Strader v. Graham. 10 H. in operation in the States formed within the limits of the ⚫ northwestern territory, it would place them in an inferior [96] condition as compared with the other States, and subject their domestic institutions and municipal regulations to the constant supervision and control of this court. The constitution was, in the language of the ordinance, "adopted by common consent," and the people of the territories must necessarily be regarded as parties to it, and bound by it, and entitled to its benefits, as well as the people of the then existing States. It became the supreme law throughout the United States. And so far as any obligations of good faith had been previously incurred by the ordinance, they were faithfully carried into execution by the power and authority of the new government. In fact, when the constitution was adopted, the settlement of that vast territory was hardly begun; and the people who filled it, and formed the great and populous States that now cover it, became inhabitants of the territory after the constitution was adopted; and migrated upon the faith that its protection and benefits would be extended to them, and that they would in due time, according to its provisions and spirit, be admitted into the Union upon an equal footing with the old States. For the new government secured to them all the public rights of navigation and commerce which the ordinance did or could provide for; and moreover extended to them when they should become States much greater power over their municipal regulations and domestic concerns than the confederation had agreed to concede. The six articles, said to be perpetual as a compact, are not made a part of the new constitution. They certainly are not superior and paramount to the constitution, and cannot confer power and jurisdiction upon this court. The whole judicial authority of the courts of the United States is derived from the constitution itself, and the laws made under it. It is undoubtedly true, that most of the material provisions and principles of these six articles, not inconsistent with the constitution of the United States, have been the established law within this territory ever since the ordinance was passed; and hence the ordinance itself is sometimes spoken of as still in force. But these provisions owed their legal validity and force, after the constitution was adopted and while the territorial government continued, to the act of congress of August 7, 1789,' which adopted and continued the ordinance of 1787, and carried its provisions into execution, with some modifications, which were necessary to adapt its form of government to the new constitution. And in the States since formed in the territory, these provisions, so far as they have been preserved, owe their 11 Stats. at Large, 50. Strader v. Graham. 10 H. [*97] validity and authority to the constitution of the United States, and the constitutions and laws of the respective States, and not to the authority of the ordinance of the old confederation. As we have already said, it ceased to be in force upon the adoption of the constitution, and cannot now be the source of jurisdiction of any description in this court. In every view of the subject, therefore, this court has no jurisdiction of the case, and the writ of error must on that ground be dismissed. M'LEAN, J. I agree that there is no jurisdiction in this case, and that it must be dismissed. The plaintiffs obtained this writ of error to reverse a judgment of the court of appeals of Kentucky, which affirmed the judgment of the inferior court, in which Graham obtained a verdict and judgment against the defendants below for three thousand dollars, on the ground that three of the servants of the plaintiff had been conveyed from Louisville, Kentucky, to Cincinnati, in the steamboat of defendants, by which means they escaped, and the plaintiff lost their services. The defendants set up in their defence the ordinance of 1787, for the government of the northwestern territory, which prohibited slavery in the sixth article of the compact, and which was declared "to be unalterable unless by common consent." The defendants alleged that, with the permission of Graham, the slaves had been permitted to visit Ohio and Indiana as musicians, by which they were entitled to their freedom, although they had returned voluntarily to their master, in Kentucky. And the right to their freedom was asserted under the ordinance, which, it is insisted, brings the case within the 25th section of the judiciary act of 1789, and gives jurisdiction to this court. The provision of the ordinance in regard to slavery was incorporated into the constitution of Ohio, which received the sanction of congress when the State was admitted into the Union. The constitution of the State, having thus received the consent of the original parties to the compact, must be considered, in regard to the prohibition of slavery, as substituted for the ordinance, and consequently all questions of freedom must arise under the constitution, and not under the ordinance. This, in my judgment, decides the question of jurisdiction, which is the only question before us. And any thing that is said in the opinion of the court, in relation to the ordinance, beyond this, is not in the case, and is, consequently, extrajudicial. [ * 98 ] *CATRON, J. The ordinance of 1787 provides that the six articles contained in it shall be unalterable, and remain a Strader v. Graham. 10 H. compact between the original States and the people of the northwestern territory, "unless altered by common consent." 1. The 6th article declares, that slavery shall be prohibited. 