the material if we have an idea of the direction. We will have the material with us anytime, sir, because we do want to be responsive to the Congress. And the best we can do at this time is to offer it for the record.

Mr. GOLDWATER. It just seems to me that ought to be one of those subjects that's always in the forefront of your mind. Obviously, you're concerned about pipelines and railroads, but aviation safety, when we have an aircraft accident that makes a lot of headlines, it would seem to me you would want to be responsive to any questions that would arise.

Mr. KING. We will be, sir, and we are.

Mr. GOLDWATER. The question is: Why don't you know this information now?

Mr. KING. Quite frankly

Mr. GOLDWATER. Why don't you know the status of those recommendations that you made almost a year ago? You wouldn't have made those if they weren't important.

Mr. KING. That's correct.

Mr. GOLDWATER. If they were important, obviously, you would monitor those and you would know on a fairly current basis the status, whether the FAA is responsive enough, and you're saying you don't know?

for.

Mr. KING. No, we have the information. We can provide it, sir. Mr. GOLDWATER. All right. That's what we're holding the hearings

Mr. KING. I can't provide it at this moment because the records-these are substantial records. There is a 6 unit flow of information back to us, and I would have to pull the particular items.

Mr. GOLDWATER. That's the purpose of these hearings, to find out. I have a great respect for the NTSB, and I think it's a very useful agency of our Government set up to monitor aviation safety.

Mr. KING. Yes, sir.

Mr. GOLDWATER. It's similar to an arm of the Congress. If that is one of your missions, it would seem to me you would know on a very current basis all of these things that we're talking about that are important to aviation safety, and the recommendations you just don't make in vain and then just go home and walk away from them. You have two members of your staff that obviously are or should be as knowledgeable as yourself on this; that's what these hearings are about, to get some answers, not to be submitted 6 months from now, but to be submitted right now. You're the expert.

Mr. KING. Congressman, we were asked to come to this particular site to talk about midair collisions. We did try to prepare. We do want to be responsive. There is no question about it. Had we known of your interest in the national ILS construction program, we would have had that data, and I would have been able to respond to your specific questions. We would have had these answers ready for you. We do want to be responsive.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I don't want to prolong this discussion, but it just seems to me whether we're having a hearing or not, if I stopped you on the street, you ought to have those kinds of answers because they're just that important. You wouldn't have made those recommendations almost a year ago if you didn't think they were important. If they were important, it would seem to me you would be very current

as to whether the FAA is responding or not and not just waiting for a public hearing to get up to speak, which you didn't really do in this case except for collision avoidance. I'm a little disappointed.

Let me ask you this question: How do you think your relationship with the FAA is at this particular time? Is it a close working relationship?

Mr. KING. I think you might characterize it as remaining a constant one of creative tension.

Mr. GOLDWATER. It's what?
Mr. KING. Creative tension.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Creative tension. What does that mean?

Mr. KING. That means they're somewhat uncomfortable with us. They have a product they have to deliver on a daily basis. We don't. We come in and basically kind of look over their shoulder. We look, you know, into the safety areas through our accident investigations. They are parties to virtually every accident investigation we are in. Most of our recommendations for correction are directed toward FAA where that's felt to be necessary. So I imagine that they view us somewhat guardedly. You know, they're professional folks, but I don't think they're always thrilled to see us when we come over the horizon,

sir.

Mr. GOLDWATER. You're a nuisance to them, is what you're saying. But the question I asked: Do you have a good working relationship with them? Do you exchange information? Do you have working dialog on a daily basis? Do you have people that work with their technicians and their experts in various fields?

Mr. KING. On a staff level there is an ongoing relationship.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Are you sure of that?

Mr. KING. To the best of my knowledge, that is true. I have no reason to doubt it. I mean, I see it at meetings, both in the formal quarterly sessions for reviews, which are formal, but I also see it on a basis where I can turn and ask what would be a junior person in our technology section as to what's happening in a given area and giving me very close update as to what's going on in FAA.

