of training which can be given. These restraints are summarized, in part, in paragraph 18, above.

c. In addition to certain prohibitions against offenses by drill instructors against the person of recruits and certain prohibitions designed to prevent drill instructors from using excessive or unauthorized training as punishment, the problem is approached from the positive point of view by directing drill instructors to afford recruits certain rights and privileges. Those directives are summarized, in part, in paragraph 17, above.

d. Additional regulations are directed toward the personnel of the command as a whole, and are born of the order and discipline required of a military post. These include certain safety regulations. Among this type of orders are that prohibiting swimming in tidal waters in and around Parris Island, and that prohibiting the possession or use of alcoholic beverages in barracks.

e. Specifically, an analysis of orders pertaining to entry into marshlands, based upon the above reasoning, will demonstrate why additional orders are not extant or necessary. The local marshes have never been, and are not now, a source of danger to human life, limb, or health. They are constantly used by fishermen and hunters, and there has not, to my knowledge, been a death or injury attributable to the marshes in this area. To prohibit entry upon the theory of danger to life or health would require the regulation to apply to the entire command, which is not considered warranted under the circumstances. It would remove an important recreational and morale factor for permanent personnel.

f. It is pointed out that the scheduling of recruits is so complete in detail that they have no occasion, whatsoever, to enter a marsh except on the trip to Elliot's Beach. Entry into the marshes in that area has been prohibited. Although it is not shown in the record, the prohibition was not made as a safety factor, because the marshes are not considered dangerous. I am advised that the restriction was imposed in 1954 when scouting and patrolling was taught as a part of recruit training in order to prevent recruits who were off course on a night compass march from becoming unduly muddy. It has been retained to prevent the platoons from getting muddy while in the area.

g. In view of the adequate facilities at this depot for all phases of legitimate recruit activity, it is considered that the taking of any recruit platoon into the marshes stems from an improper motive such as mass punishment, and under proper conditions could amount to maltreatment. That such conduct is considered prohibited is eloquently demonstrated by the action of the commander of the guard, the officer of the day and the commanding officer of Weapons Training Battalion when they heard a platoon was in the marsh and before it was suspected that anyone was dead or injured; the drill instructor was ordered to be relieved, and in, fact, was arrested before the drownings were known.

h. Even so, had marches into marsh areas been recurrent at this command, an order prohibiting such entry by recruits would have been in order. As is shown by paragraph 27, below, such has not been the case, and until now there has been no reason to anticipate that this type of conduct might require special attention. i. It should be particularly noted, however, that the specific case of platoon 71 does not involve the marshes as such-it involves a march into a tidal stream. The platoon, in its march to Ribbon Creek, avoided the marshes, and went an additional 1,000 feet to a point where the creek approached within 100 feet of firm dry ground. The marsh was little more than an extension of the bank of the creek and was crossed at right angles as an expedient to reach the stream. i. It is felt that existing regulations, including directives and prohibitions, are sufficient, if obeyed, to prevent any incident of the type in question. In view of the numerous directives and orders broken by Staff Sergeant McKeon on Sunday, April 8, 1956, by drinking intoxicating beverages in the barracks before a recruit and while on duty, by conducting unauthorized field days on Sunday, by marching his platoon in such conditions of temperature and dampness as to constitute maltreatment, by marching his platoon at night without lights, and by swimming and causing his troops to swim in waters around Parris Island-it is highly unlikely that an additional order prohibiting some 100 feet of the march would have been heeded.

27. The second question that arises is: Knowing that the marching of recruits into marshlands is prohibited, is there a practice to do so that is known and condoned at this command? The answer is found in the testimony of 13 witnesses who were queried on the point. Of the 13, 11 had no knowledge of a platoon being taken into marsh areas, and 2 had hearsay testimony of something of that nature in the remote past. Staff Sergeant Huff stated (R. 128, Q. 42-47) he had "heard" of platoons being taken in the swamps when he first came here in 1954. Upon further examination he testified that it had never been done in a platoon