2. And that absconding slaves there found shall be surrendered to their owners. The constitution of Ohio incorporates the first part of the 6th article, but leaves out the second part. The state constitution having received the sanction of congress,1 the alteration was made by common consent, as this was the mode of consent contemplated by the compact; that is to say, by the States in congress assembled, whether under the confederation or present constitution. This being an "engagement entered into" before the adoption of the constitution, was equally binding on the one congress as the other, according to the 6th article of the new constitution; and the new congress, equally with the former one, had power to consent to alterations. The power to alter necessarily involves the power to annul, or to suspend; and when the state constitution of Ohio was assented to by congress, the article stood suspended, or abolished, as an engagement among the States, and can now only be recognized as part of the organic state law. And as this law is drawn in question here, no jurisdiction exists to examine the state decision. But in regard to parts of the other five articles, I am unwilling to express any opinion, as no part of either is in any degree involved in this controversy. The 4th article secured the free navigation of the waters leading into the rivers Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the carrying places between them, as common highways; and exempted them from tax, impost, or duty. The mouths of the two great rivers were in possession of foreign powers, and closed to our commerce, at the date of the ordinance and constitution; and therefore it was more necessary that the tributaries should be always open, and the carrying places free, so that the Ohio and St. Lawrence could be reached from the great lakes, and back and forth either way. Some of these tributary rivers and the carrying places, it was known, would fall into a single new State, as contemplated by the ordinance. This is true of every carrying place, and is equally true as respects most of the rivers leading to the carrying places; and as congress had only power given by the new constitution "to regulate commerce among the States," it is a question now unsettled, whether such inland rivers and carrying places could be regulated, where the navigation [99] and carrying places began and ended in a single State. For thirty years, the state courts within the territory ceded by Vir 1 2 Stats. at Large, 173 Wilson v. Sandford. 10 H. ginia have held this part of the 4th article to be in force, and binding on them respectively; and I feel unwilling to disturb this wholesome course of decision, which is so conservative to the rights of others, in a case where the 4th article is in nowise involved, and when our opinion might be disregarded by the state courts as obiter, and a dictum uncalled for. When the question arises here on the 4th article, it is desired by me, that no such embarrassment should be imposed on this court as necessarily must be by now passing judgment on the force of the 4th article, and pronouncing that it stand superseded and annulled. 10 H. 511; 18 H. 602; 19 H. 393. JAMES G. WILSON, Appellant, v. GEORGE A. SANDFORD and Robert G. MUSGROVE. 10 H. 99. The last clause of the 17th section of the patent act of July 4, 1836, (5 Stats. at Large, 124,) allowing writs of error and appeals "in all other cases in which the court shall deem it reasonable to allow the same," does not include a suit in equity to set aside an assignment of a patent right. THE case is stated in the opinion of the court. Seward, for the appellant. No counsel contrà. [* 100 ] * TANEY, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court. The bill in this case was filed by the appellant against the appellees in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Louisiana. [* 101 ] * The object of the bill was to set aside a contract made by the appellant with the appellees, by which he had granted them permission to use, or vend to others to be used, one of Woodworth's planing machines, in the cities of New Orleans and Lafayette; and also to obtain an injunction against the further use of the machine, upon the ground that it was an infringement of his patent rights. The appellant states that he was the assignee of the monopoly in that district of country, and that the contract which he had made with the appellees had been forfeited by their refusal to comply with its conditions. The license in question was sold for fourteen hundred dollars, a part of which, the bill admits, had been paid. The contract is exhibited with the bill, but it is not necessary in this opinion, to set out more particularly its provisions. The appellees demurred to the bill, and at the final hearing the de Wilson v. Sandford. 10 H. murrer was sustained, and the bill dismissed. And the case is brought here by an appeal from that decree. The matter in controversy between the parties arises upon this contract, and it does not appear that the sum in dispute exceeds two thousand dollars. On the contrary, the bill and contract exhibited with it show that it is below that sum. An appeal, therefore, cannot be taken from the decree of the circuit court, unless it is authorized by the last clause in the 17th section of the act of 1836. The section referred to, after giving the right to a writ of error or appeal in cases arising under that law, in the same manner and under the same circumstances as provided by law in other cases, adds the following provision: "And in all other cases in which the court shall deem it reasonable to allow the same." The words "in all other cases" evidently refer to the description of cases provided for in that section, and where the matter in dispute is below two thousand dollars. In such suits, no appeal could be allowed but for this provision. The cases specified in the section in question are, "all actions, suits, controversies on cases arising under any law of the United States, granting or confirming to inventors the exclusive right to their inventions or discoveries." The right of appeal to this court is confined to cases of this description, when the sum in dispute is below two thousand dollars. And the peculiar privilege given to this class of cases was intended to secure uniformity of decision in the construction of the act of congress in relation to patents. Now the dispute in this case does not arise under any act of congress; nor does the decision depend upon the construction of any law in relation to patents. It arises out of the contract stated in the bill; and there is no act of congress providing for [*102 ] or regulating contracts of this kind. The rights of the parties depend altogether upon common law and equity principles. The object of the bill is to have this contract set aside and declared to be forfeited; and the prayer is, "that the appellant's reinvestiture of title to the license granted to the appellees, by reason of the forfeiture of the contract, may be sanctioned by the court," and for an injunction. But the injunction he asks for is to be the consequence of the decree of the court sanctioning the forfeiture. He alleges no ground for an injunction unless the contract is set aside. And if the case made in the bill was a fit one for relief in equity, it is very clear that whether the contract ought to be declared forfeited or not, in a court of chancery, depended altogether upon the rules and principles of equity, and in no degree whatever upon any act of congress concerning patent rights. And whenever a contract is made in relation to them, |