15. The question of abandonment by the patentee having been fully examined in a former suit under the same patent, further discussion of it in this case was deemed unnecessary. Ibid.

16. The claim of the patent was for the "plate of hard rubber or vulcanite, or its equivalent, for holding artificial teeth." The respondent used hard rubber, as he found it combined or prepared by others, as a substitute for gold or other substance in forming the plate and for holding the teeth. Held, it was not necessary, in order to show infringement, to prove that the respondent used the hard rubber described in the hard rubber patent referred to in the complainants' specifications. Ibid. 17. The respondent used rubber for the plates as a substitute for metallic plates; he employed the same mechanical means in forming the plates, and for setting and adjusting the teeth, and heat to harden the rubber, and fit the product for practical use. Held, that infringement of the complainants' patent was shown, although he used a rubber compound with iodine and not with sulphur (as did the complainants), and under a different patent. Ibid.

18. The invention described in the specifications of this patent is not merely a discovery of a chemical process for preparing a described substance for use in forming plates to be used for holding the teeth, and one may be an infringer if he does not use every one of the ingredients of that process. Ibid.

19. Neither the correspondence between the commissioner of patents and the applicant nor the proceedings in the patent office, pending an application, are admissible as evidence to enlarge, diminish, or vary the language of the claim of a patent. Ibid. 20. Patents for inventions are, if practicable, to be so construed as to uphold and not to destroy the right of the inventors. Ibid.

21. Although an inventor has obtained a patent for a process, he may have another for the product. Jones v. Sewall, 563.

22. There cannot be more than one valid patent for an invention, nor can the grantee of a patent sustain an action upon another patent for the same invention, issued afterward. Ibid.

23. Separate patents for separate and distinct parts of the same invention are nevertheless valid. Ibid.

24. A patent is prima facie evidence that the alleged inventor had made the invention when the specification was filed. Ibid.

25. If the alleged inventor or patentee wish to show that the invention was made by the inventor previous to the filing of the application, it must be proved, as against another patent, that it had been reduced to practice as an operative invention. Ibid. 26. A patent for preserving green corn by severing the kernels from the cob so that the juices will be liberated, and the toughening of the kernels by cooking prevented, and then boiling the kernels and juices together in sealed cans, after the juices have exuded from the kernels, is valid, although a patent has been previously granted abroad for preserving certain vegetables, not including the mention of corn, or the severing of the kernels thereof, by boiling them in hermetically sealed vessels. Ibid. 27. Inventions pertaining to machines may be divided into four classes: 1. Where the invention embraces the entire machine.

2. Where the invention embraces one or more of the elements of the machine, but not the entire machine.

3. Where the invention embraces both a new element and a combination of elements previously known.

4. Where all the elements are old, and a new combination, producing a new result, is made out of them. Union Sugar Refinery v. Matthiesson App. 639.

28. A person is an infringer of a patent of the first class who, without license, makes any portion of the machine; of the second, when the part new and patented is made or used; of the third class, when the new element or new combination is used; of the fourth, when the patented combination is pirated. Ibid.

29. The property of the inventor is the exclusive right which the letters-patent secure to him to make, use, and vend the thing patented. Ibid.

30. The reason that a patent, when introduced in evidence, is prima facie evidence that the patentee is the first and original inventor of what is claimed therein, is that it is issued upon the adjudication of a public officer charged by law with such duty. Ibid.

31. Where all the elements of a machine are old, the patentee cannot invoke the doctrine of equivalents to suppress all other improvements on the old machine. Ibid. 32. But he is an infringer who makes or vends the patented improvement with no other change than the employment as a substitute for one of its elements, a device well known in the state of the art to be such at the date of the invention, and which any constructor acquainted with the art would then know how to employ. Ibid.

33. Such substitution of one well-known element for another is a mere colorable evasion of the patent. Ibid.

34. Whether a witness has sworn falsely or not is a question for the jury, and if they find that he has wilfully sworn falsely as to a material fact, they may, if they deem it proper, disbelieve everything he has said. Ibid.

35. The presumption that the patentee is the original and first inventor of what is claimed in the patent, when introduced in evidence, extends, in the absence of the original application, no farther back than the date of the patent; and those alleging an earlier date must prove it by competent evidence. Ibid.

36. Where there is no evidence to the contrary, the presumption is that the patentee at the time of making his application for a patent believed himself to be the original inventor or discoverer of the thing patented. Ibid.

