VI. HOUSE HEARINGS ON THE NATIONAL RESERVE PLAN

Although bills may originate in the executive branch, in the legislature, or in some outside group, it is the function of the Congress to make the laws. The elected representatives of the people are close to the roots of public opinion and can gage the degree to which legislative proposals can be expected to command popular support. By receiving testimony which reflects the views of all facets of opinion, governmental and private, the committees can evaluate the probable repercussions of each provision of a bill, and arrive at a decision which ensures the maximum of equity in law.

When the House Armed Services Subcommittee No. 1, under the chairmanship of Hon. Overton Brooks, began hearings on the National Reserve Plan on February 8, 1955, the subcommittee had before it the administration bill, H. R. 2967. This bill was destined to be rewritten five times before the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 was enacted on August 9, 1955. As the Reserve legislation proceeded step by step through the legislative process, an estimation was made of what public opinion would accept, and the nature of the provisions changed so that it may be said, in general, that the result was emphasis on voluntary rather than compulsory arrangements, on incentives rather than penalties.

It became apparent very early in the House hearings," which lasted for 8 weeks, that a number of problems were being raised. The question naturally arises as to why so many issues were presented, considering the fact that the National Reserve Plan had been discussed beforehand by numerous governmental and private groups. There are several answers to this question.

The first difficulty arose because the exact legal language of the bill, H. R. 2967, was not available for analysis until about the time the House hearings began. There was a noticeable difference among the witnesses, both in and out of the Government, in their reaction to the bill as contrasted with the plan. There was general agreement on the objectives of the plan which required for its success not only legislation but also effective administration and organization, leadership, good training programs, and adequate appropriations. But when the legislative aspects were separated from the whole complex of the plan and incorporated in a bill to be cited as the National Reserve Plan, the military services, interested departments, Reserve agencies and organizations began to analyze the legal wording with reference to the probable repercussions of each section, with the result that suggested changes and numerous amendments were offered both by Government officials and private groups. Some amendments were concerned with clarifying the language of the bill, while others resulted from differing points of view on specific issues which had to be resolved by committee action.12

Another result of identifying the bill as the plan was that the legislators, seeing a bill entitled "National Reserve Plan," expected to see an explanation of the main features set forth therein; the bill, however, did not present the complete plan but consisted, rather, of

F1 National Reserve Plan. Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1 of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 84th Cong., 1st sess., February 8 to March 25, 1955, Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955, pp. 1243-2522.

12 Ibid., for a general discussion of amendments offered by several participating groups, see pp. 2275-2374; 2375-2522. Further information on amendments will be found on the following pages: Air Force, pp. 16521653, 1654; Navy Department, pp. 1621, 1622; National Guard Association, pp. 2225-2230; Office of Defense Mobilization, p. 1805; Reserve Officers Association, pp. 1744-1749.

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amendments to basic laws. A detailed knowledge of these laws and of the effects of the proposed amendments was necessary in order to understand only the legislative features of the plan. This was an important factor in general congressional and public understanding of the bill, particularly among persons who had not been briefed on the plan, notably those who were not members of the Armed Services or Appropriations Committees or of any agency or organization working on problems of the Reserve Forces.

Some of the issues which emerged during the House hearings inevitably stemmed from the fact that each military service had its own Reserve program and there were consequent differences in judgment as to the factors requisite for success. To meet this situation, the language of H. R. 2967 was permissive enough to allow for variations in the several service programs. Even with this legal canopy beneath which the Navy, Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard could formulate regulations in accordance with their missions, Secretary of Defense Wilson testified "that the services have varying degrees of enthusiasm over it." 13 As this matter was further explored by the subcommittee which sought the expression of every point of view, it became apparent that the impact of the proposed law upon the individual would vary according to the branch of the service in which his military obligation was performed. This fact, in turn, caused discussion of the equitable application of such a law.

The accumulation of testimony by various witnesses produced a situation from which basic issues developed. A description of this state of affairs will illustrate the innate difficulty of the task which confronted the subcommittee and the nature of some of the questions that had to be solved. The final disposition of these particular problems, as well as that of others that emerged, will be found in section VII of this report: Principal Changes Made in the Administration Bill, H. R. 2967, by the House Armed Services Committee Bill, H. R. 5297.

