selling, for twenty dollars, to the class of persons known as commercial travellers, mileage tickets, entitling the holder to transportation to the extent of one thousand miles over its road between said States.

The complainant, Larrison, having occasion to travel on defendant's road between said States, applied on the 21st of May, 1887, at the proper office of the defendant in the city of Detroit, to purchase one of said "thousand mile tickets" offering in payment therefor the sum of twenty dollars. The defendant refused to sell this complainant such tickets for less than twenty-five dollars, alleging as a reason therefor, as was the fact, that complainant, Larrison, did not belong to the class of persons known as commercial travellers to which alone the defendant sold said tickets for the price of twenty dollars.

The schedule of defendant, kept in its office in said city of Detroit, purporting to show the rates, fares and charges it had established, and which were in force May 21, 1887, did not show the rates, fares and charges which it had established and were in force for carrying passengers who purchased mileage tickets which it then kept and was offering for sale; but since this complaint was made defendant has caused its schedules of rates, fares and charges, to be so amended as to show the rates at which it sells mileage tickets.

The other complainant, the Michigan Central Railroad Company, owns and operates a railroad extending from the city of Detroit, in the State of Michigan, into and through the State of Indiana, to Chicago, in the State of Illinois, and is a common carrier of passengers between said States, and, while the defendant was offering to sell and selling to commercial travelers thousand mile tickets for twenty dollars and refusing to sell for less than twenty-five dollars like tickets to persons not commercial travelers, this complainant was selling such thousand mile tickets for twenty-five dollars to the public generally, without discrimination in favor of any person or class of persons. And as such common carrier of passengers between said States, this complainant and the defendant are competitors.

The answer of defendant admits the facts as found above,

but avers that nothing alleged against the defendant company is in conflict with the "Act to Regulate Commerce," because at the date of the passage of said act, the railway companies of the country generally, including the defendant and the complainant companies, were and for many years prior thereto had been doing the things now complained of; and further because, as defendant alleges, "the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Law do not apply to such mileage tickets, nor, in any respect, affect the sale thereof."

The sale of mileage tickets at lower rates to one person than to another, by railroad companies generally, might well have been lawful before, and be unlawful after the passage of said law. Nor is the fact that discriminations in the sale of tickets were so made, conclusive testimony that they had the sanction of law. Most of the provisions of the Interstate Act but re-enact the common law and supply some new, while saving all the old remedies. For unlawful discriminations or other wrongs done by common carriers now subject to the recent act, the courts, before the act, afforded the only remedy. In view of remedies so to be obtained and necessarily with much cost, great inconvenience and some vexatious delays, it could be, and no doubt it is true, that discriminations against travelers, to the extent now complained of, might then have been illegal and yet go unchallenged.

It is not important whether, in any view of this case, it might be necessary to pass upon the State of the law before the passage of the Act, which is not materiai as the case is presented.

It was made apparent in the argument, that the defendant. in averring "the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Law, do not apply to such mileage tickets, nor in any respect, affect the safe thereof," intended to and did, question the jurisdiction of this Commission, resting the averment on the twenty-second section of the act.

That section is in the nature of a proviso, saving out or excepting some things not intended to be embraced in the provisions of the act, and qualifying or restraining its generality as to others.

The language of so much of the section as the defendant relies upon to include mileage tickets among the things taken

out of the act, is "that nothing in this act shall apply to the issuance of mileage, excursion, or commutation passenger tickets," and includes excursion and commutation with mileage tickets.

