United States v. Plumer.

restrictive words are used. Yet it has never been supposed that a decision of a Circuit Court could be reviewed, unless the matter in dispute should exceed the value of $2,000. There are no words in the act restraining the Supreme Court from taking cognizance of causes under that sum; their jurisdiction is only limited by the legislative declaration, that they may re-examine the decisions of the Circuit Courts, when the matter in dispute exceeds the value of $2,000.

"The court, therefore, will only review those judgments of the Circuit Court of Columbia, a power to re-examine which is expressly given by law [act of Congress].

"On examining the act concerning the District of Columbia,' the court is of opinion that the appellate jurisdiction granted by that act is confined to civil cases.

"The words 'matter in dispute' seem appropriated to civil cases, where the subject in contest has a value beyond the sum mentioned in the act. But in criminal cases, the question is the guilt or innocence of the accused. And although he may be fined upwards of $100, yet that is, in the eye of the law, a punishment for the offence committed, and not the particular object of the suit.

"The writ of error, therefore, is to be dismissed, this court having no jurisdiction of the case." United States v. Moore, 3

Cran. 159.

This argument of the court has two palpable fallacies, inconsistent with each other, yet either of them sufficient to defeat the conclusion arrived at. The court attempt to blend these two 'fallacies. Or rather, they fly from one to the other, as occasion requires, as if to avoid being caught in either. The fallacies are these:

1. One part of their argument seems to assume that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is derived from the act of Congress, instead of the Constitution; and that the court can therefore have no appellate jurisdiction, except what the act of Congress confers. Whereas the truth is that its appellate, like its original jurisdiction, is derived wholly from the Constitution, and not at all from the act of Congress; and consequently

United States v. Plumer.

exists in all cases enumerated in the Constitution, unless Congress have "made exceptions," or taken it away in specific cases. 2. Another part of their argument seems to assume that their appellate jurisdiction is derived from the Constitution; and that it therefore necessarily exists in all the cases enumerated in the Constitution, unless Congress have "made exceptions" thereto. So far well. But they then proceed to say that, Congress having affirmatively described this appellate jurisdiction in civil suits, where "the matter in dispute exceeds the value of $2,000," this simple "affirmative description " of the jurisdiction in those cases "must be understood as a regulation under the Constitution prohibiting" the appeal, not only in all civil suits for a less sum than $2,000, but also in all criminal cases whatsoever.

How monstrous this reasoning and conclusion are will be seen when it is considered that the "exceptions" and "regulations" which Congress are authorized to make in regard to the appellate jurisdiction of that court are two wholly different things, and have wholly different objects in view. The object of the "exceptions" is to declare that the class of cases included in them shall not be appealed at all.

The object of the "regulations" is to prescribe the conditions under which, and provide the means by which, another class of cases may be appealed. There is, therefore, no analogy whatever between the "exceptions" and the "regulations" which Congress are authorized to make. And yet the court have confounded the two; and solely on this confusion of the two they base their decision, withholding the appeal.

The language of the Constitution is perfectly clear, as follows:

"In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall make."

It is here plain that the words "exceptions" and "regulations" mean two different things, because the sole object of the "exceptions" (nobody can doubt) is to particularize what cases shall not be appealed, whereas the "regulations" relate only to those

United States v. Plumer.

cases that are to be appealed. This is certain, since it is "under" the "regulations" that cases are to be appealed.

Now contrast the language of the court with this clear language of the Constitution. Thus the court say:

"But as the jurisdiction of the court has been described, it has been regulated by Congress, and an affirmative description of its powers must be understood as a 'regulation' under the Constitution, prohibiting the exercise of other powers than those described."

Here the court ignore altogether the word "exceptions," as used in the Constitution, and then assume that it is by "regulations" that certain cases are to be excluded from appeal. Whereas the language of the Constitution is explicit, to wit, that it is by "exceptions" alone that cases are to be excluded from appeal, and that it is "under" (that is, in conformity with, or by means of) "regulations "that other cases are to be appealed.

