statute of the State, and in that case the judgment of the state court was affirmed, so that no very extensive conclusions can be drawn from it. So far as I know this is the first instance in which a Circuit Court has been held authorized to take jurisdiction on the ground that the decision of a state.. tribunal was contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment.

:

It seems to me that the appellee should not be heard until it has exhausted its local remedies; that the action of the state board of equalization should not be held to be the action of the State until, at least, it has been sanctioned directly, in a proceeding which the appellee is entitled to bring, by the final tribunal of the State, the Suprem Court. I am unable to grasp the principle on which the State is said to deprive the appellee of its property without due process of law because a subordinate board, subject to the control of the Supreme Court of the State, is said to have violated the express requirement of the State in its constitution; because, in other words, the board has disobeyed the authentic command of the State-by failing to make its valuations in such a way that every person shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his property. I should have thought that the action of the State was to be found in its constitution, and that no fault could be found with that until the authorized interpreter of that constitution, the Supreme Court, had said that it sanctioned the alleged-wrong. Barney v. New York, 193 U. S. 430.

As I think that the Circuit Court ought to be ordered to dismiss this case, I shall not discuss the merits. But I cannot forbear adding that, so far as the appellee is complaining that it has been compelled to pay the full amount of the tax due from it, and is founding its complaint on the fact that other parties are escaping their liabilities whether through mistake or still uncorrected fraud, it-seems to me to show no sufficient ground for relief, unless exceptional reasons exist not adverted to in the judgment of the court.

MR. JUSTICE MOODY Concurs in this dissent.

RAYMOND, COUNTY TREASURER, v. CHICAGO
EDISON COMPANY.

SAME v. CHICAGO CITY RAILWAY COMPANY.

SAME v. SOUTH CHICAGO CITY RAILWAY COMPANY. SAME v. PEOPLE'S GAS LIGHT AND COKE COMPANY. SAME v. CHICAGO TELEPHONE COMPANY. SAME v. CHICAGO CONSOLIDATED TRACTION

COMPANY.

APPEALS FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.

Nos. 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121. Argued April 8, 9, 1907.--Decided October 21, 1907.

Decided on the authority of Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Company, ante, p. 20.

Argued simultaneously with No. 115.1

MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM delivered the opinion of the court.

These cases involve the same principle as that already decided in No. 115, ante, p. 20, and although the facts differ somewhat in the various cases, yet they present substantially the same questions, and the judgment in each case is therefore

1 For names of counsel see ante, pp. 29, 33:

Affirmed.

TILT v. KELSEY, COMPTROLLER OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.

ERROR TO THE SURROGATES' COURT OF THE COUNTY OF NEW YORK AND STATE OF NEW YORK.

No. 18. Argued January 28, 1907.-Decided October 21, 1907.

Where judicial proceedings in one State are relied upon as a defense to an assessment by the authorities of another State a right under the Constitution of the United States is specially set up and claimed though it was not in terms stated to be such a right. An adjudication by the probate court that a testator was a resident of the State though essential to the assumption of jurisdiction to grant letters testamentary is not necessarily conclusive on the question of domicil nor even evidence of it in a collateral proceeding, and, under the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution, is not binding upon the courts of another State.

In respect to the settlement of successions to property on death the States are sovereign and may give to their courts the authority to determine finally as against all the world all questions which arise therein, subject to applicable constitutional limitations.

Where the decree of the probate court is final and bars all persons having claims against the estate, the courts of another State must, under the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution, give similar force and effect to such a decree, when rendered by a court having jurisdiction to probate the will and administer the estate, and held that such a final decree in New Jersey was a bar in the courts of another State against the taxing authorities of the latter State attempting to enforce a claim for inheritance tax on the ground that the testator was at the time of his death domiciled therein.

182 N. Y. 557, reversed.

THIS is a writ of error from this court to the Surrogates' Court of the County and State of New York to review a judgment entered in that court in pursuance of an order of the Court of Appeals of that State. The judgment assessed a succession tax upon the personal estate of Albert Tilt, deceased, upon the ground that he was at the time of his death a resident of the State of New York. Before the assessment of the tax the estate of Tilt, who died testate, was fully administered in

Argument for Plaintiffs in Error.

207 U.S.

the courts of New Jersey, where the will was probated. In the course of the administration all the personal property, after paying debts, taxes and charges of administration, was distributed by the executors to the beneficiaries under the will. A reversal of the judgment of the Surrogates' Court is sought for the reason that it did not give full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of the State of New Jersey, as required by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Mr. William G. Wilson for plaintiffs in error:

The legal residence of deceased at the time of his death was in New Jersey. The right, in this country, of each individual, to change his residence at will, cannot be questioned.

Change of citizenship, as distinguished from change of residence, is not always so simple a matter, and a change of residence does not in itself necessarily involve any change of citizenship. Where the intent is not clear, it has to be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the act. But when the intent is clear, acts in furtherance of it should be interpreted in the light of the known intent. Dupuy v. Wurtz, 53 N. Y. 556; Thorndike v. Boston, 1 Met. 242.

The right which every individual has to change his residence at will could not be denied or restricted by reason of the fact that a party already possessed two "homes," one in New York City, and one in Mount Arlington, New Jersey, and occupied each, with his family, for about one-half of each year. This is one of the cases where, in the language of Chief Justice Shaw, "very slight circumstances must often decide the question." Story on Conflict of Laws, § 47; Somerville v. Somerville, 5 Vesey, 750; Thayer v. Boston, 124 Massachusetts, 132.

The probate of the will in New Jersey is conclusive upon the question of his residence for purposes of administration and tax under the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution.

To no proceedings does this provision apply with greater force than to those which involve the administration of the

207 U. S.

Argument for Defendant in Error.

estates of decedents in which the State acts in the exercise of its sovereignty. It has absolute control, except for the limitations imposed by the Federal Constitution which recognize and enforce the sovereignty of the State within those limitations, in the very provision above quoted. See Plant v. Harrison, 36 Misc. (N. Y.) 649.

The decree of the surrogate of Morris County, New Jersey, admitting the will of Albert Tilt to probate as the will of a resident of that county, is conclusive here if it is conclusive in New Jersey. If the probate is conclusive in New Jersey the question is not an open one. This is a question not answered by referring to general principles of law, by determining what at common law was the significance and effect of a judgment, but can be answered only by an examination of the decisions of the courts of New Jersey. Hancock National Bank v. Farnum, 176 U. S. 643.

New Jersey is not, as Connecticut is, an exception to the general rule that the record of probate should be collaterally invulnerable. In Matter of Caursen's Will, 3 Green's Ch. 406; Straub's case, 49 N. J. Eq. 264; Quidort's case, 3 C. E. Green, 472; Ryno's Exr. v. Ryno's Admr., 12 C. E. Green, 522.

Mr. George M. Judd, for defendant in error, submitted: The decree of a probate court is in the nature of a proceeding in rem, and therefore any ground or fact upon which that decree professes to be founded can be inquired into in a proceeding in another State, brought by a person not a party to the probate proceedings. Life Ins. Co. v. Tisdale, 91 U.S. 238.

The decree of the Surrogate's Court in New Jersey, granting letters testamentary, is conclusive only upon the point adjudicated--whether the parties named receive letters testamentary. That was the res, and upon that only has there been an adjudication. Residence was not the res and it was not the point adjudicated; therefore said decree is not conclusive as to residence in a distinct and separate proceeding brought by the Comptroller of the State of New York to fix a transfer tax