17 Aviation Daily-GAO Calls for Better System to Prevent Midair Collisions, Vol. 216, Nol 6, p. 46, November 8, 1974.

18 U.S. General Accounting Office, Comptroller General of the United States-Aircraft Midair Collisions: A Continuing Problem-Report to Congress, B-164497 (1), October 23, 1974 36 p.

19 Dexter, R. G.-AVOID-I Collision Avoidance System (M), Honeywell, Inc., Contract DOT FA73WAI-358, 1974, 185p. AD/A-002 492, N75-33019.

20 Aviation Daily-Honeywell Says Its Collision Avoidance System Ready for Airline Use, p. 237, December 15, 1975.

21 Electronic News-RCA Drops Anti-collision System Work, Vol. 20, p. 1+, December 22, 1975. 22 Ebert, Paul M.-Beacon Collision Avoidance System (B-CAS), Test Plan, Mitre Corporation Contract DOT-FA70WA-2448, Project No. 052-241-100, Technical Report MTR-7092, November 1975, 38 p.

23 Federal Aviation Administration Report-An Active Beacon-Based Collision Avoidance System Concept (BCAS), FAA Report FAA EM-75-7 MTR-7036.

24 Kowalski, Stanley; Haspert, J. K. and Witt, James-Cost Analysis of Airborne Collision Avoidance System (CAS) Concepts, ARINC Research Report FAA EM76-1. 25 Federal Aviation Administration Associate Administrator for Air Traffic and Airway Facilities Consultative Plannng Conference on Arcraft Separation Assurance: Presentations, FAA Report ATF-4-76-1 September 27, 1976, 154 p., AD-A032 354, N77-22066. 28 Litchford, G.-Avoiding Mid-Air Collisions, IEEE Spectrum September 1975. 27 Bagnall, James J., Jr. and Kay, Irwin W.-A Review and Analysis of the Litchford Beacon Collision Avoidance System, Institute for Defense Analysis, Contract DOTFA74WA-3498, Report FAA-RD 77-1 (S478) October 1976, 222 p.

28 Koenke, E. J.; Ebert, P. M.; Harman, W. H.; Spencer, N. A.; and Weinberg, A.-A Preliminary Evaluation of the ATCRBS Signal Format for the BCAS Data Link, Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Systems Engineering Management, FAA Report EM 77-9, August 31, 1977 38p.

29 Sheftel, David J., Federal Aviation Administration-FAA Views and Plans on Separation Assurance DABS/IPC/BCAS. Drouilhet, Paul R., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Lincoln LaboratoryDABS/IPC Development Progress. Langley, John V., National Air Traffic Services, U.K. Civil Aviation Authority-ADSEL in the United Kingdom-Plans and Progress. Pozesky, Martin T., Federal Aviation Administration-BCAS-What is Being Done, Tradeoffs Between Active and Passive, Results of Flight Tests. Fink, Harold H., Air Transport Association of America Communications Committee-Airline Industry View of BCAS. Engholm, Kenneth J., Collins Radio Group, Rockwell International-An Outline of Problems to be Solved to Achieve an Acceptable BCAS. Shear, Wayne G. Bendix Avionics DivisionAvionics for BCAS. Above Presentations appearing in AEEC Letter N76-106/AXX-00, October 11, 1976. 30 Schuchman, L. and Orr, R.-The Single-Site Collision Avoidance System (SS-CAS), Stanford Telecommunications, Inc. DOT Contract F04701-75-C-0239, FAA Report EM 77-8, September 16, 1977 149p. 31 Koenke, E. J., et al.-FAA BCAS Concept-Executive Summary, Federal Aviation Administration Office of Systems Engineering Management, FAA Report EM-78-5 I, April

1978.

32 Koenke, E. J., et al.-FAA BCAS Concept-Concept Description, Federal Aviation Administration Office of Systems Engineering Management, FAA Report EM-78-5 II, April 1978.

33 Watson, Fred; Lazzareschi, C. R.; and Wedlake, W. E.-Evaluation of Threat Logic for the Air Transport Association Airborne Collision Avoidance Systems (ANTC 117), McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company, Report MDC E0116, March 13, 1970.