Why? Because his colleague is a GS-13 in their technical areas. He is talking with him. There is an exchange of information on a professional level, not really on a agency level. The other thing is physical proximity, Congressman. We would like to say that they're in the NTSB building. They think because we hold only 5 percent of the space in the building we're in the FAA building. So, that gives you at least an idea of the relationship.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Do you feel captive? Is that what you're saying? You want your own building?

Mr. KING. NO. When I leave the agency, I hope I can still tell you it's one of the smallest agencies in Government and also one of the most effective.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Are there any problems with this relationship that you see concerning which you could make recommendations for changes?

Mr. KING. I think that one of the things that we have done is, whenever possible, create the climate-and we work with the Congress to create that climate-that change can occur. Again, the directions we take or the suggestions that we make, fit into a total pattern. Some of

them deal in individual accidents and some of them we try to exta-r polate from them to reflect on broader issues.

I would say across the board in FAA there are many different opinions, as I'm sure you're aware, Congressman, but they find the NTSB very, very useful. There are those areas of real kinship because we know they're concerned about certain areas of aviation safety, and they know we speak with that voice, so they will bring material, they will raise issues with us. We found the relationship on that staff level very, very productive. We think it's a very wholesome thing. We encourage it.

Mr. GOLDWATER. One last question, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your tolerance.

Have you made a review of all major airports as to safety questions and made recommendations to the FAA?

Mr. KING. No, sir. We do not have the physical capacity to do that. Mr. GOLDWATER. Do you have the legal authority to do that?

Mr. KING. Our mandate really is accident investigation. And then from there to separate the issues and to present them both to the agencies and to the Congress in testimony. So, our mandate is really that. At this time we don't have the capacity. If the Congress asked us to or directed us to, we would certainly attempt to do the appropriate thing.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Have you ever made a request?

Mr. KING. No, sir.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Is not one of your mandates to the safety of aviation transportation, and make recommendations?

Mr. KING. Yes, sir.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Do you have to wait until an accident occurs before you make a recommendation?

Mr. KING. Not as a rule, but historically that's what the Board has done.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Historically?

Mr. KING. Yes, sir.

Mr. GOLDWATER. And from now on?

Mr. KING. I think, as I had suggested, we have tried to change that pattern. As we're writing our opinions, we are trying to broaden them. Rather than dealing with each individual accident and saying only things that dealt with that accident. For example, in the recommendation that came out recently, one sentence in there I think is a bit revealing, if I might share it with you.

We realize that a TRSA may not have prevented the midair collision between flight 182 and N7711G since visual separation was still being used in all terminal areas. Nevertheless, we believe that TRSA would lessen the probability of midair collision and would be a logical first step toward the implementation of ATC services available to all users of air space.

You could say that we might be criticized by people saying, "You should stay within the parameters, you know, of the accident and not step out of them." But we are coming out of them.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I would suggest that if you would have made a review of the airport ahead of time you would have found out that they have this opposite approach to practice landings and, hopefully, you would have made a recommendation that that in itself was a dangerous practice. Before an accident happens. Your mandate is to take a look at aviation safety and make very forceful recommendations.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

First, may I say, Congressman Goldwater, in fairness to Mr. King, we requested information on collision avoidance systems, ATC procedures, and other matters directly affecting midair collisions rather than information on all past NTSB recommendations and their current status. But we can certainly ask Chairman King to furnish for the record the current status of past recommendations that have been made from the standpoint of aircraft safety.

In the notice on the hearings here, we said the hearing will focus on the development and implementation of collision avoidance system technologies, the problems created by the mix of general aviation and commercial air carrier traffic at major U.S. airports, and the utilization and development of reliever airports to reduce congestion at major traffic centers. So, we did not ask for as broad a scope as you were actually requesting information on. For instance, the grooving of runways would have little effect on the focus of these hearings. Or the effect of wind shear off the end of the runway. Installation of wind-shear equipment. So, I just wanted to get the record straight. But we will have that information provided.1

Congressman Anderson, that brings us back to you.

