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if it is seen that he treats alike, according to their merits, all subject to his authority. This feeling is natural. Nature is impartial in the application of its laws. It allows no exemption. Its fires burn the weak as well as the strong, the child as well as the man, the poor as well as the rich. One star differs from another star in glory, but no one of all the millions of stars is exempt from any of the laws set by nature for stars.

This feeling of right to impartiality of treatment had some faint expression in the Massachusetts "Body of Liberties" of 1641, in which it was declared that the liberties, etc., therein enumerated should be enjoyed "impartially" by all persons within the jurisdiction of the colony. It was more distinctly recognized in the Connecticut Declaration of 1818 and a part of the Connecticut Bill of Rights today, "That all men when they form a social compact are equal in rights and that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." Again it appears in the

federal and some state constitutions in the provision against the granting of titles of nobility. It seems to be at least impliedly recognized in the XIVth amendment to the United States Constitution in the clause that no state "shall deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," since "the equal protection of the laws" necessarily implies protection against unequal laws, laws favoring some at the expense of others or of the whole. If the state favors one more than another it does deny that other equal protection. I do not subscribe to the doctrine that "the greatest good of the greatest number" is to be sought. The only legitimate search is for the good of the whole number without discrimination for or against any one. This sentiment found expression in the once popular slogan, "Equal rights for all. Special privileges for none." I say once popular, for today it would seem not popular in practice. True, special privileges are still loudly denounced, but under the name of special exemptions, they are

still demanded by those who denounce them

most loudly.

It is not inequality of natural powers of body or mind, nor inequality in natural conditions, that excites this feeling of resentment I have noted. The man of feeble natural powers may envy him of strong natural powers, but he can see that society, that law, is not responsible for that inequality. If one finds himself from lack of natural ability or adaptiveness unable to accomplish what others of superior ability or adaptiveness easily accomplish, and hence he fails to receive the prize they so easily win, he may feel great disappointment and regret, but if honest with himself will not attribute his failure to the injustice of society.

It is not essential to the preservation of society and the race that such inequalities should be removed, that all men should be reduced to a dead level of capacity, that human nature should be ignored. It is strongly felt, however, that society should not itself create artificial inequal

ities, should not allow one man or set of men a liberty it will not allow to others, should not impose burdens on one man or set of men to be borne by them alone while others are exempt; or if it does undertake to do so it should be able to demonstrate that such artificial inequality is necessary for the safety of all. The intensity of this feeling against artificial inequalities is so great that men sometimes prefer equality before the law even to liberty. When the British ambassador said to Madam De Stael that Frenchmen had no more liberty after the Revolution than before, she answered that they had acquired equality before the law and they preferred that to more liberty. This sentiment was tersely and well expressed in the French Declaration of Rights of 1795. “Equality consists in this, that the law is the same for all whether it protects or punishes."

Of course, no assertion of rights can be carried to the extent of the dictum, "Fiat Justitia ruat

Respublica," for if the state fall, all hopes of

justice fall with it. When the alternative is the conquest of the particular society by invasion or its disorganization by rebellion or rioting or otherwise, some of its members must submit to the sacrifice of some or all of their rights. Nature will sacrifice individuals for the preservation of the race. Society must sometimes do the same. "Inter arma silent leges." But such times are exceptional and not within the scope of our inquiry.

To sum up the matter, justice is the according to every one his right, and that right is such freedom of action in gratifying one's desires as can be exercised in harmony with like freedom by others. In other words, it is equal freedom, equal restraint. It is order and harmony. Plato and Aristotle were right in teaching that order is an essential element of justice.

But who is to determine the matter? Who is to determine what degree of restraint or liberty is necessary to secure this order and harmony, this justice? Obviously it is society, or rather,

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