ant, and by which he obtained money or other valuable property, were true.

3. CRIMINAL LAW 328, 560-PROOF.

The state must prove the ingredients of the crime charged, and must prove the guilt of accused beyond a reasonable doubt.

Elkton Adams and Carmine Belascio were Jointly indicted for the extortion of $25 from one Robert L. Lockerman. Verdict guilty.

CONRAD, J., sitting.

Percy Warren Green, Deputy Atty. Gen., for the State.

"Whoever, with intent thereby to extort or wrongfully gain any money or other property, shall make or cause to be made to any other person any oral statement or communication, threatening" to accuse any person of a crime "shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor." Rev. Code 1915, § 4804.

One definition of extortion is:

"The obtaining of property from another with his consent, induced by a wrongful use of force, or fear, or under color of official right."

Another definition is:

"The taking or obtaining of anything from anPhilip L. Garrett, of Wilmington, for other by means of illegal compulsion or opdefendant Adams. pressive exaction."

James Saulsbury, of Wilmington, for defendant Belascio.

[2] It is no defense to an accusation of extortion that the charges threatened by the

or other valuable property, were true. Whether the prosecuting witness was or was not guilty of forgery is not for you to determine. The question here is whether either or both of these defendants wrongfully extorted or exacted from the prosecuting witness any money by threatening him with prosecution for a crime.

It was proved by the state that L., induced | defendant, and by which he obtained money by certain advertisements by Adams, viz. "Spot cash paid for your Liberty Bonds or Payment Cards," presented a Liberty Bond card to Adams, who, as a real estate agent occupied offices in Wilmington with Belascio, a licensed private detective, stating that he wished to sell the card. It belonged to L.'s sister, on which there had been paid $22. Adams paid L. $12 for the card, after requesting him to sign his sister's name on it. Adams and Belascio a few days thereafter went to the home of L. and (Belascio showing his badge) told L. and his mother that he had committed forgery and that meant five or ten years in jail. Belascio then suggested that L. go with him and Adams to a lawyer and settle the matter. L. replied that they could settle between themselves.

Adams then demanded the return of the $12 paid, and $25 for the services of Belascio, to save L. from arrest, which amounts L. paid to them; they refusing to receipt for the money, and warning L. that "it will be best to keep this matter to yourself, and not say anything to anybody about it."

I am asked to charge that forgery is a felony, which is true. The distinction between felonies and misdemeanors in regulated by statute, but this fact is unimportant in this case.

[3] In all criminal cases, it is the duty of the state to prove the ingredients of the crime charged. The duty is upon the state in this case to prove to your satisfaction, beyond a reasonable doubt, the guilt of these two men.

The defense was that Adams, upon presenting the card purchased from L. at the Allied Bank, in Wilmington, was informed that a duplicate card had previously been issued and that the one held by him was void; that Adams, accompanied by Belascio, went to L.'s home and requested the return JUDGMENT of the $12 paid for the card and payment of $25 to Belascio for his services in apprehending L., who it was claimed was responsible for the necessity of Belascio's services.

CONRAD, J., charged the jury in part: In this case, Elkton Adams and Carmine Belascio, are charged with an offense commonly called extortion.

[1] The word "extort" means to take from unlawfully-to exact something wrongfully from a party by threats, or putting in fear. The statute covering this offense reads:

784-PRIORITY OF JUDGMENT LIENS JUDGMENTS BY CONFESSION ON WARRANTY AND IN ACTION.

4302, relating to time of entry and lien of In view of Rev. Code 1915, §§ 4282-4286, judgments, the requirement of section 3764, that prothonotaries entering judgment on bond with warrant of attorney, or taking judgment by confession other than by virtue of such warrant, shall set down the hour of entry, does not include judgments confessed in court in actions which relate back to the first minute of the day

on which they are confessed, so that such judgments confessed in action take priority over judgments taken by confession on warrant of attorney on the same day.

Petition by Elmer H. Lawson, assignee of a judgment by confession before the prothonotary on a warrant of attorney, and by Layton & Layton, Incorporated, holder of a judgment by confession in an action to draw money out of court. Order for payment to Layton & Layton.

BOYCE and CONRAD, JJ., sitting.

time of actually entering, or signing it, and not by relation from the first day of the term in, or of which it is entered. Rev. Code | 1915, § 4282.

A judgment upon a verdict, if entered before the end of the term next after that in which it is given, shall be deemed to be entered at the same time as the verdict, and shall bind accordingly. Rev. Code 1915, §

Robert G. Houston, of Georgetown, for El- 4283. mer H. Lawson.

A judgment given, amount to be ascertain

Daniel J. Layton, Jr., of Georgetown, for ed by the prothonotary, or other person, shall Layton & Layton.

bind from the time of its entry, if the amount be ascertained and entered upon the docket

before the first day of the term next after that in which the judgment is given; but otherwise only from the time of entering upon the docket the ascertained amount. Rev. Code 1915, § 4284.

If several judgments be entered against the same person, on the same day, the first entered shall have the priority. If where there are several judgments against the same person, it does not appear, by the entries, which was first entered, they shall, when given in suits previously commenced, have priority according to the priority of the dates of the suits in which they are respectively given. Rev. Code 1915, § 4285.

