is what I actually said

The CHAIRMAN (interposing). On the other hand, without taking the report up in much detail, the report as a whole is a serious reflection on our aviation program. It is not based on the testimony of any one man, or any set of statistics, but it is general in its nature, and I think constitutes a rather serious indictment. Are you inclined to think that the indictment is overdrawn?

General ARNOLD. I would like to give you some facts in connection with our airplanes, and let us see what those airplanes have done. First, in connection with the P-40, which is the one that everybody is jumping on right now, here is what I actually said, referring to the P-40, and not to the P-40-A, B, C, D, E, or F. I said this with reference to the P-40.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the P-40?

General ARNOLD. The P-40 is a pursuit airplane. P-40's have been built and delivered to the pilots in our squadrons: I said that: "They have given an excellent account of themselves against the Luftwaffe in Egypt, and that they have been adopted as standard equipment in the Near East; although we no longer rate the P-40 as better than a good pursuit trainer, because of its limitations of speed, ceiling, and firing power."

Since the original P-40 we have come to the P-40-A, B, C, D, E, and F. As proof of the efficiency and effectiveness of these airplanes, let us see what they have actually done in the war. For instance, we have the British report, from which I quote:

From talking with pilots and squadrons that are equipped with P-40-D (Kitty Hawks), it has been found that this airplane is considered to be superior to the Messerschmitt 109-F. These pilots also consider this plane to be superior to all the other Royal Air Force planes in the Middle East.

Now, that report speaks for itself. In that connection, one squadron has been in combat with the enemy, and in two engagements 13 planes, including 2 Messerschmitt 109-F's, were destroyed with the loss of only 1 P-40-D plane. We lost only 1 plane, and they knocked down 13 hostile planes. It does not appear from that report that that plane is a bad one.

Mr. TABER. Of course, it would depend on the number of planes involved.

General ARNOLD. They were up against a superior number.

Now, in Oahu and the Philippines, during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, on December 7, 1941, Lieutenant Taylor and Lieutenant Welch, both flying airplanes similar to the British Tomahawk, attacked a formation of Japanese planes, and each shot down two planes. A short time later Lieutenant Welch engaged two Japanese planes, and shot both of them down. Other airplanes of the same type engaged in victorious battle with the Japanese on that day. Every time

67657-42-2

they went up in combat, they acquitted themselves in an excellent

manner.

Now, let us take the Chinese experience: Chinese sources are quoted to the effect that the American volunteer group of airmen defending the Burma Road and Rangoon, many of whom use airplanes of the P-40 series, have bagged from 90 to 100 Japanese planes. That has been since December 7, and it was done with the loss of only 3 planes and

3 men.

On the Russian front, early this month, four Tomahawks are reported in the news dispatches as having shot down eight Messerschmitts, which were there in support of the German drive on Leningrad.

In view of this, it looks to us as if the P-40 has more than paid for itself.

Mr. STARNES. Do you know who the military expert of the Truman committee was or is?

General ARNOLD. No, sir.

Mr. STARNES. I think it would be interesting to know who he was. General ARNOLD. Here is one other item along that line, showing where P-40 planes, or planes of the P-40 series, although outnumbered about 8 to 1 by enemy planes, destroyed as much as 60 percent of the enemy aircraft. This was against German air forces.

Mr. ENGEL. How many American planes were involved?

General ARNOLD. It was a very small force. It was a matter of 8 to 1. The CHAIRMAN. Are they developing from day to day improved types of planes, or have you followed the development of improved types pretty closely?

General ARNOLD. Yes, sir; we follow that as closely as we can. We have an exceedingly difficult task in getting information out of Germany. Before the war, with our attachés over there, we could not get the information that we would like to have.

The CHAIRMAN. What evidence along that line do you obtain from the planes that are shot down over England, in Africa, and in the Far East every day? Do those planes show any marked developments that have been made?

General ARNOLD. The planes I referred to were Messerschmitt 109-F, which means that it was the seventh model, the models running A, B, C, D, E, and F. In the same way, our P-40-F is the seventh model in the P-40 series.

The CHAIRMAN. In the case of those planes that were destroyed, did they show any evidence in their construction that would indicate that their supplies of critical materials are short or substantially reduced?

General ARNOLD. The latest reports we have received on the types of construction indicate that they are still manufacturing airplanes. from the best materials and with the best workmanship.

The CHAIRMAN. From that point of view, there is no evidence indicating that they are nearing the exhaustion of their critical materials?

