and his ability to understand mechanical apparatus and diagrams; his alertness to new developments in science, aviation, and military affairs; and his judgment in practical situations.

Applicants for aviation-cadet instruction in ground courses of training, however, must meet definite educational requirements, although the physical requirements for this type of duty do not include passing the flight physical examination. Eligibility for armament training is extended to civilians, former aviation cadets now in civil life, and to aviation cadets currently undergoing instruction, and preferably to men who have had training in engineering or science. Aviation cadets and former cadets must be recommended by the commanding officer of the Air Corps training detachment for such training by reason of mechanical aptitude and may not have failed in any ground-school subject.

Candidates for engineering training must have completed at least 3 years of engineering studies at an accredited college or university. For communications training, candidates must have completed either 2 full years of engineering studies or have had 2 years of college and hold an amateur radio license.

Applicants for meteorological training must be college graduates and have specialized in sciences, engineering, or similar technical subjects. They must have satisfactorily completed thorough courses in mathematics, including differential and integral calculus, and physics, including heat and thermal dynamics. Applications for photographic training are not being accepted at present, but applicants must have at least 3 years of chemistry or geology in an accredited college and preferably have professional or considerable amateur experience.

For successful air-crew candidates, flying training will last approximately seven and a half months, during which time the aviation cadet will receive $75 per month, plus $1 per day subsistence. He also receives, at Government expense, lodging, necessary clothing, equipment, medical care, and a $10 000 life-insurance policy during the period of training. On assignment to active duty he may continue the policy by paying the premiums.

Upon graduation the cadet receives an initial uniform allowance of $150 cash. On relief from active duty in the Air Corps Reserve, he receives $500 for each year of his active service.

Mr. SNYDER. Why do you not take them in at 18? That is the time they go on the football teams, and they make good football players. General ARNOLD. We do, but they are minors, and must have their parents' consent.

Mr. SNYDER. Would they be considered minors for this purpose? General ARNOLD. That is the one objection we have. They have to have their parents' consent.

Mr. POWERS. General, now that you have dropped your educational requirements, do you mean to say that the man must have his "trig" and calculus?

General ARNOLD. They must have the qualifications to become offiIf they have had their "trig" and calculus, they have a better ability to understand mechanical apparatus and diagrams.

cers.

Mr. POWERS. What happens to boys who are washed out from flying? Are they used as bombardiers or observers?

General ARNOLD. We are using as many as we can as bombardiers, radio operators, and so forth, or wherever they fit in.

Mr. POWERS. The wash-outs are being placed in other branches of the service?

General ARNOLD. We give them a chance to do something first, and then if they do not make good, we "wash them out."

Mr. POWERS. Do you have any officers' training school where a boy can be commissioned in the ground force of the Air Corps?

General ARNOLD. Up to this time we have been getting them from reservists or from other branches. We will now have to train our own ground officers.

Mr. POWERS. How can a boy gain admission to such a school?
General ARNOLD. It has not started yet.

TRUMAN COMMITTEE REPORT

Mr. LAMBERTSON. General, do you not think it would be a patriotic service for you to answer the report of the Truman committee, if it is wrong?

General ARNOLD. I do not know. My impression is that if somebody comes out with big headlines criticizing the air arm, everyone reads it, but if a denial comes out the next day, they do not read it. Mr. LAMBERTSON. But, of course, this is a senatorial investigation. Mr. POWERS. It is more or less like a man arguing with his wife. You do not get anywhere.

Mr. LAMBERTSON. I am serious about it, because people will more or less accept the statements in the Truman committee report unless they are refuted.

COMPLAINT OF ZEPHYR AIRCRAFT CO. IN TRUMAN COMMITTEE REPORT

Mr. ENGEL. General, the Zephyr Aircraft Co. was mentioned here today, and on page 63 of the report of the Truman committee there seems to be a severe indictment of the Department on account of the Zephyr Aircraft Co. I read from the report, as follows:

Another example which might be cited is the case of the Zephyr Aircraft Co., whose case was heard in an informal hearing with committee counsel. According to the record, the Zephyr Co., in response to an invitation for a design bid for a new type trainer, issued by the Army Air Corps, submitted a design which it claimed could be mass produced with unskilled labor at a cost of $3,000 each. The record further showed that this design was never even evaluated by the Army and they made no claim that the Zephyr people could not do all they said they could do or that their design was unsatisfactory. Instead of purchasing a new design, a contract was let, at twice the cost, to another company for biplane trainers which were the same type, with some improvements, that had been used for many years and which are now being discontinued. The Zephyr people filed a protest which was apparently none too diplomatic, but they were never given a hearing by the War Department. It was testified further that, at the request of the Department, the company agreed to eliminate one individual who was personally distasteful to certain officials. They were told that they could have an experimental order, and later told differently. Finally, it was testified that they were told that no matter how good their plane was they could not get an order because of personalities involved and because it might look as if the Army was admitting a mistake in its original failure to give proper consideration to Zephyr's bid.

