the first 6 months of an emergency situation as provided by H. R. 2967. The bill stated that

The Ready Reserve consists of those trained members and units of the Reserve Forces available to meet immediately during early phases, but not to exceed the first 6 months, of any war or general mobilization * * *.

The Navy greatly favored this definition of the mission of the Ready Reserve and the restriction to 6 months on mobilization for a war, but some of the members thought that this provision might mislead reservists into thinking that their mission was confined to the first 6 months of any war or mobilization and thus have the effect of restricting mobilization planning. Some members doubted tnat all of the reservists could be called in the first 6 months, and if they were so called the services might have difficulty in finding space for them in camps. Maj. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, Director of Selective Service, said that

*** when we tie down to this 6 months, we lose one of the things that the Ready Reserve is for, and that is to prevent war by its action prior to even the start of mobilization.23

This issue was resolved by adopting general language describing the Ready Reserve in order not to legislate its mission in too detailed a fashion. The amended wording provided that the Ready Reserve, which was limited to 2.9 million men, would be "available immediately during early phases of any war or general mobilization." A statement regarding the mission, however, was included in the committee report on the National Reserve Plan.24

The question of whether or not the National Reserve Plan constituted universal military training occasioned some difference of opinion. It is pertinent, therefore, to include the interpretation given by the committee as to why the National Reserve Plan could not be considered as universal military training:

The committee feels, in view of the erroneous conception held by some that the National Reserve Plan is universal military training, the report would not be complete without pointing out the essential differences between the two.

The National Reserve Plan gives recognition to the need for a military manpower pool to meet Active Force requirements for long-term volunteers, and to protect the manpower sources of the ROTC program. Universal military training does not recognize this need fully.

The 6 months' training program proposed in the National Reserve Plan is geared to valid Reserve Forces requirements and will be controlled within the limits set forth in H. R. 5297 of 100,000 to 250,000 annually. Universal military training is not specifically related to requirements, but is concerned primarily with the equal sharing of the military obligation and with creating a training populace.

The 6 months' training program under the National Reserve Plan is a volunteer program, whereas universal military training is a compulsory program, which personnel would enter by induction only. Universal military training would thus require the simultaneous operation of 2 induction systems at different age levels, 1 for the Active Forces and 1 for the Reserve Forces.

In the National Reserve Plan, the 6 months' trainees receive their training as members of the Armed Forces. Under universal military training, the training would be conducted under a separate corps with a distinctive shoulder patch. The National Reserve Plan is a 4-year program and is subject to periodic review and further continuance by the Congress in 1959. Universal military training is a permanent manpower program.

The National Reserve Plan recognizes the need for maintaining military strength-in-being. The size of the Active and Reserve Forces are based on

23 House hearings, pp. 2366-2372, 2375-2380.

24 National Reserve Plan. House of Representatives, Rept. No. 457, 84th Cong., 1st sess. Report to accompany H. R. 5297, p. 12.

national security requirements. Universal military training would reduce the Active Force strength in specific relation to number of trainees entering Reserve Forces.

The National Reserve Plan recognizes the need for prior-service personnel as the hard core of the Reserve Forces, and provides means to insure their participation in Reserve training programs. Universal military training would have a completely volunteer provision as regards such personnel, so that upon completing 2 or more years active service they would be eligible to go directly to the Standby Reserve.25

The difficulty of the legislative task was recognized on the very first day of the House hearings. When the chairman, Hon. Overton Brooks asked Secretary of Defense Wilson whether the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force wanted the bill as prepared and whether they would take the bill as written, the Secretary replied:

I think they will each have to take another look. *** This hasn't been an easy job, you understand. It has been tried before, and with not much success perhaps. *** It is a trying job.

Congressman Brooks said:

Well, it is not an easy job for Congress, either.26

Assistant Secretary of Defense Carter Burgess, stated:

*** I wish to emphatically say that we are not going to stand in the way of some improvements in our bill when we get to that point of the proceedings.27 The director of the Selective Service System, Maj. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, commented:

*** it is pretty hard to project yourself into the future. And, of course, I have felt personally that this bill, by the time it had been looked after by both the House and Senate, that some of the things that maybe didn't appeal to everybody might disappear.28