One of the first problems that arose concerned the use of prior servicemen in the Ready Reserve. Navy and Air Force officials endorsed the proposed legislation as a "package" which was necessary for the overall Reserve Forces, but indicated that their requirements called for continuance of their reserve program along voluntary lines in order to ensure a Ready Reserve of skilled and experienced personnel. The system under existing law, whereby trained men who had finished active duty were transferred to the Ready Reserve for the remainder of their military obligation, was proving satisfactory because a sufficient number of men were participating in training and those who were not could be called in the event of mobilization. Furthermore, the consensus of opinion was that as long as selective service inducted men in the Army, the Navy, and Air Force could maintain their volunteer enlistments. The Air Force and Navy did not, therefore, plan to use any of the 6-month trainees who were to constitute a quota for the first year of 100,000 (afterwards raised to 102,000 when the Coast Guard indicated a desire to participate in this part of the plan). In fact, their attitude toward this part of the National Reserve Plan was that the quota should be kept small in order not to interfere with 4-year enlistments in the Regular forces. Nor did the Air Force and Navy plan to use the compulsion of a less

13 House hearings, p. 1273.

than honorable discharge for reservists who did not participate satisfactorily in training programs, although they were satisfied to have this provision in the proposed law in the event that such a compulsion ever became necessary.

14

The Marine Corps agreed to take 1,000 of the trainees who were to spend 6 months in training and 9%1⁄2 years in the Reserve, but the Commandant testified that they were merely testing out this method of procurement, and that—

We actually can live without them*** We are getting along perfectly all right the way we are.15

The Army officials, on the other hand, faced with the necessity of building up a much larger Reserve Force than either the Air Force or Navy, planned to build up part of their Ready Reserve by the gradual induction of young men under 19 years of age who had not previously served, their initial annual quota being 99,000. The larger part of the Ready Reserve, however, would be composed of men transferred thereto after the completion of their active duty in the Regular forces. Although the plan was to screen combat veterans and certain other persons from the Ready into the Standby Reserve, nevertheless many prior servicemen would remain in the Army Ready Reserve for some time to come because the annual quota of trainees was so small-and was to be kept small in order not to interfere with regular 4-year enlistments in the Navy and Air Force. This meant that in another emergency some men would be called twice to active duty. If they were volunteer reservists, this was not a problem; but if they had been drafted in the Army to serve during the Korean hostilities, and thereafter happened to be called involuntarily for a second national emergency, an obvious inequity would exist.18

Another factor which must be related to this complicated situation was the realization that the increasing size of the manpower pool of young men would result in some of them escaping military service altogether because they were in excess of probable selective service inductions. Thus, men who enlisted or were drafted would be compelled to participate in Reserve training as well as active duty, while those who escaped would have no military obligation whatsoever."7

Another piece of this puzzle was that the extension of the concept of "honorable" to cover both Reserve service as well as active duty meant that men who had served satisfactorily for 2, 3, or 4 years in the Army would be given a less-than-honorable discharge if they did not participate in Reserve training, whereas men who served in the Navy or Air Force would not be under this handicap. As the Chief of Naval Personnel, Vice Adm. James L. Holloway, Jr., pointed out

a great many of our veteran Reserve-we do not plan to force them to participate in an active-drilling unit * * * They are available, however, on mobilization for recall,18

A further complication developed when it became clear that the language of the bill itself provided that until July 1, 1959, certain persons (6-month trainees) could enlist in the Reserve of any armed force or in the National Guard or Air National Guard; whereas the

14 House hearings, pp. 1279, 1316, 1317, 1356, 1357, 1361, 1366, 1529, 1617, 1633.

15 Ibid., p. 1326.

16 House hearings, pp. 1288-1289, 1291, 1307, 1312, 1326, 1399, 1473, 1544, 1545-1546, 1553, 1706.

17 Ibid., pp. 1299, 1384-1385, 1398, 1537, 1546-1547. See also the H. Rept. No. 457, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 16. 18 House hearings, pp. 1399, 1529, 1541, 1617, 1633, 1709.

choices that would actually be open to an individual did not include the Navy and Air Force Reserve components because they did ton intend to use this part of the National Reserve Plan.19

When all the above testimony was laid on the board and the various factors were interrelated, the subcommittee had to resolve a number of issues in order to strike an equitable balance between voluntary and compulsory programs, between incentives and penalties, which explains why H. R. 2967 was replaced by H. R. 5297.