34 Paradis, A. R.-L-Band Air-to-Air Multipath Measurements, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Lincoln Laboratory, Contract DOT-FA77WAI-727, FAA Report RD 77-87 (ATC-77), September 6, 1977, 100p.

35 Bagnall, James J., Jr. and Kay, Irvin W.-Review and Analysis of Some Collision Avoidance Algorithms with Particular Reference to ANTC 117, Institute for Defense Analyses, Contract DOT-FA74WA3498 Study S-450, FAA Report RD 75-72, June 1965 175p. AD-A021 635 N76-23233.

36 Bagnall, James J., Jr. and Kay, Irvin W.-A Review and Analysis of the RCA Collision Avoidance System-Phase II, Institute for Defense Analyses Contract DOT-FA74WA-3498 Study S-462, FAA Report RD 75-152, October 1975 108p. AD-A012 672 N76-23244.

37 Clark, J. and McFarland, A.-Initial Collision Avoidance Algorithms for Beacon-based Collision Avoidance System, Mitre Corporation, Contract DOT-FA69NS-162, FAA Report RD 77–163 (MTR-7532), April 1988 99p.

38 Clark, James S.-Active Beacon Collision Avoidance System Computer Algorithms-ATCRBS Mode, Mitre Corporation, Contract DOT-FA70WA-2448 Technical Report MTR-7280, August 1976 63p. 39 Broste, N. A. and Patterson, D. C.-Progress Report on the Performance of Active BCAS Threat Logic, Mitre/METREK Division, September 26, 1978.

40 Jolitz, Gordon-Status of the ACT/CAS Simulation Program, Paper presented at the 32nd Meeting of the Collision Prevention Advisory Group (COPAG), Washington, D.C., November 19, 1968 12p.

41 Jolitz, Gordon-Simulation and Analysis of ATC/CAS System Design, Paper presented at the Program Review, Test and Evaluaton Activities at NAFEC, May 14-15, 1970, 7p.

42 Jolitz, Gordon-ATC/CAS Interface Simulation-Exploratory Phase, FAA, National Aviation Facilities Experimental Center, Report No. RD 72-10 (NA 72-8), Project No. 052-241-03X, March 1972, 183p. 43 Jolitz, Gordon-Air Traffic Control/Collision Avoidance System Interface Simulation-Phase II, FAA, National Aviation Facilities Experimental Center, Project No. 052-241-050, Report RD73-140 (NA-73-400), November 1973 193p., AD 771 185, N74-12361.

44 Jolitz, Gordon-ATC/Airborne CAS Compatibility-An Analysis of Field-Derived Data, FAA, NAFEC, Project No. 052-241-030, Report RD 75-228 (NA 76-14) June 1976, 70p. AD-A026 070, N76-30188.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Jensen.

Does the ATA support an increase in the number of terminal control areas and terminal radar service areas?

Mr. JENSEN. Yes, sir. We have advocated more TCA's when they were first brought into being, and we've also thought there should be what are considered group 1 TCA's, not the so-called group 2 and 3 TCA's.

The CHAIRMAN. The contention has been made that the carriers either penalize pilots for using excess fuel or reward them for saving fuel, in either case creating incentives for the pilots to use VFR approaches wherever possible. Is there any truth to that contention, as far as you know?

Mr. JENSEN. I know of no penalty ever given any pilot, airline pilot, with regard to fuel usage. Certainly-and I think it is correctly doneairline pilots are encouraged to save fuel, as airlines are encouraged to save fuel, but never at the expense of safety.

Now, in terms of taking a visual approach, what we would prefer to have, Mr. Chairman, is a system whereby you don't have to make a full instrument approach procedure when the weather is good and you don't have to go through all of that, therefore, save the fuel in doing it. But we want to have the protection of the separation service continue when that's done.

The CHAIRMAN. Has ATA examined in detail the contention that if DAVS is turned on around the United States, it would have the effect of unintentionally shutting off or interfering with the air traffic control system?

Mr. JENSEN. We have examined that system, and we don't think it's so.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Anderson?

Mr. ANDERSON. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ertel?

Mr. ERTEL. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Jensen. We appreciate you being here and giving us the benefit of your association's feeling. Next, Domenic Torchia, regional vice president of the western region of PATCO.

