dred is the rate per mile we charge for hauling the car out. It is a fraction less than three cents per mile."

This is apparently a reasonable explanation; but other facts, which appear by the testimony before us, should be also noted. As before stated the shipper pays the full car load rate, whatever be the number of cattle in the car; thus, 160 cattle at the Missouri river shipped in Burton cars would make 10 car loads, at 16 head per car, for which the carrier would receive $700 freight money, at $70 per car. The same 160 cattle shipped in ordinary cars would make but 8 car loads, at 20 head per car, for which the carrier would receive on the same basis $560 only. The difference of $140 is the precise amount, according to the witness, which compensates the company for hauling 10 cars empty from Chicago to the Missouri river, at $14 per car. In other words, the railroad companies apparently receive about 25 per cent. more for hauling the same number of cattle in the Burton cars than in the common cars.

It is true that the ten loaded Burton cars weigh somewhat more than the eight loaded common cars. It is also true that the case stated by the witness, quoted above, showing an extra charge of only fourteen dollars per car, was not quite fair, for the reason that the Burton cars are more than thirty feet in length. In the case of a Burton car thirty-four feet in length the extra charge on the haul stated would be $22.40; thirty-six feet, $26.60; thirty-eight feet, $30.80; forty-two feet, $39.20. If fourteen dollars, or less than three cents per mile, be a fair charge for hauling a thirty-foot empty car from Chicago to the Missouri river, certainly $39.20, or nearly eight cents per mile, is too much for a thirty-two foot car. Still there is some increased expense connected with the increased length and weight of the longer cars; and on the other side, again, we have the apparent fact that the use of the special cars saves a certain amount of wear and tear that would otherwise occur to the cars of the carrier, not an inconsiderable item in a run out and back of a thousand miles. And still again, the carriers urge that when the special stock cars are in use their own equipment is idle to a corresponding extent, and the investment which they represent is unproductive.

The case was not presented to the Commissien with satisfactory precision upon this question by either party. The force of the contest was expended on the other points. It is not improbable that other pertinent considerations may exist, mention of which was not made in the evidence, and which have not occurred to the Commission. It was distinctly stated by the complainant's counsel that the object of this proceeding was not to obtain damages for past overcharges, but to obtain a settled and reasonable rule for future service. We therefore do not now put upon record a finding that the charges last above stated are unreasonable, although we are strongly impressed with the belief that such may be the case. These suggestions are commended to the immediate attention of the Western Classification Committee, and the case is retained by the Commission for future consideration upon the last above question

In this opinion all concur.

ADOLPH OTTINGER v. THE SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY.

July 23, 1887.

A complaint for unjust discrimination under the Act to Regulate Commerce cannot be made to embrace cases which occurred before the Act was passed, even though they be similar to one which is complained of, and which arose afterwards.

The Commission has a certain discretion to receive and adjudge complaints made by parties who have no interest in the matter involved. But where "a railroad ticket broker" complained that a party holding a ticket not transferable by its terms, had been refused a permission of transfer which was given to another, and produced the affidavit of such party in proof of the fact, it was held that the party himself should complain if any one.

A prima facie case of unjust discrimination is not shown by the mere exhibition of two tickets for passage, one of which the railroad company has permitted to be transferred and the other not, when the two do not appear to be similar.

The complainant who represents himself as a railroad ticket broker doing business at San Francisco in the State of

California, complains of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company for unjust discrimination, in violation of sections two and three of the Act to Regulate Commerce. The facts upon which the complaint arises are in substance stated as follows: That on June 3, 1887, one Mrs. T. M. Randolph was owner of the return portion of a first-class railroad ticket over said railroad, of which a photographic copy is given in the petition, which said ticket was permitted to be sold by said Randolph to another person, through and by virtue of the authority of said Southern Pacific Railroad Company, through its authorized agent, T. H. Goodman, the General Ticket and Passenger Agent of said company, who indorsed on the reverse side of said ticket the following: "Good for passage of Mrs. Sherwood if accompanying Mrs. Randolph. T. H. Goodman, G. P. & T. A." That on June 17, 1887, one August G. Rommel was the owner of a similar ticket, of which a copy is also given, and applied to said agent for the same and like privilege granted to said Randolph, but said company through said agent refused it. It is further stated that said Rommel desires to sell his said ticket, and his affidavit in support of the facts is appended to the petition. The complaint further avers that within two years next last past one hundred and seventy-five tickets of similar character, sold by complainant to be used for passage over said railroad, have been, when offered on the cars, seized and destroyed, to his great injury, for which he demands damages.

