[The statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF HON. LANGHORNE M. BOND, ADMINISTRATOR FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss various safety matters in which you have expressed an interest that relate to the subject of midair collisions; a threat which, although remote, still remains with us as was so tragically brought home recently. I know all of us share a deep sense of loss from this catastrophic accident, and hope that collectively we can work to minimize, to the extent humanly possible, the chance of similar occurrences in the future.

We have recognized for some time the need to continue to reduce the threat of midair collisions and have worked in many ways to refine and further improve upon the air traffic system so that one day the possibility of midair collisions will not exist. We have made significant strides but, in all candor, we are not yet where we want to be. I assure you that is not due to lethargy or indifference, but rather to the complexity of the problem to be solved.

Also, as the members of the Committee know so well, our air transportation system is evolutionary in nature. Certain key building blocks must be in place before additions can be made. Critical decisions must be timely made but with enough deliberation and review to assure that the "solution" to one problem is not the beginning of another.

This is where we are today: we have developed the world's finest air traffic control system-a system that is highly complex and sophisticated, but which must be to fulfill the diverse and growing demands upon it. We have laid many of the necessary building blocks. We have developed a system, with the support of the Congress, that has in place sophisticated long range and terminal radars; we have provided these radars with the capability of giving our controllers aircraft identity, speed and altitude; we have installed back-up emergency communication systems at long range radar sites; we have levied stringent regulatory requirements upon the users of the system; and the list goes on.

We are at the point where fine tuning of certain elements of the system may be called for to permit the further evolution of the system's safety features, and where rapidly developing technology should result in significant advances in collision avoidance that conceptually were not feasible even a short time ago.

I would like to briefly trace the evolution of certain elements of our system designed to foster aviation safety. Later on, I will discuss some actions we are in the process of taking.

Since the FAA was formed by the Congress in 1958, we have strived to assure the safe separation of aircraft. As I stated a moment ago, we have made substantial progress in that time-progress that is borne out by safety statistics over the years. I might add at this point that, notwithstanding the fact that accidents can and do happen, and notwithstanding the fact that our system is not perfect, the U.S. air transportation system is superior to that found anywhere else in the world and the U.S. air traveller has every reason to have confidence in the safety of the system. And the system continues to evolve into a better one every year.

Consider, for example, that in the five year period preceding 1973, there were a total of 12 midair collisions involving air carrier aircraft. In the nearly six years since that time, we have experienced one such tragedy. While this demonstrates the advances made in the system, it also points out that we need to look at the system carefully to identify any areas which may need improvement so that similar tragedies will be averted in the future.

Let me highlight some of the actions we have taken to improve the safety environment in which the air carriers operate. First, let me stress that the whose purpose of the air traffic system is to provide for the safe separation of aircraft. Historically it has been the responsibility of every pilot to be vigilant in scanning for other aircraft which may present the possibility of a collision, and this remains a vital part of today's system. However, the advent of high performance aircraft and increases in traffic have necessitated more sophisticated systems to assist the pilot in assuring aircraft separation. I will describe those systems in a moment. We have taken firm actions to improve the air traffic environment. First, we have extended control over more and more flight operations. This has been accomplished by progressively expanding positive control airspace, establishing Terminal

Control Areas (TCAs) and implementing expanded radar services in Terminal Radar Service Areas (TRSAs).

The United States is now blanketed in positive control areas from 18,000 feet to 60,000 feet. Further, Terminal Control Area airspace surrounds 21 of our major airports handling large volumes of high performance passenger carrying aircraft. To operate within these TCAs, pilots are required to be appropriately equipped and to obtain clearance. All aircraft operating within such airspace are provided separation.

Expanded radar services in varying degrees have been implemented at over 100 other U.S. airports and traffic advisories are issued throughout the system.

These actions resulted in some degree of public outcry, as they were considered by some to be an infringement on the freedom of transit within the nation's airspace. Nevertheless, the FAA concluded that they were necessary for the safety of the flying public.

We have also sought to improve the capability of pilots to see and avoid by increased flight visibility and cloud clearance requirements as well as by limiting maximum speeds below 10,000 feet to 250 knots. Additionally, at altitudes above 3,000 feet VFR aircraft cannot fly at random, but must conform to certain cruising altitudes to provide separation between uncontrolled aircraft and IFR aircraft. Moreover, to operate above 12,500 feet, with rare exceptions, all aircraft must have an altitude encoding transponder which apprises the en route controller of aircraft position and altitude thereby enabling the controller to provide traffic advisories and vector aircraft as necessary. Again, above 18,000 feet all aircraft are under positive control.

