through the yards of said company and the chutes leading therefrom to the platform and cars of the defendants, that no further action be taken, in the matter under consideration, until the determination of said suit. We do not concur in this view.

If the stipulation or contract between the defendants or any of them and the Covington Stock Yards Company should be held valid so as to give the Covington Stock Yards Company a right of action against the railroad company for the breach thereof, or if it should be adjudged that the Covington Stock Yards Company could, by reason of rights acquired by said contract exact payment of complainants for passing their stock through the yards of the Covington Company, this would not necessarily determine the question which is in controversy here, namely, the right of the defendants to subject the complainants to such lottage charges by making the Covington Stock Yards the exclusive depot for delivering or receiving live stock shipped to or from Covington. On the other hand, should it be held in the pending suit that, under said stipulation the Stock Yards Company had no right to demand payment of complainants for so passing stock through their yards, the order, in this case, which would be to the same effect, would be no longer important. It is not, therefore, perceived how a determination by us of the question in controversy here between complainants and defendants can lead to embarrassment, or injuriously affect any rights, which, in the Federal courts, may eventually be found to exist.

Yet, that no possible injury may result to the parties, and that the orders of the Commission may conform to the final determination in said suit, leave should and will be given to either of the parties to this proceeding, to apply for a modification of this order at any time after such final determination.

DAVID F. ALLEN AND ANOTHER v. THE LOUISVILLE, NEW ALBANY AND CHICAGO RAILROAD COMPANY.

Heard September 20, 1887.-Decided October 81, 1887.

A violation of the "long and short haul clause" of the Act to Regulato Commerce is not made out by showing that a carrier, when called upon by a consignor for through rates, names such as are greater for the shorter distance and receives the amount for itself and its connections, when it appears that on its own line the charges are the greater for the longer distance, and the through charges by the shorter line are only made greater by the fact that the connecting road which has the shorter line makes higher rates than the connecting road which has the longer line.

Defendant has a line of road from New Albany to Michigan City, on which it receives grain for the New York market and delivers it to direct eastern lines, which receive it at the rates prevailing at the points where it is taken up, and pro rate with defendant on a mileage basis. The prevailing rates at Indianapolis, which is one of these points, was twentythree cents per hundred pounds; when at Frankfort, which is another, it was twenty-five cents. Defendant received grain at Indianapolis and delivered it to the Michigan Central at Michigan City, and it also received grain at Frankfort and delivered it to the New York, Chicago, and St. Louis, at South Wanatah. The distance from Indianapolis to New York, by way of Michigan City, is greater than from Frankfort to New York, by way of South Wanatah. A dealer at Frankfort delivered grain to defendant to be carried to New York, and was charged twentyfive cents a hundred for the transportation by way of the connecting road at South Wanatah, while at the same time defendant was giving to shippers the twenty-three cent rate by the other route at Indianapolis. But it appeared that defendant had nothing to do with making the rates beyond its own line except as it agreed to accept its proportion on a mileage basis, and that its own compensation for taking grain from Indianapolis to Michigan City, and also from Indianapolis to South Wanatah, was greater than the compensation received for taking like freight from Frankfort to South Wanatah. These facts show no violation by defendant of the long and short haul clause of the fourth section of the Act to Regulate Commerce.

Where the purpose of a complaint is to compel a reduction of through rates from a western point over several roads to a seaboard city, all the roads constituting the line should be parties; it is not enough to make the road which first receives the freight a party, even though it also receives the compensation for all, where it is shown that it has no control of the rate beyond its own line, because an order directed only to that road would be ineffectual to accomplish the desired end.

Complaint heard at the Board of Trade rooms in Chicago on depositions and oral evidence.

The complaint states that on the 20th day of June, 1887, the complainants delivered to the defendant one car-load of bran for transportation from the city of Frankfort, in the State of Indiana, to the city of New York, for which service the defendant demanded compensation at the rate of twentyfive cents per hundred pounds; that the city of Frankfort and the city of Indianopolis are both upon the line of defendant's road, that Frankfort is forty-seven miles nearer New York than is Indianapolis, and that all freight from Indianapolis to New York over defendant's road must necessarily pass through Frankfort; that at the date of said shipment defendant's tariff on property of the sixth class-which included bran from Indianapolis to New York was twenty-three cents per hundred pounds; and that, therefore, by reason of such greater charge from Frankfort to New York, the shorter distance, than from Indianapolis to New York, the longer distance, defendant violated section four of the "Act to Regulate Commerce."