The Randolph ticket, as shown in the complaint, was a ticket good for a return over one specified route if used within thirty days. The return part of the Rommel ticket entitled the purchaser to choose one of four routes, and to havo a ticket issued in pursuance of the choice; and it did not appear that the route of return had been selected, nor had the return ticket been obtained when the privilege of transfer was demanded.

WALKER, Commissioner, addressing the petitioner's attorney by letter, said:

The complaint in the case of Adolph Ottinger v. The South

ern Pacific Company was duly received, and has been considered attentively by the Commission. It is returned with the following suggestions:

The allegations commencing with the words "That the said plaintiff within the two years next last past" (referring to 175 tickets alleged to have been purchased and sold by complainant, which were seized when presented for passage) should be expunged, as the subject matter thereof does not appear to be within the jurisdiction of the Commission. The Act to Regulate Commerce does not afford a remedy for transactions which occurred before it took effect. And the transaction with Mrs. Randolph is stated as having occurred on June 3d, 1887. If the case stated respecting the 175 lleged tickets was the same, there would be no grounds to claim a preference under the law as to transactions prior to that date. The case stated, however, is not the same, and upon several grounds no prima facie case as to those tickets. is presented.

name.

As to the Rommel tickets the Commission prefers that, if Mr. Rommel has a grievance, he should present it in his own His affidavit is annexed-to the petition, but the complaint is made by a party having no apparent interest in the transaction. The Commission is given by the law a certain discretion in reference to its investigations, and it has so many actual controversies pending that it cannot enter upoz the investigation of moot cases. A reasonable evidence of good faith in the present case would seem to be the complaint of the party said to be injured.

It is proper to say further that the Randolph ticket is uncancelled, and the time for its use has expired. It does not appear that the transferee, Mrs. Sherwood, was in fact transported on it, but only that Mr. Goodman endorsed it as "good" for her passage "if accompanying Mrs. Randolph." This was apparently an act of courtesy which the party did not see fit to make use of.

Nor are the Rommel tickets similar in form to the Randolph tickets. They have not reached the same stage. As they stand they are good over four routes, and no selection has been made or return ticket issued.

LOUIS LARRISON v. THE CHICAGO AND GRAND TRUNK RAILWAY COMPANY.

THE MICHIGAN CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY v. THE SAME DEFENDANT.

Tried June 15th, 1887.-Decided July 25, 1887.

A railroad company that sells mileage tickets must sell them impartially to all the public who apply for them. It is not competent to sell them to a particular class of persons, e. g,, commercial travelers, at lower rates than are charged to others.

The provision in the twenty-second section of the Act to Regulate Commerce, that nothing therein shall apply to "the issuance of mileage, excursion or commutation passenger tickets," while fully authorizing the issuance of such tickets, does not relieve the carriers as to rates charged from the requirements of reasonableness and impartiality, which are prescribed in respect to rates in other parts of the Act.

The fact that in the mileage tickets sold to commercial travelers a special contract is inserted limiting the liability of the carrier will not justify a lower rate to such commercial travelers than is charged the public, where the offer of such lower rate is not made to all who will accept such special contract.

The fact that commercial travelers by their travel are supposed to create freight traffic for the roads is no reason for giving them special rates as passengers.

Ashley Pond, for complainants.

E. W. Meddaugh, for defendant.

REPORT AND OPINION OF THE COMMISSION.

MORRISON, Commissioner:

In one of these cases the complainant, Louis Larrison, alleges unjust discrimination and neglect to publish fares, rates and charges for mileage tickets; in the other, unjust discrimination is alleged. The two cases were, with consent of the parties, heard together, and, after investigation the facts are found to be as follows:

The defendant, being the same in both cases, is and was, on the 21st of May, 1887, a common carrier of passengers on its railroad from Port Huron, in the State of Michigan, into and through the State of Indiana to the city of Chicago, in the State of Illinois, and was then offering to sell and