Terminal Control Areas, which were an outgrowth of an intensive FAA study of near midair collisions in 1968, have proven to be a highly effective means of separating traffic in high density airspace. By exercising more control over all aircraft within a TCA, we have been able to reduce dramatically the number of near midair collisions within this defined airspace. For example, before the implementation of our 21 Terminal Central Areas, there were 254 near mid-air collisions reported to the FAA in a one year period at these locations. In contrast with these 254 near midairs, there were only 24 near midairs reported to the FAA at all these locations combined during 1977. This enormous reduction occurred despite a 10 percent increase in traffic at these airports in the five years from 1973 through the end of 1977.

The FAA has also implemented Terminal Radar Service Areas which provide coverage for 102 airports within the U.S. In our busier TRSAS, VFR aircraft pilots are provided separation from other participating VFR aircraft and all IFR aircraft. FAA figures show that over 90 percent of VFR arrivals and 85 percent of VFR departures participate in this program.

We have continued to seek additional ways to reduce the possibility of midair collisions. For example, Terminal Control Areas are designed to permit high performance aircraft to exit and arrive through the "top" of the TCA, which, depending upon the TCA, ranges in altitude from 7,000 to 12,500 feet. Many of these aircraft operate in this manner. Arriving and departing at this altitude reduces the mix and exposure of air carrier traffic to uncontrolled VFR traffic outside the Terminal Control Area at the lower altitudes.

We also have in effect a high profile descent program which minimizes the exposure time of air carrier aircraft to a VFR mix by using procedures which keep the high performance aircraft at the higher altitudes until close to the destination. At Atlanta, for example, this has resulted in as much as a 50 percent reduction in time spent at altitudes below 10,000 feet by arriving high performance aircraft. A further benefit which results from this program is that, by retaining arrivals at a higher altitude until closer to the airport, departing aircraft can more expeditiously climb out of the terminal airspace thereby reducing their exposure time.

To further minimize the risk of midair collisions, we introduced into our air traffic system a function which is called Conflict Alert. The purpose of this program is to serve as a backup to the controller and to alert the controller to a potential problem in time for the controller to take action to avoid a collision. This capability is already installed and operational in all en route facilities in the continental United States, and is presently being added to all ARTS III terminals in the system.

We also have operational at all ARTS III locations a computer function called Minimum Safe Altitude Warning which generates an alert to the controller whenever a controlled aircraft equipped with an altitude encoding transponder is below, or is predicted by the computer to go below, a predetermined minimum safe altitude with respect to terrain and obstructions.

Further, I might note that by regulation we have worked in other ways to provide for the separation of air traffic. For example, pilots are trained in identifying and reacting to collision potentials; communications are required at all airports having a U.S. control tower; newly manufactured aircraft are required to have strobe lights; efforts to reduce cockpit workload are ongoing; rules of right of way have been developed to create a predictable environment for seeing and avoiding other aircraft; acrobatic flight is prohibited in control zones and in Federal airways; pilots are prohibited from entering airport traffic areas except for the purpose of landing and takeoffs (unless specifically authorized by air traffic control); and, where necessary, special air traffic patterns are prescribed to increase the ability of pilots to anticipate and see each other.

I have highlighted so far some of the actions we have taken to reduce the possibility of midair collisions. We are, of course, continuing to refine the capabilities of our automated system, to improve upon our radar coverage, to improve system reliability, and to add new features to the system designed to make the environment even safer.

One major effort in which we have been vigorously involved has been in the development of a device to provide the pilot with an independent alert of potential collisions to serve as a compatible backup to the air traffic system as a means of further reducing the possibility of midair collisions. Although our entire groundbased air traffic system is intended as a "collision avoidance system", we in the aviation community have nevertheless, through an unfortunate choice of words, perhaps obscured this fact by referring to this alerting device as a Collision Avoidance System.

The development of a Collision Avoidance System has proven over the years to be technologically elusive. In fact, despite the intense efforts of the aviation industry and the FAA over a long period of time to build such a system, there is still not a safe, efficient, and reliable Collision Avoidance System available for aircraft use. One problem with systems that have been tested in the past has been their inability to interact within the air traffic control system and their tendency to emit false alarms on too frequent a basis unless their capabilities were curtailed. Not only would these limitations potentially compromise safety based upon evasive maneuvers that could conflict with other traffic, but it has been amply demonstrated that false alarms undermine the confidence of the user.

