to accept a like sum on local shipments from Schenectady to Boston, when it appears that this would be a reduction below the rates made from intermediate stations to Boston, on the same line, and apparently under similar circumstances and conditions. Any ofder compelling such acceptance would bring the rates charged into conflict with the fourth section of the Act to Regulate Commerce, unless the roads should reduce the rates from the intermediate stations to the level of the rates made from Schenectady. But in the absence of either allegation or proof that the rates from such intermediate stations are excessive, the Commission could not require a reduction. G. L. Stedman, for complainant. T. F. Hamilton and G. 1. Torney, for defendants. REPORT AND OPINION OF THE COMMISSION. SCHOONMAKER, Commissioner: The complaint in this case charges, in substance, that the various railroad companies named as defendants, unjustly discriminate against the complainant by refusing to carry grain and flour for the complainant from Schenectady, New York, to Boston and other New England points, at the proportion of all rail rates from Chicago to Boston and the other points reached by through shipments, allowed from Schenectady by the joint tariffs for such through shipments, and demands that all the railroads which participate in the traffic of through lines, which pass Schenectady eastward over the tracks of the Delaware and Hudson Canal Company, shall be required to receive and forward from the Schenectady Elevator, possessed and used by complainant, all grain and other merchandise received at said elevator, either by Canal or railroad, and shipped to said elevator for the purpose of being forwarded further east over the routes of the defendants, and to furnish cars and all needed facilities for transportation of graineed, and flour from the Schenectady Elevator and Steam Mills to eastern points, and that they accept as compensation therefor the same amounts of money. they severally accept and receive for similar service as parts of the through lines from Chicago. The answers, in substance, deny the charge of discrimination, and aver that the shipments east from the Schenectady Elevator of the complainant are local shipments, and that the defendants have the right and that it is their duty under the statute, in order to avoid a violation of the long and short haul provision of the fourth section, to charge local rates or rates not less than from Mechanicsville, Greenfield, and other local and more eastern points to Boston. The Commission finds the facts material to the disposition of the case to be as follows: The complainant is the proprietor of a valuable elevator and flour mills, at Schenectady, conveniently located adjacent to the Erie Canal, and to the tracks of the Rensselaer and Saratoga Railroad, leased to and operated by the Delaware and Hudson Canal Company, and has for several years under contract with the Rensselaer and Saratoga Company continued with the Delaware and Hudson Company, had a privilege which has been practically the privilege of shipping grain, feed, and flour from his elevator over the said railroad to and over its connecting roads leading to Boston and other eastern points. The complainant receives the bulk of his grain from the west transported by water over the lakes and Erie Canal and consigned to him at Schenectady, where it is taken into his elevator and retained until he finds a market for it in New England. He also purchases grain locally at and near Schenectady, which is taken indiscriminately like all the other grain received into the same elevator, and for the same purposes. The elevator is also open to the public, and is used to some extent by other persons than complainant, for the transhipment and storage of grain. Prior to the time the Act to Regulate Commerce took effect the defendant roads all carried complainant's grain, feed, and flour at the proportion of through rates from Chicago to Boston allowed to the lines from Schenectady to Boston. The percentage of those through rates was twenty per cent. of the Chicago rate of thirty cents per hundred pounds, or practically six cents per hundred. The subdivision of the Fitchburgh roads from Mechanicsville to Boston of this proportion was five cents and seven hundred and seventy-eight one thousandths. Since the Act to Regulate Commerce took effect the several roads have refused to ac cept this proportion from complainant, giving as the reason therefor that it would violate the fourth section of that act, since the rates from Albany, Troy, Mechanicsville, and North Adams, which are further east and nearer Boston than Schenectady, on the Fitchburg line, are greater than such proportion would be. The principal shipments from complainant's elevator have been over the Delaware and Hudson road to Mechanicsville, and thence over the Fitchburg lines to Boston. He makes no shipments by way of Albany over the New York Central and Boston and Albany roads. The Fitchburg road now controls the Troy and Boston line and the Boston, Hoosac Tunnel and Western road. Since the change above stated, the complainant has made no shipments over these lines on account of the rates. Upon this statement of facts it is seen that what the complainant asks from the Commission is an order that shall require the several defendant roads to receive freights