warrant to the marshal requiring him to enter a place or premises where any in-
voices, books, or papers relating to the merchandise are deposited, in respect to
which the fraud is alleged to have been committed, to take possession of such books
and produce them before the judge. Stockwell v. The United States, 284.

3. It is not necessary that a complaint or affidavit should accompany the warrant. If
the court is satisfied that the fraud upon the revenue has been committed, the war-
rant will be granted. The granting or refusing the warrant is a judicial act, and
the complaint or affidavit is not necessary to be introduced where it appears, by the
recitals of the warrant, that it was shown by complaint and affidavit to the sat-
isfaction of the court that the alleged frauds on the revenue had been committed.
Ibid.

4. Exceptions to the ruling of a court in admitting evidence should be sufficiently
specific to enable it to understand the precise ground upon which the objection is
based. Ibid.

5. All that appeared in this case was, that when the books, etc. were offered in evi-
dence, the defendants objected that the court was not authorized to issue, or the
marshal to serve, the warrant in question, and that the district attorney could not
put them in evidence, because obtained by that warrant. Held, that the objections
were not sufficiently explicit to avail the defendants at this hearing. Ibid.

6. The district judge could put the papers seized under the warrant in this case into
the hands of the district attorney. Ibid.

7. It was objected that the books, etc. were not in themselves legal evidence. Held,
that as the same were not set forth in the bill of exceptions, nor in any way made
part of it, the presumption was that the ruling of the district judge was correct, and
the point was not open for examination. Ibid.

BILL OF LADING.

See COMMON CARRIER, 3; DELIVERY, 1, 2; STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU, 2-5.

BY-LAW.

1. The directors of a national bank, organized under the act of June 3, 1864,
adopted the following by-law: "No person indebted to the bank shall be allowed
to sell or transfer his or her stock without the consent of a majority of the
directors, and this whether liable as principal or surety, and whether the debt or
liability is due or not." A stockholder indebted to the bank assigned by deed in
trust for the benefit of his creditors his stock without the consent of the directors,
and the assignees requested the bank to record the deed of assignment upon the
transfer-book of the bank, or that they might " be allowed to transfer the stock to
themselves on the books of the bank." The requests were refused by the bank.
Held, that the by-law was valid, and that the directors, under § 8 of the act referred
to, had power to adopt the same. Knight et al. v. Old National Bank, 429.

CARE, EXERCISE OF ORDINARY.
See HIGHWAYS, 2.

CHARTER-PARTY.

1. Where in a charter-party no stipulation is made as to the day the vessel should
sail, or the time she was to be allowed for the trip, the rule of construction is, that
she is to sail within a reasonable time, and to proceed with reasonable despatch,

and without unnecessary deviation, to the place of loading, unless delayed by the
public enemy or perils of the seas. Fearing v. Cheesman, 91.

2. Such an implied covenant in a charter-party is not a condition precedent, which,
if broken, will justify the charterer in disregarding his covenants, unless the delay
is so great that it deprives the charterer of the whole benefit of the contract or
frustrates his object in chartering the vessel. Ibid.

3. A stipulation in a charter-party that the charter should commence when the vessel
was ready to load, does not mean that the charter-party does not attach until the
vessel arrived at the place of loading. Performance of the implied contract, that
the vessel was to sail to the place of loading within a reasonable time, was as
requisite as that notice of the readiness of the vessel to receive cargo should be
given on arrival at the place of loading. Ibid.

4. A charter-party was executed April 27, 1865, while a vessel was lying in the
harbor of Boston, by which she was to load at Farmingdale, Maine. No stipula-
tion was made concerning the time at which she was to sail for the place of loading.
She arrived at Farmingdale, May 20. When the master gave the required notice
of the readiness of the vessel to receive cargo, the charterer refused to load her.
Thereupon the following correspondence took place. From the charterer: "Will
load the vessel at going rates; no other terms, damages or not." To which the
owners replied that the charterer must "either load her per charter-party or pay
damages." To this the following reply was received: "Will load vessel for the
voyage at eight dollars, measurement or weight, difference between old and new,
charter open, to be settled by the courts or by arbitration, without prejudicing the
rights of either party." The final reply was: "We accept your proposition;
load vessel as per despatch of this date." Thereupon the defendants loaded the
vessel, and the cargo was duly transported and delivered. Held, that no new
charter-party was made by the above correspondence, and that the respondent was
liable unless he could show that the master, in failing to report the vessel within a
reasonable time, had violated some condition precedent, or that the delay was so
great as to frustrate the voyage. Ibid.

