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sioned as public ships of war, from entrance into neutral ports upon the ordinary footing. If they were so excluded by proper notice, they would not enter; and the rule (in that case) could never operate to prevent their departure. If they were not so excluded, instead of being "due diligence," it would be a flagrant act of treachery and wrong to take advantage of their entrance, in order to effect their detention or capture. Can Her Majesty be supposed to have consented to be retrospectively judged as wanting in due diligence, because, not having excluded these confederate ships of war from her ports by any prohibition or notice, she did not break faith with them, and commit an outrage on every principle of justice and neutrality by their seizure? The rules themselves had no existence at the time of the war; the confederates knew, and could know, nothing of them; their retrospective application cannot make an act ex post facto" due," upon the footing of "diligence," to the one party in the war, which, if it had been actually done, would have been a wholly unjustifiable outrage against the other.

And this being so, it may safely be asserted that the United States Government must have framed the rules with a like mind; for it would be to give them credit for sharp practice indeed, if, while the British government agreed to the rule, on the supposition that its application was to be limited to the first departure of an offending vessel, the United States should be at liberty to insist on its application, toties quoties, to every subsequent departure. I will say no more than that the construction thus sought to be put on the second branch of the first rule is quite preposterous.

But it is said, in the second place, that the equipment and sending out of an armed vessel from the port of a neutral being a violation of its territory and neutral rights, and therefore a hostile act, Great Britain had the right to seize these vessels on their again coming within her jurisdiction, and was bound to do so, to prevent them from continuing to make war on vessels of the United States.

The answer of the British government is threefold:

1st. That it had not the right, according to international law, to seize these vessels, seeing that when they came again into British ports, they were admitted as the commissioned ships of war of a belligerent state. 2d. That, independently of the foregoing ground, the British government could not, as a neutral government, seize a ship of war of a belligerent state for that which was not a violation of neutrality, but only of its own municipal law.

3d. That even if it had the right, it was under no obligation to exercise it.

The first of these grounds depends on the effect of the commissions which these vessels had in the mean time received from the government of the Confederate States as ships of war.

Effect of commis. sions on ships of war.

Now, it must be taken as an unquestionable fact that these ships were built, or equipped, for the de facto government of the Confederate States, and were employed by it as regular ships of war, under the command of officers regularly commissioned. Hereupon two questions present themselves: Were these commissions valid? If so, what was their effect as to affording immunity to a vessel, thus commissioned, from seizure by the government of Great Britain?

It is a familiar principle of international law that the ships of war of a state are entitled to the privilege of exterritoriality. This Ships of war exis a point on which leading publicists are agreed. Wheaton, in his "Eléments de droit international," writes:

territorial.

Une armée ou une flotte appartenant à une puissance étrangère, et traversant ou stationnant dans les limites du territoire d'un autre état, en amitié avec cette puissance, sont également exemptes de la juridiction civile et criminelle du pays.

Il s'ensuit que les personnes et les choses qui, dans ces trois cas, se trouvent dans les limites du territoire d'un état étranger, restent soumises à la juridiction de l'état auquel elles appartiennent, comme si elles étaient encore sur son territoire.

1 Vol. i, p. 119.

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S'il n'y a pas de prohibition expresse, les ports d'un état sons regardés comme étant ouverts aux navires de guerre d'une autre nation avec laquelle cet état est en paix et amitié. Ces navires, entrés dans les ports étrangers, soit en vertu de l'absence d'une prohibition, soit en vertu d'une autorisation expresse, stipulée par traité, sont exempts de la juridiction des tribunaux et des autorités du lieu.

Heffter declares ships of war to be exempt from the territorial jurisdiction of the country within whose waters they are.1

Heffter.

Sir R. Phillimore writes as follows:2

Long usage and universal custom entitle every such ship to be considered as a part of the state to which she belongs, and to be exempt from any other juSir R. Phillimore. risdiction; whether this privilege be founded upon strict international right, or upon an original concession of comity with respect to the state in its aggregate capacity, which, by inveterate practice, has assumed the position of a right, is a consideration of not much practical importance. But it is of some importance, for if the better opinion be, as it would seem to be, that the privilege in question was originally a concession of comity, it may, on due notice being given, be revoked by a state, so ill advised as to adopt such a course, which could not happen if it were a matter of natural right. But, unquestionably, in the case of the foreign ship of war, or of the foreign sovereign and embassador, every state which has not formerly notified its departure from this usage of the civilized world, is under a tacit convention to accord this privilege to the foreign ship of war lying in its harbors.

No writer has, however, discussed the subject with so much clearness and force as M. Ortolan in his "Diplomatie de la mer:"

Ortolan.

