New Jersey. Oyster Law (see Constitutional Law, 25). Lee v. New Jersey,
67.
New York. Laws of 1901, ch. 722, relative to life insurance companies
(see Constitutional Law, 10). Polk v. Mutual Reserve Fund Asso., 310.
North Dakota. Adulteration of mixed paints (see Constitutional Law, 33).
Heath & Milligan Co. v. Worst, 338.
Ohio. Limiting right of action for death by wrongful act (see Constitu-
tional Law, 42). Chambers v. Balto. & Ohio R. R. Co., 142.
Pennsylvania. Act of February 7, 1906, providing for union of Pittsburgh
and Allegheny (see Constitutional Law, 8). Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 161.
Porto Rico. See Jurisdiction, A 11.
South Carolina. Statute of 1903, relative to adjustment of claims by
carriers (see Constitutional Law, 31). Seaboard Air Line v. Seegers, 73.
Texas. Acts of February 10, 1852, and September 3, 1901, relative to
Mexican grants (see Constitutional Law, 11). Sullivan v. Texas, 41.
Utah. Rev. Stat. § 3511, relative to quieting titles to mining claims (see
Mines and Mining, 1). Lawson v. United States Mining Co., 1.
Vermont. Production of books and papers by corporations (see Constitu-
tional Law, 19). Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 541.
LOCAL QUESTIONS.
See FEDERAL QUESTION.
MANDAMUS.
See APPEAL AND ERROR, 6;
JURISDICTION, A 2;
PRACTICE, 4, 5.
MANUFACTURED ARTICLES.
See CUSTOMS DUTIES.
MARITIME LAW.
See ADMIRALTY;
STATES, 3.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2.
MEXICAN GRANTS.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 11.
1. Right of action under § 3511, Rev. Stat., Utah, to quiet title and for
injunction.
One in possession of the surface of a mining claim under a patent from
the United States is presumably in possession of all beneath the surface,
and, under § 3511, Rev. Stat., Utah, may maintain an action in equity
to quiet title to a vein beneath the surface and to enjoin the removal
of ore therefrom. (Holland v. Challen, 110 U. S. 15, followed; Boston
&c. Mining Co. v. Montana Ore Co., 188 U. S. 632, distinguished.)
Lawson v. United States Mining Co., 1.
2. Prerequisite to recognition of extralateral title of vein.
The ownership of the apex of a vein must be established before any extra-
lateral title of the vein can be recognized. Ib.
3. Discovery-Extralateral right of discoverer.
Discovery is the all-important fact upon which title to mines depends, and
where there is a single broad vein whose apex or outcroppings extend
into two adjoining mining claims the discoverer has an extralateral
right to the entire vein on its dip. Ib.
4. Acceptance by Government of location proceedings as evidence of regularity.
Acceptance by the Government of location proceedings had before the
statute of 1866, and issue of a patent thereon, is evidence that such
proceedings were in accordance with the rules and customs of the local
mining district. Ib.
5. Discovery; determination of priority of.
Priority of right to a single broad vein in the discoverer is not determined
by the dates of the entries or patents of the respective claims, and
priority of discovery may be shown by testimony other than the entries
and patents. Ib.
6. Scope of determination of rights.
In the absence from the record of an adverse suit there is no presumption
that anything was considered or determined except the question of the
right to the surface. Ib.
MULTIFARIOUSNESS.
See EQUITY, 3.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
Effect of decree against one to bind another.
A municipal corporation is not necessarily bound by the decree in a suit
against another municipality because officers of the State were parties
thereto. Bank of Kentucky v. Kentucky, 258.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6-8;
GRANTS, 1;
LOCAL LAW (Kan.).
NAVIGABLE WATERS.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 25.
1. Duty of carrier to intending passenger.
An intending passenger coming to a place where passengers habitually board
the cars of a trolley company, and which, in itself, is safe unless made
otherwise by the manner in which the cars are operated, is not a tres-
passer nor a mere traveler upon the highway, but one to whom the
company owes an affirmative duty and it is for the jury to determine
whether the car injuring such person was operated with the vigilance
required by the circumstances. Chunn v. City & Suburban Ry., 302.
