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subject to all ordinary international obligations; and it is firmly persuaded that there is no state in Europe or America which would be willing to claim or accept any immunity in this respect, on the ground of its inferiority to others in extent, military force, or population. Count Sclopis, in his opinion, says:
Views of Count Sclopis. The words due diligence necessarily imply the idea of a relation between the duty and its object. It is impossible to define a priori and abstractly an absolute duty of diligence. The thing to which the diligence relates determines its degree. As to the measure of activity in the performance of the duties of a neutral, I think the following rule should be laid down; that it should be in a direct ratio to the actual danger to which the belligerent will be exposed through the laxity of the neutral, and in an inverse ratio to the direct means which the belligerent can control for averting the danger.
Decision of the tri
The Tribunal, in its award, says: The due diligence referred to in the first and third of the said rules ought to be exercised by neutral governments in exact proportion to the risks to which either of the belligerents may be exposed from a failure to fulfill the obligations of neutrality on their part.
The circumstances out of which the facts constitutiog the subject-matter of the present controversy arose were of a nature to call for the exercise, on the part of Her Britanuic Majesty's government, of all possible solicitude for the observance of the rights and duties involved in the proclamation of nentrality issued by Her Majesty, on the 13th of May, 1861. 2. TOLERATION OF INSURGENT OPERATIONS IN ENGLAND,
AND ENGLISH FEELING AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
Views of Count
Count Sclopis says, respecting this point: The British government was fully informed that the confederates had established in England a branch of their means of attack and defense against the United States. Commissioners representing the government of Richmond were domiciled in London, and bad put themselves in communication with the English government. Lord Russell had received these confederate representatives in an unofficial way. The first visit took place on the 11th of May, 1861, that is to say, three days before the Queen's proclamation of neutrality, and four days before Mr. Adanis arrived in London as the minister of the United States. And further, the English government could not but know that great commercial houses were managing the interests of the confederates at Liverpool, a town whicb, from that time, was very openly pronounced in favor of the South. In Parliament itself opinions were before long openly expressed in faror of the insurgents. The Queen's ministers themselves did not disguise that in their opinion it would be very ditticult for the American Union to re-establish itself as betore.
It results from this, in my opinion, that the English government found itself, during the first years of the war of secession, in the inmidst of circunstances which could not but have an influence, if not directly upon itself, at least upon a part of the population subject to the British Crown. No governInent is safe against certain waves of public opinion, which it cannot master at its will. I am far from thinking that the animus of the English government was hostile to the Federal Government during the war. Yet there were grave dangers for the l’nited States in Great Britain and ber colonies which there were no direct means for averting. England therefore should have fulfilled her duties as a neutral by the txercise of a diligence equal to the gravity of the danger.
It cannot be denied that there were moments when its watchfulness seemed to fail and when ferbleness in certain branches of the public service resulted in great detriment to the Cnited States.
Viscount d'Itajuba has not placed on record his opinion on this subject, unless it can be gathered from a single passage in his remarks upon the effect of a commission on an offending de Itajubi erniser, when he says, “By seizing or detaining the vessel the neutral only prevents the belligerent from deriving advantage from the fraud committed within its territory by the same belligerent; while, by not proceeding against a guilty vessel it exposes itself to having its good faith justly called in question by the other belligerent."
Views of Viscovat Views of Adams
It would seem from some of Mr. Adams's expressions that he did not
Mr. concur in these views of his colleagues. While regretting
that he did not do so, because the views seem to me to be in'accordance with the facts, and also in accordance with general principles which all maritime powers would desire to maintain, I must bear
testimony to the perfect and dignified impartiality with
which, not only in this respect, but throughout the proceedings, Mr. Adams maintained his position as a judge between the two contending nations. Of him, at least, it may be said that his love of country never controlled his sense of justice, and that at no time did he appear as an advocate.
3. DUTY TO DETAIN AN OFFENDING CRUISER WHEN IT COMES AGAIN
WITHIN THE NEUTRAL'S JURISDICTION, AND EFFECT OF A COMMISSION UPON SUCH CRUISER.
Efect of 118810n.
Position of Carted States.
Views of Viscount d'Itajuba.
It was maintained in the American Case that, by the true construction of
the second clause of the first rule of the treaty, when a vessel like the Florida, Alabama, Georgia, or Shenandoali, which has been especially adapted within a neutral port for the use of a
belligerent in war, comes again within the neutral's jurisdiction, it is the duty of the neutral to seize and detain it. This con
struction was denied by Great Britain. It was maintained
in the British papers submitted to the tribunal, that the obligation created by this clause refers only to the duty of preventing the original departure of the vessel, and that the fact that the vessel was, after the original departure from the neutral port, commissioned as a ship of war protects it against detention. To this point we rejoined that a commission is no protection against
seizure in such case, and does not operate to release the neutral from the obligation to detain the offender.
