Lapas attēli
PDF
ePub

able mien, the charge can be fully explained and defended by my desire to maintain the security of a British possession and the rights of British subjects.1

Another subject of complaint is that partiality, inconsistent with Allegal partiality neutrality, was exhibited toward confederate vessels by as to coaling. reason that these, as in the case of the Sumter, were permitted to coal, while liberty to form a depot of coal at Bermuda, for the supply of their ships of war, was denied to the United States. I cannot suppose that any member of this tribunal could be misled by such a contention. It is obvious that to allow one belligerent to have a supply always stored up and ready, and to leave the other to take his chance of the public market, are things essentially different, and that, far from the refusal of such an advantage to the United States being a violation of neutrality, the concession would have been so in the opposite direction. Moreover, such an act involves a forgetfulness of one of the elementary principles of international law. A neutral is only justified in allowing to a belligerent vessel the use of his ports and access to his shores to obtain the things which the belligerent may lawfully procure. He has no right to allow the belligerent the use of his territory on shore for belligerent purposes, which the permission to form a depot would necessarily involve.

The practical answer to all these complaints is to be found in the striking facts, stated in the British Counter-Case, with reference to the number of visits to British ports by the ships of war of the two bellig. erents, and to the quantity of coal received by them respectively. The statement in question is as follows:

During the course of the civil war, ten confederate cruisers visited British ports. The total number of such visits was twenty-five, eleven of which were made for the purpose of effecting repairs. Coal was taken in at sixteen of these visits, and on sixteen occasions the limit of stay fixed by the regulations was exceeded. In one of these cases, however, the excess was no more than two hours, and in another, the delay was enforced in order to allow twenty-four hours to elapse between the departure of a United States merchant-vessel and that of the confederate cruiser. On the other hand, the returns which have been procured of visits of United States vessels of war to ports of Great Britain and the colonies, though necessarily imperfect, show an ag gregate total of 228 such visits. On thirteen of these repairs were effected; on fortyfive occasions supplies of coal were obtained; and the twenty-four hours' limit of stay was forty-four times exceeded. The total amount of coal obtained by confederate cruisers in British ports during the whole course of the civil war, though it cannot be ascertained with accuracy, may be estimated to have amounted to about 2,800 tons. The aggregate amount similarly supplied to vessels of the United States cannot be estimated, from the want of data as to the supplies in many cases, but those cases alone in which the quantities are recorded, show a total of over five thousand tons; and this, notwithstanding the United States navy had free access to their own coaling de pots, often close at hand. In one case a vessel of war of the United States, the Vanderbilt, alone received 2,000 tons of coal at different British ports within the space of less than two months, being more than two-thirds of the whole amount obtained from first to last by confederate vessels.

obtained from Great Britain.

The second head of complaint has assumed a more sensational and Supplies of arms effective form, in representing Great Britain as "the arsenal, the navy-yard, and the treasury of the insurgents." Again and again has this highly colored representation been paraded. Let us see what, when stripped of rhetorical flourish, it really amounts to. Having determined to support their effort to establish their independence by war, the confederates of course required arms and munitions of war. Both were to be had in Great Britain in abundance. The commercial relations of the Southern States had been principally with Great Britain. It was natural that in Great Britain that they should seek the arms which were so essentially necessary to them. But arms and mu'British Appendix, vol. 1, p. 79. 2 Page 118.

nitions of war are not to be had for nothing. It was necessary, therefore, that arrangements should be made for the deposit of funds in England to pay for the articles bought there. To carry on these operations -to purchase the articles required, to pay for them, to ship themagents were, of course, necessary. Agents were accordingly established in England and provided with the necessary funds. Thus far, no one can say that there was anything contrary to the law of nations, or to the municipal law, or to obligations morally incumbent on a neutral government or a neutral people. As Jefferson said more than threequarters of a century ago:

Our citizens have been always free to make, vend, and export arms. It is the constant occupation and livelihood of some of them. To suppress their callings, the only means perhaps of their subsistence, because a war exists in foreign and distant countries, in which we have no concern, would scarcely be expected. It would be hard in principle, and impossible in practice. The law of nations, therefore, respecting the rights of those at peace, does not require from them such an interual derangement in their occupations. It is satisfied with the external penalty pronounced in the President's proclamation-that of confiscation of such portion of these arms as shall fall into the hands of any of the belligerent powers on their way to the ports of their enemies. To this penalty our citizens are warned that they will be abandoned, and that even private contraventions may work no inequality between the parties at war, the benefit of them will be left equally free and open to all.

