States minister had provided himself with the legal opinion of an eminent English jurist to the effect that the permitted construction of this vessel was a flagrant violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act; Lord Russell still hesitated, and in his turn asked legal advice, which not being promptly given, the Alabama was, meantime, completed; she sailed out of the Mersey well equipped and well manned, and set forth upon her destructive career, during which she captured nearly seventy Northern vessels. These captured vessels were, in general, set on fire. More than once the light of this conflagration at sea served to attract other ships to their destruction, the humane instinct of the sailor leading him to hasten to offer assistance, and so bringing him straight towards the Alabama, yet cruising near the burning wreck.

Usually Captain Semmes kept away from the armed vessels of the United States. Once he engaged with a small blockading vessel, the Hatteras, and sunk her in a few minutes; a second encounter of this sort proved fatal to the privateer. Her antagonist was the ship-of-war Kearsarge; the encounter took place off Cherbourg, and in an hour the Alabama was sunk. Captain Semmes being taken off by an English yacht, was carried to England, where for a short time he enjoyed immense popularity.

For two years the Alabama had roved the seas, destroying American commerce, until finally ship-owners became unwilling to send out their vessels. She was now gone; the waves swept above her shattered hull; but the damage she had inflicted upon American commerce and the claims of the American government for indemnification, kept her memory fresh in the minds of all. Lord Russell and Lord Palmerston entrenched themselves behind the doctrine of the rights of neutrals, and the fact that a few British subjects had been secretly enlisted for the Union service. The relative unimportance of this latter

plea remained indisputable; as did the indifference of the English authorities in respect to the harm done by privateering, sometimes changing indeed into cordial sympathy towards these. enterprises of the Confederacy.

This controversy was destined to be protracted for many years, and to be complicated with divers incidents. It was to pass from the hands of the Liberals into those of the Tories, more equitable judges of the question, and finally, under Mr. Gladstone's ministry, terminate by the arbitration of an international tribunal in session at Geneva, whose decision, pronounced in 1872, was contrary to the claims of England. The indemnity which Great Britain was obliged to pay amounted to about three millions sterling, and even this was but a small part of the damage inflicted by the Alabama upon American commerce.

The tribunal of arbitration consisted of five persons, to be respectively appointed by the Queen, the President of the United States, the King of Italy, the President of the Swiss Confederation, and the Emperor of Brazil. It was provided for by the Treaty of Washington (May 8, 1871). The importance of the decision reached was extreme. From the beginning the English plenipotentiaries who negotiated the Washington treaty openly acknowledged that the American claims should rightfully be regarded as national, in this respect taking a different ground from that on which in 1870, Lord Clarendon and Mr. Reverdy Johnson had negotiated a settlement which the United States refused to accept. The English commissioners expressed also "the regret felt by her Majesty's government for the escape, under whatever circumstances, of the Alabama and other vessels from British ports, and for the depredations committed by those vessels." The principles which were to preside over the arbitration were then. summed up as follows: "A neutral government is bound, first,

to use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming, or equipping within its jurisdiction of any vessel which it has reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or to carry on war against a Power with which it is at peace, and also to use like diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise or carry on war as above, such vessel having been specially adapted, in whole or in part, within such jurisdiction to warlike use; secondly, not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the other, or for the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of military supplies or arms, or the recruitment of men; thirdly, to exercise due diligence in its own ports and waters, and as to all persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any violation of the foregoing obligations and duties." The English commissioners took the precaution to declare that these principles of international law were now for the first time established, but they agreed to decide the claims arising from the Alabama question in accordance with them, and also "to observe these rules between themselves in future, and to bring them to the knowledge of other maritime Powers, and to invite them to accede to them."

The result of the Geneva arbitration was not well received in England, and Mr. Gladstone's influence was considerably impaired by it. It had, however, established an equitable principle, and definitively settled an important question of the reciprocal duties of nations. The Trent affair had given a ratification to the decisions of the Paris Congress in respect to the flag of neutrals; the affair of the Alabama was the basis of an important negotiation ended by a treaty which did honor to all the contracting parties. The concessions made by England were just and proper; the United States on their side withdrew their "indirect claims." In 1862, Mr. Adams prudently dropped the question of the Alabama; when, after the triumph of the Union

cause and the subsidence of public feeling in England, the subject recurred, justice and moderation gained the victory over the excitement and exasperation of the earlier time.

In 1862 and 1863, the public feeling was more excited than ever, and the efforts of the South were persistent to obtain a recognition of the Confederate government. The Emperor Napoleon had for a long time been favorable to this idea, which in his mind was connected with certain vague, ambitious projects of his own. As early as 1861, he had engaged England and Spain in a diplomatic convention on the subject of Mexico. The state of anarchy which had for some years prevailed in that country had been the cause of various wrongs committed against foreign subjects, a redress of which was now claimed by the European governments. The power was at this time in the hands of Benito Juarez, a man as violent and corrupt as his predecessors, but more energetic in outward appearance, and especially desirous of being on good terms with the established governments of Europe. In pursuance of this design, he had pledged himself to the payment of certain indemnities, promising to make over for this purpose a part of the customs revenues. These indemnities, however, had not been paid, and the Emperor Napoleon availed himself of this pretext to claim from Spain and England the fulfilment of the agreement into which they had entered. The protection of foreign subjects and their most pressing interests required, it was said, a military demonstration.

The position of affairs in America gave reason to expect a final separation of the Northern and Southern States; nothing was to be feared in the way of intervention; the allied expedition, therefore, set sail. The English contingent was small. The projects of the Emperor Napoleon began already to excite suspicion. It was no longer a question of redressing the grievances of the foreign subjects resident in Mexico. But even here