The Viscount d’Itajuba seemed to favor the American
construction. IIe said: According to the latter part of the first rule of Article VI of the Treaty of Washington, the neutral is bound also to use due diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise or carry on war as above, (viz, against a belligerent, ] such vessel having been specially adapted, in whole or in part, within its jurisdiction to warlike use.
If, then, a vessel built on neutral territory for the use of a belligerent, fraudulently and without the knowledge of the neutral, comes again within the jurisdiction of the sovereign whose neutrality it has violated, it ought to be seized and detained.
Count Sclopis says, on this point: It is on the nature of these special circumstances that the first rule laid down in Article VI of the Treaty of Washington specifically rests. The operatiou of that rule would be illusory, if it could not be applied to vessels subsequently commissioned. The object in view is to prevent the construction, arming, and equipping of the vessel, and to prevent her departure when there is sutticient reason to believe that she is intended to carry on war on behalf of one of the belligerents; and when probability has become certainty, shall not the rule be applicable to the direct and palpable consequences which it originally was intended to prevent?
In the award the Tribunal says that-
equipment, and ariament of a vessel are not done away with by any
by the violation of neutrality, may afterward have granted to that vessel; and the ultimate step by which the offense is completed cannot be admissible as a ground for the absolution of the oftender, nor can the consummation of his fraud become the means of establishing his innocence. The privilege of exterritorality, ac
Decision of Tribunal
corded to vessels of war, has been admitted into the law of nations, not as an absoluto right, but solely as a proceeding founded on the principles of courtesy and mutual deference between different nations, and therefore can never be appealed to for the protection of acts done in violation of neutrality.
It will be observed that the Tribunal, instead of adopting the recognition by the Viscount d'Itajuba of a positive obligation on the part of the neutral to detain the vessel, in the case supposed, limited itself to expressing the opinion that, in such case, the neutral would have the right to make such detention.
Supplies of .
Dision of trbual.
4. SUPPLIES OF COAL. It was maintained in the American Case that the proofs showed that the insurgent cruisers were permitted to supply themselves with coal in British ports in greater quantities and with greater portion of the freedom, and with less restrictions than were imposed upon the United States; and it was insisted that, in consequence of these facts, there was an absence of neutrality, which made those ports bases of hostile operations against the United States under the second rule of the treaty:
On this point the award says thatIn order to impart to any supplies of coal a character inconsistent with the second rule, prohibiting the use of neutral ports or waters, as a base of naval operations for a belligerent, it is necessary that the said supplies should be connected with special circumstances of time, of persons, or of place, which may combine to give them such character.
It does not appear by the terms of the award that Great Britain is held responsible for the acts of any vessel solely in consequence of illegal supplies of coal. The question is, therefore, a speculative one, so far as relates to this controversy. The opinions of the four arbitrators who signed the award furnish, however, the explanation of what they mean when they speak of special circumstances of time, of persons, or of place.”
Mr. Adams says: I perceive no other way to determine the degree of responsibility of a neutral in these cases, than by an examination of the evidence to show the intent of the grant in any specific case. Fraud or falsehood in such a case poisons everything it touches. Even indifference may degenerate into willful negligence, and that will impose a burden of proof to relieve it before responsibility can be relieved.
Count Sclopis says: I will not say that the simple fact of having allowed a greater amount of coal than was necessary to enable a vessel to reach the nearest port of its country constitutes in itself a sufficient grievance to call for an indemnity. As the lord chancellor of England said on the 12th of June, 1871, in the House of Lords, England and the United States equally hold the principle that it is no violation of the law of nations to furnish arms to a belliyerent. But if an excessive supply of coal is connected with other circumstances which show that it was used as a veritable res hostilis, then there is an infraction of the second article of the treaty. Thus, for example, when see the Florida and the Shenandoah choosu for their fields of action, the one the stretch of sea between the Bahama archipelago and Bermuda, to cruise there at its ease, and the other Melbourne and Hobson's Bay, for the purpose immediately carried out, of going to the Arctic Seas, there to attack the whaling vessels, I cannot but regard the supplies of coal in quantities sufficient for such services, infractions of the second rule of Article VI.
Mr. Stämpfli says of the Sumter : The permission given to the Sumter to remain and to take in coal at Trinidad does Dot of itself constitute a sufficient basis for accusing the British authorities of having failed in their duties as neutrals, because the fact cannot be considered by itself, since the Sumter both before and after that
Views of Mr. Adina
Views of Count Sciupis
Views of Mr. Stampfli.
time was admitted into the ports of many other States where it staid and took in coal
so that it cannot be held that the port of Trinidad served as a base of operations.
But of the Shenandoah he says: A supply of coal was not a necessary condition of neutral asylum, and in supplying her with so large a quantity of coal, the capacity of the ship for making war was increased just as much as by the recruitment of ber crew which took place. The Viscount d'Itajuba, at the thirty-first conference, while signing
the decision, remarked with regard to the recital concern
ing the supply of coals, that he is of the opinion that every government is free to furnish to the belligerents more or less of that article.