5. A vessel was chartered April 27, 1865, at Boston, to go to Farmingdale, Maine,
for a cargo of ice, to be transported to Mobile, Alabama. From stress of weather,
she did not arrive at Farmingdale until May 20, when she reported as ready to
receive cargo. The charterers had then hired and loaded another vessel, with the
cargo destined for the first chartered vessel, on the arrival of which, however, they
changed the destination of the vessel last hired and sent her in fulfilment of
another contract, and the vessel first named actually performed the contract for
which she was chartered, and the cargo was received without complaint. Held, that
the facts showed that the voyage was not frustrated by the delay to notify, that the
vessel was ready to receive cargo, and that the owners were entitled to recover
under the charter. Ibid.

6. Where the owner retains the possession and navigation of the vessel, and contracts
to carry the cargo on freight for the voyage, the charter-party is a mere affreight-
ment sounding in covenant, and the freighter is not invested with the legal re-
sponsibility of ownership. Richardson v. Winsor, 395.

7. The charter-party in such case is a contract for the conveyance of merchandise for
a stipulated price. Ibid.

3. Where the owner parts with the possession, command, and management of the
vessel, the charterer becomes the owner for the voyage. Ibid.

9. Courts of justice are not inclined to construe the contract as a demise of the ship, even though it may contain words of grant. Ibid.

10. If the owners agree to keep the vessel tight, stanch, fitted, and provisioned, and to receive on board such lawful goods as the charterers or their agents might think proper to ship, they retain the command of the vessel, and the charter-party in such case is a mere contract of affreightment. Ibid.

11. Then in general the owners are responsible to the charterers for failure to convey the goods according to the terms of the contract. Ibid.

12. Where the contract of affreightment amounts to a demise of the ship, the officers and crew are servants of the charterer, the charterer becomes the carrier of the goods shipped, and in procuring freight, the master is then the agent of the charterer.

Ibid.

13. In this case the owners were the carriers of the goods, and were responsible to the shippers for every loss or damage to the goods during the voyage, unless it happened by the fault of the shipper, the act of God, the public enemy, or without the fault of the carrier, or was excepted in the bill of lading. Ibid.

14. In the absence of any special agreement, the duty of the master extends to all that relates to the lading and transportation of the merchandise, and in the case of a mere contract of affreightment, the ship-owners and master are responsible for the faithful performance of these duties. Ibid.

15. A stipulation in a charter-party that the ship is to employ charterer's stevedore and clerk does not amount to a special agreement, to the effect that the duty of lading and stowing the goods was to be performed by the charterers. Ibid.

16. This clause gave the right to the charterers to name the stevedore and clerk; but they were to be paid, and were subject to the orders of the master. Ibid.

17. In this case the clerk and stevedore were nominated by the charterers; but the supervision of the lading was had by an agent of the owners; the receipting for cargo, measurement, and stowage were all under his direction. Pilotage and port charges were paid by the owners, and when loaded the charterers notified the owners they wished the vessel cleared. She was discharged at the port of destination by a stevedore employed by the master. All these facts show that the owners were responsible for the safe custody, due transport, and right delivery. Ibid.

18. Whether the general owner retains the possession and command of the ship, or the control and navigation of the same passes to the charterer, the shipper, under an ordinary bill of lading, may have his remedy against the ship; but whether the general owner or the charterer is liable, depends upon the terms of the charterparty. Ibid.

19. The fact that the charterers have the privilege of appointing the head stevedore does not, as a matter of course, show them to be responsible for the character of the stowage. Ibid.

See DEMURRAge, 1.

COLLISION.

1. A schooner in the evening, close-hauled, on the port tack, was heading north by west, with the wind west-northwest. A brig on the starboard tack, with the wind at least two points free, was heading south by west half west. Both vessels were in a seaworthy condition in all respects, and had sufficient lights, and both vessels had lookouts. The speed of the schooner was five or six knots, and that of the brig

four or four and one half. When the vessels were at least one hundred and fifty
yards apart, the brig ported her helm. Inevitable accident was not set up, and it
was held not to be a case coming within the eleventh sailing rule. Lane v. Schooner
Denike, 117.

2. The pilot on the schooner was notified by the lookout that there was a light ahead,
upon which he went forward and looked at it for several minutes, and then went
aft. It was not pretended that the approaching vessel would have passed to leeward
by more than her length. Held, that he was negligent in not continuing to watch
the approaching vessel. Ibid.

3. It is not an excuse for the pilot of the schooner that he had a right to keep his
course, under the rules of navigation. Ibid.

4. Nothing in the rules of navigation can exonerate from the consequences of neglect
of precautions such as are required by the ordinary practice of seamen, or the spe-
cial circumstances of the case. Ibid.

5. A party who negligently casts himself upon an obstruction is not entitled to dam-
ages, and the party who inflicts an injury cannot be allowed to defend himself upon
the ground that the injured party committed the first error, if the person so com-
mitting the act causing the damage had reasonable notice of the error of the other,
and means and adequate opportunity to have avoided the disaster. Ibid.

