ments. turns out, if we may judge from the instructions, Mr. Adams's comthat he did not precisely say either the one thing or the other. Substantially, indeed, he might mean that the general law of nations, if affirmed between the two Governments, would, to a certain extent, attain the object of the first article of the Declaration of Paris, without the adoption of it as a new principle. But he must have known, on the day of the date of these instructions, which is the very day of his first conference with me, and four days after the issue of the Queen's Proclamation, that the Government of the United States contemplated, in the pending struggle, neither encouraging privateers nor issuing letters of marque; hence that such a proposition would only complicate the negotiation for no useful purpose whatever. Besides which, it should be borne in mind that the effect, if adopted, would have been, instead of a simple adhesion to the Declaration of Paris, to render it necessary to reopen a series of negotiations for a modification of it between all the numerous parties to that instrument. Moreover, it is admitted by his Lordship that no powers had been given to make any convention at all-the parties could only agree. Yet, without such powers, what was the value of an agreement? For the Declaration of Paris was, by its very terms, binding only between parties who acceded to it as ments. Mr. Adams's com- a whole. Her Majesty's Government thus placed themselves in the position of a party which proposes what it gives no authority to perform, and which negotiates upon a basis on which it has already deprived itself of the power to conclude. "How are we to reconcile these inconsistencies? By the terms of the Queen's Proclamation his lordship must have been aware that Great Britain had released the United States from further responsibility for the acts of its new-made belligerent that was issuing letters of marque, as well as from the possible offenses of privateers sailing under its flag; and yet, when the Government of the United States comes forward and declares its disposition to accept the terms of the Declaration of Paris, pure and simple, the Government of Her Majesty cannot consent to receive the very thing that they have been all along asking for, because it might possibly compel them to deny to certain privateers the rights which may accrue to them by virtue of their voluntary recognition of them as belonging to a helligerent power. Yet it now appears that, on the 18th of May, the same Government was willing to reaffirm the law of nations, which virtually involved the very same difficulty on the one hand, while on the other it had given no powers to negotiate a new convention, but contemplated a simple adhesion to the old declaration on ments. the part of the United States. The only way by Mr. Adams's comwhich I can explain these various involutions of policy with a proper regard to Lord Russell's character for straightforwardness, which I have no disposition to impugn, is this: He may have instructed Lord Lyons prior to the 18th of May, the day of our first conference. I certainly received the impression that he had done so. Or he may have written the paper before one o'clock of that day, and thus have referred to the act as a thing completed, though still within his power, in order to get rid of the proposition to negotiate directly here. Of that I do not pretend to judge. But neither in one case nor in the other was there the smallest intimation of a desire to put in any caveat whatever of the kind proposed in his last declaration. That seems to have been an afterthought, suggested when all other obstacles to the success of a negotiation had been removed. "That it originated with Lord Russell I cannot credit consistently with my great respect for his character. "That it was suggested after his proposed consultation with his colleagues, and by some member who had in view the defeat of the negotiation in the interests of the insurgents, I am strongly inclined to believe. The same influence may have been at work in the earlier stages of the business ments. Mr. Adams's com- as well as the latest, and have communicated that uncertain and indirect movement which I have commented on, not less inconsistent with all my notions of his lordship's character than with the general reputation of British policy." Contrast between conduct of Great The partial purpose which was thus disclosed in Britain toward the the first official act of the Queen's Government, United States, in the Trent affair, after the issue of the proclamation of neutrality, and toward viola tors of British neutrality, in the appears often in the subsequent conduct of that Government. insurgent interest. Thus, when, a few months later, an officer of the Navy of the United States had taken from the deck of a British vessel on the high seas four prominent agents traveling on an errand that, if successful, would result in disaster to the United States, against which they were in rebellion, the course of the British Cabinet indicated an unfriendliness so extreme as to approach to a desire for war. The news of this reached both countries at about the same time. In the United States, while there was some excitement and some manifestation of pleasure, Lord Lyons bears witness to the moderation of the tone of the press. Mr. Seward immediately wrote Mr. Adams to acquaint him that the act of Captain Wilkes was unauthorized, and Mr. Adams communicated this fact to Lord Russell. Lord Lyons to Earl Russell, Nov. 25, 1861, Blue Book No. 5, North America, 1862, page 10. 2 Earl Russell to Lord Lyons. Same, page 11. Contrast between conduct of Great Britain toward the United States, in the Trent affair, tors of British The excitement in England, on the contrary, was intense, and was fanned into animosity by the press. Although without information as to the of purpose and toward violathe Government of the United States, peremptory neutrality, in the insurgent interest. instructions were immediately sent to Lord,Lyons to demand the release of the four gentlemen, and to leave Washington with all the members of the legation, if the demand was not complied with in seven days.' In anticipation of a refusal, vessels of war were hurriedly fitted out at the naval stations, and troops were pressed forward to Canada. In the midst of this preparation Lord Russell received from Mr. Adams official information that the act had not been authorized by the Government of the United States; but this intelligence was suppressed, and public opinion was encouraged to drift into a state of hostility toward the United States. The arming continued with ostentatious publicity; the warlike preparations went on, and the peremptory instructions to Lord Lyons were neither revoked nor in any sense modified. Contrast this conduct of Great Britain with reference to a violation of British sovereignty that had not been authorized or assumed by the Government of the United States, and that, to say the least, could be plausibly defended by reference to Earl Russell to Lord Lyons. Blue Book No. 5, North America, 1862, page 3. |