La Roche v. Jones. 9 H. On the 17th of October, 1792, Richard Ellis (of Mississippi) made his will, wherein he devised to his son, John Ellis, the tract of land in question, and died shortly afterwards. On the 2d of July, 1795, Mary Ellis (widow of William Cocke Ellis) married, in Virginia, Richard Jones, lessor of the plaintiff, and they continued to reside in Virginia. On the 27th of October, 1795, by the treaty between the United States and Spain, the latter admitted the parallel of 31° N. Lat. to be the north boundary of the Spanish possessions,—as it had always been claimed to be by the United States since the treaty of peace in 1782, where it is so expressly declared. 8 Stats. at Large, 138. On the 7th of April, 1798, an act of congress established the Mississippi territory, bounded on the south by 31° N. Lat., and constituted a board of commissioners to receive a cession from Georgia of her territory west of the Chatahoochee, and north of 31° N. Lat., and to adjust all differences in regard thereto. 1 Stats. at Large, 549. * On the 24th of April, 1802, an agreement was made be- [* 169 ] tween the United States and Georgia, and a cession by Georgia of all claims to territory north of 31°, and west of the Chatahoochee. It was therein expressly covenanted that all persons who were, on the 27th of October, 1795, actual settlers within the territory ceded, should be confirmed in their grants made by the Spanish government before that day. 1 Laws of the United States, 489. On the 3d of March, 1803, an act of congress was passed, 2 Stats. at Large, 229, which provided that: 1. All persons, and the legal representatives of persons, who were resident in the Mississippi territory on the 27th of October, 1795, who had before then received from the British or Spanish government a warrant or order of survey, and who, on that day, actually inhabited and cultivated the land in the warrant, should be confirmed in their titles if they were twenty-one years of age, or heads of a family, at the date of the warrant. 2. All persons, and their legal representatives, who, at the time of the Spanish evacuation in 1797, were twenty-one years of age, or heads of families, and actually inhabited and cultivated a tract of land in the Mississippi territory not claimed under the preceding section or any British grant, or the agreement with Georgia, should be entitled to a donation of such tract. 3. All persons, and their legal representatives, who, at the time of passing this act, were twenty-one years of age, or heads of a family, and inhabited and cultivated a tract of land in said territory not claimed as aforesaid, should be entitled to a preëmption right therefor. La Roche v. Jones. 9 H. 4. All persons claiming lands by virtue of the preceding sections, or of a British grant, or under the agreement with Georgia, were required to file their claims and evidence with the register, before the 31st of March, 1804, and if this was not done, all their right was forever barred. 5. Commissioners were appointed to ascertain the rights of persons claiming under the agreement with Georgia, or under this act; they were to hear and decide, in a summary manner, all matters respecting such claims; and to determine them; and their determination, so far as the right was derived under the agreement with Georgia or the acts of congress, was declared to be final. They were to give certificates to claimants who should appear to them entitled, stating that they are confirmed in their titles thereto; which certificate, being recorded, was to be a relinquishment forever of all claim on the part of the United States. [ * 170 ] * Thereupon, John Ellis presented and filed his claim to be confirmed in the tract of land in question. By indorsement on the original Spanish grant in this case, it appears that it was duly recorded in the register's book C of written Evidence of Claims, folio 534. He also produced and filed the will of his father, Richard Ellis, dated 17th October, 1792, devising the tract to him. On the 19th of June, 1805, his title thereto was absolutely confirmed, and a certificate of confirmation was issued by the commissioners "to John Ellis, for the tract mentioned in the Spanish grant, dated 16th February, 1789, to William Cocke Ellis," and which had been, as they certified, "legally conveyed to the said John Ellis." On the 3d of July, 1807, the report of the commissioners was made to the secretary of the treasury, stating, among others, the confirmation of the tract in controversy to John Ellis; and, on the 2d of January, this, with numerous other reports on the Mississippi land-titles, was reported to congress. See Gales & Seaton's documents, Public Lands, vol. i. p. 868. On the 30th of June, 1812, an act of congress was passed which declared that all persons, and their legal representatives, claiming lands in the Mississippi territory under British or Spanish warrants or orders of survey, granted before the 27th of October, 1795, who were actual residents on that day, and whose claims had been filed with the register and reported to congress, were thereby confirmed in the lands so claimed, and should receive patents. 2 Stats. at Large, 765. On this state of facts, it was submitted to the circuit court, whether the lessor of the plaintiff (Mary Jones) could recover; that court La Roche v. Jones. 9 H. having pronounced her title legal and valid, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff; and the only question presented for our consideration is, whether that judgment was a proper conclusion of law on the facts agreed by the parties. That the grant of 1789, made by Miro, governor-general of Louisiana and West Florida, was void for want of power in the Spanish authorities to grant lands north of the thirty-first degree of north latitude, is not open to controversy at this time. It was so held in Henderson v. Poindexter, 12 Wheat. 