37. Crude and imperfect experiments equivocal in their results, and then abandoned and given up, shall not be permitted to prevail against an original inventor who has perfected his improvement and obtained his patent. Ibid.

38. It is not enough to defeat a patent to show that another had first conceived the possibility of effecting what the patentee accomplished, unless it appears that he reduced what he conceived to practice. Ibid.

39. If two machines, having the same mode of operation, do the same work in substantially the same way, and accomplish substantially the same result, though differing in form, shape, or name, they are the same. Ibid.

40. If the defendant's means of causing pressure at the nozzle of his machine were, at the date of the patentee's invention, known as a substitute for the means of causing pressure at the nozzle described in the patent in this case, and if this mode performed the same function as the patented one, and could, from a constructor's knowledge, be substituted for it, then the two means are substantially the same. Ibid. 41. The patent in this case is not limited to any arbitrary mathematical amount of pressure, but covers such degree as is capable of carrying out the described object of the patentee under the conditions described in the patent. Ibid.

See ABANDONMENT, 1, 2; PRACTICE, 1-10; PRIOR USE, 1-4; Reissue, 1–7.

PAYMENT OF MONEY INTO COURT.

1. Where the declaration contains the general counts in addition to a special count
which may contain many causes of action, the payment of money into court, gener-
ally upon the whole declaration, is not an admission of the defendant's liability,
upon the special count. Snow et al. v. Miles, 608.

2. By such payment the defendant does not admit any specific contract; the only effect
is that he admits a liability on some one or more of the causes of contract set out
in the declaration, not exceeding the amount paid into court. Ibid.

PLEADING.

1. If the respondent have no personal knowledge of the matter set forth in any par-
ticular allegation of the bill of complaint, a denial by the respondent upon informa-
tion and belief is sufficient to make it necessary for the complainant to prove the
same. Robinson v. Mandell, 169.

2. Whenever the same plea may be pleaded, and the same judgment given on two
counts, they may be joined in the same declaration. Stockwell v. The United States,

284.

3. It was held that shingles described in the warrant as the "growth and manufac-
ture" of the provinces of Canada, were so described as to make their importation
without paying duty a fraud on the revenue. Ibid.

4. The liability for receiving, concealing, or buying is founded upon a distinct act
from that of illegally importing. An agent or a consignee may be liable for both,
and the two counts may be joined. Ibid.

5. Where the warrant described the alleged frauds to be that defendants had at certain
times committed frauds on the revenue by importing large quantities of shingles
subject to duty by law, into the port of Bangor and other ports in the district,
without paying or accounting for the duty to which the same were liable, it was
held that the description was made with sufficient particularity. Ibid.

6. It is a defect in the warrant not to allege that the district judge became satisfied, by
complaint and affidavit, that the alleged frauds on the revenue had been committed.
This, however, could not avail the defendants in this case:-

1. Because they did not at the trial except to the ruling of the court, admitting
books, documents, etc. upon that ground.

2. Because the books, etc. were properly admitted, even if the search-warrant were
illegal. Ibid.

7. A general allegation of negligence in a collision case is, on the part of the libellant's
vessel, not sufficient to constitute a valid defence even in pleading. Specification as
to what was done or omitted and caused the accident must be made. Killam v.
Schooner Eri, 456.

8. Reasonable presumptions are admitted by a demurrer as well as matters expressly
alleged. Amory v. Lawrence et als., 523.

9. The allegation in the bill was sufficient, although it did not state that the assign-
ment of the claim against the trustee was under an order of court first made,
because the presumption is that such sale was made in conformity to such order,
and because independently of the assignment the bankrupt's title was good against
all the world if the assignee elected not to take the property as not beneficial to the
estate. Ibid.

10. Waiver by the bill of oath in the answer amounts to nothing unless accepted by
the respondent. Ibid.

See PAYMENT OF MONEY INTO COURT, 1, 2. PRIOR USE, 4.

POLICY.

See EVIDENCE, 13, 14; INSURANCE.

POWER.

1. A power evidenced by a usage must be considered as defined and limited by that usage; and if it appeared that a usage existed among certain banks other than the defendant bank for the cashier to certify checks upon them, it is doubtful if it could be regarded as evidence that the cashier of the defendant bank had any such authority. Merchants' National Bank v. State National Bank, 205.

PRACTICE.