STATEMENT OF DOMENIC TORCHIA, REGIONAL VICE PRESIDENT, PROFESSIONAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS ORGANIZATION; ACCOMPANIED BY NORM BELSTERLING, FACILITY PRESIDENT OF PATCO LOCAL AT LINDBERGH TOWER; AND BILL BARRY, PRESIDENT OF PATCO LOCAL AT MIRAMAR APPROACH CONTROL

Mr. TORCHIA. Good afternoon. I'm Domenic Torchia. My position was stated, to save time. I brought with me today Norm Belsterling, facility president of PATCO local at Lindbergh Tower, and Bill Barry, president of PATCO local at Miramar approach control. In the interest of brevity, I think we've heard enough prepared statements that we've had in front of us today; so I would like if it's OK with you to waive the reading of this. I believe everybody has my

statement.

The CHAIRMAN. I've read your statement and I'm sure that my colleagues have. If you'd just summarize from it, that would be fine.

Mr. TORCHIA. Okay. Fine. What my main concern is right now is all the talk I've been hearing lately about increasing the responsibility of air traffic controllers, increasing positive control areas, et cetera; and then I heard the ridiculous statement from the Administrator that instead of taking an aggressive stance in response to the questions about the staffing problems in the system, which would be compounded by these additional safety measures and positive control measures, by the way of which this system could not handle anymore right now due to the shortage of air traffic controllers-that instead of saying that he would look into the fact that there is a shortage of controllers, he said he was going to look into the fact that there might be an overescalation of the actual numbers of air traffic controllers as set forth by the FAA. I think you'll find that if he did that, he'd run across, let's say, the Seattle Center, where the FAA has continually kept the number of recommended journeymen air traffic controllers at a low level; and he would probably find a figure like that in several other places, where the recommended staffing is far below even what it should be. Contrary to what he thinks, staffing levels at the Los Angeles and Oakland Centers would probably be below the figures it should be at also.

As far as staffing goes right now at the Los Angeles Air Route Traffic Control Center, which handles approximately 1,250,000 operations a year, IFR operations-that doesn't include VFR, general aviation advisories-there are authorized 351 journeyman air traffic controllers. They now have on shift work 195. Now, the FAA could pad that another 120 or so, and taking secretaries and clerks and everyone else and calling them air traffic controllers, which they would do to save face.

In Oakland center, where we have over a million IFR operations and probably another hundred thousand general aviation advisories, which is the responsibility of the air traffic controller also, is allocated by the FAA 333 GS-13 journeymen control slots. Right now the total staffing in the air traffic control division is 205. The number of controllers actually working shifts is 188. They're almost down to 50 percent.

Mr. Bond also inferred that it would be very easy to supply this committee with overtime figures for the FAA, of which several controllers work 6-day weeks. And we heard about the controller that was working local control at Lindbergh had worked 11 out of 12 days because he had to work overtime. That goes along with the increase of 19 percent, as the FAA has come out in the press in the past couple of days-the increase in 19 percent in the amount of traffic in the United States handled by the ATC system. Yet they have only requested an increase of less than 2 percent in the number of controllers, new controllers that they hire, when they went before Congress this year.

After some prodding they-I'm not sure of how this works. I should temper this a little bit. There was 350 controllers, and that was pushed very hard by PATCO. That was the top figure that we figured we could get the FAA to ask for in Congress, and I understand they got 350 new controllers. But for 350 controllers, what will actually filter into the system will probably be less than 75. The current washout rate in the State of California, the Western Region actually, which covers Arizona, Nevada, and California, at the Academy alone, which

is at the very initial state of traffic control training, was 58 percent in a class that was 2 months ago and 47 percent, I believe it was, in the last class that came out of Oklahoma City, that washed out. When they go to the facility, rest assured that probably half of what's left, which is a quarter of those that were hired, will make it through. It's a very difficult job to learn.

And when we sit back there day to day and listen to the people talk about the system that the pilots and the controllers make work, it more or less solidifies our thoughts that maybe only pilots and controllers know how the system does work. That's a statement that air traffic controllers become more and more aware of, is the idea that we talk about TCA's and their benefits and we relate that to the way that it might have prevented the aircraft accident in San Diego. Well, the terminal control area would not have prevented the accident in San Diego. Everything would have happened just the same.