Virginia M. Joines did, on the 10th day of February, A. D. 1914, at 12:35 o'clock p. m., obtain a judgment by confession before the prothonotary for Sussex county upon a warrant of attorney, against Daniel W. Lawson and the said Elmer H. Lawson for the sum of $300, besides interest and costs, which judgment was subsequently paid by and assigned to the said Elmer H. Lawson. Layton & Layton, Incorporated, did on the same day obtain in the Superior Court for said county a judgment by confession in an action pending against the said Daniel W. Lawson for the sum of $300, besides costs of suit. The lands of the said Daniel W. Lawson were thereafter sold by the sheriff of said county, under execution process. Afterwards the sheriff, because of conflicting claimants, was allowed to pay the net proceeds of the sale into court for distribution. On present-day of entering which does appear by the ing the petitions to the court, Mr. Houston stated that he was prepared to prove by the former prothonotary and another person that the judgment of Layton & Layton, Incorporated, was confessed in court on the same day, but several hours after the entry of the Joines judgment, since assigned to Elmer H. Lawson; and it was claimed, under the several provisions of the statute in relation to the time of the commencement of the liens of judgment, that the latter judgment has priority over the judgment of Layton & Layton, Incorporated.

Mr. Layton replied that the prothonotary had set down on the docket under the judgment which he represented the day, month and year of its entry as required to do, and contended that the entries so made could not be contradicted, explained, or varied by parol evidence, and that in respect to the time of the entry and lien of said judgment the common-law rule which rejects fractions of a day applies. Hollingsworth v. Thompson, 5 Har. 432.

A judgment entered during a term, if the day of entering it does not appear by the docket, shall be postponed to a judgment entered during the period of the same term, the

docket. None of the foregoing regulations shall contravene the provisions of the second section respecting judgment upon a verdict. Rev. Code 1915, § 4286.

Another provision thereafter enacted, requiring the true date of entry of a judgment to be set down on the docket is:

The true date of entering, or signing, every judgment, shall be entered on the docket thereof, as also the date of ascertaining the amount of a judgment given, the amount to be ascertained by the prothonotary, or other person; and all judgments shall be indexed according to the provisions of Chapter One Hundred and Thirteen. Rev. Code 1852, § 2407; Rev. Code 1915, § 4302. Also:

Whenever a judgment is entered, or signed, in the Superior Court (except judgments on verdict when entered before the end of the term next after that in which the verdict is given), the prothonotary shall set down on the docket the day, month, and year of actually entering or signing it; and also when entering the ascertained amount of a judg

BOYCE, J., delivering the opinion of the ment given, "amount to be ascertained by

court.

By act of the General Assembly, passed January 29, A. D. 1829 (Hall's Digest [1829] | 392-395), the following provisions, in substance, among others, were enacted:

the prothonotary, or other person," he shall in like manner set down the true date of the entry. Rev. Code 1852, § 669; Rev. Code 1915, § 3764, first paragraph.

This was the state of the statute law down

A judgment shall bind lands only from the to 1854. So that in the entry of a judgment,

106 A.-19

Exceptions overruled, and case remitted, | tions 30 and 31, chapter 200, Gen. Laws of with instructions to enter judgment on R. I. 1909, "Of Negotiable Instruments," verdict.

Gardner, Pirce & Thornley, of Providence (Thomas G. Bradshaw, of Providence, of counsel), for plaintiff.

Frank H. Wildes and William A. Heathman, both of Providence, for defendant.

PER CURIAM. The action is in assumpsit to enforce the liability of defendant as indorser of a promissory note for $250, made May 24, 1913, by William A. Heathman, payable to Joseph Avila, 90 days after date, with interest.

The note, with defendant's indorsement thereon, was given to Joseph Avila in part payment of the purchase price of an automobile sold by Avila to William Heathman. Avila, who was indebted to the E. C. Church Company, was asked by the company to make a payment on his account. As he stated that he was unable to pay any cash, it was agreed that he would turn in the note in question in part payment. The company had accepted payments from Avila of several other notes at different times, made by different parties, and there was nothing unusual in the transaction in this case. On or shortly before May 28, 1913, the note in question was transferred to the E. C. Church Company by Avila, by indorsement and delivery, and Avila was credited on the books of the company with a payment of the full amount of the note. The Church Company discounted the note at the bank on May 28, 1913. The note was not paid at maturity, and, having been duly protested, the plaintiff paid the note at the bank, and now sues to recover from defendant, the indorser.

The trial justice, at the conclusion of the testimony, directed a verdict for the plaintiff for $335.71, the same being the amount due, with interest to the date of the trial, and protest fees of $2.08. The case is now before this court on bill of exceptions.