Another problem area to which the subcommittee gave its attention was the effect of the proposals contained in H. R. 2967 upon the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard. The discrepancy between the briefings on the National Reserve Plan and the actual wording of the bill was brought out by the president of the National Guard Association, Maj. Gen. Ellard A. Walsh. This situation explains why a number of changes in the bill were suggested. The use of the word "assigned" instead of "transferred" in connection with persons becoming members of the guard would constitute an authorization which was not sufficient to make a person a member of the Army National Guard or the Air National Guard for all purposes. The effect of "assigning" instead of "transferring" persons would be to divide the membership of guard units between those who had dual State-Federal obligations and those who would be subject only to Federal obligation. Such a division would tend to break down the integrity of units and to interfere with discipline and morale.

The National Guard Association also took the position that the quota of 100,000 trainees was inadequate to maintain the strength of the Army National Guard and should be raised to at least 250,000. Furthermore, the lack of a guarantee for members of the Air National Guard would cause that strong reserve component to "disappear" because the Air Force did not plan to accept men for 6 months' training and then transfer them to the ANG, and thus the ANG could only procure personnel by enlisting men who had served 4 years on active duty with the Air Force.

Among the other objections the National Guard Association advanced against the bill was that it contemplated repealing a section in existing law which authorized a State governor to issue a proclamation when authorized National Guard strength could not be maintained by enlistments or appointments. The retention of this authorization was held to be vital, especially if the National Reserve Plan failed to provide sufficient men to maintain or increase the strength of the Army National Guard.

The association also held that H. R. 2967 was too restrictive in prohibiting a governor of a State from using the Army National Guard or the Air National Guard for internal security missions without the President's consent. The destruction of communications during a hurricane or air attack, for example, might make it impossible to contact the President or even the Governor; in such cases State authorities should not be denied the right to use the National Guard for internal security missions if any or all of the guard was not in active United States military service. The testimony revealed the necessity for some guarantee that the needs of the Army National Guard and

Ibid., pp. 1307, 1326.

Air National Guard could be met, and this was the subject of subsequent discussions between the subcommittee, the Department of Defense, and the spokesmen for the National Guard in redrafting the bill. The results were incorporated in the bill reported by the subcommittee, H. R. 5297.20

The effect of H. R. 2967 upon the ROTC was another matter for concern. Dr. Arthur Adams, Chairman of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, stated that—

*** the Board is very much concerned about making explicit in the plan and in the legislation the steps that may appropriately be taken with respect to officer procurement. There is at present nothing in the legislation relating to officer procurement for the Reserve. This involved the ROTC, the Reserve officer candidate program, the platoon leaders class, and various other programs of officer procurement for the Reserve *** it would hope that there would come some clear definition in the statute itself as to what the status of the ROTC and the other Reserve officer procurement plans might be *** this same indefiniteness of status, I think, is certain to militate against the continued success of the ROTC program.21

This testimony, substantiated by that of other witnesses, led to consideration by the subcommittee of guarantees which would have the effect of strengthening the legislation as it pertained to the procurement of Reserve officers.

Still another problem was that of the numbers of reservists the President would be authorized to order to active duty. Under the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, the President was authorized to call members or units of the Ready Reserve to active duty in an emergency which he proclaimed, but it was necessary for Congress to determine the numbers of reservists to be called. H. R. 2967 provided that in a national emergency proclaimed by the President, units and members of the Reserves could be ordered to active duty for not more than 24 consecutive months "in such numbers as are authorized by the President to meet the requirements of the emergency." Thus the issue was raised as to whether the Congress or the President should determine the numbers of reservisits to be called to active duty. The reason for the suggested change in H. R. 2967 was that the pattern of future warfare might be such as not to allow time for Congress to meet in order to make such a decision, and that the President's hands should not be tied if the national defense required instantaneous action.

The subcommittee recognized that since the passage of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, the strategic situation had changed and a potential enemy had developed the nuclear capability of making a sudden attack upon the United States. There was no disagreement regarding the fact that the President might have to act quickly during an emergency when Congress was not in session. On the other hand, the subcommittee judged that the Congress should exercise some control over the recall of numbers of reservists and was unwilling to give the President unlimited authority. In the section of this report which follows it will be seen that this question was finally decided by giving the President authority to order up to 1 million reservists in an emergency which he proclaimed, but any above this number would have to be determined by Congress.2

22

The subcommittee was also faced with making a decision on the question of whether the Ready Reserve mission should be limited to