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1. The National Guard of the United States.

2. The Army Reserve.

3. The Naval Reserve.

4. The Marine Corps Reserve.

5. The Air National Guard of the United States.

6. The Air Force Reserve.

7. The Coast Guard Reserve.

Men who have completed their active duty under the Universal Military Training and Service Act are placed in the Ready Reserve unless they qualify for the Standby. Most veterans of World War II may go into the Standby Reserve.

The three different categories of Reserves-Ready, Standby, and Retired are subject to different degrees of vulnerability for recall to active duty, and a limitation has been placed on the recall of Korean veterans to insure a fair "sharing of hazardous exposure."

(1) The Ready Reserve is liable for a 24-month, involuntary call during a war or in a national emergency declared by the Congress or proclaimed by the President, or when otherwise authorized by law. In a national emergency proclaimed by the President, Congress determines the number of men to be called from the Ready Reserve.

(2) The Standby Reserve is liable for active duty only during a war or a national emergency declared by Congress, or when otherwise authorized by law; and except in time of war or under congressional authorization, is not to be ordered to active duty unless adequate and qualified Ready Reserves are not available.

(3) The Retired Reserve may be ordered to active duty only in time of war or a national emergency declared by Congress, or when authorized by law.

C. The National Defense Act of 1916, as amended (39 Stat. 166).— In addition to the two laws described above, there are certain provisions in the National Defense Act that must be reviewed when any changes are contemplated in the composition of the National Guard and the Air National Guard. These provisions (secs. 58, 61, and 70) may be briefly noted as follows:

Section 58 provides that the National Guard of each State shall consist of members of the militia voluntarily enlisted therein, provided they are not less than 17 nor more than 45 years of age.

Section 61 contains provisions which prohibit States, in time of peace, from maintaining troops other than National Guard and Air National Guard units.

Section 70 provides an oath of enlistment in the National Guard and Air National Guard and is of interest in connection with the original version of the National Reserve plan because of the proposal to add a new subsection. This would provide a 1 additional oath to be taken by persons transferred to the National Guard upon their release from active training or active training and service.

IV. NEED FOR CHANGES IN THE RESERVE PROGRAM

Although a legislative pattern for the development of the Reserve Forces had been provided by the three basic laws which have just been described, it soon became apparent that there were serious weaknesses in the Reserve program. During 1953 and 1954, major studies and reports were made by the Senate Armed Services Com

mittee, the National Security Training Commission, and the Office of Defense Mobilization.

The Senate Committee on Armed Services issued two reports on the Status of Reserve and National Guard Forces of the armed services. Senator Saltonstall reported the following conclusions of the Interim Subcommittee on Preparedness to the full committee on January 29,

1954:

1. The paramount problem facing the defense effort is the acute shortage of personnel needed to meet manpower requirements in the Reserve Forces.

2. The tremendous annual turnover of personnel hampers adequate and efficient training and keeps the readiness state of the units at a low level.

3. There is an imbalance between the ranks which must be corrected.

4. There is a definite shortage of young pilots and other skilled technicians.

5. It is apparent that the Army Reserve program has not been realistically organized to conform to the potential manpower available to it.

6. The responsibilities and opportunities of individual reservists should be defined and fixed with some degree of permanency.

7. Better acceptance and support by the general public, civic groups, and industry should be secured for Reserve training.

8. The subcommittee feels that notwithstanding personnel and training difficulties which the Reserve components face, the problem of creating a strong and available Reserve can never be effectively solved until a plan for creating a continuous rotating Reserve is formulated. This is not a new conclusion. The Committee on Armed Services reported favorably on legislation for the establishment of a program of universal military training which it was believed would augment the flow of new personnel into both the Regular Forces and the Reserve program as well. On three occasions the committee pointed out during its deliberations on that legislation the serious inequities which are basically inherent in our Reserve structure. This inequity was demonstrated during the Korean conflict when the services were required to recall reservists-veterans of World War II-for the second time, while there were available in the communities of the United States thousands of men who had never served in either the military forces or the Reserves. This lack of equity in the sharing of the military obligation essential to our national defense is a basic weakness in our Reserve structure and has far-reaching effects in practically all types of Reserve activities.3

The same subcommittee reported again on December 28, 1954, with regard to the shortage of enlisted personnel in the various Reserve programs, and concluded that "any proposed legislation by the executive branch should inquire into the following":

1. Means by which an active program can be made more attractive to the young men of the Nation and the American public can be stimulated to encourage participation in the Reserves.