Les bâtiments de guerre au contraire, armés par l'état lui-même et pour sa défense, en sont les représentants à l'étranger; leurs commandants et leurs officiers sont comme des délégués du pouvoir exécutif, et sur quelques points du pouvoir judiciaire de leur pays. Ces bâtiments doivent donc participer pleinement à l'indépendance et à la sonveraineté de la puissance qui les arme; ils ont droit aux respects et aux honneurs qui sont dûs à cette souveraineté; c'est ce que reconnaissent et ce que commandent les lois internatinales.3

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Par cela seul que les bâtiments de guerre sont armés par le gouvernement d'un état indépendant, auquel ils appartiennent, que leurs commandants et leurs officiers sont des fonctionnaires publics de cet état et en exercent la puissance exécutive, en certains points même la puissance judiciaire, enfin que tout individu faisant partie de leur équipage, sans distinction de grade, est un agent de la force publique; ces bâtiments, personnifiés, sont une portion de ce gouvernement et doivent être indépendants et respectés à son égal.

Ainsi, quel que soit le lieu où ils se trouvent, qui que ce soit au monde, étranger au gouvernement auquel ils appartiennent, n'a le droit de s'immiscer en rien dans ce qui se passe à leur bord, et encore moins d'y pénétrer par la force.

Ôn exprime généralement cette règle par une métaphore passée en coutume, et tellement accréditée, tellement traditionnelle, que dans la plupart des esprits elle est devenue comme une raison justificative de la proposition dont elle n'est véritablement qu'une expression figurée. On dit que tout bâtiment de guerre est une partie du territoire de la nation à laquelle il appartient; d'où la conséquence que, même lorsqu'il est dans un port étranger, les officiers, l'équipage, et toute personne quelconque qui se trouve à son bord, est censée être, et que tout fait passé à bord est censé passé, sur ce territoire. C'est par une continuation, par une expression résumée de la même figure, qu'on appelle ce privilége le privilége ou le droit d'exterritorialité.

The matter is so well handled by this able writer that I am induced to cite one or two more passages :5

Ce qui est vrai, c'est que le navire est une habitation flottante, avec une population soumise aux lois et au gouvernement de l'état dont le navire a la nationalité, et placée sous la protection de cet état. Ce qui est vrai, c'est que si le navire est bâtiment de guerre, il est, en outre, une forteresse mobile portant en son sein une portion même de la puissance publique de cet état, des officiers et un équipage qui forment tous dans leur ensemble un corps organisé de fonctionnaires et d'agents militaires ou administratifs de la nation.

1" Völkerrecht der Gegenwart," § 148.

2 International Law, vol. i, p. 399.

3 Vol. i, p. 181.

+ Ibid., p. 186.

Ibid., pp. 188-191.

S'il s'agit de navires de guerre, la coutume internationale est constante; ces navires restent régis uniquement par la souveraineté de leur pays; les lois, les autorités, et les juridictions de l'état dans les eaux duquel ils sont mouillés leur restent étrangères; ils n'ont avec cet état que des relations internationales par la voie des fonctionnaires de la localité compétents pour de pareilles relations.

Le navire de guerre portant en son sein une partie de la puissance publique de l'état auquel il appartient, un corps organisé de fonctionnaires et d'agents de cette puissance dans l'ordre administratif et dans l'ordre militaire, soumettre ce navire et le corps organisé qu'il porte aux lois et aux autorités du pays dans les eaux duquel il entre, ce serait vraiment soumettre l'une de ces puissances à l'autre; ce serait vouloir rendre impossibles les relations maritimes d'une nation à l'autre par bâtiments de l'état. Il faut ou renoncer à ces relations, ou les admettre avec les conditions indispensables pour maintenir à chaque état souverain son indépendance.

L'état propriétaire du port ou de la rade peut sans doute, à l'égard des bâtiments de guerre, pour lesquels il aurait des motifs de sortir des règles ordinaires et pacifiques du droit des gens, leur interdire l'entrée de ces eaux; les y surveiller s'il croit leur présence dangereuse, ou leur enjoindre d'en sortir, de même qu'il est libre, quand ils sont dans la mer territoriale, d'employer à leur égard les moyens de sûreté que leur voisinage peut rendre nécessaires; sauf à répondre, envers l'état auquel ces vaisseaux appartiennent, de toutes ces mesures qui pourront être, suivant les événements qui les auront motivées, ou la manière dont elles auront été exécutées, des actes de défense ou de précaution légitime, ou des actes de méfiance, ou des offenses graves. ou même des causes de guerre; mais tant qu'il les reçoit, il doit respecter en eux la souveraineté étrangère dont ils sont une émanation; il ne peut avoir, par conséquent, la prétension de régir les personnes qui se trouvent et les faits qui se passent à leur bord, ui de faire sur ce bord acte de puissance et de souveraineté.

