The systematic done the same thing. The United States were operations of the tion of the duties of a neutral. insurgents a viola- under no such necessity. If they could not manufacture at home all the supplies they needed, they were enabled to make their purchases abroad openly, and to transport them in the ordinary course of commerce. It was the insurgents who, unable to manufacture at home, were driven to England for their entire military supplies, and who, finding it impossible to transport those supplies in the ordinary course of commerce, originated a commerce for the purpose, and covered it under the British flag to Bermuda and Nassau. Under the pressure of the naval power of the United States, their necessities compelled them to transport to England a part of the executive of their Government, and to carry on its operation in Great Britain. They were protected in doing this by Her Majesty's Government, although its attention was called to the injustice thereof.' This conduct deprived the United States of the benefit of their superiority at sea, and to that extent British neutrality was partial and insincere. The United States confidently submit to the Tribunal of Arbitration that it is an abuse of a sound principle to extend to such combined transactions as those of Huse, Heyliger, Walker, and Fraser, Trenholm & Co, the well-settled right of a neutral to manufacture and 1 Lord Russell to Mr. Adams, Vol. I, page 578. sell to either belligerent, during a war, arms, munitions, and military supplies. To sanction such an extension will be to lay the foundation for international misunderstanding and probable war, whenever a weaker party hereafter may draw upon the resources of a strong neutral, in its efforts to make its strength equal to that of its antagonist. Continuing partiality for the in From the Queen's proclamation of neutrality to the close of the struggle, Great Britain framed its surgents. rules, construed its laws and its instructions, and governed its conduct in the interest of the insurgents. What could tend more to inspirit them than the news that on the eve of Mr. Adams's arrival in London, as if to show in the most public manner a purpose to overlook him, and to disregard the views which he might have been instructed by his Government to present, it had been determined to recognized their right to display on the ocean a flag which had not then a ship to carry it? How they must have welcomed the parliamentary news,' on the heels of this proclamation, that the effect of this recognition would be to employ British subjects in warring upon the commerce of the United States, with a protection against piracy promised in advance! How great must have been their joy, when they found British laws construed so as to confer upon them the right to use the workshops tiality for the in gents. Continuing par- and dock-yards of Liverpool, for building ships which, without violating the municipal law of England, might leave British ports in such warlike state that they could be fitted for battle in twentyfour hours! How they must have been cheered by the official legalization of the operations of those who had been sent to Liverpool in anticipation of the proclamation, to be in readiness to act! And if these welcome sights inspirited and cheered the insurgents, as was doubtless the case, how relatively depressing must have been their effect upon the loyal people and upon the Government of the United States! The correspondence of Mr. Seward and of Mr. Adams, running through the whole of the volumes of evidence accompanying this case, bears testimony to the depth of this feeling. When Great Britain carried into practice its erated in British theory of neutrality, it was equally insincere and partial. Recapitulation of hostile acts tol possessions. Its municipal laws for enforcing its obligations as a neutral, under the law of nations, were con- . fessedly inadequate, and, during the struggle, were stripped of all their force by executive and judicial construction. Yet Great Britain refused to take any steps for their amendment, although requested so to do.1 The Queen's proclamation inhibited blockade 1 Ante, page 251. of hostile acts tol possessions. running; yet the authorities encouraged it by en- Recapitulation acting new laws or making new regulations which erated in British permitted the transshipment of goods contraband of war within the colonial ports; by officially informing the colonial officers that "British authorities ought not to take any steps adverse to merchant vessels of the Confederate States, or to interfere with their free resort to British ports;"" by giving official notice to the United States that it would not do to examine too closely, on the high seas, British vessels with contraband of war; and by regulations which operated to deter the United States vessels of war from entering the British ports from which the illicit trade was carried on. The Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819 forbade the employment of a British vessel as a transport; and yet vessels known to be owned by the insurgent authorities, and engaged in carrying munitions of war for them, were allowed to carry the British flag and were welcomed in British ports. Still further, the same vessel would appear one day as a blockade-runner, and another day as a man-ofwar, receiving an equal welcome in each capacity. The instructions of January 31, 1862, forbade both belligerents alike to enter the port of Nassau except by permission of the governor, or in stress 'Duke of Newcastle to Governor Ord, Vol. II, page 558. Recapitulation of weather. That permission was lavishly given to of hostile acts tol erated in British possessions. These facts every insurgent cruiser, but was granted churlishly, if at all, to the vessels of the United States. The same instructions forbade the granting to a steam man-of-war of either belligerent in British ports a supply of coal in excess of what would be necessary to take the vessel to the nearest port of its own country or some nearer destination. This rule was enforced upon the vessels of the United States, but was utterly disregarded as to the vessels of the insurgents. Those instructions also forbade the granting of any supply of coal to such a vessel if it had been coaled in a British port within three months. Yet in three notable instances this salutary rule was violated, that of the Nashville at Bermuda in February, 1862; the Florida at Barbadoes, in February, 1863; and the Alabama at Capetown in March, 1864. These admitted facts were repeatedly, and in upon the acts of detail, brought to the notice of the British Gov throw suspicion British officials cruisers. toward insurgent ernment, and as repeatedly, the answer was given. that there was no cause for interference. At length they were, as a system, brought to Lord Russell's attention, by Mr. Adams, with the threads of evidence, which furnished him with the proof of their truth. Yet he declined to act, saying that "this correspondence does not appear |