Status of Reserve and National Guard Forces of the Armed Services. Reports of the Interim Subcommittee on Preparedness of the Committee on Armed Services, U. S. Senate. January 1954. Committee print, 83d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 15–16.

2. Whether some form of compulsory Reserve training program is not essential.

3. Whether the mobilization manpower requirements, as set by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Reserve program, are realistic.

4. A clear-cut delineation of how the Reserve Forces will be integrated into the regular establishment in the event of an emergency. 5. What is the plan for providing armories, training sites, and for supplying equipment to conduct the Reserve training program, and the extent of joint utilization by the services? How much will it cost?4 Meanwhile the executive branch of the Government was continuing its study of the problem of military manpower. Two reports that were published before proposals were made for the new Reserve program of 1955 are of special significance: 20th Century Minutemen, a report to the President on a Reserve Forces training program by the National Security Training Commission on December 1, 1953; and Manpower Resources for National Security, a report to the President by the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization on January 6,

1954.

The National Security Training Commission concluded in its report 20th Century Minutemen that "our present Reserve system is unsatisfactory. The Commission findings were that

"

1. All should share equally the obligation to serve the Nation. 2. Our present Reserve system is unfair *** [a policy that] has been not only morally wrong, it has also been socially and financially costly.

3. Our present Reserve is inadequate. About three-fourths of our reservists are veterans of Korea, World War II, or both, and the nonveteran reservists are relatively untrained. Only 30 percent of our reservists are participating in Reserve units. Units are seriously under strength. ***

4. At least 1 million men are available for a national security training program between now and 1960. * * *

5. Inductions for training and service can and should operate concurrently. ***

6. Present rejection standards for military service are not realistic in light of the nature of 20th century warfare.

7. Our defense posture must be well adapted to the long-term Soviet danger."

The Commission went on to recommend that a national security training program should start with trainees who would be given 6 months' basic training and thereafter be obligated to serve in a Reserve component for 7%1⁄2 years, and liable to recall ahead of veterans. "The trainees should become the basis of a realistic nonveteran Reserve."

On the same day that the President had requested the National Security Training Commission to submit recommendations on a military training program, August 1, 1953, he had also requested the Office of Defense Mobilization for a report on "the availability of manpower simultaneously to operate a military training program, to supply military personnel for active service, and to meet the needs

Status of Reserve and National Guard Forces of the Armed Services. Second Report of the Interim Subcommittee on Preparedness of the Committee on Armed Services, U. S. Senate. December 1954. Committee print, p. 12.

20th Century Minutemen. A report to the President on the Reserve Forces training program. National Security Training Commission. December 1, 1953. Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1954, pp. 123-130.

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of the civilian economy" as well as to "review military manpower procurement policies and to recommend any (needed) changes." This report, submitted on January 6, 1954, made the following recommendations with the idea that ultimately they would be presented to the Congress:

1. That the National Security Council, on the basis of recommendations by the Department of Defense, determine the size and composition of military Reserve forces needed in the light of current and future national-security requirements.

We do not now have Reserve forces adequately organized and trained to meet the needs of a national emergency

* * *

2. That the Department of Defense prepare for the consideration of the National Security Council a program for the establishment of an "immediately callable Reserve" and of a "selectively callable Reserve," each of appropriate size and composition.

At present there is no clearly identified category of reservists of adequate size and in suitable state of readiness to meet the initial shock of a suddenly expanded need for military manpower

* **

3. That the Department of Defense prepare for the consideration of the National Security Council a training program for the "immediately callable Reserve" *

*

The report strongly urged that those who have a Reserve obligation should receive training so that the Nation could be "assured of support by highly trained Reserves in a state of readiness to enter effectively upon active duty. We do not now have Reserve_training of this character. As a result, we do not have Reserve Forces adequate to the needs of an emergency."