Until a bill is subjected to the critical analysis of every person and group concerned with the problem of legislative planning for the future, it is almost impossible to foresee every contingency that may arise and to interrelate all the factors which are brought up. The Chairman, Hon. Overton Brooks, upon calling together the representatives of all the organized groups, governmental and private, to get comments and suggestions on the reserve legislation, said:

I think those represented at this hearing realize that this subcommittee has a hard job to frame a bill which will be acceptable to its members, have a chance of passage in Congress, and become law *** We have to have, first, a bill that we can put through, and second, a bill which is acceptable to all groups, insofar as possible, and third, a fair and equitable bill for the country.29

The bill was read paragraph by paragraph and each of the witnesses who was sitting around the table had an opportunity to comment and to suggest amendments to the proposed legislation. In accordance with expert testimony, a new bill was formulated, H. R. 5297. The report on the final version of this bill was submitted by Hon. Overton Brooks from the House Committee on Armed Services to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union on April 28, 1955.30 The manner in which H. R. 5297 differed from H. R. 2967 is explained below.

2 Ibid., p. 17.

House hearings, p. 1273.

Ibid., p. 1452.

Ibid., p. 1399.

Ibid., p. 2277.

#National Reserve Plan.

House of Representatives Rept. No. 457, 84th Cong., 1st sess. Report to

accompany H. R. 5297, April 28, 1955. 55 p.

VII. PRINCIPAL CHANGES MADE IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE BILL (H. R. 2967) BY THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE BILL (H. R. 5297)

A comparative analysis of the original Department of Defense proposal, H. R. 2967, with the House Armed Services Committee bill, H. R. 5297, reveals that a number of significant changes were made after hearings had been held by Subcommittee No. 1.

Several revisions were made in the nature and scope of the Ready Reserve Under the Defense Department bill, the size of the Ready Reserve was to depend upon military requirements; but the committee placed a statutory ceiling of 2.9 million on the Ready Reserve (thus changing it from the 1.5 million in existing law).

The Defense Department bill did not restrict the numbers of Ready reservists the President could call in an emergency he had proclaimed; whereas the committee bill authorized the President to order 1 million Ready Reservists to active duty; any in excess of that number would have to be determined by Congress.

The original Department bill contained a definition of the mission of the Ready Reserve, introducing an element of time that might result in restricting mobilization planning. The committee bill, therefore, omitted this statement of the mission, although it was included in the committee report.

The Department bill did not reduce the military obligation of persons who were already in the Reserves; but the committee bill eliminated the Reserve training requirement for men who were in active service prior to the Korean cease-fire (July 27, 1953).

The Department bill proposed incentives to reduce the period of Reserve service by satisfactory participation, but planned to handle such programs administratively. The committee bill provided that participation in Reserve training should be reduced according to a schedule set forth in the law. There was no provision, however, for reducing the period of Reserve training for the 6-month trainees.

The Department bill provided that the Ready Reserve should be continuously screened according to regulations made by the Secretary of Defense after he had consulted with various other Federal agencies. The committee bill, on the other hand, provided that the President should prescribe the criteria and regulations for screening the Ready Reserve.

When the committee considered the problem of providing trained young men for the Reserve Forces, changes in the Department bill were made all down the line. The Department bill provided that persons not yet 19 years of age should have a 10-year obligation to be fulfilled by 6 months' training at $30 monthly, plus 9%1⁄2 years in the Reserves. This was changed by the committee to an 8-year obligation with $50 per month during the 6 months of active duty for training.

"The Department bill provided that if the quota of such young men was not met, it could be filled by inductions into the Reserves. The committee bill, on the other hand, provided for a strictly volunteer program.

The Department bill contained a provision that annual quotas for this training program should be set by the President, and although the committee bill retained Presidential control over the quota, a provision was written in whereby the minimum number was 100,000 and the maximum 250,000 for the 6-month trainees.

The Department bill provided that the National Security Training Commission should advise the President and the Secretary of Defense concerning the welfare of the 6-month trainees; the committee bill added a proviso that the Commission should make annual reports to the Congress.

The Department bill contained a provision that persons not yet 19 years old could enlist in the National Guard or a Reserve component for 8 years, and that within 2 years of the enlistment, they would undertake 2 years of active duty. This same provision was kept in the committee bill, but a condition was added so that this choice. of Reserve duty was open only to those who had not yet received an order to report for induction.

