Paup v. Drew. 10 H. the bank. That the pledge of the State to receive the notes of the bank, in payment of debts, was a standing guarantee, which embraced all the paper issued by the bank until the guarantee was repealed. And that this construction was founded upon the fact, that the bank belonged exclusively to the State, was conducted by its officers, and for its benefit. That the guarantee attached to the notes of the bank in circulation at the time of the repeal, and such notes the State was bound to receive in payment of its debts. That in this respect the obligation of the contract applied to a State equally as to an individual. And that as to the binding force of a similar guarantee by an individual, there would seem to be no ground for doubt. But that under this guarantee the State is bound to receive the notes of the bank only in payment of debts in its own right. The lands sold did not belong to the State of Arkansas, but were held by it in trust "to be appropriated solely for the use of the seminary." The money, of course, secured to be paid by the purchaser, partook of the same character. The bonds were made payable to the governor or his successor in office. And it appears, as stated in the plea, that the money to be received was intended, under the act of incorporation of the bank, to constitute a part of its capital. The governor acted as the agent of the State in making the sale of the land, and in collecting the money; but he could only represent a trust interest. The manner in which the money was intended to be appropriated can in no respect affect the question now under consideration. In law, the money did not belong to the State, in any other capacity than as trustee, and consequently the debt was not due to the State in its own right. No court can sanction the violation of a trust, but will always act on the presumption that it will be faithfully executed. And this is especially the case when the trust is vested in a State, which is not amenable to judicial process. To hold that the State of Arkansas is bound, under the provision in the charter of the bank, to receive its notes in payment for the seminary lands, would violate the trust, as it would greatly reduce the fund. Should the money be invested by the State, and lost, it would be responsible for it. No hazard incurred in the appropriation or use of [223] this money could exonerate the State from faithfully carrying out the object for which the fund was originally con stituted. The bonds were given payable "in specie or its equivalent." This shows that it was the understanding of both parties, that currency less valuable than specie should not be received in payment of the bonds. If by a contract the State was bound to receive the notes Paup v. Drew. 10 H. of the bank in payment of its debts by a contract, this obligation might be waived. And no waiver could be more express than an obligation by the debtor to pay in specie or its equivalent. We are, therefore, of opinion that, as this fund is a trust in the hands of the State, it cannot, within the 28th section of the charter of the bank, be considered a debt due to the State; and we think by the condition of the bonds to discharge them "in specie or its equivalent," the notes of the bank are also excluded. On both these grounds, the contract set up in the pleading not being impaired, we think the judgment of the state court must be affirmed. Mr. Justice Catron, Mr. Justice Daniel, Mr. Justice Nelson, and Mr. Justice Grier gave separate opinions, as follows. DANIEL, J. I concur in the conclusion adopted by the court in these causes, Paup et al. v. Drew, and Trigg et al. v. Drew, 10 How. 224; but whilst I do this, I cannot claim to myself the argument upon which that conclusion professes to be founded. The principles and reasonings propounded in these cases, and in that of Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 190, appear to me to place all three of the cases essentially upon the same platform, and establish no valid or sound distinction between them, but should, if those principles and reasonings be correct, have led to the same conclusion in them all. CATRON, J. I concur with my brother Daniel. NELSON, J. I concur in the judgment of the court on the ground, first, that the act of the legislature of the State of Arkansas, repealing the provision of a previous act, by which the bills of the Bank of Arkansas were authorized to be taken in payment of the public dues and taxes, was constitutional and valid, and the defendant therefore bound to discharge his obligation *in the [* 224 ] legal currency of the country; and, secondly, that, if other wise, the obligor in this case has expressly stipulated to pay the debt in specie or its equivalent. GRIER, J. I concur with my brother Nelson. 10 H. 224. Trigg v. Drew. 10 H. JAMES TRIGG, RICHARD PRIOR, and JOHN W. PAUP, Plaintiffs in Error, v. THOMAS S. DREW, as Governor of the State of Arkansas, and Successor of ARCHIBALD YELL, deceased. 10 H. 224. The decision in the next preceding case held applicable to this case. M'LEAN, J., delivered the opinion of the court. This case is here under the 25th section of the judiciary act of 1789,' from the supreme court of Arkansas, on a writ of error. An action was commenced in the Pulaski circuit court, on certain bonds given by the plaintiffs in error to Archibald Yell, governor of * the State of Arkansas, and his successors in office, to pay [* 225 ] certain sums of money at the time specified, which bonds were negotiable at the principal bank of the State of Arkansas, and to be paid " in specie or its equivalent," &c., in payment for certain tracts of land, sold by the governor under a law of the State, as a part of the seminary lands given by congress for the support of a seminary, under certain acts of congress. A plea was filed setting up in defence a tender of the notes of the State Bank of Arkansas, and that, in the charter of said bank, the State bound itself to receive said notes in payment of debts, &c. A judgment was finally entered against the defendants below for $10,709.10, and costs. That judgment was taken to the supreme court of the State of Arkansas, and was there affirmed. As this case is similar in principle to the above case of Paup et al. 10 How. 218, it is unnecessary to repeat the reasons assigned in that case for the judgment of the court. The judgment of the state court is affirmed. Note by the Reporter. Daniel, J., Nelson, J., and et al. v. Drew. For the separate opinions of Catron, J., 10 H. 218. 