Suppose the words "with such exceptions" had been left out of the Constitution, and that the clause had read (as it then would have done) thus:

"In all the other cases before mentioned the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, under such regulations as the Congress shall make."

Would Congress then have been authorized to "except" any of the cases enumerated by the Constitution itself from the appellate jurisdiction of the court? Plainly not. They would only have been authorized to make "regulations" "under" which all the cases enumerated by the Constitution might be appealed.

If the words "exceptions" and "regulations," in this clause, had meant the same thing, the language of the Constitution would not only have been tautological, but the powers granted to Congress would have been widely different from what they are now. If, for example, the two words "exceptions" and "regulations were to be held to mean the same thing, they must both be held to mean either "exceptions" or "regulations," for they could not mean the same thing, and yet mean both of these two different

United States v. Plumer.

things. If then, the two words "exceptions" and "regulations" were held to mean only" exceptions," Congress would have simply had the power to say that certain cases should not be appealed at all. They would have had no power to prescribe any "regulations" whatever, "under" which cases should be appealed. On the other hand, if the two words were to be held to mean only "regulations," then Congress would have had no power to "make exceptions" of or to prohibit the appeal of any cases whatever. They could only have prescribed "regulations "under" which all cases whatever might be appealed. But now, by giving different meanings to these two different words, Congress gets two different powers, to wit, first, the power to forbid the appeal of certain cases; and, second, the power to prescribe the "regulations" "under" which all other cases may be appealed.

It being thus established that the words "exceptions" and "regulations," as used in this clause of the Constitution, mean two wholly different things, and grant to Congress two wholly different powers, there is left no foundation whatever for the decision of the court, that the regulations prescribed by Congress, "under" which certain cases are to be appealed, must be considered as "exceptions" prohibiting the appeal of all other These "regulations" apply only to the particular cases to which they purport to apply; and they leave all other cases to stand just as they would have done if the "regulations" had not been made.

cases.

These "regulations" governing the appeal in civil suits, where the matter in dispute exceeds $2,000, cannot legally be construed into "exceptions" prohibiting the appeal even of other civil suits, where less amounts are involved. Still less can they be construed into "exceptions" prohibiting appeals in criminal cases, which are not mentioned, and where not money, but life, liberty, and character are in issue. Such a construction would not only be legally absurd, it would be morally atrocious.

To hold that a regulation prescribing the mode of appeal in a civil suit where $2,000 are at stake, shall, by implication, be deemed a prohibition upon any appeal in a criminal case, where

United States v. Plumer.

one's life is at stake, would be an interpretation of law as ludicrous and grotesque as it would be brutal and inhuman.

It is a maxim of universal appplication, that all interpretations are to lean to life and liberty. And neither the Supreme Court, nor any other decent court, has any excuse for disregarding, or for pretending ignorance of this maxim. And nothing, it would seem, but deliberate corruption would induce them to disregard it in this case.

If it be asked, what could have been the motive of Congress in providing "regulations" under which the appeal of civil cases, where the amount involved exceeds $2,000, is to be made, unless it were to exclude all other cases from the right of appeal? One answer is, that we have nothing to do with the private motives of Congress, but only with the legal effect of their enactments, the intentions they have legally conveyed. Another answer is, that it is presumable that Congress may have thought some special" regulations" would be useful or proper in those cases, which would not be useful or proper in other cases.

But perhaps it will be asked, how can any case be appealed, except Congress have first made "regulations" for its appeal?

The answer is, that there are writs and forms of proceeding well known to the law, by which a superior court reviews the decisions of inferior courts; and the Judiciary Act of 1789, § 14,

enacts:

"That all the before-mentioned courts of the United States [including the Supreme Court] shall have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law."

This provision alone would be ample to enable the Supreme Court to take appellate jurisdiction in all cases tried in subordi

nate courts.

In addition to all this, the fifth amendment to the Constitution provides that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."

It would seem that no narrower interpretation could possibly