5. THE MUNICIPAL LAWS OF ENGLAND.
Views of Viscount d'Itajuba
Municipal laws of
The tribunal pass non Nishville, &c., not
It was maintained in the American Case that the liability of Great Bri
tain should be measured by the rules of international law; and England came be that it could not be escaped by reason of any alleged defi
ciencies in any internal legislation enacted for the purpose of enabling the government to fulfill its international duties.
The pleadings and arguments on the part of Great Britain are filled with denials of this proposition in every possible way, from the opening Case to the last supplemental argument of Sir Roundell Palmer.
The award says, "the government of Her Britannic Majesty cannot justify itself for a failure in due diligence on the insufficiency of the legal means of action which it possessed."
6. THE SUMTER, TIE NASIIVILLE, &c. It was maintained in the American Case that, under the terms of the
treaty of Washington the parties had agreed to submit to the sumter, the decision of the tribunal of arbitration, not only the shumtanding British claims growing out of the acts of the Florida, the Alabama,
the Georgia, and the Shenandoah, which originally proceeded from ports of Great Britain, but also all claims growing out of the acts of other cruisers, such as the Nashville, the Sumter, &c., which could in any way be shown to have used British ports as bases of supplies. The British Case and Counter Case strenuously contended that the submission was limited to the four vessels first above named. The tribunal unanimously, including Sir Alexander Cockburn, took no notice of this claim of Great Britain, and considered all the claims presented and decided them upon their merits. Sir A. Cockburn's 7. THE DISSENTING OPINION OF SIR A. COCKBURN. The frankness with which Sir Alexander Cockburn confesses in this
opinion that he sat on the Tribunal, not as a judge, but as, ventative of Grene “in some sense the representative of Great Britain," one of the
parties to the controversy, places before the world the knowledge of a fact of which, otherwise, it would have been better to take no public notice. The chief justice calls legal propositions made by General Cushing, Mr.
Evarts, and Mr. Waite, over their signatures and under the responsibility of counsel, strange misrepresentations," and
assertions without the shadow of a foundation.” He says that “their imaginations must have been lively, while their consciences slept." He finds in a portion of their argument“ an extraordinary series of propositions," and the most singular confusion of ideas, misrepre
He is the
His charges against the American counbel
They need no vin
No opportunity of
He charges the came with abuse and hostility.
sentations of facts, and ignorance both of law and history, which were, perbaps, ever crowded into the same space.” He calls the part of their argument on which he was commenting, an affront offered to this tribunal, by such an attempt to practice on our supposed credulity or ignorance," and says that he is at a loss to understand how counsel, familiar with English law, can take upon themselves to make statements of this sort."
I need not assume in the United States to vindicate the accuracy of statements or the soundness of reasonings which have the guarantee of the names of our distinguished counsel.
The dication charges are sanctioned by the chief justice alone. I have no hesitation in expressing my conviction that they would have been indignantly repudiated by each and all of his colleagues had fered to provider the the paper in which they are made been publicly read, or had its contents been made known at the time when the Tribunal ordered it to be recorded. This voluminous paper was, in fact, not read in the Tribunal; its author presented it in bulk without any statement respecting its character; no one had any reason to imagine its contents; and it was not made public until several days after the dissolution of the Tribunal and the separation of its members. As Sir Alexander Cockburn says of the charges of unfriendliness which were made in the American Case against members of Lord Palmerston's cabinet, “The world must judge between the accusers and accused.”
The British arbitrator also charges that the Case of the United States " pours forth the pent-up venom of national and personal bate." Ile speaks of the "abuse” it “freely bestows,” and complains of the “hostile and insulting tone thus offensively and unnecessarily adopted toward Great Britain, her statesmen, and her institutions."
These charges appear to be founded upon the proof of the desire of various members of the British government for the success of the insurgents in the South, taken from the mouths of those charges. the speakers and presented for the consideration of the Tribunal, and upon the legitimate application wbich was made of that proof in the issue respecting “due diligence” which was pending before the tribunal at Genera.
A complete vindication of the line of argument in the Case (if any were needed) could be drawn from Sir Alexander Cockburn's paper. “There can be no doubt,” he says, “that lines areement these speeches not only expressed the sentiments of the admitted. speakers, but may be taken to be the exponent of the sentiments generally entertained at that time;" and he adds, “though partiality does not necessarily lead to want of diligence, yet it is apt to do so, and in case of doubt would turn the scale.” With such an admission as this, it is surprising that a man of the robust sense of the chief justice should hare reproduced the rash imputations of the British press.
That I charged individual members of Lord Palmerston's cabinet with a partiality for the insurgents, is true; equally true is it that I supported the charge by proof from their own lips.
But I never questioned their right to entertain such partiality, or to espress it in any manner that suited them. I never even assuned to criticise its justice before a tribunal created to try other issues. fined myself strictly to the issues before that body, and I argued that this partiality of individual members of the government would be apt to lead to want of diligence, and in case of doubt would turn the scalea line of argument wbich is now admitted to be just.
The justice of the