at his elevator at Schenectady for transportation to Boston, and Boston points, at rates less than are now charged by the same roads for the transportation of like freights to Boston and Boston points from stations on the same lines nearer to the points of destination, and the transportation of which freights would, so far as we can now see, be under substantially similar circumstances and conditions. Such an order, if issued, would require the roads to depart from the general rule laid down in the fourth section of the Act to Regulate Commerce. While that act authorizes the Commission to permit exceptions under some circumstances and conditions indicated by the law, it does not empower the Commission to require exceptions. This is the only question which is so presented by the complaint that the Commission can pass upon it. It may be truthfully said that the several defendants might avoid any conflict with the fourth section of the Act by reducing their charges to Boston and Boston points from the stations east of Schenectady; but this complaint does not ask the Commission to compel such reduction, nor has any evidence. been given or offered which would enable us to determine what would be proper and just rates from any such stations. It is therefore impossible to fix them in this case, even if the Commission had power to make rates generally, which it has not. Its power in respect to rates is to determine whether those which the roads impose are for any reason in conflict with the statute. The rates with which complainant finds fault it is not claimed are in conflict with the statute, unless the conflict. is found in the fact that they exceed what the roads accept on through business as their proportion of the rates fixed at distant points. If that is in any sense contrary to the law, the illegality would not be corrected by compelling the roads. to accept upon shipments from Schenectady rates less than are charged from the stations further east. We cannot correct one alleged violation of law by compelling another. If complainant thinks the rates from Schenectady and intermediate points to Boston and Boston points are excessive he can raise that question directly and distinctly, and the Commission can then enter upon a full investigation of the facts bearing upon it. But the question is not made here. It is proper to state that the question whether a proportion of through rates less than the local rates over the same line can lawfully be accepted, is involved in a pending case, and is awaiting further evidence and argument. The complaint must be dismissed. In this opinion all concur. THE ASSOCIATED WHOLESALE GROCERS OF ST. LOUIS v. THE MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY. Tried July 22, 1887-Decided July 25, 1887. Mileage, excursion and commutation passenger tickets are each issued for a different purpose, and the price for each kind is determined on special considerations. The charge made for one kind, therefore, does not determine what it will be admissible to charge for either of the others. That twenty-five dollars for a thousand mile ticket is too much cannot be inferred from the fact that excursion and commutation tickets are sold at rates which would make transportation upon them for a thousand miles less than twenty-five dollars. Mileage tickets when issued must be sold impartially to all who apply for them, and on the same terms. Complainant appears by committee of members. REPORT AND OPINION OF THE COMMISSION. WALKER, Commissioner. The facts found in this case are as follows:-Prior to April 5th, 1887, the defendant sold mileage tickets over its road to the general public for $25 per thousand miles, and to commercial travelers for $20 per thousand miles. Since the Interstate Commerce Law became operative it charges $25 to all alike. It also now sells excursion tickets and commutation tickets at rates which are less per mile than are charged for mileage tickets, and which in some instances would amount to no more than $15 per thousand miles. These excursion and commutation tickets are open to all purchasers, on the same terms. Upon these facts complainants claim that their commercial travelers are unjustly discriminated against; and also that any sum over $15 for a thousand mile ticket to commercial travelers is unjust and unreasonable. The issuance of these three classes of tickets, called mileage, excursion, and commutation tickets, is permitted by section 22 of the Act to Regulate Commerce. They are each issued for distinct purposes and the form of the contract in each case is different. In establishing the price upon each, different considerations obviously arise. The Commission does not regard the fact that excursion or commutation tickets are put on sale at a given rate, to be one that entitles the purchaser of a mileage ticket to complain of unjust discrimination if charged a higher rate. The "circumstances and conditions," to use the phraseology of the second section of the Act, are not the same. Upon the question whether $25 per thousand miles is more than a just and reasonable rate for the sale of mileage tickets to commercial travelers, the only evidence offered was that above stated, that excursion and commutation tickets are sold at rates which are the equivalent of a less sum per mile than that rate produces, and that the former rate to commercial |