1. Upon the final hearing of a cause in equity, a final decree was entered, and the cause referred to a master, to take, and state to the court, an account of all gains and profits made by the defendants. No report was made by the master, but the following entries were made upon the docket: " May 27th. Master's certificate upon settlement of interrogatories, with state of facts, and schedule filed." "Roll containing nine drawings filed with certificate." "May 31st. Exceptions to master's certificate and report filed." Ordered, that the filings entered by the clerk be stricken out, and that the several papers filed be returned by the clerk to the master. Union Sugar Refinery v. Mathiesson, 146.

2. Explanation of the correct practice in this circuit, where a cause has been referred to a master to state an account. Ibid.

3. In case the decretal order was ambiguous, the master might have authority to report the case back for more specific instructions. Ibid.

4. The court might have power to revise each act of the master, as it progressed, but such a practice would be productive of delay, and will not receive countenance from the court. Ibid.

5. When a suit in equity has been heard, neither party has a right to file any paper in the cause, except by leave of court. Ibid.

6. The correct method is, for a master, if possible, to complete his investigations under the rules, make up his draft report, file it in the clerk's office, and give time for the parties to make their objections thereto. Ibid.

7. The correct practice is, where infringement to any extent is admitted, if the patent is held to be valid, to enter an interlocutory decree for complainant and send the cause to a master to ascertain the amount the complainant is entitled to recover. Carew v. Boston Elastic Fabric Co. 356.

8. Under the act of July 8, 1870, where a decree is entered for complainant, he may recover, in addition to the profits to be accounted for by the respondent, the damages he has sustained, and the court may in its discretion assess the same. Ibid. 9. Profits are to be accounted for in such case by the respondent wherever the decretal order to that effect is entered, and if the injuries sustained by the complainant from the infringement are greater than the gains and profits realized by the respondent, then the complainant is entitled to recover compensation for the excess of the injuries beyond the amount estimated for profits of the respondent. Ibid. 10. Actual damages are assessed in the first instance, but the court may in its discretion increase the amount to a sum not exceeding three times the amount estimated and assessed as the actual damages sustained beyond the gains and profits realized by the respondent. Ibid.

See NONSUIT, 1-4. NEW TRIAL, 1–14.

PRESUMPTIONS.

See PATENT, 35, 36; PLEADING, 8.

PRIOR USE.

1. Previous use or knowledge of an invention abroad is no defence against a patent,
unless such invention was described in some printed publication so clearly as to
enable others to put it in practice. Jones v. Sewall, 563.

2. The use of an invention by the author thereof, for the purposes of experiment,
though continued for more than two years, will not deprive him of his right to a
patent. Neither will the sale of it for two years by others without his consent. Ibid.
3. Where an invention has, through the acts of the inventor, gone into public use be-
yond his control, his right is forfeited beyond recall. Ibid.

4. The defence that the patentee had allowed his invention to be in public use or on
sale for more than two years before he applied for a patent, is distinct from the de-
fence that he had abandoned it to the public, and should not be blended with it in
the same pleading. Ibid.

PRODUCTION OF PAPERS.

1. The word "require" in § 15 of the Judiciary Act, when taken in connection
with a subsequent clause, does not mean to include a power in the Circuit Courts
to compel a compliance with an order to produce books or writings; but if the
party against which the order is passed shall fail to comply, then it shall be
lawful for the court to give judgment, if against the defendant, the same as in case
of default, if against the plaintiff, the same as in case of nonsuit. Merchants' Na-
tional Bank v. State National Bank, 201.

2. At common law parties were not competent witnesses, and they could not be com-
pelled to attend, by writ of subpana, or bring with them any writings pertinent to
the issue, by the writ of subpœna duces tecum. Ibid.

3. Notice to produce was at law the only method of a party desiring the production
of papers by the other, unless he resorted to equity. Ibid.

4. Such notice, however, only laid the foundation for the production of secondary
proof. Ibid.

5. The conditions under which the power to require the production of writings, etc.
should be exercised are: the motion must be in a case at law; the writings, etc.
must appear to be in the possession of the party against whom the order is passed;
it must appear that they contain evidence pertinent to the issue, and that the cir-
cumstances are such that the party might be compelled to produce them, as pro-
vided in the section referred to. Ibid.

6. The order may be absolute or nisi. Ibid.

7. Production before the trial is not perhaps contemplated by the provision, unless
there is just ground to apprehend that the writings may be destroyed, or transferred
to another, or removed out of the district, in which cases the order should be made
without delay, and absolute. Ibid.

8. In the case of incorporated banks having officers well known as the custodians of
their books and papers, notice should be given for such officers to produce any
document desired in the case. Ibid.