the reason, as it was claimed, that the land was not then open for entry on account of this contest. It further appears that afterwards, on the 23d day of the same month, after the decision of the secretary had been certified to the local land office, there was a rush of several parties at the opening of the local land office in the morning, each seeking to enter this land. The decision filed by the secretary on the 21st day of December, 1894, upon the various contests which arose from the efforts that had been made to enter this piece of land, decided, as a matter of fact, that Mr. Hartman's application to enter it was the first on that 23d day of February, 1889; but he held that the prior attempt to enter it by Mr. James, on the 19th of February, was valid, and therefore his decision was against Mr. Hartman, and in favor of Mr. James. The bill of complaint in this case alleges that the secretary was in error in making that decision; that he committed an error in law, and, but for that error, the decision would have been in favor of Mr. Hartman, and he would have been entitled to a patent for the land, and that the subsequent entry of the land by Mr. Craig, under the Porterfield scrip, could not have taken place. It appears from the testimony that, after this decision of the secretary in favor of Mr. James, the latter made an entry upon this 40 acres as a homestead, and that subsequently, on the 23d of September, 1895, by reason of a bargain between himself and Mr. Craig, and for a consideration paid to him by Mr. Craig, he relinquished his homestead right upon the premises, and filed a written relinquishment of that right to the United States, and that upon that filing Mr. Craig immediately entered this land with Porterfield scrip. The title of the defendants arises upon that entry, and through conveyances from Mr. Craig as the owner of the land under this entry. In order to succeed in this case, it is necessary that the complainants show not only that the secretary committed an error of law in allowing the entry of James, but that Hartman was at that time legally entitled to enter the land, and that he had a good equitable title. It has been decided by the circuit court of appeals in this very case (Iron Co. v. James, 32 C. C. A. 348, 89 Fed. 811) that if there was a rule in existence at that time which forbade the register and receiver of the local land office from receiving any appli cations to enter land while there was a contest in respect to it pending in the general land office, or before the secretary, prior to the time when the decision of the contest was communicated to the local land office, and entered upon its records and plats, then, in that case, the decision of the secretary that this land was open for entry on the 19th day of February, 1889, was error in law. All the evidence in the case, taken together, I think, fully shows that such a rule was in existence at and prior to that time,—a rule known as "Rule No. 53,"-under which, whatever was the effect of the judg ment as between the parties to the contest, the land in question was not in condition to be entered as unappropriated land of the public domain until notice of that decision was given to the register and receiver of the local land office. When the matter was before me on demurrer, it seemed to me that, being a rule of the secretary, it might perhaps be varied by the secretary himself. At any rate, there were cases submitted from which it appeared that the rule had not always been followed in the land department, particularly the Anderson Case, 7 Land Dec. Dep. Int. 163. But I think the evidence is now satisfactory that there was such a rule in existence, which had not been abrogated, and had been by circulars made known to the local land officers, and was a rule which they were expected to follow. The circuit court of appeals held that, under such circumstances, it was error in law for the secretary himself to disregard a general rule which was in force; and the evidence shows that it was so in force; and therefore it must be held that the secretary's decision that James was entitled to make this entry on the 19th day of February, 1889, was an error in law. As to the suggestion that the decision of the secretary went to the extent of holding that there was no such rule, I do not think that it does so hold; that is, it does not go to the extent of holding that there never had been such a rule, or that no such rule had been promulgated, or that it had been abrogated. The holding of the secretary, in effect, was that there was no such rule which would bind him, not that there was not such a rule in existence; and the circuit court of appeals, in this case, has adjudged that such holding by the secretary was error in law. The other question which arises is whether the evidence shows that, if this error had not occurred, Hartman would have been entitled to enter the land. The secretary found, as a matter of fact, that Hartman was the first applicant; but it is objected to his application that the Porterfield scrip which he used in attempting to make that entry was void, as having already been used, and therefore exhausted, in an entry of land made by Mr. Gilman at a prior time. The evidence in relation to that is that Mr. Gilman was desirous of entering land which at the time was not subject to cash entry, but was subject to be entered with Porterfield scrip, and that he made his application and filed this scrip for that purpose; that, by some misapprehension or misconception on the part of the local land officers, the certificate, or receipt, or whatever it was, was given to Mr. Gilman as for a cash entry, and was so entered upon the books of the local land office, and so noted in the returns to Washington, and this Porterfield scrip was sent, instead of cash, to the United States treasury. It seems the treasury officials made inquiry about it, and it was returned to the general land office, as not being cash or anything that the treasury could accept as cash; and as the result of further inquiry, upon being notified of the facts by the