The problem of developing an independent but compatible pilot alerting device has proven to be extremely difficult and complex. Over the past ten years, various electronic devices have been developed and proposed using the technology available at the time. One-by-one these relatively simple proposals have been tested and shown to be deficient. The reasons for this span a broad spectrum of problems ranging simply from poor performance to annoying "bells and whistles" in the cockpit. These problems are well known to the aviation community.

The advent of large scale microcomputer technology-now emerging-offers, for the first time, the real potential for a compatible collision warning device which offers the pilot the high quality service necessary to serve as an effective air traffic control back-up.

Today we are at a juncture where the availability of a Collision Avoidance System is rapidly approaching because of these technological capabilities that did not exist a short while ago.

FAA's program for the development of a Collision Avoidance System is threefold: Active Beacon Collision Avoidance System (Active BCAS), Full Beacon Collision Avoidance System (Full BCAS), and Automated Traffic Advisory and Resolution Service (ATARS).

Automated Traffic Advisory and Resolution Service is a ground-based automated conflict advisory and collision avoidance service which uses the Discrete Address Beacon System (DABS) data link for communication with the aircraft and between aircraft. Through the use of the DABS data base and data link, Automated Traffic Advisory and Resolution Service would provide traffic information and collision avoidance advisories to the pilot. This service would permit every DABS transponder-equipped user to obtain automatic traffic advisory service and ground-derived conflict resolution instructions at a relatively low cost. When supplemented by an Active Beacon Collision Avoidance System, greater protection can be provided in all airspace.

As a ground-based system, ATARS can be readily adapted to peculiarities of specific segments of the airspace and be operationally compatible with the basic air traffic control system. It is designed to function in high density airspace and is scheduled to be available in the mid-1980's. Testing and evaluation of this system should begin in approximately six months at FAA's National Aviation Facilities Experimental Center.

Active Beacon Collision Avoidance System will be compatible with the existing Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System, the Discrete Address Beacon System, and Automated Traffic Advisory and Resolution Service and will be capable of functioning in low-to-medium density airspace. Active BCAS, by itself, would not be suitable for high-density airspace since the traffic levels would result in numerous false warnings. This system will provide vertical guidance only to the pilot by issuing instructions to descend or climb. Active BCAS can be phased into the system quickly and is expected to be available in the very near-term.

The Full Beacon Collision Avoidance System has significant improvements over Active and provides bearing information which can be portrayed as a situation type display of surrounding traffic. Thus, Full BCAS will provide information to the pilot concerning the need for right or left movement as well as vertical guidance. Full BCAS is still some time away from implementation, and will not be available before 1983 at the earliest.

In the recent past, FAA decided that, although Active BCAS was not the optimum solution to the threat of midair collisions, it nevertheless offers protection which should be made available to pilots. For that reason, it was concluded that development of the Active Beacon Collision Avoidance System should proceed independently but in parallel with the Full Beacon Collision Avoidance System so that earlier protection could be afforded system users. We plan to issue a draft standard by the end of this year to be used by industry for initiating equipment designs.

Since an aircraft equipped with Active BCAS receives protection from aircraft equipped with either an Active BCAS or a beacon transponder with altitude encoder, immediate additional protection would be afforded the equipped user. Further, the Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System transponder which works with the Beacon Collision Avoidance System is already internationally standardized and carried by military and international air carriers. Thus, without the need for additional action of the International Civil Aviation Organization, BCAS-equipped aircraft would receive comparable protection in international operations.

One issue that is now receiving a high level of attention concerning our air traffic system is the role of the pilot in contrast to that of the controller, or put another way what, if, or how should the present respective functions of pilots and controllers be modified given forseeable technological advances. This distribution of work functions is referred to as "distributed management."

There are some who believe that the pilot should have more information available and greater responsibilities in the air traffic system. On the other hand, others believe that pilot workload is already great and that too much information could distract pilots and result in delayed reactions to critical situations requiring instantaneous decisions. We are presently examining this subject in two major ways: through user community working groups, and through a joint program with NASA. There are presently five working groups examining a host of policy and technology issues which need to be considered by the FAA in developing new directions and initiatives in our research, engineering, and development programs. Among the issues under examination are aspects of distributed management in the future air traffic system. We expect to receive the input of the working groups in the near future. We will then distribute this information to the public.

