generally. 1606 The use of municipal zoning ordinances to restrict the 1608 location of "adults" theatres was upheld by the Supreme Court in Young v. American Mini Theatres. 1607 The Detroit ordinance challenged in Young prohibited "adult" theatres from being located within 1000 feet of any two other "regulated uses" or within 500 feet of any residential area. A theatre was classified as "adult" if it presented "material distinguished or characterized by an emphasis on matter depicting, describing, or relating to 'specified sexual activities' or 'specified anatomical areas' as defined elsewhere in the ordinance. 1609 The Court found that Detroit enacted the zoning ordinance based on the opinions of urban planners and real estate experts who believed that, the location of several such business in the 1610 In a plurality opinion, the Court rejected challenges to the ordinance based on vagueness and prior restraint. 1611 The Court found that the only vagueness question related to the quantum of 1606 Id. 1607 427 U.S. 50(1976). 1608 Id. at 52. 1609 Id. at 53. 1610 Id. at 55. 1611 Id. at 61. sexually explicit activity that must be portrayed in order for the material to be "characterized by an emphasis" on such matter. 1612 The Court reasoned that for most films the question was "readily answerable" and in doubtful cases, the ordinance was "readily subject to a narrow construction by the state courts."1613 The ordinance did not amount to a prior restraint of speech since the theatres were not prevented from showing the movies and viewers were not prevented from seeing them.c 1614 Court stated that, The mere fact that the commercial The The separate zoning classification for adult theatres was also not violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 1616 The classification established by the Detroit ordinance adequately supported by the city's interest in the present and future character of its neighborhoods. 1617 was The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the validity of zoning ordinances that restrict the location of adult theatres in Renton v. Playtime Theatres. 1618 Relying on Young v. American Mini-Theatres, a seven member majority of the Court upheld an ordinance enacted by the city of Renton, Washington, that prohibited adult movie theatres from locating within 1000 feet of any residential zone, single or multiple family dwelling, church, park, or school. The definition of adult theatres was 1619 almost identical to that in Young but also included showings of prevent crime, protect the city's retail trade, it The Court went on to analyze whether the ordinance was designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and whether allowed for reasonable alternative avenues of communication. The city of Renton had relied heavily on the experience of and studies produced by the neighboring city of Seattle. 1623 1618 Slip. op. No. 84-1360 (Feb. 25, 1986). The Court ruled that, The First Amendment does not require a city, Reasonable alternative avenues of communication were found to be available in that 520 acres or more than five percent of the land area of Renton was left open for use as adult theatre locations.1625 Justice William Rehnquist wrote for the majority, That respondents must fend for themselves in He added that the First Amendment does not compel the government to "ensure that adult theatres or any other kinds of speech related businesses bargain prices." 1627 I will be able to obtain sites at These two decisions make it very clear that the Supreme Court will uphold what Justice Rehnquist called "the essence of zoning" and enable local jurisdictions to preserve the quality of life in their communities by restricting the locations of adult movie theatres. 1628 1624 Id. at 9-10. 1626 Id. at 12. 1627 Id. 1628 Id. The law of obscenity encompasses a myriad of legal issues. 1629 As Chief Justice Burger wrote in Miller v. California, consideration of these issues does not present "an easy road, free from difficulty."1630 The Chief Justice resolutely declared that "no amount of fatigue' should lead us to adopt a convenient 'institutional' rationale an absolutist, 'everything goes' view of the First Amendment burden." 1631 |