On January 12, 1954, President Eisenhower asked the two officials who had given him these reports-Maj. Gen. Julius Ochs Adler, Chairman of the National Security Training Commission, and Arthur S. Flemming, Director of Defense Mobilization-to combine their talents, and come up with a further study on establishing an adequate Reserve system. Throughout 1954 the study of the military manpower situation, with special emphasis on the problem of trained Reserves, continued to occupy the attention of the executive branch.

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The Department of Defense developed interservice recommendations on the mobilization requirements of the Reserve Forces and sent them in May 1954, to the Office of Defense Mobilization. After these recommendations were presented to the National Security Council on June 17, 1954, the Council requested the Department of Defense and the Office of Defense Mobilization to look into certain revisions. Working closely together, these two agencies sought advice from other parts of the executive branch, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council Planning Board, the Reserve Forces Policy Board, the three military departments, the National Security Training Commission, and the Director of Selective Service. Briefings were also held with various private organizations concerned with the problems of military manpower: the National Guard Association, the Reserve Officers Association, and the State Guard Association. The final presentation of the Reserve program to the National Security Council occurred on November 15, 1954. The result of these combined efforts was the National Reserve Plan.

6 Manpower Resources for National Security. A report to the President by the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization. January 6, 1954. Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1954. Pp.iii-v. 7 New York Times, January 13, 1954, p. 12L.

It was recognized that the success of the plan depended upon the integration of a number of factors: Administration, regulations, appropriations, and legislation. As the President pointed out in his message on military security:

*** recent surveys indicate that certain improvements can be accomplished within the services, without legislation, and steps have been taken to remedy existing deficiencies. I shall follow this action personally with particular attention to training for combat missions.

The President stated, however, that

there is need for certain changes in present laws relating to the Reserves. There are five principal areas where affirmative legislation is needed to provide the basis for a strengthened Reserve plan.3

The deficiencies in the five areas which could be corrected by legislation were described by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel, Mr. Carter L. Burgess, when he appeared to testify before the House Armed Services Subcommittee No. 1 on February 15, 1955. The areas were briefly listed as follows:

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1. Improve the Reserve structure.

2. Supply initially trained young men to the Reserve Forces without adverse effect on the Active Forces.

3. Assure supply of trained personnel to the National Guard by assignment of obligated reservists.

4. Secure compliance with Reserve training participation require

ments.

5. Permit organization in peacetime of State militia.

The need for changes in Reserve legislation stemmed from the weaknesses which had become apparent in the above five areas. The first area-improving the Reserve structure-contained a difference between theory and practice. The theory under which the Ready Reserve was established was that it would be composed of 1,500,000 persons who would be trained as individuals and as units which could be mobilized in a limited emergency declared by the Congress or proclaimed by the President. The theory was also that a system would be devised whereby trainees would flow into the Ready Reserve so that ultimately it would not be composed primarily of prior servicemen. This part of the law was never implemented, however, so that in practice the Ready Reserve was made up of men who had already seen service and who were automatically placed in Reserve components to complete their total military obligation when they had finished their tour of duty in the Regular Forces. This meant that in an emergency the same men would be called twice.

Another point was that the men who were placed in the Ready Reserve had to make individual application for transfer into the Standby Reserve, but many who were eligible did not apply, while those who could become eligible by participating in a training program had not done so. The numbers of men discharged from active service thus caused the Ready Reserve to exceed its statutory limitation. Mr. Burgess testified that we had 2,546,000 in the Ready Reserve (including 300,000 on active duty). Only 700,000 of the 2,200,000 Ready reservists not on active duty were participating in paid-training programs, and this number was not considered adequate for an emergency. Thus the term "Ready" had come to mean that the individual

H. Doc. No. 68, 84th Cong., p. 3.

National Reserve Plan. Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1 of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, 84th Cong., 1st sess. February-March 1955. Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955. Pp. 1407-1469.

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