Adams, 180 U. S. 28, 45 L. ed. 410, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 251; Vicksburg Waterworks Co. v. Vicksburg, supra; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 516, 42 L. ed. 819, 838, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418; Riverside & A. R. Co. v. Riverside, 118 Fed. 736. And the jurisdiction vested upon this ground extends to every question in the case. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 6 L. ed. 204; Nashville v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 247, 18 L. ed. 851; Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257, 25 L. ed. 648; Penn Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Austin, 168 U. S. 685, 42 L. ed. 626, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 223; Gregory v. Van Ee, 160 U. S. 643, 646, 40 L. ed. 566, 567, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 431; New Orleans, M. & T. R. Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U. S. 135, 140, 141, 26 L. ed. 96, 98. The state acts through the state board of equalization. Its acts are the acts of the state. Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 154 U. S. 362, 38 L. ed. 1014, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 560, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, supra; Railroad & Teleph. Cos. V. Board of Equalizers, 85 Fed. 302; Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Taylor, 86 Fed. 168, 31 C. C. A. 537, 60 U. S. App. 166, 88 Fed. 350; Louisville Trust Co. v. Stone, 46 C. C. A. 299, 107 Fed. 305. The reassessment in the case deprived appellee of due process of law, and of the equal protection of the laws. Santa Clara County v. Southern P. R. Co. 9 Sawy. 165, 18 Fed. 397, Affirmed in 118 U. S. 394, 30 L. ed. 118, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1132; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 41 L. ed. 979, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581; Berthold v. Hoskins, 38 Fed. 772; Martin v. Barbour, 34 Fed. 701; Hunting ton v. Central P. R. Co. 2 Sawy. 503; Fed. Cas. No. 6,911; Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Taylor, 86 Fed. 183. The testimony of the members of the state board that they were coerced was competent. State Bd. of Equalization v. People, 191 Ill. 540, 58 L.R.A. 513, 61 N. E. 339; Pelton v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 101 U. S. 143, 25 L. ed. 901; Fargo v. Hart, 193 U. S. 490, 500, 48 L. ed. 761, 765, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 498; Louisville Trust Co. v. Stone, supra. Mr. James F. Meagher argued the cause and filed a brief for the People's Gaslight & Coke Company: The complainant was not a party to the mandamus suit, and no notice was given to it. Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U. S. 701, 28 L. ed. 569, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 663; High, Extr. Legal Rem. 3d ed. ¶ 458; Winstanley v. People, 92 Ill. 402; Gray, Limitations of Taxing Power & Public Indebtedness, § 1295. The board did not use its own judgment upon arriving at the full value, but, through judicial coercion, used a false standard. Railroad & Teleph. Cos. v. Board of Equalizers, 85 Fed. 311; Central Transp. Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co. 139 U. S. 29, 35 L. ed. 59, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 478. A valuation of property at its full worth, in accordance with the state law, is invalid where there is a systematic, habitual, and intentional undervaluation of other property of the same class throughout the state. Bureau County v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 44 Ill. 229; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Boone County, 44 Ill. 240; Randell v. Bridgeport, 63 Conn. 321, 28 Atl. 523; Santa Clara County v. Southern P. R. Co. 18 Fed. 394; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Republic County, 14 C. C. A. 456, 32 U. S. App. 224, 67 Fed. 411; Taylor v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 31 C. C. A. 537, 60 U. S. App. 166, 88 Fed. 350; Louisville Trust Co. v. Stone, 46 C. C. A. 299, 107 Fed. 305; Cummings v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 101 U. S. 153, 25 L. ed. 903. The assessment made by the state board of equalization in 1900 was final. There is no board or body in the state to exercise a revisory power over their judgment. Missouri v. Dockery, 191 U. S. 165, 48 L. ed. 133, 63 L.R.A. 571, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 53. The acts complained of in the case at bar were state actions. L. ed. 676, 679; Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 347, 25 U. S. 270, 29 L. ed. 185, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 903, 962; Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U. S. 213, 42 L. ed. 1012, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 583; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U. S. 403, 41 L. ed. 489, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 130; Smyth Ct. Rep. 418; Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 42 L. ed. 819, 18 Sup. T. Co. 154 U. S. 