MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

The motion to dismiss was rested on two grounds: (1) That appellant had failed to comply with clause 3 of general order in bankruptcy XXXVI; (2) That the case was not appealable to this court.

Clause 3 of general order XXXVI reads as follows:

"In every case in which either party is entitled by the act to take an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, the court from which the appeal lies shall, at or before the time of entering its judgment or decree, make and file a finding of the facts, and its conclusions of law thereon, stated separately; and the record transmitted to the Supreme Court of the United States on such an appeal shall consist only of the pleadings, the judgment or decree, the finding of facts, and the conclusions of law."

No such finding of facts and conclusions of law was made in this case, nor was the court requested to make such finding. The appeal was a general appeal, and the entire record was sent up.. The omission cannot be supplied by reference to the opinion as is attempted in argument. British Queen Mining Company v. Baker Silver Mining Company, 139 U. S. 222, and cases cited; Lehnen v. Dickson, 148 U. S. 71, 74.

But if the case was not appealable, the appeal must be dismissed, even though clause 3 had been complied with.

The bankruptcy act provides, sec. 25, b:

"From any final decision of a court of appeals, allowing or rejecting a claim under this act, an appeal may be had under such rules and within such time as may be prescribed by the Supreme Court of the United States in the following cases and no other:

"1. Where the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of two thousand dollars, and the question involved is one which

might have been taken on appeal or writ of error from the highest court of a State to the Supreme Court of the United States; or

"2. Where some justice of the Supreme Court of the United States shall certify that in his opinion the determination of the question or questions involved in the allowance or rejection of such claim is essential to a uniform construction of this act throughout the United States."

As to paragraph 2, there was no such certificate here; and as to paragraph 1, we are not able to perceive that a writ of error from the highest court of a State to this court could be maintained. No validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under, the United States was drawn in question; nor the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under, any State, on the ground of repugnancy to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States; nor was any title, right, privilege or immunity claimed under the Constitution, or any treaty or statute of, or commission held or authority exercised under, the United States, and decided against.

The decision below proceeded on well-settled principles of general law, broad enough to sustain it without reference to provisions of the bankruptcy act. And, moreover, even if it could be held that by his claim Bowen asserted any right within the meaning of section 709, Rev. Stat., the decision was in his favor, and the trustee's bare denial of the claim could not be relied on under that statute. New Jersey City & Bergen Railroad Company v. Morgan, 160 U. S. 288.

Appeal dismissed.

207 U.S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

LEATHE v. THOMAS.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.

No. 21. Argued October 17, 1907.-Decided November 11, 1907.

In a case coming from a state court this court can consider only Federal questions decided adversely to the plaintiff in error and upon which a decision was necessary to the decision of the case, and if the judgment complained of is supported also upon other and independent grounds it must be affirmed or the writ of error dismissed. When the record discloses other and completely adequate grounds on which to support the judgment of a state court, this court does not commonly inquire whether the decision upon them was correct or reach a Federal question by determining that they ought not to have been held to warrant the result.

Writ of error to review 218 Illinois, 246, dismissed.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. John Maynard Harlan, with whom Mr. James S. Harlan and Mr. Victor Koerner were on the brief, for plaintiff in error: The issue raised by the third and fourth pleas of set-off is identical with the issue adjudicated in the case of Belleville & St. Louis Railway Co. for the use of Thomas v. Leathe, 84 Fed. Rep. 103, namely, Leathe's personal liability or non-liability under the instrument of March 25, for the debts of the railway company, and, therefore, the subject matter of these pleas is res judicata. Moreover, the only issue in this case in the lower court was that raised by the third and fourth pleas of set-off and that issue having been decided in favor of Leathe in the Federal court, the state court should have given full faith and credit in this suit to the judgment of the Federal court. This it did not do.

If, as claimed by the defendant in error and as held by the Supreme Court of Illinois in its second and final opinion, the judgment in that court was founded, not on the third and fourth pleas, but on the first and second pleas of set-off, then

Argument for Defendant in Error.

207 U. S.

the plaintiff in error has not been accorded due process of law since no evidence whatever was adduced in support of the first and second pleas; there were no findings based upon those pleas and no trial whatever was had upon them.

This court has jurisdiction to inquire whether full faith and credit and full force and effect have been given to the judgment of the Federal court; in determining this question the court may examine the entire record. Washington Gas Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U. S. 316.

Rights acquired under a Federal judgment are substantial rights which this court will guard and protect. When a Federal court has, by its final judgment, disposed of a controversy, the person in whose favor the judgment was so rendered may confidently rest upon it as giving him a substantial and practical immunity from further prosecution on the same subject matter.

This court will not be controlled by the mere surface appearance of things as created by the opinion of a state court, but, in the protection of rights acquired under a Federal judgment, will look into the substance of things and ascertain their real character.

Whether a state court has given due effect to the judgment of a court of the United States is a question arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States and comes within the jurisdiction of this Court. Crescent Live Stock Co. v. Butchers' &c. Co., 120 U. S. 141; Washington Gas Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U. S. 316.

Mr. Edward L. Thomas, defendant in error, pro se:

The errors assigned on the record upon the appeal from the appellate court to the Supreme Court of Illinois, were too general to raise the question of former adjudication, and presented no question for determination upon that issue. Louisiana, A. & M. R. R. Co. v. Board of Levee Com., 87 Fed. Rep. 594. Not being properly presented to the court below, this court will not consider it. Ansbro v. United States, 159 U. S. 695. There is ample evidence to support the first and second pleas,

207 U.S.

Argument for Defendant in Error.

and the affirmance of the case by the Supreme Court of Illinois is in pursuance of a statute of Illinois. This court will not review or reverse a decision of a state court upon a question of statutory practice. Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U. S. 398–405; Egan v. Hart, 165 U. S. 188; Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U. S. 361.

This court is bound by the construction of a statute of a State given to it by the courts of that State. Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U. S. 388-405.

The question as to the effect to be given the report of a referee under the Illinois statute is governed by the practice and decisions of the local courts. The statement of the referee as to the facts is no part of his verdict. The conclusions of law are his verdict and are treated as a general verdict of a jury.

This construction is not reviewable in this court, and is binding on this court.

The three foregoing propositions are questions of state practice under state statutes and, being determined by the state court, that determination is final.

When a party invokes an adjudication, he is bound by it in every particular, and the adjudication must have the effect given it by the court that made it, and when that court itself finds what it adjudicated, and what it did not adjudicate, that finding is to be taken in all courts as the extent of its adjudication.

The Circuit Court of Appeals held that the original cause of action had not been adjudicated and was still at large. Belleville & St. Louis R. R. for use of Thomas v. Leathe, 84 Fed. Rep. 103; Leathe v. Thomas, 109 Ill. App. 434.

The doctrine of former adjudication does not extend to matters not in issue in the former suit. Black on Judgments, § 731; Gray v. Gillian, 15 Illinois, 457.

The case cited by the dissenting justices and by counsel, namely, Beloit v. Morgan, 7 Wall: 619, was practically overruled in Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351; and see Belleville & St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Leathe, 84 Fed. Rep. 103, and authorities there cited,