dead to inflame the passions of the living; solicit the pity of the community in favour of your pri vate bargain, from a whining exposure of the extent of your probable loss; instead of manfully appealing to their reason to uphold you in your rights and, finally, strive to identify the kindlier feelings. due to the misfortunes of the orphan, with the unaffecting interests of a greedy speculator. These are logical and rhetorical privileges which are, perhaps, intimately connected with that contempt of letters on which you seem so much to pride yourself. They are privileges of which I am content you should avail yourself, if, in pursuing the consideration of this "Con"stitutional question," I am allowed to persevere in that mode of treating it, which has given you so much offence. It was attempted, in my former Letter, to be shewn that the grant by the individual States to Congress, of the power" to promote the progress of science "and the useful arts, by securing, for limited times, to "authors and inventors the exclusive right to their "respective writings and discoveries," was the grant of an exclusive power. The nature of the subject was briefly explained; but the origin and nature of the property meant to be regulated, and the general policy of this article of the Constitution, were not fully developed. I shall endeavour, therefore, to supply that omission. A right of exclusive enjoyment in things, both real and personal, corporeal and incorporeal, is the very foundation of the idea of Property. It is the crea ture of civil society, and one of the strongest ligaments by which the body politic is knit together. To give full efficacy to this powerful principle, a right of transmission was gradually superadded, by which an ancestor handed down to posterity the acquisitions of his industry and talents. Previously, then, to any positive law affecting the subject, it is difficult to conceive a process of reasoning, founded on strict legal principles, by which the right of exclusive enjoyment, and the right of transmission, could be denied to any modification of property. The moment any thing was acknowledged as property, from that moment it would have seemed to follow that the great principles common to all property, must apply to it ; and, therefore, an acknowledgment that the fruits of an Author's genius were subjects of propriety, induced, as a necessary consequence, both the right of exclusive enjoyment, and the of transmission. power But both the premises and the conclusion were denied by certain English jurists, and denied, as is abundantly evident, from a complete misconception of the principles upon which the right of property is founded. A STATE OF NATURE had been opposed, by the learning of preceding ages, to a STATE OF SOCIETY, and certain rights, supposed to be derived from the one, were considered as original principles, variously modified by the other. But I believe most sound Lawyers, as well as most sober Metaphysicians, have renounced all faith in that ancient speculation; and regard the ، State of Nature," as one in which the genius and talents of mankind would be for ever useless and unprofitable. As society is an indispensable requisite of human improvement, it is to the "SOCIAL STATE," that we ought to look for the original of all our rights; and amongst others, of the RIGHT OF PROPERTY :-and if it be not extraordinary that they who looked to a visionary state from which to derive their principles, should have been led into error,-it is strange, indeed, that they who rested the right to property on the slender basis of bodily labour, or the slighter foundation of occupancy, should have rejected the more intelligible title of invention or discovery. The claims of inventors and authors are so congenial to our notions of natural justice; they fall in so easily, and accord so harmoniously with all the ideas we derive from the ultimate objects of Society, in establishing the right of Property, that some ill founded principle, some imagined ill consequence, or some inveterate prejudice, must have prevented the full admission of this right, arising as it does, from individual merit, and springing into existence at the command of individual power. Two causes may be enumerated, as having concurred to produce this erroneous opinion. FirstA misconception of the grounds on which the right of Property ultimately rests; and, secondly, the inconvenient consequences supposed to result from the admission of the principle in its particular application to the productions of the mind. The former was rather the avowed, whilst the latter was, perhaps, the secret cause of the opinions held by some of the Judges, in the great case of Miller vs. Taylor.* It was evident that if an inventor or author had a right to his discoveries or writings, and that right was exclusive and transmissible, ad infinitum, to their 4 Burr. 2303. legal representatives, a formidable barrier would be opposed to the progress both of art and science. It was foreseen that as each successive heir or representative, would be interested to draw as great pecuniary gains as possible from the work or invention of his ancestor, a TAX, indefinite in duration and amount, might be levied on posterity, and the free advancement of Science and the Arts proportionably impeded. The effects which such consequences would produce, were perceived and deprecated. In the Republic of Letters, the widest range of diffusion, and an uninterrupted circulation, were alike indispensable to the expectations of Philosophy, and the wishes of Benevolence. In the useful arts, experience was daily opening an interminable field to future discovery. Chemistry was just emerging from the darkness which had so long concealed her powers; and the condition of the world was undergoing a sensible change from the new impulse which had been given to all the powers of human invention. Improvement had hitherto been unrestrained, and Letters and the Arts had been, as yet, transmitted from age to age, without any other exaction than the tribute which Fame pays to the memory of Genius. The result of admitting an exclusive and perpetual right of Property, in the fruits of intellectual labour, was not, and could not, be fully known or estimated; but that it would operate as a clog to the advancement of knowledge, and powerfully retard the progress of society, was clear to demonstration. Yet to deny to inventors the fair profits derivable from their talents and exertions, was, of itself, at va `riance with every idea of natural justice, and every dictate of liberal policy. It was, in effect, to deny to Genius its appropriate reward, and to withhold, from the powers of intellect, one of the strongest stimulants to their activity. From a balanced consideration, therefore, of both sides of this important question, a compromise was at length effected, by which the claims of the inventor were acknowledged, his rights protected, and his reward secured ;whilst a public interest was effectually created, and an immunity, from too great a burden, erected for Posterity. From this rapid sketch may be collected both the origin and policy of the Act of the British Parliament limiting the rights of authors and inventors in their writings and discoveries to a term of years. With a full knowledge of that Statute and of the principles and policy on which it was founded, the several States ceded to Congress a power to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their writings and discoveries. The English Law limited the right as we have seen to a term of years. power ceded by our Constitution was to secure it for "limited times." The former restricting the right by a definite term, the latter adopting the same principle and pointing to the same object, but leaving the quantum of interest to the discretion of the National Legislature. The Thus, then, it is manifest, that in conformity to the policy of the British Statute, the power in question was vested in Congress, with the same means and for a similar end. The ultimate object of the |