At the trial the defendant claimed that, inasmuch as the plaintiff company did not actually pay cash to Avila, but simply credited his account to the amount of the note, the Church Company took the note subject to any defense which the maker has as against Avila, the payee, and defendant sought to introduce testimony of a partial failure of consideration in the transaction between Avila and the maker of the note.

provide that an antecedent or pre-existing debt constitutes value. As the plaintiff company accepted the note in part payment of an antecedent debt owed to it by Avila, it thereby became a holder for value, and as there transaction it was a bona fide holder for was no question of its good faith in the value, and consequently entitled to recover

from the defendant,

On December 4, 1916, the defendant was As it appeared at the trial that the plain-indicted by the grand jury for the counties tiff took the note in good faith and without of Providence and Bristol for the same notice of the facts alleged, the trial court offense. Upon this indictment the defendant ruled that the plaintiff company was a bona fide holder for value and in due course; as this was the only real question in issue, a verdict was directed for the plaintiff. The action of the trial court was correct. Sec

was arraigned in the superior court, December 16, 1916, pleaded not guilty, and gave bail, and on December 20, 1916, the complaint pending in the district court was volunta.. rily discontinued by the prosecution without For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

any hearing or other action thereon. The In State v. Snell, 21 R. I. 232, at page 234, defendant was tried upon the indictment 42 Atl. 869, the court said: in February, 1917, and found guilty. Defendant's motion for a new trial was heard and denied by the trial court, and the case is now pending in this court upon the defendant's exceptions upon which there has been no hearing.

"The grand jury under its common-law powers, and also under the provisions of Gen. Laws R. I. c. 223, § 6, has full power to find an indictment regardless of the source of the complaint. Its powers, generally speaking, are coextensive with the original criminal jurisdiction of the court of which it is a constituent part. Cas. 15,364]; 9 Am. & Eng. Ency. L. 13; State United States v. Hill, 1 Brock, C. C. 156 [Fed. v. Barnes, 5 Lea, 398,"

The defendant has now filed in this court his motion asking (1) that the indictment be dismissed or quashed; (2) that the defendant be released and discharged from arrest; and (3) that the bail and sureties of the defendant be released and discharged | further. We think that the action of the from further liability.

The defendant bases his motion on the want of jurisdiction in the superior court, the grand jury having no jurisdiction to indict the defendant while preliminary proceedings were pending against him for the same offense in the district court.

The defendant does not claim that it would be illegal for the grand jury to find an original indictment without any preliminary proceeding or examination in the lower court, but he does claim that the actual pendency of the preliminary proceeding suspends the jurisdiction of the grand jury to act, and that to hold the defendant to bail in two different proceedings at the same time and for the same offense would be illegal.

We do not need to pursue the discussion

grand jury, in the case at bar, was in accordance with our statute and the decisions of this court, and that a grand jury may exercise the powers, which the statute confers, independently and without giving consideration to any proceedings which may have been instituted, or may be pending, in the district court.

The defendant's motion is denied.

(42 R. I. 192)

RICHMOND ▼. KETTELLE, Town Treasurer (three cases). (Nos. 310-312.)

(Supreme Court of Rhode Island. April 25, 1919.)

1. TOWNS 82-JUDGMENTS-LIABILITY OF TOWN TREASURER.

As we have no statute in this state requiring a preliminary examination as a condition precedent to the finding of an indictment by the grand jury, and as the defend- In view of the history of legislation governant admits that the grand jury may prop-ing liability of town treasurers for judgments erly find an indictment in the absence of any for town debts and under Gen. Laws 1909, c. previous examination in the district court, 46, §§ 12-14, a treasurer is not personally reour investigation necessarily becomes limit-sponsible or primarily liable to pay such a ed to the single question as to whether the judgment in the first instance out of his own pendency of preliminary proceedings inter- pocket, but he may pay and be reimbursed, not rupts or neutralizes, at least for the time being a volunteer. being, any action by the grand jury.

It is undisputed that for a long time it has been the practice in this state for grand juries to take up cases pending in the district courts and bring indictments, and that grand juries have found indictments in some cases where the district court has discharged the defendant, and in other cases have refused to find indictments against defendants who have been bound over. While such existing practice may not be decisive of the question before us, it may be taken into account in its consideration.

By section 15 of chapter 273, General Laws of Rhode Island, it is provided that:

"All grand juries shall be impaneled by the superior court. They shall be empowered, required, and charged to diligently inquire and true presentment make of all crimes and offenses done or committed within their jurisdiction, and shall, in so far as may be deemed necessary, be instructed by the court in the law relative thereto."

2. TOWNS 82-JUDGMENT-EXECUTION.

A judgment against a town treasurer cannot be collected by execution; there being no provision in the law for the issue or service of execution in such case.

Mandamus against the town treasurer is the proper proceeding to compel payment of judgment against such treasurer in his official capacity; it being his duty to pay such judgment out of funds in his hands, or, if he has no available funds, to proceed to procure the levy of a tax to provide for such payment. 4. TOWNS 81-JUDGMENTS.

After suit against a town treasurer in his official capacity has proceeded to judgment, it is not necessary to summon in his successor in office in one year in order to keep the judgment alive, in case the town treasurer against whom the judgment was rendered ceases to hold office and a successor is elected and qualified before the judgment is paid; Gen. Laws 1909, c. 283, § 13, applying only to pending suits.