Oakey v. Bennett. 11 H.

This can only be done by the laws of the sovereignty where such property may be situated.

*

[ 46 ] It is said that Texas, by an act of the 17th of March, 1841, has recognized the validity of foreign bankrupt laws. There is nothing in that act which can affect the question now under consideration. It merely provides, that where relief has been given under any foreign bankrupt or insolvent law to an individual who has surrendered his property, and who afterwards shall become a citizen of Texas, he shall be considered as discharged from his debts, unless fraud be shown.

But if the assignee had power to convey the property, there would be two fatal objections to the title of the plaintiff. The deed is not executed according to the form required by the laws of Texas for the conveyance of real estate. Under such an instrument the fee does not pass. And in the second place, if the deed were operative to convey the fee, the property would be subject to satisfy the claims of the Texas creditors of Hall. Administration of his estate was granted to Bennett, who took upon himself the trust, and made returns to the court of the debts of Hall, amounting, as above stated, to the sum of $1,800, before he had any notice of the bankrupt proceeding. And it is averred that these creditors trusted Hall, knowing he possessed the property in controversy. Bennett, it is insisted, represents only the rights of the deceased, and, the right to this property having become devested by the decree in bankruptcy, he can set up no objection to the plaintiff's title. This position is not sustainable. The administrator represents the rights of creditors, and as regards this controversy must be considered as standing in their stead. He is responsible to the court for the faithful administration of all the assets of the deceased within the jurisdiction under which he acts. The creditors who have substantiated their claims were not subject to the decree of bankruptcy. From the property which Hall was known to possess in Texas, it is alleged they gave him credit, and a conveyance of the property, under the circumstances, could only be held valid by a disregard of the rights of the Texas creditors. This, we suppose, could not receive the sanction of the courts of that State. Whether advantage could be taken of this in the present procedure, if the deed to the plaintiff conveyed the fee, it is unnecessary to determine.

The annexation of Texas1 to the United States long after the decree of bankruptcy, and a short time before the deed by the assignee was made to the plaintiff, does not affect the question. At the time the decree in bankruptcy was pronounced, there was no

15 Stats. at Large, 797.

United States v. Guillem. 11 H.

jurisdiction over this property; and the subsequent annexation cannot enlarge that jurisdiction. The rights of creditors were fixed by the decree.

*

*We deem it unnecessary to examine the other excep- [ 47 ] tions, as we are all of the opinion, that the title to the property in controversy did not pass to the assignee, under the decree in bankruptcy. The judgment of the district court is, therefore,

affirmed.

THE UNITED STATES, Appellants, v. BAPTISTE GUILLEM, Claimant of One Box of Specie.

11 H. 47.

A neutral, who has resided in an enemy's country, resumes his neutral rights, as soon as he puts himself and his family in itinere to return home to reside, and he has a right to take with him the means of support for himself and his family, in specie.

Such property is not forfeited by a breach of blockade by the vessel, on board of which he has taken passage, if he, personally, is in no fault.

APPEAL from a decree of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Louisiana, in a cause of prize.

Crittenden, (attorney-general,) for the appellants.

Soulé, contrà.

[ * 60 ]

TANEY, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court. There is no dispute about the material facts in this case. The claimant was a citizen of France who had been domiciled in Mexico about three years, following the occupation of a cook in a hotel, and was returning with his family to reside in his own country when the capture was made. They sailed from Vera Cruz in a French vessel bound to Havre. The money he had with him, and which is now in question, was not shipped as cargo, or for the purposes of trade. It amounted to only $2,860; and was the earnings of his industry in Mexico, and taken with him for the support of himself and his family upon their return to France. The hostile character which his domicile in Mexico had impressed upon him and his property had therefore been thrown off; and as soon as he sailed from Vera Cruz he resumed the character of a French citizen, and as such was entitled to the rights and privileges of a neutral, in regard to his property, as well as in his person. The rights of the neutral in this respect have always been recognized in the prize courts of England, and were sanctioned by this court in the case of The Venus, 8 Cranch,

United States v. Guillem. 11 H.

280, 281. Indeed, we do not understand that the appellants claim to have this money condemned upon the ground that it was liable to be treated as the property of an enemy, on account of the previous domicile of Guillem. But it is insisted that, if it is regarded as the property of a neutral, it was shipped in violation of the blockade; and that the character of the vessel in which it was found also subjects it to condemnation.

So far as concerns the breach of blockade, the attempt to pass out of the port with this money was not of itself an offence, apart from the vessel in which he sailed. The blockade had been opened for the purpose of enabling consuls and other neutrals to pass out to their respective ships of war, soon after General Scott landed and invested the town. And it continued open for that purpose until the [61] 22d of March. It is true that the permission was confined to ships of war. But the reason is obvious. They were the only vessels that could be safely allowed to communicate with the town then closely besieged. And the permission was restricted to them, because it was believed that commanders of national vessels would not suffer a privilege granted to neutrals from motives of humanity to be used for improper purposes.