of which he had been a drill instructor, nor had it been done in a battalion to which he belonged (R. 132, Q. 94-96). He stated he had never heard of it being done with platoons of the 2d, 3d, or 4th Recruit Training Battalions, but had heard of platoons of the 1st Battalion being "out there" (R. 133, Q. 101–105). Queried further, he revealed he had never seen a platoon in the marshes, but at some time last summer, while drinking at the staff NCO club, he heard a man whom he did not know remark he (the man) had seen a platoon "in the boondocks in the First Battalion" (R. 133, Q. 107-110). The only other witness who had heard of a platoon in the swamps was Col. William B. McKean who testified he heard of a "rash of marching" in the swamps in Elliot's Beach area which motivated the prohibition of it at some earlier date (R. 226-227, Q. 54-58). Court exhibit 10 shows the prohibition existed in March 1955. It is believed Colonel McKean referred to the wandering into the marsh of recruits who were on night compass marches in 1954 when scouting and patrolling was taught as part of the recruit training program. However, the point is immaterial, since the record shows that entries into marshes in that area were halted over a year ago. The 11 witnesses who had no knowledge of marching or training in marsh areas (before April 8, 1956) were: Sgt. Richard J. King, junior drill instructor of platoon 71 (R. 138, Q. 59–64); Col. David W. Silvey, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, since September 1953 (R. 183, Q. 40-42); T. Sgt. John D. Perdeus, liaison NCO, Weapons Training Battalion since November 1955 (R. 240, Q. 42-43); Capt. Charles E. Patrick, officer of the day, Weapons Training Battalion (R. 250-251, Q. 90-91); Lt. Col. Robert A. Thompson, Commanding Officer of Third Recruit Training Battalion (R. 257–258, Q. 20–30; R. 269, Q. 28-29; 1st Sgt. Herschel L. Baker, Field Sergeant Major of Third Recruit Training Battalion (R. 302, Q. 26-27); M. Sgt. Hans C. Manthey, chief drill instructor, A Company, Third Recruit Training Battalion (R. 310, Q. 51-54); Capt. J. D. Greene, Assistant Depot Adjutant and former Adjutant of the Third Recruit Training Battalion (R. 232, Q. 14); and, with respect to platoon 71, three recruits; Privates Moran (R. 11, Q. 78) Porter (R. 17, Q. 59–60) and Rambo (R. 29, Q. 48). These 13 witnesses represent a cross-section of personnel at this depot from recruits to colonels with 3 years of local duty. Assuming that 1 or 2 platoons may have been marched in the marshes during the past year, the record proves that it is not a practice, and that isolated instances (if any) are not known to the command. It therefore could not be condoned.

28. At the conclusion of the proceedings, counsel for the party requested immunity for certain unnamed prospective witnesses. Conditions under which immunity would be considered were announced to the counsel (R. 238–239), and no witnesses were produced. The court offered to produce any witness desired by the party (R. 329), but no witnesses were requested. A close examination of the remarks of the counsel indicates they were made for effect, only, and they are not considered as evidence. It is considered that if there was any witness who could testify to any matter favorably affecting the interests of the party the witness would have been requested. But assuming that the party knew of 1 or 2 individuals who at sometime may have taken a platoon into the marshlands, and who would testify if granted immunity, it is obvious from the manifestations of guilty knowledge that such conduct was undertaken surrepticiously, and is not known to any responsible person at the command. The acts could not therefore be condoned. The fact that others, unknown to this command or its subordinate units, had on rare occasions taken a platoon into the marshes would in no way explain or excuse the conduct of the party; particularly since the act of the party involves marching into a tidal stream, and not into a marsh.

29. A third question involves the supervision by this command over recruits to see that they are not physically harmed; in short: was the supervision over recruit platoons adequate? Paragraphs 13, 14, 15, and 16, above, detail the findings with respect to supervision supported by the record. It should be emphasized here, however, that no attempt is made to maintain a commissioned officer physically present with each platoon at all times. To the contrary, drill instructors have been selected with meticulous care, and are considered to be as reliable as younger, less experienced junior officers. The duty drill instructor is considered to be on a true duty status with his platoon. He should require no closer supervision than any other duty noncommissioned officer. Experience has taught that, with rare exceptions, the drill instructor is worthy of his trust. Even so, officer supervision is considered important, and for this reason all company administrative duties have been removed from recruit training companies in order to permit the officers to spend more time with the troops. Additional officer supervision is not indicated by the record of proceedings. Also, additional security is not indicated. At the time of the incident there were, on duty at this depot, a staff duty

officer, a depot officer of the day, a depot guard including roving motor patrols, 7 battalion officers of the day, 5 commanders of the guard, and the duty complement from 7 battalion guards. Also, each platoon had a duty drill instructor on duty.