As I mentioned, we are also engaged in a joint program with NASA concerning the distribution of responsibilities between the pilot and the controller. This program is referred to as Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI). CDTI is a system which would present traffic data to the pilot on a cockpit display, along with map, weather, terrain, and other related information. The concept was first formulated in 1946 and various versions have been explored by NASA, FAA, the military, and universities. The work has shown potential benefits, but also certain potential liabilities such as increased workload, misinterpretation of situations, and decreased attention to other cockpit duties. The successful implementation of the system presently assumes that all aircraft would carry at least an altitude reporting transponder.

Such a system would augment the already existing distributed management concept of the air traffic control system. Today, the system is a cooperative one, and the role of controller and pilot within the system is defined. For example, the practice of visual approaches or visual separation clearly serves the concept of distributed management and places the responsibility for separation on the pilot. The addition of such devices as Collision Avoidance System and Cockpit Display of Traffic Information will enhance the pilots' capability in meeting this responsibility.

This joint program with NASA concerning cockpit traffic displays is to determine their advantages and disadvantages in an operationally complete environment and to establish the best ways of using such systems. The program will reexamine issues associated with Cockpit Display of Traffic Information which may be sensitive to realistic operational constraints, and will explore issues not previously addressed such as traffic control stability and system compatibility. The source of the information could be the ground-derived DABS/ATARS system and/or the Full Beacon Collision Avoidance System.

We are currently developing a test plan, and several cockpits at NASA/Ames, NASA/Langley, and NAFEC are being outfitted for testing. We have been working with interested user groups, and our test plan will be fully coordinated with all interested users. Industry coordination is expected to begin late this winter with initial tests beginning in early spring of 1979.

Additionally, we have a standing committee, the Air Traffic Procedure Advisory Committee whose function is to review existing air traffic control procedures and practices and to make recommendations to us for improvements on any issues of concern. This committee was commissioned in November of 1975, and is comprised of 15 representative organizations which provide an overall viewpoint of aviation and airspace users.

The Committee has expressed an interest in reliever airports; a subject which is both timely and important. All of us recognize that one way to reduce congestion and the mix of general aviation traffic and air carriers at major airports is through greater reliance on reliever airports. I strongly support the concept of relievers and we have tried to encourage and promote their development. Toward this end, from Fiscal Year 1971 through 1978, $118 million in ADAP funds were provided to reliever airports. One hundred and five of the existing 147 relievers received aid during this period. Most of the money went to rehabilitate aging facilities and improve existing airports. We used our reliever discretionary fund authorization to assure that the high priority needs-specifically safety needsof these airports are met.

A major problem we see with reliever airports is the fact that new airport construction is often very controversial and acceptable sites are frequently scarce and far from the city center. We have been able to aid the construction of only a handful of new relievers, including Mount Comfort Airport in Indianapolis, Chesterfield City and Chesapeake Municipal Airports in Virginia, and a new airport now being developed for Albuquerque, New Mexico. We have worked closely with many local sponsors to encourage the purchase of privately owned airports or to expand existing facilities at current publicly owned airports. Frequently, strong local opposition stymies these efforts. We have been successful in some cases such as at Whiteman Air Park in California, Glenn L. Martin Field in Baltimore, Caldwell Wright Field in New Jersey, as well as at a few other locations.

Although to date our efforts to encourage the growth of relievers have not been as fruitful as we would like, we will nevertheless continue to promote this concept. I might add that we are concerned not only about the need for future expansion of reliever capacity but with the real possibility that the existing network of relievers might be reduced through local actions.

As you know, we will be coming before you within the next several months to offer our legislative recommendations for extension of airport and airway development legislation for the post-1980 time period. I hope that, through our joint legislative efforts, we can establish a dialogue which will result in meaningful ways we can work together to address the problem of the lack of sufficient reliever airport capacity.

We have also sought to encourage the development of short runways for general aviation at air carrier airports. Naturally, adequate room must exist before such expansion is possible. In many cases, this lack of additional space has prohibited such development. Also, there is a need for adequate levels of general aviation usage before the construction is warranted. We have been successful in encouraging these efforts at a number of airports throughout the country, BaltimoreWashington International being a good example.

I might note that of the 147 existing airports identified in the 1978 National Airport System Plan as reliever airports, we have provided master planning grant funds to 48%. Insofar as facilities and equipment are concerned, it is true that many of these airports are not equipped with sophisticated landing aids. Generally it is our practice, as the Members of the Committee are aware, to install facilities and equipment at locations which meet our established criteria. In the case of relievers, however, we have in several instances installed LIS's where our criteria would not otherwise have called for them.

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