Do you know who testified to that?

General ECHOLS. In 1939, when we started with the so-called 5,500plane program, we asked any and all comers to submit designs, and the Zephyr Aircraft Co. submitted a design for a primary trainer. The board of officers that passed on those planes considered the Zephyr plane no better than either the Stearman or Fairchild primary plane, which were planes of the same type. Therefore, they recommended against the purchase. The Zephyr Co. then came to the Air Corps and tried to get a contract to develop a primary training airplane, but there was no indication that their plane would in any way be superior to the plane we already had in production, if it were produced. The representatives of the Zephyr Co. claim that this plane was designed to be particularly adaptable to production in large quantities and at a small price. A survey was made of the Zephyr Co.'s facilities, and it appeared that they had a small hangar on a flying field. They had one plane partially completed, but there was no indication, so far as

we could determine, that their airplane was particularly adaptable to quantity production, or that the Zephyr Co. could even begin to produce.

They had neither the management, facilities, nor reputation, and for that reason the proposal was turned down. Then they brought their protest to Washington, and they were turned down on that. So far as the details of the personal matter is concerned, I am not familiar with the discussion or argument with General Brett, or the discussion he had with the representatives of the Zephyr Co. I feel positive that General Brett did not say that they had to discharge their manager, but I suspect that they thought that if they did discharge their manager, they might get some business. They did discharge the manager, but they never got any business, because General Brett again turned them down. The Zephyr Co. case was investigated by the White House. I think ex-Senator Minton was in charge of the investigation. It was also referred to the O. P. M. for investigation, and I think it was discussed on the floor of the House.

Mr. ENGEL. Do you have any knowledge of anyone telling them that no matter how good their plane was, they could not get an order because of the personalities involved?

General ECHOLS. I never heard that statement made before.

Mr. ENGEL. Do you recall an occasion 2 or 3 years ago when I had Mr. Dupont down here testifying about gliders? It was about 3 years

Mr. ENGEL. At that time it was a question of using these gliders for the purpose of training pilots, and it was believed that gliders were better than other planes for the observation of air currents. They were believed to be better than nonglider planes for that purpose. Do you have any further information on that subject?

General ARNOLD. We have information from British or German sources which would indicate that there would be no distinct advantage in giving airplane pilots glider training prior to the heavierthan-air training.

RATIO OF INCREASE IN PRODUCTION RATE BY INCREASING DAYS AND HOURS OF WORK

Mr. ENGEL. Coming to the question of production, or the production of other War Department matériel, such as rifles, and so forth, it was testified that by going from a one-shift to a three-shift day, or 24-hour day, you would obtain about two and one-half times instead of three times the production. Would that hold true in the case of airplane production, or could we expect two and one-half times the production in a 24-hour day?

General ARNOLD. I think it would be less than that. Two and onethird times is the figure I have in my head, for the reason that you cannot use 100 percent of the first shift on the second shift, and only about 30 or 40 percent on the third shift.

TIME REQUIRED TO PRODUCE AIRPLANES

Mr. ENGEL. In some testimony you gave at one of the hearings you stated that it would take approximately 18 months from the time you put the pencil on the drawing board to the time when the planes would

begin to roll off the line. Has that time been cut down since then? General ARNOLD. It has been cut down materially in pursuit planes, light bombers, and medium bombers. In the case of heavy bombers Í think that 18 months is still a good figure.

Mr. ENGEL. You recall when Colonel Lindbergh was before the committee, do you not? His testimony was to the effect that we were from 3 to 5 years behind in research and development work. That was in 1939. That was when the War Department had the money or contract authorization for 907 planes. They had a contract authorization, and there was a delay of from 17 to 19 months in building the planes because they were awaiting developments that would be the result of certain research and development work.

General ARNOLD. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGEL. Prior to that time, you were following the policy of demanding quality rather than quantity?