Substitute Her Majesty's proclamation and Her Majesty's subjects for the American phraseology, and the cases are identically the same.

But had the United States no arsenal in Great Britain? As we have seen, arms and munitions of war were purchased by the United States in Great Britain to the amount of £2,000,000 sterling. Several agents, Colonel Thomas, Colonel Schuyler, Mr. J. R. Schuyler, Mr. Tomes, were sent over to order and select the arms, and forward them to the United States.

It appears from the British Counter Case, and the documents therein referred to, that

and

Colonel Thomas, of the United States Army, was in England during the war, came over to England to superintend the purchases of military stores. Colonel G. L. Schuyler was, in July, 1861, appointed by the President of the United States "a duly authorized agent to purchase arms in Europe for the War Department." He received his instructions from the Secretary of War, with a memorandum from General J. W. Ripley, of the Ordnance Department at Washington, specifying the arms to be purchased, viz. 100,000 rifle muskets with bayonets, 10,000 cavalry carbines, 10,000 revolvers, and 20,000 sabers. The financial arrangements for these purchases were to be made by the Secretary to the Treasury with Messrs. Baring, financial agents for the United States in Loudon, and a credit of $2,000,000 was appropriated for the purpose.

In the summer or autumn of 1861, Mr. J. R. Schuyler and Mr. Tomes, of the firm of Schuyler, Hartley & Graham, of New York, visited Birmingham, and, after communicating with the principal rifle, bayonet, and sword manufacturers there, gave orders for as many of those articles as their respective manufactories were capable of supplying, the goods to be paid for on delivery to them at a place to be subsequently named, or on shipment. Messrs. Schuyler and Tomes made no concealment of the fact that these arms were destined for the American Government, and they intimated their intention of continuing unlimited orders for a period of two years. They took warehouses in Birmingham for the receipt of arms when completed, and shipped them through the agency of Messrs. Baring Brothers, and Messrs. Brown, Shipley & Co., of Liverpool. It appears from the returns made to Congress of arms purchased by the United States War Department up to December, 1862, that 2,650 rifles and 232 revolvers of English manufacture had at that time been supplied by Messrs. Schuyler, Hartley & Graham; but Mr. Schuyler is also believed to have acted as agent for the purchase of arms for the State of New York. Messrs. Schuyler and Tomes were soon followed to Birmingham, by Mr. Lockwood, of New York, who had entered into a contract for the supply of rifles, bayonets, and swords to the War Department at Washington. He also gave unlimited orders for such articles, acting, however, to some extent, in concert with Messrs. Schuyler and Tomes, and shipping the goods through the agency of the same houses at Liverpool. The effect of these orders was to raise the prices in the Birmingham gun trade to the extent of 20 per cent.; indeed, the price of rifles rose from 528. to 758. each.

A Mr. Laumont Dupont also came to England, furnished with a credit of £82,800 on Messrs. Baring, and purchased and shipped saltpeter to the amount of very nearly £80,000.

Messrs. Naylor, Vickers & Co., of New York, Liverpool, and London, bought and shipped to the United States large quantities of small-arms. They were supplied from Birmingham alone with 156,000 rifles between June, 1862, and July, 1863. They acted very extensively as agents of the United States Government, and submitted to that Government large proposals from the Birmingham Small-Arms Company. The Assistant Secretary of War at Washington, in a letter addressed to them on the 20th October, 1862, directly sanctioned an arrangement for the supply of 100,000 rifles, and the acceptance of this order was duly notified to the Secretary of War by a letter from Birmingham, dated November 4, 1862. The arms were sent to Liverpool for shipment. In December, 1863, fifty 68-pounder guns were proved at the royal arsenal at Woolwich, at the request of Messrs. T. and C. Hood, and, after proof, were taken away by Messrs. Naylor & Co., and shipped to New York. Mr. Marcellus Hartley, of the firm of Schuyler, Hartley & Graham, already mentioned, was also a large purchaser of small-arms in London during the latter half of the year 1862.1

Warehouses were openly taken at Birmingham for the reception of arms when completed, after which they were shipped through the agency of Messrs. Barings and of Brown, Shipley & Co., and Wright & Co., of Liverpool.

