tutions and their oratory, actually impose various forms of control over the press, and would have written these proposed controls into the treaties. But in the end, at Lake Success, all these hazards were excluded from the combined AmericanFrench convention.

When work was begun on the third, or British convention, the difficulties pyramided. The list of specific exemptions, bad enough as it came from Geneva, was made considerably worse. It was voted, for example, to add to the explicit bases on which guarantees of freedom could be suspended, the following grounds:

For the prevention of the diffusion of reports for racial, national or religious discrimi

nation.

For preventing the diffusion of false or distorted reports which undermine friendly relations between peoples or States.

It will readily be seen that such vague and general stipulations would permit the complete nullification of any guarantees of freedom. The British denounced their own convention, with these additions, and supported a proposal to defer work on it until the Fourth Assembly should meet in September. By that time, it was hoped that diplomatic interchanges would have removed some difficulties.

To some delegations, the British convention (now called the second convention) consists of obligations of the press, while the first convention consists of privileges for the press. This is not the viewpoint of the British, American, or other delegations. But the great majority of have-not nations (they "have not" large, powerful press associations or the concept of the free press which has grown up in Englishspeaking and western-European countries) have little enthusiasm for the first convention. They insist that the two conventions must be coupled together. Partly to meet this view, it was agreed not to open the first convention to signature and ratification (although it is completed) until the second convention has been disposed of. That will be the task of the Fourth Assembly.

V

THE FUTURE

There will be many sticky problems ahead, before the second convention is either amended so that American, British and other governments can accept it, or is placed indefinitely on the shelf. If it is adopted, against British-American protests, they and a considerable number of nations can never sign it. Possibly their reluctance will doom the first convention, too, as a reprisal by the other nations which do not like it.

There are, therefore, the following alternative possibilities as the outcome of these years of United Nations' effort:

(1) The first convention on Gathering and International Transmission of News and the International Right of Correction may be signed and ratified. It should then prove to be a moderate and practical aid to news-gathering and dissemination

in many parts of the world. Since the Soviet Union and its satellites have repeatedly proclaimed their deep repugnance for the treaty, they are most unlikely to sign it. Therefore the treaty would do no immediate good in the areas where restrictions are greatest. It would not directly help to lift the iron curtain. But it would be of value, all the same. It would be a beginning: an initial charter of liberties for the indispensable act of gathering and transmitting news, with the addition of the right of

correction.

(2) The second convention on Freedom of Information may be signed and ratified. Even if improved, it is unlikely that the United States would find it worth while to support this document. Its advantages, such as they may be, are to be duplicated in the Covenant on Human Rights. The convention, at best, is a noble declaration of principles. At worst, it could be the basis of restrictive action, serving perhaps to nullify the advantages of the first convention, and even worse, to set up barriers and controls which do not exist.

(3) The United States Senate might choose not to ratify the first convention. In that case, if other nations did so and the treaty came into operation, all its guarantees and advantages could be limited legally to correspondents and information agencies of signatory states. American correspondents and agencies could be the victims of the most severe discriminations in history. This is a serious possibility, which calls for careful study.

(4) Both conventions may fail the necessary signatures or ratifications, for one reason or another. In that case, the primary blame can be placed on today's international climate, which has certainly not turned out to be salubrious for new freedoms in areas where they are now restricted.

Two great facts stand out. One is the familiar truth on the basis of which the entire freedom of information crusade is premised: that it is highly important to the cause of peace and understanding to reduce present barriers. This will remain true whatever happens to the present crusade. But these experiences may raise great questions regarding the possibility of freedom coming through governmental action. It is quite likely that greater progress could now be made through cooperative efforts of the information media themselves.

The second fact is that the United States and its news organs are in the line of fire, which is perhaps the unavoidable fate of a great power. There is much resentment against these agencies on the part of foreign governments-though not necessarily on the part of foreign newspapers or peoples. Our newspapers and information agencies are big, strong, rich, powerful. They are a tempting target. Everyone wants to get his story in the American press, nearly everyone feels he is misrepresented there.

If the United Nations, or any other organism, is to make genuine progress toward reducing information barriers, it will be because the press itself has awakened far more realistically than at present to the essence of the problem.

NATIONAL MINORITIES: A CASE STUDY IN

INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION

MARY GARDINER JONES*

INTRODUCTION

Characteristic of twentieth century society is its increasing emphasis on the group as a means for the individual to realize many of his basic aims and desires.1 As one authority has pointed out, “the scale of a modern society, the mobility, the range of communications, the variety of interests, the necessities of specializationall these combine to make any modern society . . . multi-group society." The same author has emphasized the necessity for achieving a decent ordering of those intergroup relations if democracy is to flourish. A special aspect of this problem is presented by those groups which are formed not by reason of the special economic, social, or political interests of their members but rather by virtue of the similarity of their members with respect to race, language, or religion. The problem of the relationship of such "national minorities" to the majority is complicated by the fact of their frequent identification either in their own minds or in the minds of the majority with another political state which may represent a different cultural pattern, different traditions, and in some cases wholly different principles and values. Thus the factors involved in a harmonious adjustment of these intergroup relations are peculiarly international in nature and have accordingly given rise to demands for an international solution.