Contributory negligence; question for jury-Right of passenger of trolley car
to assume care on part of carrier.
Where a trolley car platform is so narrow that its width cannot fairly be
considered without taking into consideration the dangers on both sides
of it, one taking a car on one side of it has a right to assume that he
will not be put in peril by a car running rapidly in the opposite direction,
and he cannot, as a matter of law, be held guilty of contributory negli-
gence in taking the car at that place. That issue is for the jury. Ib.
3. Contributory negligence excused.
Even if the plaintiff carelessly places himself in a position of danger, if the
defendant discovers the danger in time to avoid the injury by using rea-
sonable care, the failure so to do, and not the plaintiff's carelessness,
may be the sole cause of the resulting injury. Ib.
NEW JERSEY OYSTER LAW.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 25.
NOTICE.
See PATENTS, 1, 2;
COPYRIGHT, 3.
PAINTINGS.
See COPYRIGHT.
PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 39, 40;
JURISDICTION, A 9.
1. Infringement, contributory; notice to charge vendee of patented article with
notice of license restriction.
In this case this court follows the unaminous opinion of the Circuit Court
of Appeals that defendant did not have sufficient notice of the license
restriction to be charged with contributory infringement, even if that
doctrine exists, for selling ink to the vendee of a patented printing
machine, sold under a license restriction that it should be used only
with ink made by the patentee. Cortelyou v. Johnson & Co., 196.
Where none of the executive officers of a manufacturing corporation knew
of the license restriction under which a patented machine was sold,
notice to a salesman, who was not an officer or general agent of the
corporation, was held insufficient to charge the corporation with notice
as to future sales of the article manufactured by it to the licensee and
used by the latter in violation of the license restriction. Ib.
3. Power of State to regulate transfer of patent rights.
Woods & Sons v. Carl, 203 U. S. 358, and Allen v. Riley, 203 U. S. 347, fol-
lowed as to the power of a State, until Congress legislates, to make
such reasonable regulations in regard to the transfer of patent rights
as will protect its citizens from fraud. Ozan Lumber Co. v. Union
County Bank, 251.
This court is not called upon to consider errors argued but not assigned.
(O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323.) Paraiso v. United States, 368.
2. As to following findings of lower courts.
It is the duty of this court to accept the findings of the Circuit Court of
Appeals unless clearly and manifestly wrong. Lawson v. United States
Mining Co., 1.
3. As to following findings of fact concurred in by lower courts.
In an accounting for attorneys' fees for collection of claims against the
Government this court followed the general rule of affirming a finding
of fact made and confirmed by both the courts below unless the same
is clearly erroneous and held that certain services were of the char-
acter generally designated as lobbying services and could not be al-
lowed. Earle v. Myers, 244.
4. As to issuance of mandate in case originating in District Court and reaching
this court via Circuit Court of Appeals.
This court customarily issues a single mandate, and if in case originating in
the District Court it is addressed to the Circuit Court of Appeals the
directions are simply to be communicated to the District Court to be
followed by it on the authority of this court and not of the Circuit Court
of Appeals. Ex parte First Nat. Bank of Chicago, 61.
5. Procedure where Circuit Court of Appeals has issued mandamus to District
Court in such case.
Where the Circuit Court of Appeals has improperly issued mandamus to
the district judge to modify a decree to conform to the decision of this
court, this court will reverse the judgment and issue mandamus to the
District Court to set aside the decree entered in pursuance thereof. Ib.
6. Determination of existence of Federal question.
This court determines for itself whether an act of the legislature of a State
amounts to a contract within the impairment of obligation clause of
the Federal Constitution. Sullivan v. Texas, 416.
7. Limitation of scope of inquiry.
This court, ordinarily, will not inquire whether the decision upon matter
not subject to its revision was right or wrong. Arkansas Southern R. R.
Co. v. German Bank, 270.
8. When validity of state statute applying to both intrastate and interstate ship-
ments not considered.
Where a state statute applies to both intrastate and interstate shipments,
but the shipment involved is wholly intrastate, this court will not con-
sider the validity of the statute when applied to interstate shipments.
Seaboard Air Line v. Seegers, 73.
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