Had the United States no treasury in Great Britain? No less a one than the great house of Baring Brothers, with whom large credits were opened. The house appears to have been energetic in its efforts in furthering the United States armaments. "You will please express my acknowledgments," writes the United States Secretary of War to Mr. Schuyler, "to Messrs. Baring Brothers & Co., for their prompt and pa triotic action in facilitating your operations. The terms offered by Messrs. Baring Brothers & Co., namely, 1 per cent. commission and 5 per cent. interest per annum, as agreed upon by them with the Navy Department, are approved." 2

Of course the "prompt and patriotic action” of Baring Brothers & Co. was in perfect conformity with neutral duties. But, what would have been said, if that great and wealthy house, its leading member having an influential voice in the House of Commons, had undertaken and exhibited equally "prompt and patriotic action" in facilitating confederate operations on the terms of 1 per cent. commission and 5 per cent. interest? or, was there to be one law for the United States and another for the confederates? Her Majesty's government did not think so, and Great Britain remained an arsenal for the latter as well as for the former. Next as to Great Britain having been, as it is said, "the navy-yard of the insurgents."

Ships obtained from

It was, of course, impossible to prevent the confederate government, reduced to desperate straits by the blockade, and in want of Great Britain. ships of war, from resorting to the ship-builders' yards of Great Britain. It was impossible to] prevent the ship-builders, who looked upon the furnishing of such vessels as purely commercial transactions the Messrs. Laird who built the Alabama having been perfectly willing, as appears from their correspondence with a Mr. Howard, who professed to have authority to enter into ajcontract with them, to build

193.

British Counter Case, pp. 52-54; British Appendix, vol. vi, pp. 153-160, 173, 1882 British Appendix, vol. vi, p. 154.

vessels for the Federal Government, to supply ships to the latter as well as to the insurgents-and who appear to have thought that, so long as the ships were not armed in British waters, such transaction would not be within the foreign-enlistment act-from entering into such contracts. All the government could do was to use reasonable care to see that the act was not violated.

Two vessels of war, and two only, the Florida and the Alabama, equipped in British waters, found their way into the hands of the confederates. Whether, in respect of them, the British authorities were wanting in due diligence, will be matter for future consideration, when these vessels come specifically under review. The most unjustifiable charge that the government were willfully wanting in the discharge of their duty from motives of partiality has, I hope, been already disposed of. Every other vessel built or equipped in British waters for the war service of the confederate government was prevented by the Steps taken by the act of the British government from coming into their hands. British Government. Immediate and untiring attention was paid to the frequent applications of Mr. Adams, which for the most part turned out to have proceeded on erroneous information. It may have been that, in the cases of the Florida and the Alabama, the local officers may have been somewhat too much disposed to leave it to the United States officers to make out the case against the vessels. But such, as we have seen, had been the traditional view of the matter, not only in England but in the United States. These officers may have attached too much importance to the fact that the vessels, though equipped for receiving arms, were not actually armed before leaving the port. In that they only shared the opinion of two distinguished judges in the court of exchequer. But when the authorities had become thoroughly alive to what was going on, no vessel of war to which the notice of the Government was called, and which proved to be intended for war, was suffered to escape. An enumeration of the instances on which inquiry was instituted by Her Majesty's government, with the results, will set this part of the case in its true light, and show the flagrant injustice of the wholesale accusations which have been so unwarrantably made.

The Bermuda.