General ARNOLD. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. ENGEL. Then, so far as Congress is concerned, we gave you all the money you wanted, so far as planes were concerned. In view of the fact that you did not use all of the money provided, Congress had given what you desired up to that period. In other words, those 907 planes were provided for, or you had the money that had been furnished by Congress to procure them.

General ARNOLD. In those days we did not get all the money we asked for, because there was a limitation placed on it, first, in the War Department, second, in the Budget Bureau, and third, here in Congress; so that we were not able to ask for all the money we wanted.

Mr. ENGEL. What I am getting at is this, that the bottleneck in this production program was in keeping up with the research and development work.

General ARNOLD. That had a great deal to do with it.

Mr. ENGEL. Then in March or April 1939, when we had the 5,500plane program

General ARNOLD. It was 5,500 total.

Mr. ENGEL. That was in March or April 1939, and at that time you testified that you were following the policy of quantity regardless of the quality, because you had to have more planes.

General ARNOLD. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGEL. Now what is the situation? Have we reached the point where we are getting both quality and quantity?

General ARNOLD. We are now getting both quality and quantity. I do not think we will need to apologize to anybody in the world for the type of airplanes we are producing.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Mr. ENGEL. According to the testimony given in 1939, we were from 3 to 5 years behind Germany in research and development work. Where do we stand today in that respect?

General ARNOLD. From my point of view, as in charge of the air forces, I think we are equal to most nations and ahead of a lot of them. Mr. ENGEL. That problem has been solved?

General ARNOLD. I think that problem has been solved. I would like to have my technical expert tell me.

General ECHOLS. I think, from the best information we have, that I can say, without any hesitation, we are up to the Germans, and I think, in certain respects, we are ahead of them. I think the new pursuit planes that the general refers to are the best airplanes in the world, and I think in our heavy bombers that we are ahead of them.

Mr. ENGEL. I would like to have put in the record such information as you can give on this particular question of research and development, because I think both the Truman committee report and the testimony in past records should be corrected.

(The matter referred to follows:)

Since 1939 we have been able to accelerate our research and development work to an impressive degree. The steadily increasing facilities of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics and of Wright Field, together with the wider use of outside research agencies, such as Massachusetts Institute of Technology, California Institute of Technology, National Research Council, National Defense Research Committee, and others, has considerably broadened the scope of our research attempts.

In procuring a particular piece of equipment, we always are shooting for a definite goal. If a new type of aircraft is dictated, the military characteristics (requirements) of such a type are definitely established by both tactical and technical military personnel. Such requirements cover all the angles of performance, armament, and equipment, necessary for successful combat operation, Following this military requirement directive, definite, and detailed type specifications covering engineering and production details are then furnished to the industry. Compliance with the specification requirements by the manufacturer or manufacturers of the type airplane in question is controlled throughout development and production by careful cooperation with the manufacturer throughout all development phases and the checking of engineering data, physical checking of parts and assemblies during fabrication, and finally a flight test evaluation. In no sense can such policy permit the manufacturers to dictate to the Air Corps the procurement of equipment not thoroughly desired, checked, and approved by the Air Corps.

PROTECTION AT SAULT STE. MARIE, MICH.

Mr. ENGEL. Now, I have heard a great deal of newspaper comment and had a great deal of correspondence regarding the failure of the War Department to protect the Soo at the Sault Ste. Marie, Mich. They tell me that 85 percent of the ore goes through there and that there is more traffic goes through the Soo-and it is outside of my district, you understand-than goes through the Kiel, the Suez, and the Panama Canals; that, on the other hand, the War Department officials have said the requirements for air forces at other places are so great and the chances of the Soo being attacked are so small that they could not afford, at the present time, at least, to put any protection in there in the way of putting an air squadron in there.

Now, the thought occurred to me—and, again, it is out of my district-that whatever equipment they would put in there, some kind of a school or something up in that neighborhood where they could have a certain number of planes used for training purposes, educating, at the same time, in case of an emergency, if anybody did come up there and attack, those instructors could get out and defend the Soo; in other words, have a dual-purpose place where you could take care both of education and protection, so to speak-educate the flyers and protect the Soo. Have you anything to say about that?

General ARNOLD. How far is Selfridge Field from the Soo?
Mr. ENGEL. I think, several hundred miles.

General ARNOLD. With the modern airplane, how long would it take to get there? The idea, Mr. Engel, is, Selfridge Field is close enough