11 Stats. at Large, 25. Greely v. Thompson. 10 H. PHILIP GREELY, JR., Plaintiff in Error, v. WILLIAM THOMPSON and WILLIAM HENRY FORMAN, Merchants and Copartners, trading under the Style and Firm of THOMPSON AND FORMAN, Aliens and Residents of London, Defendants. 10 H. 225. Under the 16th and 17th sections of the tariff act of August 30, 1842, (5 Stats. at Large, 563,) the value of merchandise at the time of its procurement is to be ascertained, not its value at the time of exportation.' An appraisement under the same sections can be lawfully made only after a personal examination of the merchandise by the appraisers. Neither the collector nor the secretary of the treasury can remove a merchant appraiser, duly appointed and qualified, unless for misconduct. ERROR to the circuit court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts. The case is stated in the opinion of the court. Crittenden, (attorney-general,) for the plaintiff. Sherman, contrà. [* 234 * WOODBURY, J., delivered the opinion of the court. This writ of error is brought by the collector of Boston to reverse a judgment rendered against him in favor of Thompson et al., importers of a quantity of railroad iron. The judgment was that he should refund $6,681.28, which had been exacted of the importers, on the ground that the iron was appraised more than ten per cent. above the invoice. The first questions appearing on the record relate to rulings against the defendants, admitting certain evidence that the appraisers were duly sworn, to which the defendants objected. But as the defendants do not bring a writ of error on that account, the final judgment being in their favor, we proceed to consider the rulings and instructions of which the collector, who is the plaintiff here, complains. The first ground of objection by him is the refusal of the court below to allow in evidence a letter from the secretary of the treasury, to show that the removal of one of the merchant appraisers was made by his order. We think, however, that the removal of that appraiser must be deemed valid or not, as to third persons, according as the collector possessed legal power to make it on the facts of the case. The orders as well as the opinions of the head of the treasury department, ex See act of March 3, 1851, (9 Stats. at Large, 629, § 1.) Greely v. Thompson. 10 H. pressed in either letters or circulars, are entitled to much respect, and will always be duly weighed by this court; but it is the laws which are to govern, rather than their opinions of them; and importers, in cases of doubt, are entitled to have their right settled by the judicial exposition of those laws, rather than by the views of the department. Marriott v. Brune, 9 How. 634, 635. And though, as between the custom-house officers and the department, the latter must by law control the course of proceeding, 5 Stats. at Large, 566, yet, as between them and the importer, it is well settled that the legality of all their doings may be revised in the judicial tribunals. Tracy et al. v. Swartwout, 10 Pet. 95; United States v. Lyman, 1 Mason, C. C. 504; Opinions of Attorneys-General, 1015. Besides this objection, there are specific exceptions, taken to these instructions below, which deserve a separate and more detailed examination. Those instructions, as set out in the record, were : "1. That the date of the procurement of the iron in England or Wales, to wit, the 24th of January, was the time at which the appraisers should have fixed the value of the iron, and not the date of invoice and bill of lading, to wit, the 24th of February, when materially different. "2. That if both appraisers, in each set of appraisers, did [* 235 ] *not make some personal examination of the iron, their report or decision was not made in conformity to law, and lid not justify the penalty. "3. That the valuation of the merchant appraisers was invalid, because one of the merchants who made the appraisal was wrongfully substituted for another, to wit, the merchant appraiser who was turned out of office, or attempted to be, without any legal authority to do it on the facts of the case." The first of these instructions extends merely to the point of law, whether the date of the procurement of the iron abroad was, by the acts of congress, the proper time at which to fix the value of it, or the date of the invoice and bill of lading. This has become a highly important question to the government, as well as the commercial world, under facts such as exist in this case, because a month had intervened here between the procurement and the shipment, and, in the mean time, under one of those extraor dinary fluctuations in prices which occasionally happen in trade, iron had risen nearly one fifth in value. Ordinarily, the time of the procurement of an article, as also the time of the purchase of it, when it is bought and not manufactured by the importer, is near the date of the invoice or exportation, and the price differing but little. Then, if selecting for the period of ap |