The first case in which a representation was made by Mr. Adams as to a vessel supposed to be fitting out in England for warlike purposes against the United States, in violation of the foreign enlistment act, was that of the Bermuda. Mr. Adams's letter was dated the 15th of August, 1861. The principal grounds of suspicion alleged against the vessel were that she was "ostensibly owned by the commercial house of Fraser, Trenholm & Co., of Liverpool, well known to consist in part of Americans, in sympathy with the insurgents in the United States;" that she was armed with guns, and had been for some time taking in crates, cases, and barrels, believed to contain arms and ammunition of all kinds ordinarily used in carrying on war. Mr. Adams continues:

This cargo is nominally entered as destined to Havana, in the island of Cuba, but her armament and cargo are of such a nature as to render it morally certain that the merchants who claim to be the owners can have no intention of dispatching her on any errand of mercy or of peace.

I am informed that this vessel will sail in a day or two; I therefore feel under the highest obligation to submit the information I have obtained as the ground for application for a prompt and effective investigation of the truth of the allegations while there is time. Not doubting the earnest disposition of Her Majesty's government faithfully to adhere to the principles of neutrality to which it has pledged itself, I ask, on the part of the United States, for no more than a simple enforcement of the law, in case it shall appear that evil-minded persons are seeking to set it at naught.'

1 1 British Appendix, vol. ii, p. 133.

Mr. Adams, it would seem, entertained none of those notions of the duty or the necessity of having recourse to prerogative force in order efficiently to observe the obligations of neutrality, of which we hear so much in the argument of the United States.

Inquiry was at once made by the government. The collector of cus toms at West Hartlepool, where the vessel was, reported the next day as follows:

Finding, from a communication which I had seen from the American consul at Leeds to his broker here, that the steamer in question was suspected to be fitting out at this port for the purpose of being used as a privateer for the Confederate States. I have been keeping an eye on her, but I see nothing to indicate such to be her object, either as regards her external equipments, or the character of her crew, or anything in her case more than usual to give ground for remark, unless it be the circumstance that a large portion of her cargo consists of arms and ammunition; and it is possible that, although the destination of the vessel ostensibly is Havana, it may be the design eventually to run some if not the whole of the goods on board into the States referred to.

The rest of the information collected pointed to a similar conclusion, and Mr. Adams was accordingly informed, on the advice of the attorneygeneral, that the vessel did not come within the terms of the foreignenlistment act, (to which, in his letter, he had referred,) and that there was no ground for any interference with the clearance or departure.

The Bermuda turned out, in fact, to be a blockade-runner. She sailed from Liverpool with cargo for Savannah, and succeeded in entering that port and returning to Liverpool. On her second voyage she was cap tured by a United States ship, and condemned as prize.

The next cases in order of time to which Mr. Adams called the attention of the British government were those of the Oreto or Florida, and of the Alabama, originally known as No. 290. As I shall have to enter in detail into the facts connected with these vessels further on, I will not here allude to them more particularly.

The Georgiana.

On the 16th January, 1863, Mr. Adams made a representation to Earl Russell respecting the Georgiana, a vessel built at Glasgow, and then fitting out at Liverpool, which he stated he "had reason to believe was intended to pursue a similar course with that formerly called No. 290-to wit, the destruction of the commerce of the United States." Mr. Adams inclosed a letter from the United States consul in London, "giving," as he said, the "particulars based upon credible information received by him, the authority for which it is not in his power to disclose," and he thus concludes his letter:

I therefore solicit the interposition of Her Majesty's government, at least so far as to enable me to procure further evidence to establish the proof of the allegations here made in season for the prevention of this nefarious enterprise.2

Lord Russell informed Mr. Adams on the following day, the 17th, that he had communicated copies of his letter and its inclosure to the board of treasury and to the secretary of state for the home depart ment without delay, and had requested that orders might be sent by telegraph to the proper authorities at Liverpool, enjoining them to take such steps in the matter as might legally be taken. He added:

I think it right, however, to observe that Her Majesty's government cannot be answerable for any difficulty which may be experienced in carrying out those orders, in consequence of the evidence on which the statement of the United States consul is made being withheld from them.3

Inquiries were accordingly made, both by the customs officers and by the detective police at Liverpool, but it was found that the vessel was not in any way adapted for warlike purposes, and that from the nature British Appendix, vol. ii, p. 134.

2 Ibid., p. 147.

3 Ibid., p. 148.

« iepriekšējāTurpināt »