Mr. ANDERSON. I just have one more question, Mr. King. Have you made any recommendations which would require better lighting of aircraft or other means to make aircraft more conspicuous?

Mr. KING. Mr. Laynor.

Mr. LAYNOR. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman, we have made such recommendations. I could probably dig them out if you wish me to go through a number of pieces of paper here. We have made recommendations since 1969, when we held a hearing on the midair collision. problem. One of the recommendations that came out of that hearing was increased conspicuity of aircraft. Anticollision lights and strobe lights were, of course, a part of that recommendation.

Mr. ANDERSON. What has the FAA done with your recommendations?

Mr. LAYNOR. In general, the FAA has encouraged the use of anticollision lights. They have not required the use of strobe lights. They have responded

Mr. ANDERSON. Did you ask they just be encouraged or they be mandated?

Mr. LAYNOR. We asked they be required. They are presently not required during daylight hours in VFR conditions.

Mr. KING. Just as an additional item: There is some discussion that in daylight a strobe, although its hits you harder in twilight is no different than the usual anticollision flasher. That is from technical reports. But I found it interesting when we were talking to the folks who said they found that in haze and other kinds of background situations, generally the kind of a white background that you run into, that strobe lights are very effective. We talked to pilot after pilot who said he couldn't make out the aircraft but he could see the light in daylight. And that's one of the reasons that we have pursued this.

I know that our strobe light recommendations go back historically. FAA may wish to respond to that directly themselves.

1 See p. 26.

Mr. ANDERSON. I have no more questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Question, Mr. Stump?
Congressman Ertel.

Mr. ERTEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a quick question.
Did the Cessna have any strobe lights on?

Mr. KING. I would ask Mr. LaGrange, who worked directly with that to answer.

Mr. LAGRANGE. The Cessna was equipped with strobe lights. We have not been able to determine if the strobe lights were turned on at the time of the collision. We did interview a pilot who flew the aircraft the day before the accident, and he used the lights. As to whether or not they were being used at the time of the collision, we have not been able to determine this yet.

Mr. ERTEL. If I may, one further question. Since you testified and I asked you a series of questions, Mr. King, I received an oral summarization and statement of the Airline Pilots Association-have you read that, by chance?

Mr. KING. No, sir, I have not.

Mr. ERTEL. I'll try and summarize it quickly. It's rather extensive. They indicate that in November of 1969 your Board had a hearing as a result of 19 midair collisions on the concept of see and avoid. And you recommended at that time that the FAA develop a collision avoidance system for airlines and other large aircraft, and a proximity warning indicator for smaller aircraft.

Then they follow through with a series of events leading up to and including February of 1976, where the FAA told the Senate Aviation Subcommittee about its current work on collision avoidance systems. In a letter after that, it said they were developing such a system and expected to issue a national standard for the system by July of 1977. I guess that was changed again and has never been implemented in any way, shape, or form.

Now, you originally had the recommendation in 1969. Not you personally, but your Board.

Mr. KING. Right.

Mr. ETREL. What have you done to insure such a system?

Mr. KING. We cannot do anything to insure anything happening. Mr. ERTEL. I understand that. But you said you were the pebble in the shoe. How big a pebble are you?

Mr. KING. I can say as recently as yesterday, upon reviewing the Memphis midair, we have asked the FAA that we would like their benchmarks issued for the public as to what their timetable will be and when they prepare to implement it. And we would like something better. As I suggested, there is a tendency, you know, when we use the calendar as opposed to the stopwatch there are times when we talk to agencies and they respond in terms of the mid-80's. We would like a more precise response so we have some benchmarks to hold everyone to. And then, if there is a problem, that can be articulated in a public arena rather than having it merely set back and rescheduled. That was as recently as yesterday.

Mr. ERTEL. Does it take a midair collision of this scope to require that you try and force through some implementation? We're talking now of a period almost 9 years.