enough to keep men alive to the fact that they are citizens. of a republic and to afford them the requisite opportunity of exercise in the performance of their duties as such. Let us assume also that the cost of one election a year is quite as much as the average yearly results of two have been worth to the public.

With the exception of one, all the amendments proposed were limited to doing away with the elections regarded as superfluous and to conforming existing conditions to the new order of things. That one, besides directing the selection of election officers biennially, undertook to give the Legislature power to provide for their appointment, instead of election, under laws to be enacted by it applicable at its discretion to cities only. As it turned out that was the one amendment that failed to carry, admittedly because the change indicated would have made it possible for the Legislature to take from the people the power of naming the election boards. The motive that dictated the unwelcome provision was pretty generally understood to be an upright one. It was the hope of securing, especially in the great cities, by some judicious method of appointment, a higher grade of men for service on these boards than can be looked for so long as positions upon them have to be sought and obtained by election. Nevertheless the chance of a misuse of the power to be given to the Legislature condemned the amendment to failure, a highly instructive commentary, on the one hand, upon the healthy instinct of the people to keep within its grasp the direct control of what is left of elections, and on the other hand, upon the estimation in which it holds the bulk of those whom it habitually sends to the Legislature to enact the laws it consents in advance to be governed by. Beyond this, however, the rejection of the Seventh Amendment leaves the constitutional scheme in a somewhat mutilated condition. It was designed to change Section 14 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Its rejection leaves that section intact. In it we have a pro

vision for the annual choice by the people of election boards in all the election districts, which, according to Section 3 of the same Article, is to be made at the spring election. But the spring election is abolished by the Sixth Amendment transferring all elections heretofore held at that time to the fall of odd-numbered years. No serious complication is to be apprehended from this mere transfer; nor perhaps from the incongruity between biennial local elections and the requirement of an annual election of election officers, a purely local matter. But then comes the schedule providing that all election officers elected at the spring election of 1910 (the last to be held) shall continue in office until the first Monday of December, 1911, overlapping at least one period at which in obedience to Article VIII, Section 14, others will have to be elected. Thus, thanks to the defeat of the Seventh Amendment, it looks as if we should be under a necessity of piling up election officers at a rate which may be expected speedily to cause a supply very much in excess of the demand-not to mention the embarrassment capable of resulting from the existence of rival election boards. Just what remedy may be found for this perplexing state of things can, of course, be a matter of conjecture only. That any may be looked for from the Legislature seems exceedingly doubtful. The requirement of annual selection of election boards either remains in the Constitution or has been converted into one of biennial selection. In either event it is determined by the Constitution as it originally stood or as it stands since its amendment, and is therefore beyond the Legislature's power of regulation. In other words the question arising is not a legislative but a judicial one-a question of implied intent to be decided broadly as in all cases where various parts of a constitution have to be harmonized so as to rationally effectuate its essential and unmistakable purposes.

The difficulty just adverted to is one that springs from a contingency which could hardly have been foreseen or provided against,-the defeat of one of a series of amend

ments all converging to a single point, and therefore forming an entire whole and mutually interdependent. Against mere oversights the mode prescribed by the Constitution itself for its amendment might be supposed to afford ample safeguards. Any amendment, proposed in either of the branches of the Legislature, must in the first instance be assented to by both. If so agreed to it is published throughout the State for three months prior to the next general election. It then comes before the next succeeding Legislature. If that body also agrees to it, it is republished and finally voted on every proposed amendment being separately submitted to and passed upon by the voters, a majority of those voting thereon determining its adoption or rejection. It will be observed that one of the incidental effects of the change to biennial elections, the general elections falling in the even years, will be that the period of incubation of a Constitutional Amendment is prolonged by one year. But even under the shorter period there is apparently sufficient opportunity for detecting any flaw in a projected scheme of alterations, more especially where it is supplemented by a schedule undertaking in terms to provide against any inconvenience arising from the same and for carrying them into complete operation. Nevertheless, since the adoption of the amendments of 1909 and the schedule with its brave profession, it has been discovered that in both certain oversights have occurred. The Legislature will have it in its power by prompt action to settle what is to become of the legal holiday falling on the third Tuesday of February, no longer an election day, and of bills and notes then maturing. There is no obstacle in the way of speedily readjusting the registration and primary election system by amendment of existing laws. Neither need our minds be vexed by the idea that the adoption of the amendments at last November's election might control the terms of all the officers then elected. The answer to that misconception is found in the opinion of the Attorney-General concerning the term for which county officers elected

last November were to be commissioned. He holds in substance that that election was under the original provisions of the Constitution and that the terms of the officers then elected are measured by those provisions, except in so far as the amendments specifically direct otherwise. At the same time he concedes that in the case of county officers who were elected in November, 1909, for terms of three years, but whose successors can, under the Sixth Amendment, be elected only in odd-numbered years, the result may be to entitle them to hold over until after the election of 1913,apparently a casus omissus. But there are other matters not so readily dealt with.

The provision of the schedule lengthening the terms of previously elected officers which would expire in odd-numbered years, fails to apply it to the case of an incumbent appointed before the adoption of the amendments to fill a vacancy in such an office under a commission running to the time when, under the Constitution as it then stood, his successor elected at the next appropriate election should qualify. The question then arises whether the term of an officer appointed to fill a vacancy until the first Monday of January, 1911, is extended for a year, where, under the amendments, that office can be filled only at the election occurring in the fall of 1911. That question was mooted with reference to a Judge who had been so appointed. The decision of the Attorney-General is that there can be no judicial election in 1910, and that therefore the appointed incumbent is entitled to an extension of his commission for another year.

The death of the State Treasurer-elect between the last general election and the beginning of the term for which he was elected, May 2, 1910, precipitated questions solved only in part by the Governor's appointment of his successor and the Supreme Court's recognition of him. Article IV, Section 21, of the Constitution made the term of the Treasurer two years and forbade him to hold office for two consec

utive terms. The Act of 1874 added to the designation of his term the words "or until his successor shall be duly qualified." This addition was regarded as incompatible with the constitutional provision; so that the expiration of the twoyear term of the then Treasurer, on May 2, 1910, caused a vacancy to be filled by the Governor. The Second Amendment enlarges the term of the Treasurer to four years, but directs that the Treasurer elected in 1909 shall serve for three years and that his successor shall be elected in 1912. By the First Amendment vacancies in an office are to be filled by the Governor's appointment to the date for the commencement of the same following "the next election day appropriate to such office," occurring two months or more after the happening of the vacancy. The commission issued to the newly appointed Treasurer does not assume to decide when his successor is to be elected, but runs to "the first Monday of May following the next election appropriate for filling such office"-which must be either the general election of this year or that of 1912. Which of these it shall be will depend upon whether the provision of the Second Amendment is to be taken as declaring that there shall be no election for Treasurer before 1912—or whether its reference to the election of a Treasurer in that year to succeed the one elected in 1909 is to be understood only as a direction. ancillary to the accomplishment of the purpose of changing the term of the Treasurer from two to four years and adjusting the occurrence and recurrence of his election to the scheme of general elections in even-numbered years. If that is all it was meant to do, it is obvious that an election of a Treasurer in 1910 for a four-year term will answer as well as its postponement to 1912, while according with the general constitutional policy of filling elective offices by election at the earliest convenient time.

Doubtless as time goes on other problems respecting the effect of these amendments will spring up, each affording fresh demonstration of the oft-proven inadequacy of