362, 38 L. ed. 1014, 4 InScott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34, 38 L. ed. 896, ters. Com. Rep. 560, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1108; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 41 L. ed. 979, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581; Guthrie's 14th Amend ment, p. 45. The case made is clearly one of equitable jurisdiction. Cummings v. Merchants' Nat. Bank; Stanley v. Albany County, 121 U. S. 535, 30 L. ed. 1000, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1234; Railroad & Teleph. Cos. v. Board of Equalizers, 85 Fed. 302; Taylor v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 31 C. C. A. 537, 60 U. S. App. 166, 88 Fed. 369; Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co. v. King, 57 C. C. A. 278, 120 Fed. 620; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Cole, 75 Ill. 591; Burton Stock Car Co. v. Traeger, 187 Ill. 9, 58 N. E. 418. In the bill filed by appellee there is an offer to do equity. Appellee tendered whatever sum the chancellor might decree to be rightfully due. It is true that no specified amount was tendered, for the reason that no portion of the reassessment was valid. If any reliance should be placed by the appellants upon the failure of the bill to tender a specific amount, that contention would be readily met by Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, 43 L. ed. 443, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 187; Fargo v. Hart, 193 U. S. 490, 502, 48 L. ed. 761, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 498. Messrs. William G. Beale. Charles S. Holt, and William P. Sidley for the Chicago Telephone Company. Messrs. William W. Gurley, Isaac M. Jordan, Arthur Dyrenforth, and Howard M. Carter for the Chicago Consolidated Traction Company. 3. The conclusiveness attending, under the New Jersey practice, the probate of a will, the settlement of the executors' account, and the final distribution of the estate pursuant to orders which the court made, after having decreed that all those who had neglected to bring in their claims were forever Mr. Justice Peckham delivered the opin- barred from their action therefor against ion of the court: the executors, renders repugnant to the These cases involve the same principle as full faith and credit clause of the Federal that already decided in No. 115 [207 U. S. diction of the New Jersey courts was made Constitution-where no attack on the juris20, ante, 78, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 7], and al--the subsequent assessment, under N. Y. though the facts differ somewhat in the vari-Laws 1896, chap. 908, upon the personal ous cases, yet they present substantially the same questions, and the judgment in each case is therefore affirmed. [43]*ADELAIDE V. TILT, Benjamin B. Tilt, Jo seph W. Congdon, and John R. Curran, as V. OTTO KELSEY, Comptroller of the State of (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 43-60.) Error to state court-Federal question -how raised. estate of the decedent as a resident of New York, of a succession tax, which, under § 222 of that act, is made a lien on the property and a personal obligation of the transferees and executors. [No. 18.] Argued and submitted January 28, 1907. I 'N ERROR to the Surrogate's Court of the County and State of New York to review a judgment entered in pursuance of an order of the Court of Appeals of that state, affirming a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, First Department, which had in turn affirmed the order of the surrogate, assessing a succession tax upon the personal estate of a decedent. Reversed. See same case below in court of appeals, 182 N. Y. 557, 75 N. E. 1134. Statement by Mr. Justice Moody: 1. The objection that no Federal right was "specially set up and claimed" within the meaning of U. S. Rev. Stat. § 709 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 575), governing the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court over state courts, cannot successfully be maintained, where judicial proceedings in New Jersey were clearly relied upon in New York by executors in an "appeal to the surrogate" as a defense to the assessment of the New York transfer tax, although such right was not in terms stated in that court in pursuance of an order of to be one claimed under the Federal Consti- the court of appeals of that state. The tution, especially where the constitutional judgment assessed a succession tax upon This is a writ of error from this court to the surrogates' court of the county and state of New York, to review a judgment entered NOTE.