30. The disestablishment of the post of liaison duty officer at the rifle range in February 1955 is noted. In the 14 months that have ensued there has been no indication that its existence is necessary or desirable, nor has the commanding officer of Weapons Training Battalion requested additional assistance of any kind in providing local security and supervision. The old liaison duty officer not only duplicated the functions and duties of the officer of the day at the Weapons Training Battalion (R. 322, Q. 4–11), but the orders for that officer did not place him in the chain of command of the commanding officer of the Weapons Training Battalion. He was assigned from one of the recruit battalions and was responsible to three different officers in his performance of duty (Ct. Ex. 19a). The commanding officer of the Weapons Training Battalion is charged with operational control over the separate platoons of each Recruit Training Battalion when at the rifle range (Ct. Ex. 9a, par. B. 4; R. 216, Q. 4). The officers acting for him or assisting him to discharge his duties and assume his responsibilities must be under his command. Proper military functioning dictates that they come from his own organization. Duplication of effort by and assignment of dual responsibilities to two separate officers of the day within a single battalion is unsound and unnecessary. The supervision exercised by the officer of the day and his commander of the guard at the Weapons Training Battalion is entirely adequate and within proper command channels (see R. 107, Q. 7; R. 244–246. Q. 9–36). The area in which platoon 71 was billeted was inspected at least eight times on April 8, 1956, by either the officer of the day or the commander of the guard.

31. The last question discussed as such is: Were the deaths an outgrowth of the training program? This question is emphatically answered in the negative by the findings. Paragraphs 7 and 8, above, reflect that there is not, in any part of the recruit-training program, a night march, a march into the marshlands, a march or exercise into or across salt water, a scouting and patrolling exercise, a compass march, or any other activity remotely related to a night march into a marsh or tidal stream. The march could not have been conducted for purposes of drill, because no cadence was kept, no orders were given, and the platoon traveled without march discipline. The platoon traveled a distance of 4,500 feet to an area over 1⁄2 mile from their barracks where no training was authorized to be conducted. It is conclusive that the deaths did not occur during the execution of or preparation for any phase of the recruit training program.

32. It is observed that not all survivors of platoon 71 were called as witnesses before the court of inquiry. I have ascertained that each survivor was questioned at length by the Investigation Section of the Provost Marshal's Office and by the counsel for the court of inquiry, and that those having information material to the issues before the court of inquiry were called. The remainder apparently could contribute nothing to the proceedings except repetition. To interrogate them on the record would serve to unduly lengthen the record and delay its completion. The statements of the survivors which were not called were submitted to the party for examination (R. 326) and he was given an opportunity to interrogate and call as a witness any and all survivors.

33. The record shows that several survivors of the march were taken to the sick bay, but is silent as to the extent of their injuries, if any. It has been determined that each survivor was returned to duty not later than noon of April 9, 1956. There were no injuries to them of a permanent nature, and no loss of time in excess of 1 day.

34. In view of the foregoing, it is my studied opinion that the march which resulted in the deaths of six young marines was not a part of or in preparation for any phase of the authorized recruit training program; that this command, including subordinate units, has taken all reasonable precautions from the standpoint of regulations, training, supervision, and security to prevent foreseeable conduct injurious to the person or property of recruits; that the march was born of a zealous but unreasoning desire to prevent future conduct considered in breach of discipline among recruits of platoon 71; that Staff Sergeant McKeon willfully and deliberately violated the known policies of this command with respect to methods of recruit training in order to substitute unauthorized methods of his own; that the march was undertaken not only without authority, but in direct contravention of directives and prohibitions regulating the conduct of drill instructors toward recruits; that Staff Sergeant McKeon had no reason to believe, and indeed did not believe, that the march was within the scope of his duties or authority; that the immediate purpose of the march was to inflict fear and physical discomfort upon

members of the platoon as a result of former conduct considered to be in breach of discipline and to prevent similar future conduct considered in breach of discipline; that the march was undertaken without intent to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm on anyone; that the portion of the march conducted in a tidal stream of unknown depth in darkness with troops, some of whom could not swim, was undertaken with a wanton disregard for the reasonably foreseeable consequence that death might result; and that the deaths of the six men named in the findings resulted from the fault and negligence of S. Sgt. Matthew C. McKeon, United States Marine Corps, a person in the naval service.

35. Subject to the foregoing, the proceedings, findings, opinions, and recommendations are approved. The deaths of the six subject persons are considered to have occurred in line of duty and not as a result of their own misconduct.

36. The charge sheets against Sgt. Richard J. King and T. Sgt. Elwyn B. Scarborough have been forwarded to their respective immediate commanding officers. It is contemplated that disciplinary action will be taken.