6. The lookout on the schooner in this case had informed the pilot of the light ahead,
saw the brig both before and when her helm was ported, and she attempted to cross
the schooner's course. Instead of going aft, the pilot should have observed the ne-
cessity for precaution, and also watched the approaching vessel longer, in order to
have obtained the same knowledge as the lookout. He could then have ported the
schooner's helm in season to have avoided the collision. Ibid.

7. Vigilance is required from those having the conduct of both vessels, when the cir-
cumstances of their approach require caution. Ibid.

8. In this case it was held that there was negligence on both sides, and that the dam-
ages should be divided. Ibid.

9. A vessel in the evening was lying-to on the starboard tack, with her helm hard
aport, with a competent lookout properly stationed, and with signal-lights fully dis-
played as required by law. Another vessel was discovered directly ahead. The
order was given not to change the helm, and a collision took place. Held, that no
negligence could be charged to those on board the vessel first named for not keeping
her to her course. Killam v. Schooner Eri, 456.

10. Inevitable accident in cases of collision is where a disaster takes place, occasioned
exclusively by natural causes, without any fault on the part of the owners or those
intrusted with the management of either vessel. Ibid.

11. Two vessels were lying-to just prior to a collision, which took place in the night,
-one with competent lookout properly stationed, the required signal-lights, on the
starboard tack, with helm hard aport; the other had her red light burning brightly.
Just before the collision the green light was burning, but not so brightly as it should
have done. In the attempt by an officer to turn it up it went out. It was handed
to a seaman, and was only seen on the starboard side by the master when the two
vessels were close together. No person was specifically appointed or stationed as a
lookout. All the crew were abaft of the mainmast just before the collision. A col-
lision ensued. Held, not an inevitable accident, but that the vessel last referred to
was in fault. Ibid.

12. The rules of navigation require seasonable precautions to avoid danger in collision
cases. Ibid.

13. The ground upon which the vessel in fault in this case was clearly liable was the
absence of an appointed and properly stationed lookout. Ibid.

14. The general rule is, that where a vessel is at anchor in a proper place, with no
sails set, and another under sail collides with her and occasions injury to her, the
vessel in motion is liable. Sterling v. Brig Jennie Cushman, App., 636.

15. The harbor regulations of the harbor of Bangor require that no vessel shall come
to anchor in the channel within certain limits; in this case it was found that the
libellant's vessel was anchored in a proper place, had the proper light, and that her
owners were entitled to recover of the respondents, in accordance with the decree of
the District Court which was affirmed. Ibid.

16. Inevitable accident in collision cases is never admitted as a defence, except when
it is shown that neither vessel was in fault.

Ibid.

See PLEADING, 7. INSURANCE, 13–18.

COMBINATION.

See PATENT, 7-11, 27, 28.

COMMON CARRIER.

1. Common carriers are not responsible for losses or damage which may happen to
goods received to be carried, if the same result from the act of the owner. Choate
v. Crowninshield, 184.

2. When goods are lost or damaged after their reception by the common carrier and
before their delivery, the prima facie presumption is, that the loss was occasioned
by the carrier's default. Ibid.

3. The legal effect of a bill of lading, affirming the goods to have been shipped in
good order, is to raise a prima facie presumption that in all particulars open to
inspection the goods were in that condition; but this does not preclude the carrier,
in case of loss or damage, from showing that the loss proceeded from some cause
which existed, but was not apparent, at the time he received the goods. Ibid.
4. The responsibility of the carrier does not extend to damages resulting to a cargo
of cotton in bales, from moisture of the contents of the bales received previous to the
time of lading, which could not have been discovered by the master, and where the
vessel was in all respects seaworthy, and there appeared to be no want of ordinary
care, skill, and energy on the part of the master, to protect the goods against such
injury while on board the vessel. Ibid.

5. While cotton in bales was lying on the wharf, and while a vessel was loading with
the same, it was discovered by the accidental opening of one bale that the contents
thereof were wet. This fact was reported to the shippers, who said that the wet
would do no injury, and the bale was thereupon tied up and placed on board.
Held, that there was no evidence in the case to warrant the conclusion that the
master had reason to believe any portion of the residue unfit for the voyage. Ibid.
6. While collecting the fares, the clerk of a steamer owned by the defendant inflicted
personal injuries upon the plaintiff, on board the vessel during one of her regular
trips. Held, the plaintiff could recover of the defendant for the injuries received,
although the defendant did not authorize the acts of his employee. Pendleton v.
Kinsley, 416.

7. The principles of law applicable to the relations of master and servant do not fully
define the rights, duties, and obligations between carriers of passengers and pas-
sengers; they are not merely citizens bearing only toward each other the relations