-On how and when questions must As to full faith and credit to be given to be raised and decided in a state court in or-state records and judicial proceedings-see der to make a case for a writ of error from notes to Lindley v. O'Reilly, 1 L.R.A. 79; the Supreme Court of the United States- Cummington v. Belchertown, 4 L.R.A. 131; see note to Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. McGrew, Rand v. Hanson, 12 L.R.A. 574; Wiese v. 63 L.R.A. 33. San Francisco Musical Fund Soc. 7 L.R.A. 578; Darby v. Mayer, 6 L. ed. U. S. 367; Mills v. Duryee, 3 L. ed. U. S. 411; D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 13 L. ed. U. S. 648; and Huntington v. Attrill, 36 L. ed. U. S. 1123. As to review of decisions of state courts presenting the question of full faith and credit-see note to Allen v. Alleghany Co. 49 L. ed. U. S. 551. the personal estate of Albert Tilt, deceased, upon the ground that he was, at the time of his death, a resident of the state of New York. Before the assessment of the tax the estate of Tilt, who died testate, was fully [44]administered in *the courts of New Jersey, where the will was probated. In the course of the administration all the personal property, after paying debts, taxes, and charges of administration, was distributed by the executors to the beneficiaries under the will. A reversal of the judgment of the surrogates' court is sought for the reason that it did not give full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of the state of New Jersey, as required by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Mr. William G. Wilson argued the cause and filed a brief for plaintiffs in er ror: The legal residence of Albert Tilt at the time of his death was in the state of New Jersey. Dupuy v. Wurtz, 53 N. Y. 556; Thorndike v. Boston, 1 Met. 242; Thayer v. Boston, 124 Mass. 139, 26 Am. Rep. 650; Story, Confl. L. § 47; Somerville v. Somerville, 5 Ves. Jr. 750; Bassett v. Wheeler, 84 N. Y. 466; Re Roberts, 8 Paige, 519. The probate of the will of Albert Tilt in New Jersey is conclusive upon the question of his residence for purposes of administration and tax. Plant v. Harrison, 36 Misc. 649, 74 N. Y. Supp. 411; Re Coursen, 4 N. J. Eq. 408; Re Straub, 49 N. J. Eq. 264, 24 Atl. 569; Quidort v. Pergeaux, 18 N. J. Eq. 472; Ryno v. Ryno, 27 N. J. Eq. 522; Bolton v. Schriever, 135 N. Y. 69, 18 L.R.A. 242, 31 N. E. 1001; Roderigas v. East River Sav. Inst. 63 N. Y. 467, 20 Am. Rep. 555, 76 N. Y. 316, 32 Am. Rep. 309; Kinnier v. Kinnier, 45 N. Y. 540, 6 Am. Rep. 132; Schluter v. Bowery Sav. Bank, 117 N. Y. 130, 5 L.R.A. 541, 15 Am. St. Rep. 494, 22 N. E. 572. The administration in New Jersey is a bar. Tompkins v. Tompkins, 1 Story, 547, Fed. Cas. No. 14,091; State v. McGlynn, 20 Cal. 264, 81 Am. Dec. 118; Deslonde v. Darrington, 29 Ala. 95; Bogardus v. Clark, 4 Paige, 625; Woodruff v. Taylor, 20 Vt. 65; Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 612, 624, 12 L. ed. 841, 846; Peale v. Phipps, 14 How. 368, 374, 14 L. ed. 459, 461; Byers v. McAuley, 149 U. S. 608, 615, 37 L. ed. 867, 871, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 906; Simmons v. Saul, 138 U. S. 439, 34 L. ed. 1054, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 369. Mr. George M. Judd submitted the cause for defendant in error: Morrison v. Watson, 154 U. S. 111, 115, 38 L. ed. 927, 929, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 995; F. G. Oxley Stave Co. v. Butler County, 166 U. S. 648, 654, 41 L. ed. 1149, 1151, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 709. The Federal question was not specially set up or claimed at the proper time and in the proper way: (a) It was not specially set up or claimed before the decision rendered by the surrogate of New York county upon the appeal to him. (b) It has been decided by the court of appeals of the state of New York that the only questions on appeal which can be reviewed by it or by the surrogate are those presented by the appellants in the notice of appeal to the surrogate; and the notice of appeal to the surrogate does not raise a Federal question. Re Davis, 149 N. Y. 547, 44 N. E. 185; Re Manning, 169 N. Y. 451, 62 N. E. 565. (c) The record in this case shows that neither the surrogate nor the appellate division nor the court of appeals considered a Federal question. The only question considered by the surrogate was the question of the residence of the decedent, which was a question of fact. Dupuy v. Wurtz, 53 N. Y. 562. When, therefore, an appeal was taken from the order of the surrogate to the court of appeals, the only question presented to said court was the question of law as to whether there was any evidence to support the decision of the surrogate. This was an independent question of law, not involving any Federal question. Dower v. Richards, 151 U. S. 658, 666, 38 L. ed. 305, 308, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 452. It must affirmatively appear that a Federal question was raised and presented to the court of appeals for decision, and that such question was decided. Adams County v. Burlington & M. River R. Co. 112 U. S. 123, 28 L. ed. 678, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 77; California Powder Works v. Davis, 151 U. S. 389, 393, 38 N. E. 206, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 350. If the probate decree in New Jersey was not conclusive, and the surrogate of New York county has jurisdiction to pass upon the question of residence, then this court cannot review the facts of residence presented to said surrogate, for the question of residence so presented is a question of fact, and, on appeal to the court of appeals, becomes an independent question of law, not involving any Federal question. New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Ref. Co. 125 U. S. 18, 31 L. ed. 607, This court has not jurisdiction of the writ 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 741; Eustis v. Bolless, 150 of error. U. S. 361, 37 L. ed. 1111, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 131; California Powder Works v. Davis, | Bishop, 82 App. Div. 112, 81 N. Y. Supp. supra. The decree of a probate court is in the nature of a proceeding in rem; and therefore any ground or fact upon which that decree professes to be founded can be inquired into in a proceeding in another state, brought by a person not a party to the probate proceedings. Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. v. Tisdale, 91 U. S. 238, 241, 23 L. ed. 314, 316; Brigham v. Fayerweather, 140 Mass. 413, 5 N. E. 265; 3 Wigmore, Ev. § 1347, p. 1636; Thormann v. Frame, 176 U. S. 350, 356, 44 L. ed. 500, 503, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 446; Overby v. Gordon, 177 U. S. 214, 223, 44 L. ed. 741, 745, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 603; 2 Black, Judgm. 2d ed. §§ 635, 794, 795, 808; 1 Woerner, American Law of Administration, 2d ed. p. 337; Townsend v. Van Buskirk, 22 App. Div. 445, 48 N. Y. Supp. 260; Re Law, 56 App. Div. 456, 67 N. Y. Supp. 857. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the probate court of one state does not possess the power to bind all the world conclusively as to the fact of domicil by a mere finding of such fact in an ex parte proceeding for the appointment of an administrator. Thormann v. Frame, 176 U. S. 350, 353, 44 L. ed. 500, 502, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 446; Overby v. Gordon, 177 U. S. 214, 218, 44 L. ed. 741, 743, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 603. Leaving out of consideration the ex parte nature of the probate proceedings, in view of the fact that, by § 15 of the statutes of New Jersey, residence of the decedent in the county is made one of the jurisdictional facts upon which the probate court of that county bases its decree admitting the will to probate, and in view of the further fact that an exemplified copy of the decree of that probate court has been offered in evidence by the appellants claiming a benefit under it, it is a general rule of law that this court is not precluded from inquiring into the question of residence. The fact that the record of the probate proceedings in New Jersey recites the jurisdictional fact of residence can make no difference. Hard v. Shipman, 6 Barb. 623; Bolton v. Schriever, 135 N. Y. 73, 18 L.R.A. 242, 31 N. E. 1001; Re Law, 56 App. Div. 457, 67 N. Y. Supp. 857; Ferguson v. Crawford, 70 N. Y. 257, 26 Am. Rep. 589; Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457, 21 L. ed. 897; Thormann v. Frame, 176 U. S. 350, 356, 44 L. ed. 500, 503, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 446. The surrogate of New York county had jurisdiction to take testimony and pass upon the question of the domicil of the testator. Re Fitch, 160 N. Y. 91, 54 N. E. 701; Re 474. Mr. Justice Moody delivered the opinion of the court: In the disposition of this case we are somewhat embarrassed by our ignorance of the reasons which controlled the decision of the highest court of the state. The opinion of the surrogate *was very brief. His judgment [47] was affirmed upon appeal successively by the supreme court and the court of appeals,-in each court without an opinion and with two judges dissenting. The record shows the following facts: Albert Tilt was engaged in business as a silk manufacturer in Paterson, New Jersey, until the time of his death. Until 1888 he was a resident and citizen of Paterson. In that year he removed to New York city, became a resident and citizen of New York, and remained such until some time in the year 1899. He died in New York on May 2, 1900. His residence and citizenship at the time of his death was in dispute. For many years he had owned a house in New York City, where he lived during the greater part of the year, and another house in Roxbury, New Jersey, where he lived during the summer and early autumn. contended by the executors of his will, the plaintiffs in error, that in the last year of his life he changed his domicil from New York City to Roxbury, and that at the time of his death he was domiciled in New Jersey. On the other hand it is contended by the comptroller of New York, the defendant in error, that his domicil continued until his death to be in New York. Upon this question the evidence was conflicting. It is After the death of Mr. Tilt, his will was admitted to probate by the surrogate of Morris county, New Jersey, who by law had jurisdiction to do this if the testator resided in the county at the time of his death. The petition for probate described the testator as "late of the township of Roxbury, in said county," and the letters testamentary granted on May 23, 1900, by the surrogate, described him as "late of the county of Morris, deceased." An order was made