While both the Hungarian3 and the proposed Austrian peace treaties as well as •B.A. 1943, Wellesley College; LL.B. 1948, Yale University. Member of the New York bar.

1 A moment's reflection will conjure up countless groups with which an individual associates himself in order to accomplish certain ends. Labor unions, employers' associations, lobbies, Masons, Rotaries, women's and professional groups, literary and musical clubs, represent only a few which could be listed. One evidence of the importance of such group activity can be seen in the persecution of Free Mason groups in Germany and France by Hitler and his henchmen during World War II, and in the present attempts by the eastern European regimes to break down the dominance of the Roman Catholic Church. To destroy the group is to vitiate the effectiveness of the individual member. See in this connection, MacIver, Summation in GROUP RELATIONS AND GROUP ANTAGONISMS 215, 222 (1944); and Cole, Europe's Conflict of Cultures, id. at 121.

2

* MacIver, Group Images and Group Realities in GROUP RELATIONS AND GROUP ANTAGONISMS 3, 6 (1944).

All the peace treaties concluded with Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and Finland contain provisions obligating these countries to secure to all inhabitants the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Italy: Art. 15; Bulgaria: Art. 2; Hungary: Art. 2; Rumania: Art. 3; Finland: Art. 6. (Dep't State Pub. 2743, Eur. Ser. 21 (1947)). In addition, provisions with respect to nationality and option rights are contained in the Italian peace treaty (Arts. 19 and 20). Only the Hungarian treaty, however, contains any specific reference to minorities. In Article 5 of this treaty, Hungary has obligated herself to negotiate with Czechoslovakia for the solution of the problem of inhabitants of Magyar ethnic origin residing in Czechoslovakia.

According to reports, agreement has been reached on the rights and privileges to be enjoyed by the Slovene and Croat minorities in Austria. These rights include: (1) equality of treatment between

5

certain national constitutions, contain some provision for the protection of minority rights, countless minority groups throughout the world remain without legal protection of any kind. Considerable progress has been achieved by the United Nations in securing certain basic rights to every individual regardless of race, color, creed, or nationality, but the formulation of a similar charter for the protection of group rights or as they are more popularly referred to, minority rights-has made little progress.7

One major source of difficulty arises from the complexities of the group types which might form the object of protection, and from the unwillingness of states to accord legal recognition to what they regard as external interference with their domestic affairs. Another stems from a lack of conviction as to the necessity for special group protection in addition to that sought to be accorded to the individual. minority and majority including the right to form their own organizations, to hold meetings, and to maintain their own press; (2) the right to primary school education in their own language and to secondary education in their own schools; (3) recognition of Croat and Slovene languages as official for administrative and judicial purposes in areas where minorities are resident; (4) the right to share equally in the judicial and administrative system in these areas; and (5) the right to protection against activities of any organization designed to deprive them of their minority character and rights. N. Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1949, p. 9, col. 1.

5

See, for example, ALBANIAN CONST. Art. 35, guaranteeing national minorities the right to enjoy equality of treatment with other citizens and the freedom to use their own language and develop their own culture; Australia, Sec. 51, empowering Parliament to enact legislation with respect to the people of any race for whom it is deemed necessary to enact special laws; Belgium, Art. 23, providing that the use of languages in Belgium is optional and that legislation may be enacted for its regulation with regard to the acts of public authorities and for judicial proceedings; Brazil, Art. 168, requiring that all primary schooling be given in the national language; Bulgaria, Art. 79, granting national minorities the right to be educated in their vernacular and to develop their national culture; Burma, Art. 22, prohibiting discrimination with regard to the admission into state educational institutions against religious, racial, or linguistic minorities and prohibiting the imposition of religious instruction upon such minorities; Bylo Russian Sov. and Soc. Rep. Art. 86, guaranteeing minorities free use of their language in judicial proceedings; Canada, (Br. N. Am. Act 1867, sec. 133), providing for use of English or French in legislative debates and judicial proceedings; China, Art. 168, providing that legal protection is to be accorded to racial groups in the border areas and that the state shall take positive action for the development of educational culture, public health, and economic and social enterprises of racial groups in the border areas; Czechoslovakia (draft of new constitution not available); Finland, Art. 14, providing that both Finnish and Swedish shall be the national language; Italy, Art. 6, declaring it to be the duty of the state to protect linguistic minorities; Panama, Art. 81, requiring authorization in order to teach in a foreign language, and Art. 94, guaranteeing special protecting to peasants and indigenous communities in order to integrate them into the national life and yet to preserve and develop the value of their autochthonous culture; Transjordan, Art. 21, conferring rights on various "societies" to establish and maintain their own schools; Ukranian Soc. Sov. Rep. and U.S.S.R. (see provisions of Const. of ByloRussian Soc. Sov. Rep.); Yugoslavia, Art. 13, extending the right to national minorities to enjoy their own cultural development and free use of their own language. YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 1947; also U. N. Doc. E/C.N. 4/Sub. 2/4 (Oct. 8, 1947).