General ARNOLD. We have had no indication along that line at all. The CHAIRMAN. Referring further to the report of the Truman committee of the Senate, the statement is made that when the Japanese aircraft attack was made down at Pearl Harbor on December 7,

1941, the United States Army and Navy had only enough airplanes to furnish skeleton forces with equipment, a great deal of which was of inferior quality. The report states

There seems little reason to analyze the facts by which this conclusion was reached prior to the war, since the events of the last few weeks have demonstrated its truth beyond reasonable doubt. Not only has it been shown that we have not had a great quantity of planes in action, but information made available to the public demonstrates that too many of the ships used were of types long considered by our armed forces to be obsolete.

The report goes on to say—

After 2 years of frantic effort, we have too few planes to allow adequate flying time to our pilots.

It may be claimed that this shortage existed with our own forces as the result of huge shipments diverted to foreign consumers. Actually, the facts do not indicate that to be the case. Information made available to the public has shown that, of the best types, our shipments abroad have been very limited.

STATEMENTS IN TRUMAN COMMITTEE REPORT-CHANGES IN SPECIFICATIONS

Some of the aircraft manufacturers, it appears complained that they had no sooner gotten into production when changes were made in the specifications. In one specific case, it appears that 165 planes were held up for something to be done to the carburetor, which should have been taken care of in the first place. I would like to ask about that, because that is one of the most severe criticisms affecting the policy. When your planes are to go into production, what is the policy in reference to anticipated improvements or accessories which may be added to the planes at some future time?

General ARNOLD. Our plane policy with reference to production is to standardize on everything before we go into production. With that in mind, as early as 1938 we had a standardization committee under which we standardized with the Navy so that changes in certain parts and processes could be made from Army planes to Navy planes. Since the British have come into the picture, we have standardized with the American-made British planes, so the same planes could be diverted either to or from the British, the Army, and the Navy. We then standardized on bombs as far as we could. We standardized on attachments of all kinds. We standardized, for instance, on bomb racks wherever we could. We even tried to standardize on radio, but there we ran into exceedingly great difficulties. With the standards that are in effect, the airplanes roll down the line as rapidly as possible. The only changes that we ever made in airplanes when they had started rolling were changes involving life and death, or something which would lead to life or death. For instance, the Truman committee talked about "piddling changes in carburetors," but that same piddling change in our carburetor was to correct something that probably caused a forced landing, with the death of eight or nine people. That is what they call a piddling change. Any change we might make in a carburetor might be called a piddling change, but it involves the matter of saving life.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it your statement that any delays occurring to plane production are not due to a desire to inaugurate later types of improvement or equipment?

General ARNOLD. Insofar as we can do it, changes are deferred so they will not interfere with production. We cannot always do that, but that is the policy we follow wherever we can.

STATEMENTS IN TRUMAN COMMITTEE REPORT-CONCENTRATION OF ORDERS WITH A FEW MANUFACTURERS

The CHAIRMAN. The further charge is made in the report that orders have been concentrated with a few companies. The statement is made that billions of dollars of orders have been placed with 19 aircraft manufacturers, while there are more than 60 aircraft companies in the country today which have been unable so far to secure any substantial place for themselves in the production of aircraft for national defense. The report states that detailed information is available on more than 50 of these companies, much of which has been verified by the field inspectors of the Civil Aeronautics Administration. It is stated that they have detailed information on more than 50 of those concerns, most of which are offering to build airplanes.

The report states that these companies have machinery, space, and the men with which, it has been estimated, they can produce a minimum of 2,000 airplanes per month. In view of that, how do you account for the fact that while there have been some 60 companies available for this work, in awarding the contracts, they have been limited to only 19 concerns?

General ARNOLD. There are other people here who are far better qualified to answer as to the production problem than I am. You have General Knudsen here and Under Secretary of War Patterson. General Echols is very closely concerned with production. So far as our policy is concerned, we have utilized every known facility in the United States for production that can produce either whole airplanes or engines, or any of their component parts. So far as I know, we utilize all of those facilities in the manufacture of planes or parts. However, we cannot just go out and take a company because they say they are ready to manufacture pursuit planes. We cannot give them orders because they make that claim, because we have found from bitter experience that there is a big difference between the desire to produce and the actual capability to produce. The CHAIRMAN. Right in that connection, the report of the Truman committee also says that responsibility for the condition is to be placed directly on the Army and Navy. They state that they still retain control over the awarding of contracts and consider the O. P. M. as a sort of vexatious necessity.

General ARNOLD. I would like to have General Echols answer that question.

General ECHOLS. I would like to answer the first question first: It was stated that there were 60 manufacturers. I have not seen the list, but I read that extract from the report.

The CHAIRMAN. You are referring to the list provided by the Civil Aeronautics Authority?

General ECHOLS. Yes, sir. The statement is made that we have let contracts to only 19 manufacturers, while there are 60 other manufacturers capable of turning out 2,000 planes per month. Those 60