The most usual form of mileage tickets is the one thousand mile ticket, but the custom has been to issue them in other and various forms, and they may be issued for any given number of miles. There is no uniform usage fixing the form of excursion or commutation tickets, or prescribing the extent to which they may be issued. The extent to which traveling may be done on these three forms of tickets is without limit. They can be used in and extended to the entire passenger traffic, or nearly one-third of the railroad business of the country. The first three sections of the Act require all passengers to be carried for reasonable rates of fare, without undue preference or unjust discrimination. The construction contended for by the defendant, would take out of these sections all that relates to passengers, because all may ride on tickets to which, defendant insists, the act does not apply. In effect this would be saying, that, so far as the "Act to Regulate Commerce" provides, charges for carrying passengers need not be reasonable and just, nor without unreasonable preference, nor free from unjust discrimination. Certainly nothing so contradictory as such interpretation leads to, was intended by the Congress. The body or enacting part of the statute is generally considered as more clearly expressing what is intended than the saving clause. The language of so much of the twenty-second section as relates to mileage tickets is perfectly satisfied by confining its operation to the issuance, or the act of issuing, or giving out such tickets. It is to this issuing or giving out, the Act to Regulate Commerce does not apply or prevent, while the terms, conditions and circumstances, upon which the sale is made, are subject to, and must be in accordance with the act in its general provisions. Thus understood, the several sections of the law are consistent with each other and in harmony with its general purposes, while the other construction renders useless many of its provisions affecting the carrying of all passengers.

Copies of the two forms of mileage tickets sold are given as part of defendant's answer, in which answer it is claimed that the form of ticket which defendant now sells to such commercial travelers constitutes a special contract between defendant and the holders of such tickets, by which defendant, in the transportation of such commercial travelers, is relieved from some part of the liability under and subject to which it transports all other passengers on its line of road; which limitatation of liability, defendant submits and claims, constitutes a good and sufficient reason for the discrimination it makes in favor of commercial travelers.

It might be questioned to what extent such an agreement is binding on the parties, and relieves the company from common law liabilities. Any traveler with any baggage might make such an agreement. Putting aside any question of the validity of such a contract, no reason is assigned, nor is any believed to exist, why only commercial travelers should be permitted to enter into such an agreement. The copies of mileage tickets show that none others were permitted to enter into it. The alleged release of liability so made, does not constitute a good and sufficient consideration for the discrimination made in favor of commercial travelers, but is another evidence of discrimination against the general public.

It is further claimed that commercial travelers, as salesmen, represent wholesale merchants and manufacturers, for whom they sell goods, thereby creating a large freight traffic for the roads over which they ride. And further they constitute a distinct class of the traveling public, generally riding short distances at a time, and traveling very much more than other people.

The principle of cheaper rates at wholesale, practiced by merchants who in their sales but consult their own interest, is subject to much modification when applied to railroads, who owe a duty to the public which requires them to treat their customers alike. Besides, it is not quite apparent how one person can travel "very much more" than another on a thousand mile ticket. Riding short distances between, and stopping off at stations is an accommodation which makes the ticket more, not less valuable.

To increase the quantity of railroad business in the manner alleged, traveling salesmen must stimulate consumption and add to the demand for necessaries and comforts of life. Commercial travelers are usually men of such energy and superior intelligence that they introduce into some commuties articles useful and desirable earlier than such articles might otherwise reach them. Yet the general intelligence of the people is equal to providing themselves with such luxuries and comforts as their means will justify. And the representatives of merchants are not likely to sell, nor railroads to carry, more goods than customers can pay for.

Common carriers may continue the issuance of mileage passenger tickets, the charges for which must be reasonable and just and free from unjust discrimination or unreasonable preference.

Persons belonging to the class known as commercial travelers are not privileged to ride over railroads at lower rates than are paid by other persons. Whatever reasonable rates commercial travelers are made to pay, other travelers may be made to pay. To charge one more than the other is unjust discrimination. And this is true whether tickets issued are mileage tickets or in some other form.

The refusal of the defendant, the Chicago and Grand Trunk Railway Company, to sell the complainant, Larrison, a thouand-mile ticket for $20, the price at which said company was selling such tickets to commercial travelers, and the neglect to publish rates at which defendant was offering to sell mileage tickets, were alike in conflict with the "Act to Regulate Commerce."

In this opinion all concur.

RALPH W. THATCHER v. THE DELAWARE AND HUDSON CANAL COMPANY AND OTHERS.

Heard July 21-Decided July 25.

The fact that railroad companies accept on through shipments from Chicago to Boston a certain sum as their share for the transportation of the freight from Schenectady to Boston, is no ground for compelling them