Reports of Decisions in the Supreme Court of the United States : [1790-1854]

This court has not jurisdiction under the 25th section of the judiciary act of 1789, (1 Stats. at Large, 85,) to reëxamine the decision of a state court on a mere question of boundary, between coterminous owners of land.

In an action of slander of title in Louisiana, the state court having determined that the true line between the parties excluded the defendant from the land in question, he can not have a writ of error under the 25th section of the judiciary act of 1789, because the court went on to express an opinion concerning the title of the plaintiff, and declared that he had a good title under an act of congress, and enjoined the defendant from selling the land.

THE case is stated in the opinion of the court.

Almonester v. Kenton. 9 H.

Brown, for the defendant.

No counsel contrà.

[ *6 ] * CATRON, J., delivered the opinion of the court. This case is brought before us by writ of error to the supreme court of Louisiana. The suit originated in a petition filed the 28th of December, 1836, by Kenton, in the first district court of that State, alleging that the defendant, Pontalba, through her agent, Le Breton, had advertised for sale certain lots of ground in the rear of the city of New Orleans, claiming to own the same, which land the petitioner averred belonged to him, and was, at the time of filing the bill, in his possession, and that it had been in the peaceable and uninterrupted possession of himself and those under whom he derived title, for upwards of thirty-five years. The petitioner therefore prayed that the defendant might be restrained from selling or intermeddling with the property in question, and that he might be quieted in his title. In answer, the defendant averred that she was the legal owner of the premises, and had been in possession of the same for more than fifty-five years. On the trial of the cause in the district court, the plaintiff introduced, with other testimony –

1. A concession made by Don Ramon de Lopez y Angulo, with the certificates of survey, records, &c., dated May 20, 1801, granting the premises in question to Carlos Guardiola.

2. An act of sale from Guardiola to Fleitas, conveying the property to the latter, dated June 5, 1805.

3. A sale of the land from the heirs of Fleitas to the plaintiff, dated May 19, 1835.

4. He also produced testimony to show that he and those under whom he claimed, had been in possession since the date of the grant to Guardiola in 1801.

The defendant then introduced in evidence an act of sale from L. C. Le Breton to Madame Dauberville for six arpens and fourteen toises front, dated May 30, 1757, reciting that the vendor was the owner of the premises sold, as well as of two arpens front adjoining the same, which he reserved from such sale. She also presented acts of sale made in 1757 and 1758, from Le Breton and from the succession of Dauberville, conveying the whole of the above-mentioned lands to Latil, and a grant made to the latter by the Spanish government in 1764. She then exhibited a full chain of title from Latil to herself, and proved possession of the premises covered by her title papers from 1789.

[ *7 ] A decree was made by the district court in favor of the

Almonester v. Kenton. 9 H.

petitioner, Kenton, and a perpetual injunction awarded in accordance with his prayer. The cause was carried to the supreme court on appeal, where the decree of the inferior court was affirmed. Both courts decided that the premises included in the Spanish grant of 1801, to Guardiola, were not the same as those covered by the acts of sale and grant to Latil.

Now that this court has no jurisdiction, under the 25th section of the judiciary act of 1789, to reexamine the decision of a state court, which drew in question the mere fact of where a dividing line between two tracts of land was, is too plain for discussion. Had the decision of the supreme court of Louisiana stopped here, then certainly jurisdiction would be wanting. But that court went further in its first opinion; and then a rehearing was demanded, after the first decree in favor of Kenton had been pronounced; and a rehearing was granted on the single question whether Guardiola's grant was protected by the proviso to the 14th section of the act of congress of March 26, 1804.1

That section declares, "that all grants for lands within the territories ceded by the French republic to the United States by the treaty of the 30th of April, 1803,2 the titles whereof were, at the date of the treaty of San Ildefonso, in the crown, government, or nation of Spain, and every act and proceeding subsequent thereto, of whatsoever nature, towards the obtaining of any grant, title, or claim to such lands, and under whatsoever authority transacted or pretended, be, and the same are hereby declared to be, and to have been from the beginning, null and void, and of no effect in law or equity; provided, nevertheless, that any thing in this section contained shall not be construed to make null and void any bonâ fide grant, made agreeably to the laws, usages, and customs of the Spanish government, to an actual settler on the lands so granted for himself, and his wife and family; or to make null and void any bonâ fide act or proceeding done by an actual settler, agreeably to the laws, usages, and customs of the Spanish government, to obtain a grant for lands actually settled on by the person or persons claiming title thereto, if such settlement in either case was actually made prior to the 20th day of December, 1803," &c.

And on this proviso of the statute, an opinion was expressed by the court below, which is found in the record, and was as follows:"The proviso above recited contemplates two classes of titles; first those granted according to the ordinances and usages of the Spanish government, upon the usual condition of settle- [ 8 ] ment upon the lands so granted to heads of families, pro

12 Stats. at Large, 287.

28 Ib. 200.

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