Mr. STARNES. Are you making a rounded plan which will bring in the raw material necessary, and the power necessary, to produce this vast number of planes? General KNUDSEN. Yes, sir. Mr. STARNES. Where do you find, or where do you anticipate, the greatest bottleneck in getting the facilities and in getting the raw material? General KNUDSEN. I think it will be a series of bottlenecks all through. The quantities are very much larger than anything we have ever conceived. So I think we will have to take them one at a time and see what we will have to do. Mr. STARNES. In other words, you will have to feel your way along, and as these bottlenecks develop, try to break the bottleneck? General KNUDSEN. Of course, some of the materials are available now; but we will have to take them one by one and see what we will have to do to get them for 1943. Mr. STARNES. As the official charged with the responsibility for this production, are you going to continue to expand these big airplane plants along the coasts, in exposed positions, so that a daring raid such as was made upon Pearl Harbor might wipe out the entire plant. or are you going to move into the interior? General KNUDSEN. We are going into the interior, sir, of course. Mr. STARNES. I certainly hope you do. Mr. TABER. General Knudsen, can you give us anything regarding the status of our situation with reference to the aluminum production and the power production that would be definite as to what your requirements might be and as to what you have available, in the nature of statistics? If you could, I would like to have you put something of that kind into the record rather than give it to us here. General KNUDSEN. We are not prepared for that as yet, sir; but we have sufficient for the 1942 production. Mr. TABER. You are all right for your 1942 production? Mr. TABER. Now, as to what the situation is with reference to 1943, you do not have much idea? General KNUDSEN. We are plotting that now. In fact, I found about 60.000 kilowatts, but I need some more. Mr. TABER. There is a tremendous lot of power that can be salvaged by cutting out a lot of this advertising and that sort of thing? General KNUDSEN. Yes, sir. We have already done that in one section. We had to do it in Atlanta last fall. Mr. TABER. And you are doing it in other sections? Mr. TABER. Now, as to your ability to handle all of these planes and get them out: At the present time, when would you begin to run out of work on the airplanes that are already appropriated for? General KNUDSEN. You mean if this program is not approved? Mr. TABER. Yes; before this program that we are talking about now. General KNUDSEN. I believe we will begin running out in July on some of the lighter planes. Mr. TABER. But not very much? Colonel HEISS. Yes, sir; after August the curve goes right down. Mr. TABER. You mean on combat planes? Colonel HEISS. On tactical planes also, but not on the large bombers. Mr. TABER. Now, on this item you have got to begin to raise the level in order to keep your production up to the level you already had on the 1st of July? General KNUDSEN. We have got to raise the level in order to keep up. Mr. TABER. You have got to raise the level of production in order to take care of these planes? General KNUDSEN. Yes, sir. Mr. TABER. You mean that the number of combat planes involved here will require you to raise the level of your production? General KNUDSEN. Yes, sir. Mr. TABER. Then you will not get into production with these new facilities for 14 months? General KNUDSEN. Well, some of them we have under way from past appropriations that you have granted us. They are beginning to come in now. Mr. TABER. With the facilities that are already provided for? Mr. TABER. You will not be in production next August as the result of this appropriation? General KNUDSEN. On some of it we will be. When we make an addition to a present plant, where the job costs four or five million dollars, we will get some production in. Mr. TABER. You will really be able to get some of these things out by the end of the calendar year 1943? General KNUDSEN. Yes, sir. We received an order from the President to that effect. Mr. TABER. Are you going to be able to do it, do you think? General KNUDSEN. Yes, sir. Mr. WIGGLESWORTH. The whole program that is before us? General KNUDSEN. Yes, sir. There is another program, you understand. Mr. WIGGLESWORTH. But the program can all be turned into planes and other materials by the end of 1943? General KNUDSEN. All except the heavy bombers. Mr. WIGGLESWORTH. What percentage of our existing facilities will be required to handle the program that is before us now, in addition to what we have already got? General KNUDSEN. I do not think I understand your question. Mr. WIGGLESWORTH. You gave us a table when you were here before us in December for the record, showing the percentage of our national manufacturing capacity that would be required to handle the program then under way. Now, I would like for the record, if you can give it to us, what the percentage would be on this program that is now before us, on top of what has gone before. General KNUDSEN. This only deals with the airplanes in connection with the whole program. The entire program calls for 50 percent of the manufacturing capacity of the United States. Mr. WIGGLESWORTH. I want to know what the whole program, with this included, means in terms of percentage of national manufacturing capacity. General KNUDSEN. Fifty percent of the national income by the end of the year. Mr. WIGGLESWORTH. No; I am talking about manufacturing capacity. General KNUDSEN. I could not answer that. Mr. WIGGLESWORTH. Could you bring that little table that you gave us in December up to date, so that it will include the program before us here? General KNUDSEN. Yes, sir. (The statement will be furnished later to the committee.) Mr. CASE. General Knudsen, once before you gave us a statement on mass production with reference to the position of labor. I was wondering, in talking up this program, if you had in mind the utilizing of the productive power of small business in some of the smaller cities in the central part of the country. I have in mind the possibility that a great many garages and small factories connected with the automobile industry will be practically out of business now, and they have the greatest number of lathes and tools of various sorts. General KNUDSEN. All the facilities that can be used will be used. With all these people now practically shut down, we will have to try to find something for them to do. Mr. CASE. Is it possible to break down this production of airplanes into subcontracts? General KNUDSEN. For small parts; yes, sir. There is quite a market for that. In