fixing a time within which creditors must prove claims against the estate. On the expiration of this time a further order was made, that all creditors who had neglected to bring in their claims and demands should "be forever barred from their action therefor against the executors of said deceased." Succession taxes, imposed by the law of New Jersey and the law of the United States, and all[48] debts, were paid. The executors presented their accounts to the orphans' court of the county, and that court, acting within its jurisdiction, on June 20, 1901, allowed the accounts and directed the distribution of the estate, according to the terms of the will. | The executors made the distribution in conformity with the court's order, thereby parting with all the property of the testator which had been in their hands. After the distribution had been accomplished, the state of New York for the first time made known its claim for a transfer tax. The comptroller of the state filed his petition with the surrogate of the county of New York. In response to this petition, on August 16, 1901, Robert Mazet was appointed by the surrogate as appraiser, to fix the fair market value of the property of Albert Tilt, deceased. This was done with the view of ascertaining the amount of a transfer tax due under a section of a statute providing for such a tax "when the transfer is by will or by the intestate laws of this state from any person dying seised and possessed of the property while a resident of the state." On March 6, 1903, Mazet filed his report in the surrogate's court. The material part of this report was: First, that the net personal property of the deceased "subject to tax herein" was, at the time of his death, of the fair market value of $1,056,951.22; second, that Tilt was a resident of New York City at the time of his death; third, that he left a will which had been "duly admitted to probate in the surrogate's court of the county of Morris, state of New Jersey;" fourth, after stating the disposition of his property made by the testator by this will, the report appraised the estate "subject to tax herein" at its fair market value at the amount already stated. On June 15, 1903, the surrogate entered an order adopting the value of the property reported by the appraiser and assessing the amount of the transfer tax specifically on each bequest contained in the will. The total tax amounted to about $13,000. On August 10, 1903, a paper, entitled "Appeal to the Surrogate," was filed by the executors. This paper gave [49]notice of an appeal *to the surrogate from the appraisement, assessment, and determination of the transfer tax, and from the surrogate's own order of June 15. The only ground of appeal which need be stated here is the fifth, which alleged "that the right to assess or impose a tax under the laws of the state of New York upon the transfer of the property of the testator, if there ever was any such right, was barred before the commencement of this proceeding, by a decree of the orphans' court of Morris county, New Jersey, a court of competent jurisdiction, made on the 25th day of February, 1901, barring all claims against the said testator or his estate which had not been presented and proved to said executors, pursuant to public notice heretofore given and published, as prescribed by the laws of the state of New Jersey; and by the further decree of the same court, made on the 20th day of June, 1901, directing the distribution of the estate of said testator in the hands of said executors, according to the terms of the will of the said Albert Tilt, deceased; in obedience to which the said executors, without any notice or knowledge of any claim or liability for the payment of a transfer tax under the laws of the state of New York, distributed the said estate, so that there was not, at the time of the commencement of this proceeding, and is not now, any property of the said estate in the It hands of said executors." was then agreed by counsel that the surrogate should determine on affidavits whether or not Albert Tilt was a resident of New York at the time of his death. Pending the consideration of this question the executor requested in writing certain findings of facts and conclusions of law, of which only two need be stated here. They are as follows: (2) "Under the Constitution of the United States full faith and credit must be given to the probate of said will and codicil of said Albert Tilt in the state of New Jersey, and to the accounting and distribution made by his executors under the decree of the orphans' court of Morris county, in said state, of the estate of said Albert Tilt as a resident of New Jersey at the time of his death." (3) "None of the personal *estate [50] of said Albert Tilt is subject to the payment of a transfer tax under the laws of the state of New York, excepting only such of his personal estate as was actually within the state of New York at the time of his death." These requests were refused by the surrogate, who, in a short opinion, found as a fact that Tilt was a resident of New York at the time of his death, and ruled that his |