The problem of trained personnel for the National Guard was handled by the Department bill without giving a specific guaranty of personnel to meet the military strength of the guard; whereas the committee bill guarantied the strength of the National Guard and the Air National Guard. Upon approval or request of the Governor, the Department bill "assigned" persons to State National Guard organizations for Reserve training, whereas the committee bill "transferred" such persons.

The new State militia was permitted by the National Reserve Plan under both the Department and the committee bills. The Department bill provided that regulations on this matter should be prescribed by the President whereas the committee bill gave this duty to the Secretary of the Army and the administration of the program to the National Guard Bureau.

The provisions for participation in Reserve training also underwent revision. The Department bill provided that the maximum training program would consist of 48 drills and 17 days' annual training. The committee bill provided that this was the normal minimum training, and also gave an alternative choice-30 days of active training each year.

Differences were also evident in the methods of enforcement for noncompliance with Ready Reserve training programs. The Defense Department bill provided for a less-than-honorable discharge; that 6-month trainees could be inducted for an additional 18 months; but did not include a compliance provision for ROTC graduates. The committee bill, on the other hand, provided that if the reservist did not participate in the weekly drill program or the 30 days' annual training, he would be liable for 45 days' compulsory training each year; the 6-month trainees would be inducted for an additional 24 months; and ROTC officers who did not participate satisfactorily in training would have their commissions revoked. With further reference to ROTC graduates, the Department bill provided that their commissions and assignments would be handled administratively; whereas the committee bill guaranteed commissions to qualified ROTC graduates.

Finally, the Department bill made no provision for reports on the National Reserve Plan whereas the committee bill required an annual report by the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress. It will be seen from this account that by the time the bill was reported to the House by the Committee on Armed Services, it had undergone a thorough analysis and revision. The committee bill was endorsed by the Department of Defense and the main Reserve organizations.

71066-56-No. 82-5

VIII. MAIN FEATURES OF H. R. 5297

In authorizing the National Reserve Plan, H. R. 5297 provided for a number of amendments to the Universal Military Training and Service Act (65 Stat. 75), the Armed Forces Reserve Act (66 Stat. 481), and the National Defense Act (39 Stat. 166).

A. The Ready Reserve emphasized the training of individuals and units so that they would be militarily ready for recall during the early part of a general mobilization. This Reserve Force, which would not include reservists on active duty, would be increased from 1.5 million to 2.9 million. In the event of a national emergency proclaimed by the President, he would be authorized to order up to 1 million reservists, but any in excess of that number would have to be approved by Congress.

The President would also prescribe criteria for screening Ready reservists into the Standby Reserve so that combat veterans, persons with critical skills or in situations involving personal hardship, would not be retained on the list for immediate recall. Those who had an obligation to serve in the Ready Reserve would be men who could meet the needs of an emergency mobilization. The screening process would also seek to achieve a balance in the military skills required by the Ready Reserve and give due consideration to maintaining the requirements of the civilian economy. Skilled persons working in industries essential to defense would be permitted to discharge their military obligation in the 6-months' program which is described below, and would also come under the screening provisions.

The total 8-year military obligation provided in the Universal Military Training and Service Act would remain in effect, but incentives to reduce the amount of time spent in the Ready Reserve were provided. Ready Reserve service could be reduced by satisfactory participation in Reserve training programs. Those who had served 2 years on active duty could reduce the time spent in the Ready Reserve from 6 to 3 years; those with 3 years' active service could reduce their obligation from 4 to 2 years; and those with 4 years of active service could reduce their training participation from 2 years to 1; while those with 5 years' active duty would not be required to participate in the Ready Reserve. Upon completion of their Ready Reserve service, members would be transferred to the Standby Reserve.

The training requirement for the Ready Reserve included 48 annual drills and 17 days of active duty for training. An alternative was provided whereby reservists could participate in the plan by training for 30 days annually. Refusal on the part of a Ready Reservist to participate in either one of these training programs could result in his being ordered involuntarily to perform active duty for training for 45 days annually. Those who did not participate in prescribed Reserve programs could not accrue eligibility to certain benefits. The compulsory training features applied to men who entered the active services after July 27, 1953 (the date of the cease-fire in Korea). Combat veterans were not liable for participation in Reserve training but the bill did not change the length of time of their total military obligation. When the Ready Reserve was screened, however, combat veterans were to be given a priority for transfer into the Standby Reserve. If any individual wished to remain in the Ready Reserve, he could volunteer to do so.