Gill v. Oliver's Executors. 11 H. court, in his opinion, overruled his claim. This, in my view, gives jurisdiction to us, whether the state court decided right or wrong. See Armstrong v. Athens County, 16 Pet. 285; Miller v. Nichols, 4 Wheat. 311. The very object of the writ of error is to ascertain whether they did decide right or wrong, and the jurisdiction to make this revision of their opinion arises not from its error, but its subject-matter; the latter being a claim set up under some United States authority. Neilson v. Lagow, 7 How. 775. The next and only remaining inquiry for me, supposing that we have jurisdiction, is, whether the state court formed a right conclusion in overruling the claim set up by the appellant. I think they did. So far as it rested on authority under the United States, it is by no means clear that they overruled it improperly. The claim, so far as regards the enforcement of the treaty with Mexico, does not seem to have been overruled in terms by the state court. [* 550 ] That court did not decide that the treaty was corrupt or illegal, or in any way a nullity, when they held that the original contract violated the laws of neutrality. So far, too, as regards the award made by the commissioners, that the Baltimore Mexican Company and their legal representatives had a just claim under the treaty for the amount awarded, it was not overruled at all. It is not manifest, then, that any thing really in the treaty or in the award, set up by Gill, the plaintiff, was actually decided against, but only something he claimed to be there; that when the appellants claimed that he, rather than others, was legally entitled to one ninth of the sum awarded to the Baltimore Mexican Company, the state court seems to have overruled that. But in doing this, they must still have held the treaty itself to be valid, and the award of the commissioners under it to be valid, or they could not have decreed this share of the fund to Oliver's executors, as they appear to have done expressly by the record. All must concede, that the state court speaks in its language against the Mina "contract" alone as illegal, and in terms do not impugn either the treaty or the award; and it is merely a matter of inference or argument that either of these was assailed, or any right properly claimed under them overruled. But it is true the court held that Oliver's executors, rather than the appellant, were entitled to the fund furnished by Mexico, and long subsequent to Mina's contract; but in coming to that conclusion, they seem to have been governed by their views as to their own laws and the principles of general jurisprudence. The treaty or award contained nothing as to the point whether Gill or Oliver's executors had the better right to this share, Gill v. Oliver's Executors. 11 H. but only that the Mexican Company and their legal representatives should receive the fund. This last the court did not question. But who was the legal representative of Lyde Goodwin's share? Who, by insolvencies, sales, or otherwise, had become entitled to it? That was the question before the court, and the one they settled ; and in deciding that, they overruled the claim of Gill to be so, by virtue of any authority in the treaty or award; and in saying that the fund should go to Oliver's executors, as best entitled, rather than Gill, they did it under their own state laws. It is a general rule for the state tribunals, and not the commissioners, to settle any conflict between different claimants; and the usage, when disputes exist, is not for commissioners to go [* 551 ] further than act on the validity of the claim, and *decide, besides, the superior rights of one of the claimants. Frevall v. Bache et al. 14 Pet. 95; Comegys v. Vasse, 1 Pet. 212; Sheppard v. Taylor et al. 5 Pet. 710. It is true that the opinion given in the state court in support of its judgment is not entirely free from some grounds for misconception, yet the judgment itself appears right, and, if erroneous, resting as it does wholly on the state laws, it is not competent for us, under this writ of error, to reverse it. We can reverse it only when wrong, and wrong, too, for deciding improperly against some claim under a United States law or treaty. This, I think, it has not done. In short, the whole real truth appears to be, that the state court considered the Mina contract in 1817 as a violation of the neutrality act of 1794; and therefore, when Lyde Goodwin failed in the same year, and went into insolvency, that his share in the contract, being illegal and void, could not then pass to his creditors, or his trustee in their behalf. But when the Mexican government, about 1825, adopted the contract, and acknowledged its liability to pay those entitled, the court seems to have thought that their obligation was virtually a new one. It occurred after the insolvency, and hence seems supposed not to have passed to the creditors, any more than did new property subsequently acquired. See insolvent act of 1805, c. 110, § 2. Consequently, the commissioners held that the creditors and their trustee were not entitled to its benefits. Goodwin could and did legally assign to Oliver his new rights and new guarantees, for his share from Mexico. These last, though growing out of the original Mina purchase, were not a violation of the act of 1794,- were honorable, though not compellable, and were not deemed illegal either by Mexico or the government of the United States, or the commissioners, or the state court. Again, under the state laws doubts seem to arise, (in deciding on United States v. Hughes. 11 H. which was the proper claimant,) whether the original trustee was not duly appointed in 1817, and could not legally assign this claim, if it passed to him then or afterwards, as he attempted to pass it to Oliver, rather than considering it as belonging to, or vesting in, Gill, the appellant, who was not appointed trustee till 1825, and then in a manner somewhat questionable. 4 Gill & Johns. 392. That, however, was likewise a point arising exclusively under the state laws, and which we are not authorized to decide in this writ of error. It is for reasons like these, that, in my opinion, the judgment in the state court, so far as it related to any claim set up and supposed to be overruled under any authority derived from the United States, is within our jurisdiction; but that the state court* did [*552] not improperly overrule any such claim so set up, and hence that the judgment in the state court ought to be affirmed. 12 H. 111; 17 H. 232, 239; 20 H. 535; 24 H. 317; 6 Wal. 258. THE UNITED STATES, Appellants, v. DAVID M. HUGHES, ROBERT SEWALL, and FRANKLIN HUDSON, a Minor, by his Tutor, HOLMES HUTCHINSON. 