37. This headquarters concurs that S. Sgt. Matthew C. McKeon should be tried by general court-martial for the offenses alleged in the charge sheet dated April 20, 1956, which accompanied the record of proceedings and which is enclosed as enclosure (1). Counsel for the party raised the question, in his argument, of the competency of the undersigned to act upon the record of proceedings of this court of inquiry. In view of the administrative nature of the proceedings I do not consider myself in any way disqualified to act on the basic record. The position and objections of the counsel for the party were not directed to my qualifications to convene a general court-martial; however, the rationale is more nearly appropriate to such action. The incident has had a profound effect upon all members of this command and it is doubtful if a court could be assembled of personnel from this command who have not formed an opinion on some material issue. Although I do not consider myself disqualified to convene a court-martial to try the charges and specifications appended as enclosure (1), I consider that my refraining from doing so will avoid the issue and prevent any breath of suspicion with regard to the trial. The charges and specifications are, therefore, forwarded herewith with the recommendation that they be referred for trial to a general court-martial convened by higher authority.

38. As a result of the foregoing investigation, this headquarters proposes to take the following action:

a. Issue an order at depot level placing all marshes, tidal streams, beaches, and waters out-of-bounds for recruit training;

b. Initiate a study to revise the language and approach of certain lesson plans in drill instructors school.

c. Initiate an independent investigation into the conduct of recruits of platoon 71 while in the waters of Ribbon Creek to explore more fully the possibility of meritorious conduct on the part of individual recruits, with particular reference to Pvt. Thomas C. Hardeman, 1587021, United States Marine Corps (deceased). J. C. BURGER.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gavin, do you have any comment you want to make?

Mr. GAVIN. Well, I would say that the general has outlined to us the policies and programs that he intends to pursue. And I trust that the policies and programs that you have outlined to us here today will be carried through. And also the fact that other incidents that have occurred previous to this incident to which the general refers will be answered as you have covered in your statement here today.

Evidently, there have been a number of complaints before this tragic incident occurred, and the conditions that existed there should have been corrected.

But we are now assured that these conditions are going to be taken care of and that sometime in the very near future that the general is to come before the committee or executives from the Department of the Marine Corps, and tell us what progress is being made and what they intend to do to clear up evident deficiencies.

I realize fully that training boys for the horrors and hardships of war is a very difficult problem, following the television programs each Sunday night-Guadalcanal invasion and Bougainville and Saipan

and Tinian Islands-and last Sunday night observed the Marines evacuating the Chosan Reservoir, which was really a tough, rugged, hard assignment, and they had to be trained to the minute to meet the demands that were made upon them in that evacuation and breakthrough, when they were surrounded by the Communist Chinese troops, fighting to get back to their lines. Any boy who was not trained and trained well could never have stood up under the rigors of that evacuation.

It evidenced to me the need for training to meet the horrors and hardships of war, the cold and the heat, the filth and fatigue, and the misery and mud of mechanized warfare. But nevertheless along with it there should be some commonsense used in these training programs, and I am now satisfied after listening to the statement of the general that the general is going to pursue policies and programs that will bring about a more favorable attitude than has been evidenced to us in some of these complaints that have been made. I want to compliment our very good and able chairman Mr. Vinson for his fine statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gavin.

Mr. Rivers.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, first, I want to say that, along with the distinguished members who have spoken before, I agree with the proposal you have outlined. I think it is the only sensible course to

pursue.

Secondly, I agree in a great measure with the statement of our distinguished South Carolinian who heads the Marine Corps.

Of course, General Pate, we who know you are proud of you. We are not surprised that you are not reluctant to avoid your responsibility. That is your background, and we expect it, and we know that you will do it.

General PATE. Thank you, sir.

Mr. RIVERS. We know of the great record you have. And history knows whether or not the training of the Marine Corps on the high seas and in every nook and cranny of the world has been successful. History will have to answer that.

I think it has been successful.

But we are confronted with 1 or 2 things I just want to inquire about.

One has said sometime in the past something to this effect, "No storied urn or no animated bust can restore to life the fleeting breath." We know these boys are gone. That is lamentable. That is one thing which we all grieve on.

Some overenergetic newspaper reporter asked me when this thing came about, about an inquiry, and I told him exactly, to the limit of my obvious equivocation in speaking, that I could not speak plainly to him, so he misquoted me, which happens to all of us. But I said we ought to have an inquiry. I said then just what Mr. Vinson recommends this morning, that you should have your day before this committee, and I agree with the procedure outlined by that distinguished sage, at whose feet I have sat for 16 years, like Saint Paul at the feet of Gamaliel. And I do not regret having sat at his feet. I learned a lot, a lot of us. I think your statement has been good. But General Pate, you have been reluctant.

Now, I have represented Parris Island to the best of my ability, along with this committee, Mr. Vinson to the greater part, for a long