Case of the Ex

In the case of the Exchange, reported in Cranch's Reports, (vol. vii, pages 135-147,) the principle that a vessel bearing the flag and commission of a belligerent power was not within the change. local jurisdiction of the neutral law, though claimed by citizens of the neutral country as having been forcibly taken from them as prize, contrary to international law, was fully upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court of the United States.

66

"By the unanimous consent of nations," says Chief Justice Marshall, a foreigner is amenable to the laws of the place, but certainly, in practice, nations have not yet asserted their jurisdiction over the public armed ships of a foreign sovereign entering a port open for their reception. It seems, then, to the court to be a principle of public law that national ships of war entering the port of a friendly power open for their reception are to be considered as exempted by the consent of that power from its jurisdiction."

It has been ingeniously attempted by the counsel of the United States to place the decision in this case and the judgment of Chief Justice Marshall on the footing that a neutral court has no jurisdiction over a belligerent vessel as a matter simply of judicial authority. But this is not so; the eminent judge who delivered the judgment in that case places the matter not on the footing of jurisdiction in a judicial point of view, but as one of international right. In proof of which the following passages are deserving of the fullest attention:

A nation would justly be considered as violating its faith, although that faith may not be expressly plighted, which should suddenly, and without previous notice, exercise its territorial powers in a manner not consonant to the usages and received obligations of the civilized world.

*

If, for reasons of state, the ports of a nation generally, or any particular ports be closed against vessels of war generally, or the vessels of war of any particular nation, notice is usually given of such determination. If there be no prohibition, the ports of a friendly nation are considered as open to the public ships of all powers with whom it is at peace, and they are supposed to enter such ports, and to remain in them, while allowed to remain, under the protection of the government of the place.

*

But in all respects different is the situation of a public armed ship. She constitutes a part of the military force of her nation; acts under the immediate and direct command of the sovereign; is employed by him in national objects. He has many and powerful motives for preventing those objects from being defeated by the interference of a foreign state. Such interference cannot take place without affecting his power and his dignity. The implied license, therefore, under which such vessel enters a friendly port, may reasonably be construed, and it seems to the court ought to be construed,

as containing an exemption from the jurisdiction of the sovereign within whose territory she claims the rights of hospitality.

Com mission

No doubt the effect to be given to the commission of a belligerent of government must depend on its power to act as a governmere belligerent. ment. And I repeat what I have before endeavored to make good namely, that where an integral portion of a nation separates itself from the parent state, and establishes a de facto government of its own, excluding the former government from all power and control, and thereupon a civil war ensues, a neutral nation is fully justified in recognizing the government de facto as a belligerent, though it has not as yet acknowledged it as a nation; and that from the time of the acknowledgment of its belligerent status, the government de facto acquires, in relation to the neutral, all the rights which attach to the status of a belligerent of an established nationality. The practice of nations has been uniform on this point; all the maritime nations concurred in according to the confederate government the status and rights of a belligerent. The commissions of the Confederate States must therefore be taken to have been valid, and to have had the same force and efficacy as the commissions of any recognized government would have had.

It has, indeed, been contended that, in the particular instance of the vessels belonging to the Confederate States, the commissions of the government de facto ought not to have been respected. After having listened, with the utmost attention, to the argument of Mr. Evarts, I protest I am at a loss to know why. Setting aside all the idle language that has been written and spoken about "piracy"-as though the ships of eleven great provinces, having an organized government, and carrying on one of the greatest civil wars recorded in history, could be called pirates-the argument comes to this: that a country, the independent nationality of which has not been acknowledged, and which has not been admitted into the fraternity of nations, has no rights of sovereignty, and consequently cannot by its commission exclude the right of the local sovereign to seize one of its vessels of war if any infraction of the municipal law has been committed in respect of it. But what is this, practically, but to deprive the recognition of belligerency of all the effects it was intended to have? It is admitted among nations that such a recognition may be made by a neutral state. Its purpose is to invest the de facto government with the character of a belligerent power, for the common benefit of both belligerent and neutral, without any recognition of independence or sovereignty. The recognition would plainly be idle if it did not carry with it one of the most important rights incidental to a belligerent government, that of commissioning and employing vessels of war, and of having those vessels, when sailing under its flag, and armed with its commissions, invested with the privi leges conceded to ships of war, and therefore exempted from the jurisdiction of any neutral country in whose waters they may be. But it is alleged that, even assuming the commissions to have been valid, these vessels ought nevertheless to have been seized. violation of neutral The argument, as I understand it, is in substance this: the equipping and sending forth of a vessel from neutral terri tory, for the purpose of being employed in the service of a belligerent, is a violation of the territorial rights of the neutral; every violation of the territory of a neutral is a hostile act; every hostile act calls upon the neutral to vindicate its rights by force; therefore Great Britain ought to have seized these vessels.