11 H. 552. Though a proceeding is in the form of an information by the district attorney in behalf of the United States, if it show rights, and claim a remedy for the United States, though it should have been simply a bill in equity in the name of the United States, it will not be dismissed on demurrer for this defect of form. If the United States is defrauded out of a patent, it can, like any other proprietor, maintain a bill in equity to set it aside. THE case is stated in the opinion of the court. Crittenden, (attorney-general,) for the United States. Henderson, contrà. *CATRON, J., delivered the opinion of the court. 100 [* 567 ] The attorney of the United States for the district of Louisiana on behalf of the United States filed an information in the nature of a bill in chancery, against David M. Hughes, having for its object the repeal and surrender of a patent for 175 acres of land, made to Hughes by the President of the United States, April 16, 1841. The bill proceeds on the ground that said patent was fraudulently obtained, being in violation of the rights of Sewall and Hudson, deriving title from John Goodbee, who entered the land as his preëmption claim under the act of April 12, 1814,' paid the purchase 1 3 Stats. at Large, 121. United States v. Hughes. 11 H. money, and got a certificate of purchase, in 1822, for 160 acres; but when the public surveys were executed, the legal subdivision was found to contain 15,6 acres more, to which Goodbee's right of preemption also extended. 100 The validity of Goodbee's entries depends on the regulations of the land-office, made in pursuance of statutes' enacted by congress; and which statutes and regulations are accurately set forth by the attorney-general in his argument in this cause, and need not be further stated here. It appears that in 1836, Hughes entered the same land, with full knowledge that those holding possession under Goodbee's title were owners and cultivating a sugar plantation on it. The existence of Goodbee's preemption right and better title was overlooked at the land-office in Louisiana, where the entry of Hughes was made; and again at the general land-office until after his patent had issued. As the bill was demurred to, no dispute can be raised on the question of fraud, nor can any doubt exist that this second purchase was fraudulently obtained, Sewall and Hudson being notoriously in possession of the land as owners when Hughes made his entry at the land-office. 1. The first and main objection made for defendant, Hughes, is, that this proceeding is improper, and will not lie. [ * 568 ] *It is to be regretted that this was not a simple bill in equity, brought by the United States against the defendant, Hughes, praying that the patent might be annulled and surrendered by a decree in chancery, without any attempt of assimilating the proceeding to an information brought by the attorney-general on behalf of the crown, in England, to repeal a patent. In this country, the lands of the United States, lying within the States, are held and subject to be sold, (under the authority of congress,) as lands may be held and sold by individual owners, or by ordinary corporations; and similar remedies may be employed by the United States as owners, that are applicable in cases of others. This, we think, is manifest. It was so held in the case of United States v. King et al. 3 How. 773. In substance, this is a bill in equity for and on behalf of the United States, because of an injury done to the United States by Hughes, the defendant, and we will not dismiss it for want of form. By the constitution, congress is vested with power to dispose of the public lands, and to make all needful rules and regulations respecting them. Under existing regulations, Goodbee had a right to enter the land in dispute in exclusion of others, and did so; and the United States, as owner, having been paid for the land, was bound to make ' 5th Feb. 1813, 2 Stats. at Large, 797; 12th April, 1814, 3 Ib. 121. United States v. Hughes. 11 H. the purchaser a title, in the same manner that an individual would have been bound under similar circumstances. As the patent to Hughes is a conveyance of the fee, the United States stand devested of the legal title, and therefore cannot fulfil their engagement with Goodbee and his alienees, to whom they stand bound for a legal title, until the grant to Hughes is annulled. It is manifest that if the agents of an individual had been thus imposed on, the conveyance could be set aside because of mistake on part of such agents, and fraud on part of the second purchaser, in order that the first contract could be complied with. Nor can it be conceived why the government should stand on a different footing from any other proprietor. Hughes has no right to complain, for so soon as it was discovered that he had defrauded the government, and those claiming under it, his purchase-money was tendered, and a surrender of the patent demanded; but he refused to receive the money, or surrender his legal advantage. 2. The demurrer having been sustained, and the bill dismissed by the circuit court, it is insisted here that no appeal would lie, because the matter in dispute does not appear to have amounted to $2,000. All the assignments from Goodbee down to the present owners (Sewall and Hudson) are exhibited with the bill, [* 569 ] as a part thereof; the first of which is a notarial conveyance from Goodbee to Bush, dated in 1822. It states that the consideration of $2,000 had been paid for the land; and, there being a sugar plantation on it, we assume its value to be quite equal now. As we are bound by complainant's allegation of value, no controversy can be raised on the fact. If, however, any objection existed, value could be proved here in like manner as is usually done in cases of ejectment, where there is no allegation what the property in dispute is worth. 100 We are of opinion that the patent to Hughes should be vacated and annulled; and accordingly order that the decree of the circuit court of the district of Louisiana be reversed; and it is adjudged and decreed, that the patent made to David Michael Hughes by the President of the United States, on the 16th day of April, A. D. 1841, for 17546 acres of land, being for section 54 in township 10 of range 12 east, in the district of lands subject to sale at New Orleans, Louisiana, be, and the same is hereby vacated, and declared null and void. And it is also ordered and decreed, that said David Michael Hughes do, within one calendar month from the time of filing and entering the mandate of this court in the circuit court for the district of Louisiana, surrender said patent to the clerk of the aforesaid cir |