maintain, that it is the duty of all governments, including especially constitutional governments, to discharge their neutral duties in obedience to rules of right, independent of and superior to all possible acts of Parliament. In consonance with which doctrine it is that every President of the United States, from President Washington to President Grant inclusive, has never failed to apply due diligence, voluntarily, sponte sua, in the vigilant discharge of his own official duty, not in mere complaisance to foreign suggestion, by himself or by other officers of the Government, to prevent all unlawful enterprises of recruitment or equipment in the United States.1

Laws, no doubt, have been passed, and proclamations in abundance issued. But, in spite of all this, privateering, armed incursions into countries at peace with the United States, hostile raids, and filibustering expeditions have gone on as before. The practical result is that the counsel of the United States cannot be permitted to prejudice the British nation and government before the tribunal and the world by an imaginary representation of the neutrality of the United States; and some allowance should be made for Great Britain if, on a far more humble scale, something of the same sort should have happened on her shores, seeing that with a law said to be perfect, and with the loftiest sense of neutral obligations, the Government of the United States have not found it altogether possible to prevent their citizens from occasioning trouble to neighboring nations, whether at war or at peace, and giving to other governments much cause of complaint and remonstrance against their own.

The observation which thus legitimately arises is not got rid of by an attack on the past maritime policy of Great Britain, or by a reference to "the numerous piratical enterprises fitted out in former times against the possessions of Spain in America, and the honor accorded to the chiefs of those expeditions, such as Drake and Hawkins."

However offensive this telling sentence may have been intended to be, though an Englishman, I readily forgive it for the sake of the charming simplicity which has made its authors forgetful of the fact that, at the time when Drake and Hawkins went forth on the enterprises they term "piratical," the ancestors of their countrymen and their own still formed a part of the British uation. May not some of the old blood which warmed the hearts and animated the courage of those bold adventurers still flow in the veins of their transatlantic descendants, who have made the name of "filibuster" detract somewhat from our idea of the perfect character of American neutrality?

friendliness.

Having compared the law of the two nations in the matter of neutrality, I should, in the natural order of things, have now Cmplain's of un proceeded to the facts connected with the different vessels, were it not for the unexpected course pursued by the representatives of the United States in seeking to prejudge the question to which the inquiry before this tribunal is directed, namely, whether the British government was wanting in due diligence in respect of the equipment of certain specified ships, by imputing to the British nation an intentional disregard of its duties as a neutral, and to the British government not only a want of diligence in the discharge of its duty for the protection of the United States against violations of neutrality, but a willful negli gence, arising out of an undue partiality and desire to favor the confed

erates.

For this purpose the representatives of the United States before this tribunal have gone into the whole history of the time; and, not content with disparaging the institutions of Great Britain and reviling her law, have sought to cast obloquy on her government, on statesmen

1 United States Argument, p. 76.

whom the British people have been in the habit of looking up to, and, indeed, on the British nation itself.

Again

We are told of "the early and long-continued unfriendliness of the British government;" that "Her Majesty's government was actuated by a conscious unfriendly purpose toward the United States." and again we are told of the unfriendliness and insincere neutrality of the British cabinet. "The cabinet were actuated by an insincere neutrality to hasten the issue of the Queen's proclamation." "The feeling of personal unfriendliness toward the United States continued during a long portion or the whole of the time of the commission or omission of the acts complained of." Finally, we are told that "the facts established show an unfriendly feeling which might naturally lead to, and would account for, a want of diligence bordering upon willful negli gence."

Earl Russell is made the object of unworthy and unjustifiable attack. He is represented as having evinced a consistent course of partiality toward the insurgents." "When information as to the Florida was conveyed to Her Majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs, he interposed no objection to her sailing from Liverpool." Surely the writer must have known he was doing grievous injustice in making such a statement. The Florida sailed from Liverpool on the 25th of March. As will appear when we come to the facts connected with that vessel, Earl Russell had heard nothing about her for a month be fore. Again, "when the overwhelming proof of the complicity of the Alabama was laid before him, he delayed to act until it was too late." He who penned this must have known that the delay was not Lord Russell's, and that, but for an unlucky delay, accidentally occurring elsewhere, so far as the action of his lordship in that affair was concerned, the Alabama would have been stopped.