The one thing we needed was Alpha-numerics in the tower, and that's primarily because if the controller had time from his other duties, he might have told PSA 182, "Traffic at 12 o'clock, 1 mile, same direction"-that's what he did say. What he might have added to that is "Out of 2,100" or "out of 2,300 feet, climbing VFR." Now, if he had said that to PSA-and PSA has the finest airline pilots in the industry-the pilot would have taken maybe that extra split second maybe to scan some more. That's the only thing that could have helped. A TCA could not have helped the situation.

That's why we strongly encourage the use of the Alphanumeric system when related to the BRITE displays. They would be the only thing that might have helped in that situation.

As far as, skipping back here, rest periods-we'll skip around. The CHAIRMAN. Wouldn't there have been a BRITE display in the tower, if that was a TCA?

Mr. TORCHIA. No. A TCA will not show Alphanumerics. A terminal control area is nothing but an upside down wedding cake or maybe some sort of geometric figure that emanates from the surface to a certain altitude that is drawn on charts, and pilots refer to geographic figures in their navigation. And they are either cleared through it or you keep them out of it if they haven't requested clearance through.

The Alphanumerics is a piece of equipment that is put in the control tower or the radar facilities, the centers, and the terminals, and one does not mandate the other. One does not necessitate having the other. The TCA and an Alphanumeric system is not related.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that wasn't the answer we heard from the FAA.

Mr. TORCHIA. OK. The FAA might have stated if they put in a Stage 1 TCA, that they will have Alphanumerics in the tower. Is that what they stated?

The CHAIRMAN. I don't believe they specified it had to be a Stage 1. Mr. TORCHIA. Category 1. I think it was called "Stage 1." Whatever they used.

The CHAIRMAN. The FAA did say that you would have the transponder and the decoder and from that you would be able to determine the location of the aircraft.

Mr. TORCHIA. OK. To fly a through a Category 1 TCA, you need an encoding transponder, all right? But there's nothing I've ever seen in the regulations that to fly through a Stage 1 TCA you need Alphanumerics in the control tower. I know there is an Alphanumeric system in the center, so, in other words

The CHAIRMAN. Well, according to the FAA, they go hand in hand. Mr. TORCHIA. Well, it just works out that way, because it is like at Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles. And those are the places where they've concentrated the bulk of the money, and the money is what brought the equipment. It's not the TCA that brought the equipment. It's the actual money that brought the equipment. It's what came first, the chicken or the egg? So, they had the Alphanumerics and, then, came the TCA, or vice-versa. In my facility where I worked for 5%1⁄2 years, they had the TCA, then the Alphanumerics. Mr. BARCLAY. Isn't it purposeless to require a transponder and encoding altimeter if you don't have Alphanumerics?

Mr. TORCHIA. Well, see, most of the major terminal facilities do have Alphanumeric facilities now. The towers are what don't have it. The enroute facilities, all the facilities, have the RDP-type equipment, radar data processing.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Go ahead.

Mr. TORCHIA. The statement on rest periods, I think it speaks for itself. The FAA has completely ignored this. There were several instances that I can recall where controllers were working 6 days a week for as long as they could live with no regard to their welfare. There are five controllers right now in my region, which I'm completely at odds with the FAA over. They are psychologically disqualified by two or three physicians, which the FAA fails to recognize; and we don't want psychologically disturbed controllers working traffic. The FAA has continually overlooked the welfare of the controller, and they place little or no emphasis on the health of the controller. They allow us to work 40, 48 hours a week; and now the Administrator is talking of staffing less

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I interpreted him to say that he would take a look at whether their projected staffing requirements were too high. I got the impression that he thought their own projections were too high due to the upgrade of the equipment that's now available, the state of the art.

Mr. TORCHIA. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the impression that I got. Maybe I was wrong.

Mr. TORCHIA. We appreciate all the money that the Congress and the Senate of the United States have given to the air traffic controller for this upgraded, automated equipment; but I want you to know that the equipment has not alleviated the workload of the air traffic controller. It just has redirected it from oral communication between facilities to manual communications between facilities. In other words, it still makes it necessary if you're flying across the country say in "United 53," to roll the ball around, make a handoff, to enter it and wait for you to accept it, and transfer it. "United 53," and they'd say, "Go ahead." I'd say what I had to say, give my initials and read-off. The time is about the same. It's just redirected.

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