6 In the United Nations Charter is recorded the solemn obligation of the member nations to promote and encourage universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion (Arts. 1, 13, 55, 56, 76); and to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self determination of peoples (Art. 1). U. N. CHARTER (Dep't State Pub. 2353, Conf. Ser. 74).

On December 10, 1948, the General Assembly unanimously approved a Declaration on Human Rights enumerating the basic civil, political, economic, and social rights which should be secured to every individual in pursuance of the U. N. Charter provisions. For text, see Dep't State Pub. 3381 (Int. Org. and Conf. Ser. III, 20) U. N. Doc. No. A/811, Dec. 16, 1948.

See infra pp. 624-626.

In order to assess these difficulties, and to explore the potentialities of international protection for group rights, it is necessary to have some understanding first, of the basic problems of minorities and second, of the experience of the League of Nations in what represented the first attempt on the part of the international community to implement minority protection by the collective guarantee of a neutral international organization.

I

THE PROBLEM OF MINORITIES

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8

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Groups differing from a majority of the population by reason of their race, language, or religion exist throughout the Western Hemisphere, Europe, the Middle East,10 and the Southeast Asian area. In some cases, the presence of minority groups in these areas has resulted from entirely voluntary immigration;1 in other cases it has been brought about by conquest or wartime territorial transfers;18 and in still others as a result of treaty commitments unrelated to such wartime transfers.14

Frequently a close correlation exists between the origin of the minority and its general attitude towards the members of the dominant group to which it is attached. Both factors are influential in the policy of the majority towards its minority groups. Thus a minority which has voluntarily emigrated to a country such as the United States, for example, attempts to assimilate itself as quickly as possible into the American way of life. It therefore affords less provocation to the dominant group

8 For discussion of minority groups in the United States, see Nelson, Religion and Racial Tension in America Today in APPROACHES TO NATIONAL UNITY 544 (1945); and Ascoli, The Italian Americans in GROUP RELATIONS AND GROUP ANTAGONISMS 31 (1944); for similar discussion of minority groups in Latin America, see Tannenbaum, Minorities in Latin America in GROUP RELATIONS AND GROUP ANTAGONISMS 171 (1944).

In eleven East-Central European States, for example, the proportion of minorities in the total population ranges from a low of 8 per cent (Czechoslovakia) to a high of 31 per cent (Poland). The number of minority groups in each state ranges from two (Albania) to eight (Yugoslavia). For more complete data, see Cole, Europe's Conflict of Cultures in GROUP RELATIONS AND GROUP ANTAGONISMS 121 (1944); also OSCAR I. JANOWSKY, NATIONALITIES AND NATIONAL MINORITIES (1945).

10 A. HOURAMI, MINORITIES IN THE ARAB WORLD (1947).

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Most of the Southeast Asian nations and territories are populated by Indians, Chinese, Hindus, and a variety of other miscellaneous racial and nationality groups. For details on minority problems and cultural frictions in Burma, see C. H. T. CROSTHWAITE, THE PACIFICATION OF BURMA (1912); for Indonesia, see JOHN S. FURNIVALL, NETHERLANDS INDIA (1944), and Indonesia: Crossroads in American Policy, I AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE 382 (1947); for the Malayan Peninsula, see Rawlings, Malaya (Pamph. 1945); and Barnett, Malaya in Development of Self Rule and Independence in Burma, Malaya and THE PHILIPPINES; for India, see Shridharani, Minorities and the Autonomy of India in GROUP RELATIONS AND GROUP ANTAGONISMS 199 (1944).

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13

14

For example, in the United States and in certain of the Southeast Asian countries.

Europe of course constitutes the best example of this type, see note 9 supra.

Perhaps the most familiar example of this type is the Indian immigration into South Africa during the 19th century. For summary of the history of Indian immigration and attempted assimilation in South Africa, see documents submitted by India and South Africa to the United Nations in connection with Indian charges of violations by South Africa of its human rights obligations assumed under the U. N. Charter, summarized by Gross, The Impact of the United Nations Upon Domestic Jurisdiction, 18 DEP'T STATE BULL. 263 (1948); also U. N. Docs. A/68 (Aug. 26, 1946), and A/373 (Sept. 2, 1947) (Indian Memoranda).