Of the cabinet which has been thus assailed, three distinguished members are no more. But he who, at the difficult time in question. presided over the foreign relations of Great Britain, still lives among us in the fullness of years and honor. There have, of course, been many who, in the strife of party politics, have been opposed to Earl Russell; there have been others who have differed from him in particular incidents of his political conduct; but never did it occur to political enemy-personal enemy he never could have had to question for a moment the lofty sense of honor, the high and unimpeachable integrity, the truthfulness, the straightforwardness, which have characterized the whole of his long and illustrious career. When the history of Great Britain during the nineteenth century shall be written, not only will there be none among the statesmen who have adorned it whose name will be associated with greater works in the onward path of political progress than that of Earl Russell, but there will be none to whom, personally, an admiring posterity will look back with greater veneration and respect. That this distinguished man should feel deeply aggrieved by the unworthy attack thus made on the government of which he was a leading member, and on himself personally, it is easy to understand; but there are attacks which recoil upon those who make them, and of this nature are aspersions on the honesty and sincerity of Earl Russell.

Speaking of the officials in the colonies, the case of the United States asks the tribunal to bear in mind what it calls "these constant demonstrations of partiality for the insurgents." "They show," it is said, "a persistent absence of real neutrality, which should throw sus

picion upon the acts of the British officials as to the vessels, and should incline the tribunal to closely scrutinize their acts."

The British nation comes in, of course, for a share of the abuse thus freely bestowed. British neutrality is described sometimes as "partial and insincere," sometimes as "habitually insincere." "Great Britain framed its rules, construed its laws and its instructions, and governed its conduct in the interest of the insurgents."

I have called this an "unexpected" course; for, assuredly, neither the British government nor the British people were prepared to expect that, after Great Britain had not only expressed, openly and before the world, her "regret " that vessels should have left her shores which afterward did damage to American commerce, but had voluntarily consented to make good that damage, if it could be shown that any want of sufficient care on the part of the British authorities had rendered the equipment and evasion of those vessels possible-on an occasion when, in the peaceful and amicable settlement of any claim the United States might have against Great Britain, the remembrance of past grievances or past resentments was to be forever buried, and the many ties which should bind these two great nations together drawn closer for the time to come-advantage should be taken to revive with acrimonious bitterness every angry recollection of the past, and, as it would seem, to pour forth the pent-up venom of national and personal hate. Deploring the course which has thus been taken as one calculated to mar the work of peace on which we are engaged, I comfort myself with the conviction that a great nation, like the people of the United States, seeing in the present attitude of Great Britain a cordial and sincere desire of reconciliation and enduring friendship, animated itself by a kindred spirit, will not approve of the hostile and insulting tone thus offensively and unnecessarily adopted toward Great Britain, her statesmen, and her institutions, throughout the whole course of the case and argument presented on behalf of the United States.

Alleged evidence of unfriendly feeling.

In support of the alleged unfriendly feeling which the United States. ascribe to the British government, as the foundation of the charge of partiality toward the insurgent States, where the government should have been neutral, they refer, in the first place, to certain speeches made on different occasions by leading members of the ministry.

There can be no doubt that these speeches not only expressed the sentiments of the speakers, but may be taken to have been the exponents of the sentiments generally entertained at the time. But it is a mistake to suppose that those sentiments involved any unfriendliness toward the United States. In truth, why should any such unfriendliness have existed? The cherished sentiments of the British people on the subject of slavery had strongly tended to alienate them from the South, and the recent public discussion of the subject of slavery, on which the South felt so sensitively, had produced feelings of by no means a friendly character on the part of the latter toward Great Britain. The North might, therefore, not unnaturally calculate on the sympathy of Great Britain, if not on its active support, in a conflict with the South. How was it that what might thus have been expected à priori, was not realized to the extent of such expectation, and that where active sympathy, or even actual support, might have been looked for, impartial neutrality took its place? The causes are not difficult to find. In the first place, it appeared to many that right and justice were on the side of the seceding States. To such persons it seemed that when eleven great provinces, with a population of several millions, forming fully one-fourth of the