local land officers, the scrip was returned to the local land office to be sent back to Gilman as its owner, and the land went to patent, as having been entered for cash. The scrip was returned to Mr. Gilman, and afterwards, upon suit brought by the United States on a deficit in the accounts of the receiver, involving a hundred dollars as the purchase price of this land, Mr. Gilman paid that money over to the receiver, who paid it to the government, and it was accepted, and the matter dismissed out of the suit. Now, the result of all this is, in my judgment, that although this land was not subject to cash entry, and might have been entered by Porterfield scrip, and although it undoubtedly was the idea and purpose of Mr. Gilman when he attempted to make entry to secure the land by the use of this Porterfield scrip, still, as a result of the whole transaction, the scrip was not accepted by the government for the land, but the cash was accepted, and the scrip returned by the land department to Mr. Gilman as not used. Whether that was regular or irregular does not affect the validity of this scrip. Although it had been offered in purchase of that land, it had not been accepted, but the cash had been accepted instead, and this scrip had been returned to Mr. Gilman as unused and unappropriated. So it seems to me very clear that it was, under these circumstances, unappropriated scrip, and Mr. Gilman or any one else might use it thereafter in the location of land. No other objection is made to Mr. Hartman's location. He was first in time, and, if no error of law had been committed by the secretary, Mr. Hartman would have been entitled to enter the land with this Porterfield scrip at that time. The only question that remains is as to the bona fides of Mr. Hillard and Mr. James in the subsequent purchase of this land from Mr. Craig. The doctrine of bona fides is, of course, an equitable doctrine, and cannot be allowed to cause an inequitable effect. If the complainant was in fact entitled to the land, and was without laches, and pursued the only remedy he had, it is difficult to see how anybody could be a bona fide purchaser from Craig, under the circumstances. He would be substantially buying pending litigation. But, however that may be, the evidence in the case does not sustain the claim of bona fides; that is, that the grantees of Craig purchased this land without any knowledge of anything to put them upon inquiry as to the claim of Hartman. There is no question that James had full knowledge of Hartman's claim, as he was a party to this contest when it was before the secretary of the interior. So far as the other parties were concerned, Craig, Hillard, and Belden, the purchases were made, as appears from the evidence, through the agency of either Mr. Draper or Mr. Chandler, both of whom were familiar with this contest from its inception. Even if any of the purchasers from Craig had no personal knowledge of the matter, the knowledge of their agents, through whom these transactions were had, would be sufficient to charge them. It appears, in most instances, that the transactions were had entirely through agents. In many cases the principals knew very little about the details of the transactions, but trusted wholly to Mr. Draper or Mr. Chandler. I do not see why they would not be chargeable with whatever knowledge their agents had in the matter. The result is, without dwelling on the evidence at any greater length, I have come to the conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to a decree in each case. Ordered accordingly. UNITED STATES v. SOUTHERN PAC. R. CO. et al. Nos. 494, 495. 1. PUBLIC LANDS-GRANTS TO SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD. The decisions of the supreme court in the various suits between the United States and the Southern Pacific Railroad Company involving the right of the latter to lands in California within the limits reserved under the grant to the Atlantic & Pacific Railroad Company must be regarded as having settled that the grant to the Atlantic & Pacific Company became effective, as to the lands between the Colorado river and San Buenaventura, on the coast, on the filing and acceptance by the land department in 1872 of the map of its route between such points, by relation as of the date of the grant, July 27, 1866, and that all the lands within both the primary and indemnity limits of such grant were forfeited by the act of July 6, 1886, and restored to the public domain; and hence as having conclusively determined, as between the parties and their privies, that the Southern Pacific Company did not acquire any of such lands under either its main-line or branch-line grants. 1 2. SAME-RECOVERY OF LANDS ERRONEOUSLY Fatented-ACT FOR PROTECTION OF BONA FIDE PURCHASERS. Under Act March 2, 1896, supplementing Act March 3, 1887, directing the bringing of suits for the recovery of lands erroneously certified or patented under railroad grants, by providing that no patent to any lands held by a bona fide purchaser should be annulled, and confirming the title of such purchasers, all purchasers in good faith, and in the belief that they will obtain a good title from a railroad company of lands which have been patented to it, are protected, whether such patents were issued before or after the commencement of suit. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of California. This is a suit in equity brought by the United States against the Southern Pacific Railroad Company and the other defendants named in the bill, to quiet the title to certain lands in California embraced within the granted and indemnity limits of the Atlantic & Pacific Railroad Company under the act of congress approved July 27, 1866 (14 Stat. 292). The lands in controversy are situated on both sides of that part of the line of the road as located between the Needles, on the Colorado river, and San Buenaventura, on the Pacific Coast. The act of July 27, 1866, granted lands to aid in the construction of a railroad and telegraph line from the states of Missouri and Arkansas to the Pacific Coast; and, to carry out the purposes of the grant, the act incorporated the Atlantic & Pacific Railroad Company, and authorized that company to lay out, locate, and construct a continuous line of railroad and telegraph from the town of Springfield, in the state of Missouri; thence westerly to the head waters of the Colorado Chiquito; and "thence along the 35th parallel of latitude as near as may be found most suitable for a railway route to the Colorado river, at such point as may be selected by said company for crossing; thence by the most practicable and eligible route to the Pacific." For the purpose of aiding in the construction of this road and telegraph line to the Pacific Coast, the third section of the act granted to the Atlantic & Pacific Railroad Company every alternate section of public land, not mineral, designated by odd numbers, to the amount of 10 alternate sections per mile on each side of said road, whenever it passed through any state, and whenever on the line thereof the United States had full title, not reserved, sold, granted, or otherwise appropriated, and free from pre-emption or other claims or rights at the time the line of said road should be designated by a plat thereof filed in the office of the commissioner of the general land office. It was further provided that whenever, prior to said time, any of said sections or parts of sections shall have been granted, sold, reserved, occupied by homestead settlers, or pre-empted or otherwise disposed of, other lands shall be selected by said company in lieu thereof, under the direction of the secretary of the interior, in alternate sections, and designated by odd numbers, not more than 10 miles beyond the limits of said alternate sections, and not including the reserved numbers. The sixth section of the act provided "that the president of the United States shall cause the lands to be surveyed for forty miles in width on both sides of the entire line of said road after the general route shall be fixed, and as fast as may be required by the construction of said railroad; and the odd sections of land hereby granted shall not be liable to sale or entry, or pre-emption, before or after they are surveyed, except by said company, as provided in this act." The eighth section of the act provided "that each and every grant, right, and privilege herein are so made and given to and accepted by said Atlantic & Pacific Railroad Company upon and subject to the following conditions, namely: that the said company shall commence the work on said road within two years from the approval of this act by the president, and shall complete not less than fifty miles per year after the second year, and shall construct, equip, furnish, and complete the main line of the whole road by the fourth day of July, Anno Domini eighteen hundred seventy-eight." The eighteenth section of the act provided "that the Southern Pacific Railroad, a company incorporated under the laws of the state of California, is hereby authorized to connect with the said Atlantic & Pacific Railroad, formed under this act, at such point near the boundary line of the state of California as they shall deem most suitable for a railroad line to San Francisco; and shall have a uniform gauge and rate of freight or fare with said road, and in consideration thereof, to aid in its construction, shall have similar grants of land, subject to all the conditions and limitations herein provided; and shall be required to construct its road on the like regulations, as to time and manner, with the Atlantic & Pacific Railroad herein provided for." In 1872 the Atlantic & Pacific Railroad Company filed in the office of the commissioner of the general land office certain maps, designating its line of railroad, as located, from a point selected by the company for crossing the Colorado river by the route deemed by the company the most practicable and eligible to the Pacific. The line of road so designated ran from a point on the Colorado river near the thirty-fifth parallel (the Needles) to San Buenaventura, on the Pacific Coast; thence to Santa Barbara, San Miguel Mission, and San Francisco. The Southern Pacific Railroad Company, referred to in the eighteenth section of the act of July 27, 1866, was incorporated under the laws of the state of California on the 29th day of November, 1865. The charter of the corporation provided for the building of "a railroad from some point on the Bay of San Francisco in the state of California, and to pass through the counties of Santa Clara, Monterey. San Luis Obispo, Tulare, Los Angeles, and San Diego, to the town of San Diego in said state, thence eastward through the said county of San Diego to the eastern line of the state of California, there to connect with a contemplated railroad from said eastern line of the state of California to the Mississippi river." Under this charter the Southern Pacific Company on the 3d day of January, 1867, filed in the interior department at Washington a plat of preliminary survey showing a line of projected railroad from San Francisco to the Colorado river, with the request that the lands indicated be withdrawn from market. Thereafter, on March 19, 1867, the secretary of the interior directed the commissioner of the general land office to issue instructions to the local land offices in California to withhold the odd-numbered sections within the granted limits of 20 miles on each side of the road, as shown on the map, and also withdraw the odd-numbered sections outside of the 20 miles and within 30 miles on each side of the road, from which the indemnity for lands disposed of within the granted limits were to be taken. These instructions were carried out by the commissioner of the general land office under date of March 22, 1867. The right of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company to have this withdrawal made for its benefit was, however, further considered by the secretary of the interior; and on July 14, 1868, he addressed a communication to the commissioner of the general land office in which he revoked the order of withdrawal contained in his letter of |