539, and again in the case of Hickey v. Stewart, 3 How. 756, and the same doctrine has been affirmed in several other cases. It necessarily follows that, on the death of William Cocke Ellis, in 1790, his infant son, Richard, took no title by descent; nor did the mother of Richard take any title by descent on the death of her son, in 1791. Her right to recover must therefore depend on [* 171 ] the compact between the State of Georgia and the United States of 1802, or on the legislation of congress. The compact only provided for persons who actually inhabited and cultivated the land claimed on the 27th of October, 1795, and the lessor of the plaintiff, not having done so, was not provided for; and, in the next place, congress intended, by the act of 1803, to confer United States titles on claimants, and to this end instituted a board of commissioners, with powers to adjudge on the facts, whether such claim as was recognized by the compact existed, and who the proper claimant then was, whether by assignment or otherwise; and especially to ascertain and decide whether the land claimed had been actually inhabited and cultivated by the person who preferred the claim, on the 27th of October, 1795. On the necessary facts being found to satisfy the compact, and the act of congress, the land was adjudged to the applicant, and a certificate of the judgment was delivered to him; which, on being recorded, devested the title of the United States, and vested it in the individual in whose favor the judgment was given. And this title is conclusive as against the government; nor can a court of law inquire into previous facts, reaching behind the judgment given by the commissioners, thereby to impeach its validity, as this would be assuming jurisdiction to overthrow that judgment in a collateral action. As a source of individual title, the judgment and recorded certificate stand on the foot of a patent, and merge all previous requirements, and all future inquiry into such requirements, when the grant is relied on, as here, in defence of an ejectment. John Ellis's heirs having the conclusive legal titles, Mary Jones has no standing in court; and such, in effect, is the decision of Hickey v. Stewart. We deem the judgment then pronounced conclusive of the present controversy, and, for the reasons then given and here Perrine v. Chesapeake and Delaware Canal Co. 9 H. given, order that the judgment of the circuit court be reversed, and that one be entered for the defendants below, and plaintiffs in error here. 10 H. 627. JOHN A. PERRINE, Complainant, v. THE CHESAPEAKE and Delaware CANAL COMPANY, Defendants. 9 H. 172. A corporation can exercise no powers except those expressly conferred upon it, or which are incident to its existence; and, therefore, a canal corporation, not having been empowered by its charter to demand tolls on passengers, or on vessels by reason of their passengers, cannot lawfully exact such tolls. The charter of such a corporation having provided for the payment of a certain toll by vessels not having merchandise on board, it was held that such vessels could not be excluded from the canal because they carried passengers. Words intended to limit the powers of the corporation cannot be construed to describe, and so to limit, the rights of the public. A charter is to be fairly examined, and reasonably and justly expounded, and is not to receive a strained interpretation; but when thus examined, if its terms fairly admit of doubt, as to whether a power, burdensome to the public, has been granted, it cannot be exercised. CERTIFICATE of division of opinion by the judges of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Delaware. The questions certified were as follows: [ * 177 ] *1. Is the canal company entitled to charge the compensation or toll mentioned in the proceedings for passengers on board the complainant's boat passing through the canal? "2. Has the complainant a right to navigate the canal for the transportation of passengers, with passenger boats, paying or offering to pay toll upon the boats as empty boats, or upon commodities on board, but without toll or compensation for passengers, as proposed in his correspondence contained in the exhibits?" This correspondence showed that the plaintiff desired permission to navigate the canal with passenger boats, and that it was refused by the company. Whiteley, for the complainant. Gilpin and Bayard, contrà. 180] * TANEY, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court. The Chesapeake and Delaware Canal connects the waters of the Chesapeake and Delaware bays, and derives its corporate existence from charters granted by Maryland, Delaware, and Pennsyl Perrine v. Chesapeake and Delaware Canal Co. 9 H. vania. It passes through the territory of the first two States only, but Pennsylvania was deeply interested in this improvement, and Maryland, it appears, was unwilling to authorize it unless the opening of the navigation of the Susquehannah River was connected with the construction of this canal. Delaware, also, supposed itself to have some demands on Pennsylvania, as appears by the charter it granted. And in order to accomplish the objects which the different States had in view, each of them passed an act incorporating this company, with certain conditions annexed to the respective charters, concerning other objects, thereby making its incorporation a compact between them. The nature of this compact, and the purposes it was intended to accomplish, will be readily understood from the situation of the navigable waters which this canal was intended to unite, and from the peculiar provisions inserted in the respective charters. Before this canal was made, the city of Baltimore almost monopolized the trade of the country bordering on the Chesa*peake Bay, and of the numerous tide-water rivers which [181] penetrate the adjacent country. For, in order to reach Philadelphia, it was necessary to pass by sea from the capes of the Chesapeake to those of the Delaware, and commerce could therefore be carried on only in vessels fit to navigate the ocean. Philadelphia naturally desired to share in the trade thus exclusively enjoyed by Baltimore, by opening a safe and easy inland communication from one bay to the other; and it was evident from the nature of the country, that this could be effected by a canal of about thirteen miles in length, near the head of the Chesapeake Bay. On the other hand, the interests of Baltimore were adverse to this canal, as it would deprive it of the advantage it then possessed, and it moreover desired to bring to its own port the vast productions of the country watered by the Susquehannah, which flows into the Chesapeake Bay at its head. But this river was obstructed by rocks, and the trade was for the most part carried on over land with Philadelphia; and these obstructions could not be removed without the consent of Pennsylvania, as some of the most serious impedi ments to navigation were within the limits of that State, a little north of the Maryland line. The respective States naturally felt it their duty to foster thei: respective cities, as far as justice and the interests of the community generally, would permit. Pennsylvania, therefore, would not agree to remove the obstructions in the Susquehannah, unless the canal was authorized to be made; nor would Maryland authorize the canal unless the trade of the Susquehannah was laid open to Baltimore. |