But the object and intention of this order were evidently, not merely to enable the neutral to avoid the hazards of the approaching bombardment, but to afford him an opportunity to leave the enemy's country, and return to his own, if he desired to do so. The neutral was not required or expected to remain on board the ship of war. The permission opened to him a path by which he might escape altogether from a country about to be visited with the calamities of war It therefore necessarily carried with it the permission to take with him the means of supporting himself and his family, on their voyage home and after their return. The order contains no restriction upon this subject, and to imply any would be inconsistent with the motive by which it was evidently dictated. The Jeune Nelly, in which the claimant embarked, sailed on the 19th of March, while the blockade was still open for the purposes above mentioned. It was no breach of the blockade, therefore, for the claimant to pass out of the town at that time on his voyage home, and to take with him the sum of money his industry had accumulated, and which was necessary for the support of himself and his family on their arrival in their own country. The port was not then closed against the egress of neutrals from the hostile country; nor were they forbidden to take with them the money necessary for their support. And if Guillem had gone on board a French ship of war for the purpose of returning home, and taken with him this small sum of money, his right to do so could not be questioned.

United States v. Guillem. 11 H.

But it is supposed that the character of the vessel in which he embarked subjects his property to forfeiture. La Jeune Nelly had entered the port in violation of the blockade; and endeavored to break it a second time by leaving the port without permission. She was undoubtedly liable to capture and condemnation. But it does not by any means follow, that the property of the claimant is implicated in the guilt of the vessel, or must share in the punishment. There is no evidence to show that he had knowledge of the previous breach of blockade, or of the intention to break it again in going out. She was a neutral vessel belonging to his own country, and had come into the port in open day under the French flag; and she sailed again in a manner equally open, and without any

apparent design of concealing her movements from the [62] blockading squadron. The permission granted by the American commanders had as a matter of course been made public in Vera Cruz; and Guillem must without doubt have seen citizens of neutral nations daily leaving the city for the ships of war, and taking with them the necessary means of support for themselves and their families. He appears to have done nothing more than avail himself of the most convenient opportunity that offered in order to accomplish the same object; and if he did not participate in the design of breaking the blockade, his property is not affected by the misconduct of the vessel in which it was shipped. Even in the case of cargo shipped as a mercantile adventure, and found on board of a vessel liable to condemnation for a breach of blockade, although it is prima facie involved in the offence of the vessel, yet, if the owner can show that he did not participate in the offence, his property is not liable to forfeiture. This is the rule as stated by Sir William Scott, in the case of The Alexander, 4 Rob. 93, and in the case of The Exchange, 1 Edwards, 39, and recognized in 1 Kent's Com. 151. And yet, in the case of a cargo shipped for the purposes of commerce, the breach of blockade is almost always committed by the vessel for the benefit of the cargo, and to carry out some mercantile speculation injurious to the rights of the belligerent nation whose ships are blockading the port. The case before us is a stronger one in favor of the claimant than that of the innocent owner of a cargo. The money in question was not shipped as cargo or as a mercantile adventure. Guillem was a passenger on board, with his whole family, and the money was a part of his personal effects necessary for their support and comfort. The shipment of the money could give no aid or comfort to the enemy. And in taking his passage in The Jeune Nelly, his intention, as far as it can be ascertained from the testimony, was merely to return to his own country, in a mode better suited to

United States v. Boisdoré. 11 H.

his humble circumstances and more convenient to his family, than by passing through the ships of war. In the opinion of the court, the money he took with him was not liable to condemnation on account of the guilt of the vessel, and the decree of the circuit court is therefore affirmed.

THE UNITED STATES, Appellants, v. ETIENNE ALPHONSO BOISDORĖ LAURENT BOISDORE, SIDNEY BOISDORÉ, MATHILDE and ALERINE NICOLAS, Widow of MANUEL FABRE DANONY, CAROLINE NICOLAS, ELISE NICOLAS, JOSEPH MANUEL DE LABARRE, DELPHINE VICTOIRE DE LABARRE REAL and her husband, CHRISTOVAL REAL, LOUIS DEJEAN, ANTOINE BOISDORÉ, and MANATTE DEJEAN PARDON and her husband, VINCENTE PARDON, Heirs of Louis BOISDORÉ, deceased.

11 H. 63.

The Spanish governor of Louisiana, in 1783, made a gratuitous concession of a tract of land for a vacherie to the ancestor of the appellees; no survey was made of the tract while the country was held by Spain, the calls of the grant were so vague that the land could not be identified without a survey, and the consideration for the grant, namely, the removal of the petitioner and his family and slaves to the land, did not appear to have been executed; Held, that the appellees had no title as against the United States.

APPEAL from the district court of the United States for the southern district of Mississippi. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

Crittenden, (attorney-general,) for the appellants.

Volney E. Howard, (with whom was Henderson,) contrà.

[ *86 ]

* CATRON, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

The heirs of Boisdoré filed their petition, in the nature of a bill in equity, pursuant to the act of 1824,1 revived by that of 1844,2 against the United States, claiming a decree to a perfect title for a large body of land fronting on the Bay of St. Louis and the Gulf of Mexico, and extending in depth to Pearl River; containing between one hundred thousand and four hundred thousand acres in quantity, depending on the manner in which the claim should be surveyed. A decree was made by the district court of Mississippi, confirming the claim, and ordering a survey to be made in a particular manner, which will more fully appear hereafter. From this decree the United States appealed; and the first question presented for our consideration is as to the nature and character of the paper title on which the claim is founded.