Effect of alleged

territory.

Hautefeuille.

In support of this argument the following passage is cited from Hautefeuille :

Le fait de construire un bâtiment de guerre pour le compte d'un belligérant, ou de l'armer dans les états neutres, est une violation du territoire. Toutes les prises faites par un bâtiment de cette nature sont illégitimes, en quelque lien qu'elles aient été faites.. Le souverain offensé a le droit de s'en emparer, même de force, si elles sont amenées dans ses ports, et d'en réclaimer la restitution lorsqu'elles sont, comme cela arrive en général, conduites dans les ports hors de sa juridiction. Il peut également réclamer le désarmement du bâtiment illégalement armé sur son territoire, et même le détenir s'il entre dans quelque lien soumis à sa souveraineté, jusqu'à ce qu'il ait été désarmé,1

After which the learned author goes on to use the following strong language, which, however, appears to express a view peculiar to himself, and, so far as I am aware, shared by no other writer on international law:

Le peuple neutre ne peut négliger l'accomplissement de ce devoir, sans s'exposer à la juste vengeance de la nation à laquelle cet abandon de ses droits porterait un grave préjudice, sans lui fournir un juste sujet de guerre. On pourrait en effet l'accuser, avec raison, d'abdiquer les droits de sa souveraineté, de son indépendance, en faveur de l'une des parties en guerre, au préjudice de l'autre, et par conséquent de manquer d'impartialité, de méconnaître le second devoir de la neutralité.2

If, indeed, by constructing or arming a ship, M. Hautefeuille means constructing or arming for the immediate purpose of war, so as to constitute a hostile expedition from the shore of the neutral, I entirely agree that this will amount to a violation of neutral territory. Short of that, it will only be a violation of the local law, and therefore will not amount to a violation of territory. This distinction is all-important, but appears to have been wholly lost sight of.

But even should it amount to a violation of territory, it seems monstrous to assert that the neutral is bound to have recourse to force, possibly to become involved in war, for the benefit of the other belligerent. It is to be observed that M. Hautefeuille, before he came to the subject of ships, had been speaking of the violation of neutral territory by acts of hostility, such as the taking of a ship in neutral waters.

He could hardly, I imagine, mean to go the length of saying that the clandestine equipment of a ship for belligerent use, not amounting to a hostile expedition, would be such a violation of the rights of the neutral as would justify, much less necessitate, a declaration of war. M. Ortolan discusses the subject with the calm judgment which distinguishes him.

Ortolan.

It is true that his reasoning is addressed to the obligation of the neutral state to insure the restoration of prizes illegally captured within its waters; but it is obvious that the principle he lays down applies to every violation of neutral territory by a belligerent:

L'illégalité des actes d'hostilité exercés dans les eaux territoriales d'une puissance neutre entraîne, comme conséquence directe, l'illégalité des prises faites en dedans des limites de ces eaux. Ces prises ne sont pas valables, soit qu'elles aient été faites par des navires de guerre, soit qu'elles l'aient été par des corsaires. C'est le devoir de l'état anquel appartient le capteur de les restituer aux premiers propriétaires; et même c'est le droit et le devoir de l'état neutre dont le territoire a été violé de prononcer lui-même cette restitution si la prise se trouve amenée chez lui.

Toutefois la nullité des prises ainsi faites n'est pas tellement absolue qu'elle puisse être invoquée, et que l'état du capteur doive la prononcer même en l'absence de toute réclamation de la part de l'état neutre dont on prétend que les droits ont été méconnus. “C'est une règle technique des cours de prises,” dit à ce sujet M. Wheaton, "de ne restituer leur proprieté aux réclamants particuliers, en cas pareil, que sur la demande du gouvernement neutre dont le territoire a été ainsi violé. Cette règle est fondée sur le principe que l'état neutre seul a été blessé dans ses droits par une telle capture et que le réclamant ennemi n'a pas le droit de paraître pour entrainer la non-validité de la capture."

Nous adhérons complétement à cette doctrine et à cette jurisprudence pratique. Elle concorde parfaitement avec ce que nous avons dit ci-dessus des cas où, à raison des circonstances et de l'état des côtes, les actes d'hostilité peuvent être excusés, bien qu'ayant eu 1 Droits et devoirs des nations neutres, vol. i, p. 295. 2 Ibid., p. 296.

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