Union, impelled by the conviction that the political views of the majority of the Federal States were, if not antagonistic to, at all events inconsistent with, their interests, desired to separate themselves from the Union, to which they were bound only by the tie of a voluntary confederation, an attempt to coerce them by the sword into a forced continuance in it, when it must henceforth be hateful to them, was to make the issue one of might rather than of right. Others there were, men of calm judgment and reflection, who, while they deplored a disruption of the great American Union, yet thought that a re-union effected by the subjugation of the South was not to be desired in the true interest either of the victors or the vanquished; that before such a result could be brought about, a prolonged and fearful contest must have taken place, in which the best blood of the South would have been shed, its resources exhausted, its prosperity destroyed for years, its spirit humiliated and broken, making its restoration to the Union of little value, except so far as the pride of the Federal States might be concerned; that, consequently, the Union having thus been torn asunder, it would be better for both parties that each should be left to work out its own destiny, and develop its own resources, in the vast regions to which its dominions might extend. Many, too, there were who deplored this contest the more because they believed that, despite the superior force and resources of the North, the subjugation of the South was impossible, and that the prolongation of the contest could only lead to useless sacrifices on either side. This view proved erroneous in the result, but it was not the less honestly entertained. A strong impression, too, could not fail to be produced on the public mind by the energy, determination, and courage displayed by the South, and the generous ardor with which its population risked life and fortune in the desperate struggle for national independence, so resolutely main tained to the last against infinitely superior force. Whatever the cause in which they are exhibited, devotion and courage will ever command respect; and they did so in this instance. Men could not see, in the united people of these vast provinces thus risking all in the cause of nationality and independence, the common case of rebels, disturbing peace and order on account of imaginary grievances, or actuated by the desire of overthrowing a government in order to rise upon its ruins. They gave credit to the statesmen and warriors of the South; their cause might be right or wrong; for the higher motives ennoble political action, and all the opprobrious terms which might be heaped upon the cause in which he fell could not persuade the world that the earth beneath which Stonewall Jackson rests does not cover the remains of a patriot and a hero.

Public feeling in Great Britain, however, never went beyond this: that both parties having appealed to arms, they should be dealt with on terms of perfect equality, and that whatever was conceded to the one should not be withheld from the other-to use a common expression, that they should be left to fight it out fairly, without Great Britain throwing her weight into either scale, as the Northern States seemed to think she should have done in their favor, not perhaps by actual assistance in war, but by withholding from the confederates the character of belligerents, and by treating their ships of war as pirates and denying them access in British ports. For the United States appear to have been unable to understand the position assumed by the British government in making any concession whatever in favor of the insurgent States. It appeared to them like an act of perfidy toward a friend. Had not political and commercial relations bound Great Britain and the United

States closely together for many years? How then could Great Britain take any step which should give any advantage to an enemy of the United States? Two things were lost sight of in this reasoning: First, that the insurgent States, with whom the United States were now waging war, had formed part of that Union with which Great Britain had had the intimate relatious referred to-the second port in the Empire, through which the cotton trade was carried on, having had all its relations with the South; secondly, that Great Britain had the interests of her own commerce to look after, which were seriously compromised in the warfare as carried on by the United States. The blockade of the Southern ports, established by the North with a view to the speedier subjugation of the South, deemed by the North of such paramount importance as to render all consideration for the interest of Great Britain unnecessary, was about to paralyze the industry of Lancashire and bring famine and disaster on thousands. Great Britain accepted the position and acknowledged the blockade. Was she not, in other respects, to look after her own interests? It was natural enough that, in the first heat and passionate excitement, the North should take the view it did of the conduct of Great Britain. I cannot but think the time has come

when it might take a calmer and a juster view. It will do so hereafter, in spite of those who still seek to rekindle the flame of discord, the "ignes," which in their hands may be truly said to be "suppositos cineri doloso."

The charge of partiality and of willful negligence having been thus brought requires to be disposed of. For, though partiality does not necessarily lead to want of diligence, yet it is apt to do so, and in a case of doubt would turn the scale. Where a sinister motive exists, culpa, which might otherwise be excused, becomes indeed dolo proxima and inexcusable. Besides, sitting on this tribunal, as I have already said, as in some sense the representative of Great Britain, while I may say, with perfect truth, "pudet hæc opprobria nobis dici potuisse," I should not have fulfilled my duty if I did not see whether their refutation cannot be found in the facts before us.

Independently of having permitted the equipment of ships, three main heads of complaint are placed on record against the govern- Complants of unment of Great Britain: 1. That it acknowledged the Con- friendly conduct. federate States as belligerent, and, as a consequence, refusing to treat their ships of war as pirates, admitted them to British ports on the same footing with the war-ships of the United States. 2. That it did nothing to prevent the agents of the Confederate States from procuring ships and supplies of arms and munitions of war from England. 3. That it did nothing to stop the blockade-running carried on through the British port of the Bahamas and Bermuda.

Acknowledgment

The contention of the United States that Great Britain was not warranted in acknowledging the Confederate States as belligerents might find its answer in the unanimous concurrence of of belgerency the great maritime powers in following her example. But, independently of this, the course thus pursued may, without difficulty, be shown not only to have been strictly warranted by international law, but also to have been the only one which could with propriety have been adopted. First, let us see how stood the facts at the time of the recognition of the Confederate States as belligerents by the Queen's government.

Between the November of 1860 and April of 1861 seven Southern States of the Union-South Carolina, Florida, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas-had not only renounced their allegiance to the Federal Government and declared themselves independent, but