fact. there is quite a lot of that being made now in small chunks, and as the program broadens out that area broadens out with it. But you will find there are very large numbers of small parts. now being made in smaller factories. Mr. STARNES. General Knudsen. you have been charged with the responsibility in this production program now for some time. Were you called as a witness before the so-called Truman committee to testify on the question of production? General KNUDSEN. I do not remember at the moment. I have been before so many committees, sir, that I am a little bit uncertain, but I do not think I was. If I am mentioned in the report-I tried from time to time to find out if there were any specific instances that could be brought to O. P. M.. so that we could check it up, but I was never able to get a single instance. Mr. JOHNSON of West Virginia. If you were before that committee, you did not give any such testimony as you gave here this morning concerning the shortcomings that the Truman committee found you in at that time. General KNUDSEN. Of course, I do not know. but I do know this: As far as my ability to observe shortcomings is concerned, none of the things mentioned in the Truman report happened in O. P. M., so far as I know. Mr. DITTER. General Knudsen, in connection with this program, will you have the authority to deal with the labor factor as it brings its contribution to the completion of this program? General KNUDSEN. I believe so. Mr. DITTER. In other words, you have the responsibility of production and you feel that you are vested with authority which will enable you to deal with the labor problem as it contributes to this program? General KNUDSEN. To the extent of that authority. Mr. DITTER. Do you know of any other authorities that might be in conflict with your authority that might be embarrassing to the completion of the program? General KNUDSEN. I do not know of any now. In fact, our labor problem, I think, is pretty well behind us. Mr. STARNES. We cleared up a lot when the House passed the Smith bill, did we not? Mr. DITTER. Then we are to understand that the responsibility with reference to this part of the program—that is, the labor part of the program is a responsibility that you assume and that you intend to discharge; is that right? General KNUDSEN. Yes, sir. Mr. DITTER. And that, as you see it now, there are no factors which will embarrass you in the discharge of that responsibility? General KNUDSEN. I do not see any. I will say that this is a power that the Secretary has delegated to me. Mr. DITTIR. The power of the Secretary of War? Mr. DITTER. Let me put one more question. Do you want to amplify that observation, General, in any way? General KNUDSEN. I am told by Colonel Heiss that the Secretary of War has no such authority. Consequently, it will have to pass to the War Production Board and the War Labor Board, I presume. Mr. DITTER. Then would you say that Mr. Nelson will share with you a part of this responsibility? General KNUDSEN. I do not know. I have not found that out. I have not been over there yet. Mr. TABER. That is what you are going to try to find out this afternoon? General KNUDSEN. That is what I am going to try to find out at 2:30 this afternoon. Mr. DITTER. Then you do not know whether you are going to have that authority, but you feel that you are going to have charge of the production program, and you are going to see that labor brings its contribution? General KNUDSEN. Yes. I have no fear of the labor problem now. Mr. TABER. I have here a copy of today's Washington Daily News, with the headline on page 6, "Fear of Congress delays Nation's war production." Have you experienced any such fear as that? General KNUDSEN. Fear of Congress? Mr. TABER. Yes. General KNUDSEN. No, sir. I can truthfully say that I have never had any fear of Congress. Mr. TABER. I have one other question. On page 9 of the same paper appears the following: "Nelson may pick Hillman as labor czar during war.' ." I wonder how they are going to do anything of that kind? The CHAIRMAN. I do not think Mr. Knudsen can answer that question. Mr. TERRY. General Knudsen, you are in charge of production now. Would it be within your jurisdiction, and would you have the right, if you felt that there was danger of our production being interfered with on the seacoast, to order that production brought inland, in order to safeguard production? General KNUDSEN. If it is necessary; yes, sir. Mr. TERRY. You would have the authority? General KNUDSEN. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General Knudsen. The CHAIRMAN. We have discussed the estimates pretty generally and gone into many phases of them. In order that members may inquire about the specific items in the estimates, I suggest that we turn to the prepared justifications and take them. The first one will be that of the Air Corps. AIR CORPS ESTIMATE ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. O. P. ECHOLS Turning to page 3 of the justifications, General Echols, to the estimate for $9,041,317,400: You have given us the number of planes by types and you have given us the cost by types. Now, I would like to ask you: Will these planes be bought on the cost-plus-fixed-fee basis, or will there be competitive bidding? General ECHOLS. There will not be competitive bidding. A great many of them will be bought on the cost-plus-fixed-fee basis-probably one-half on the cost-plus-fixed-fee basis. The CHAIRMAN. Will there be a limitation on the percentage of the fee? General ECHOLS. The limitation by law is 7 percent and, by policy, is 6 percent. The CHAIRMAN. What ratio of spare parts to planes is provided? General ECHOLS. It is 20 percent. The CHAIRMAN. That is the ratio previously appropriated for? General ECHOLS. Yes, sir (After discussion off the record :) The CHAIRMAN. Would there be any objection, General Echols, to including page 3 of the justifications in the record, and the supporting pages 6 and 7? General ECHOLS. No, sir; no objection. Supplemental estimates C, fiscal year 1942, Air Corps, Army Purpose of project: SUMMARY OF PROJECTS Project No. 12. Procurement of standard airplanes, complete. $7, 144, 056, 340 Project No. 81. Procurement of spare engines for new air craft 390, 421, 240 Project No. 82. Material and labor for the maintenance of aircraft (spare parts). 1, 506, 895, 510 Total Air Corps, Army-. Project No. 81. Procurement of spare engines for new aircraft: Estimated obligations. 9, 041, 373, 090 390, 421, 240 Supporting data: (a) To provide for the procurement of spare engines for the airplanes under project No. 12, on a basis of 35 percent spare engines for tactical airplanes, and 75 percent spare engines for training airplanes. |