The answer of the defendant admits that on the day named its tariffs from Indianapolis and Frankfort to New York were respectively, twenty-three and twenty-five cents per hundred pounds, and that Frankfort is forty-seven miles nearer New York by its line of road than is Indianapolis, but denies that it has violated section four of the "Act to Regulate Commerce." The answer shows the comparative distances from Indianapolis, Michigan City, and intermediate points, to New York, via defendant's line and connections, as well as by the shortest line via other routes from the said several points to New York, from which it appears that the distance from Indianapolis to New York by the shortest line is 825 miles, and from Frankfort is 846 miles. It further states that for a long period transportation charges in that section have been, from necessity, based upon relative mileage distances to and from the points of shipment, via the shortest line, and the longer lines have carried at the same rate in the aggregate as the shorter ones; that between Chicago

and the Atlantic seaboard rates have been based upon the distances between those points, Chicago being the unit, and that the rates from Indianapolis to New York and other seaboard points have been and are fixed by the short lines at ninety-three per cent. of the Chicago rate; that defendant's road running in a northwesterly direction towards Chicago and Michigan City crosses several east and west roads, and that in consequence of the distances, via the crossing lines at the junction points to New York and points east thereof, being shorter than by defendant's road, yet further from Indianapolis, each of said junction points has the higher rate to and from New York points and east thereof than Indianapolis; that the rates on sixth class articles from the junction points to and from New York and points east thereof are Indianapolis, 93 per cent. of the Chicago rate or twentythree cents per hundred pounds; Westfield, 96 per cent., or twenty-four cents per hundred pounds; and the other junction points, including Frankfort, 100 per cent., or twenty-five cents per hundred pounds. That unless defendant accepts these rates it cannot secure any of the traffic to or from Indianapolis; that in the past it has charged such rates, and if it cannot continue the practice it must lose its Indianapolis business, as defendant has no power to reduce rates in the territory north of Indianapolis below the established rates, because its connections will not receive freight except at the established rate in effect at the point where the same originates. The answer further states that Indianapolis is not only nearer the Atlantic seaboard by direct route than is Frankfort, but that there are running from Indianapolis the following lines of railway, to-wit: Cincinnati, Indianapolis, St. Louis and Chicago; Cincinnati, Hamilton and Chicago; the Pennsylvania Company's lines; Lake Erie and Western; Cleveland, Columbus, Cincinnati & Indianapolis; the Louisville, New Albany and Chicago Railway, all competing for Atlantic seaboard business, and if defendant cannot compete with these lines, or is compelled to charge the same rate from Indianapolis which it charges from Frankfort, it cannot hope to do Indianapolis business. The answer also states that the shipment in question is the only car that the

complainants have shipped by defendant's line to Buffalo, or points east thereof, and that this was merely for the purposes of this action.

Suit & Combs filed a brief for complainants, and J. C. Suit argued the case orally.

Haynes & Easley and George W. Friedly, for defendant, to the point that the circumstances and conditions of the shipment from Indianapolis and from Frankfort are different, referred to and commented upon Matter of Louisville & Nashville R. Co. Petition, 1 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 611, 612; Complaint of R. J. Richardson & Co., 1 N. Y. R. R. Commissioners Rep. 101, 105; Rand Lumber Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., Iowa R. R. Com., Rep. 550, 553; Ex parte Koehler, 23 Fed. Rep. 529; same case, 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cases, 52; Greenhood on Public Policy, 639, 640; Hadley on Railroad Transportation, 116, 117; Report of Simon Sterne, N. Y. Senate Misc. Doc. 66, pp. 18 & 19; Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. People, 10 West. Rep. 588. That the lines of transportation are different lines; East & West Ry. v. Great Western Ry., 1 Ry. & Canal Traffic Cases, 344; M. S. & L. Ry. Co. v. Denely Coal Company, 14 Law Rep. 223; Finney v. Glascow Ry. Co., 2 Macy. 183; Murry v. Glascow, etc., Ry. Co., 11 Ct. Ses. Cas. 4, Sec. 205; Commonwealth v. Worcester, etc., R. Co., 124 Mass. 561.

REPORT AND OPINION OF THE COMMISSION.

COOLEY, Chairman:

The complaint in this case is that the defendant violates the fourth section of the Act to Regulate Commerce by charging more for the transportation of a like kind of property for a shorter than for a longer distance over the same line in the same direction, the shorter being included in the longer distance.

The facts as we find them to be on the evidence are the following: The defendant has a line of railroad extending in a direction west of north from New Albany to Chicago, with a branch line from Monon to Michigan City. The line