David's Hammer: The Case for an Activist JudiciaryCato Institute, 2007 - 188 lappuses Judicial activism is condemned by both right and left, for good reason--lawless courts are a threat to republican government. But challenging conventional wisdom, constitutional litigator Clint Bolick argues in David's Hammer: The Case for an Activist Judiciary that far worse is a judiciary that allows the other branches of government to run roughshod over precious liberties. For better or worse, only a vigorous judiciary can enforce the limits on executive and legislative action, protect constitution-al rights, and tame unelected bureaucrats. David's Hammer reclaims for the judiciary its intended role as the ultimate safeguard of a free society. |
No grāmatas satura
1.5. rezultāts no 61.
6. lappuse
... majority of them small , family - run enterprises that produce only 2,000 or 3,000 cases each year . At the same time , the liquor - distributor industry experienced extreme consolidation , so that today a handful of behemoths dominate ...
... majority of them small , family - run enterprises that produce only 2,000 or 3,000 cases each year . At the same time , the liquor - distributor industry experienced extreme consolidation , so that today a handful of behemoths dominate ...
12. lappuse
... majority of the Second Circuit's sister courts had ruled in favor of challenges to discriminatory wine shipment bans , Judge Richard Wesley found that those decisions had " the effect of unnec- essarily limiting the authority delegated ...
... majority of the Second Circuit's sister courts had ruled in favor of challenges to discriminatory wine shipment bans , Judge Richard Wesley found that those decisions had " the effect of unnec- essarily limiting the authority delegated ...
13. lappuse
... majority were gone , while the three dissenters ( Chief Justice William H. Rehn- quist and Justices John Paul Stevens and Sandra Day O'Connor ) were still on the Court . Moreover , Justice Thomas believes no such thing as the dormant ...
... majority were gone , while the three dissenters ( Chief Justice William H. Rehn- quist and Justices John Paul Stevens and Sandra Day O'Connor ) were still on the Court . Moreover , Justice Thomas believes no such thing as the dormant ...
15. lappuse
... majority that included Justices Scalia , Souter , Ginsburg , and Breyer , declared that the effect of the laws was " to allow in - state wineries to sell wine directly to consumers in that State but to prohibit out- of - state wineries ...
... majority that included Justices Scalia , Souter , Ginsburg , and Breyer , declared that the effect of the laws was " to allow in - state wineries to sell wine directly to consumers in that State but to prohibit out- of - state wineries ...
20. lappuse
... majority of federal judges , and seven of nine members of the Supreme Court , have been appointed by Republican presidents , conservative animosity toward the courts has only deepened . As Jonathan Rauch observed in a par- typically ...
... majority of federal judges , and seven of nine members of the Supreme Court , have been appointed by Republican presidents , conservative animosity toward the courts has only deepened . As Jonathan Rauch observed in a par- typically ...
Saturs
| 69 | |
| 87 | |
| 97 | |
| 113 | |
SCHOOL CHOICE | 127 |
THE BECKONING FRONTIER | 139 |
AN ACTIVIST JUDICIARY FOR ALL THE RIGHT REASONS | 157 |
NOTES | 165 |
INDEX | 179 |
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active liberty activist American argued authority Barnett Bill of Rights Blaine amendments branches of government Brennan Breyer Brown Cato Institute challenge Chief Justice Rehnquist citizens Clarence Thomas Clint Bolick commerce clause concurring Congress congressional conservative consti constitutionality decision declared democratic dissenting due process economic liberty eminent domain enacted equal protection exercise federal constitutional federal courts Federalist Fourteenth Amendment Framers free society freedom government power immunities clause individual liberty individual rights Institute for Justice intended interest interpretation Juanita Swedenburg judges judicial activism judicial restraint judiciary jurisprudence Justice O'Connor Justice Scalia Justice Thomas Kelo lawyers legislative legislature liberal libertarian limits litigation Madison majority ment Ninth Amendment opinion original intent Plessy political principles privileges or immunities Randy Randy Barnett regulation Rehnquist Court religion religious schools role rule of law Sanders school-choice programs Slaughter-House statute strike tion tional U.S. Supreme Court violated vote Washington wine wineries Zelman
Populāri fragmenti
36. lappuse - By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
37. lappuse - No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? And what are the different classes of...
63. lappuse - The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.
40. lappuse - The Constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it. If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the Constitution is not law ; if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts on the part of the people to limit a power in its own nature illimitable.
64. lappuse - If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein If there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.
36. lappuse - Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger of oppression. In our Governments the real power lies in the majority of the Community, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of the major number of the Constituents.
62. lappuse - The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.
66. lappuse - If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch.
51. lappuse - But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.
54. lappuse - Into the review of statutes directed at particular religious ... or national ... or racial minorities . . . ; whether prejudice against discrete and Insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial scrutiny.