Niel, 13 Wall. 236, 243. It might not give a proceeding in rem, since the statute does not purport to create a lien. It might give a proceeding in personam. The Corsair, 145 U. S. 335, 347. If it gave the latter, the result would not be, as suggested, to create different laws for different districts. The liability would be recognized in all. Nor would there be produced any lamentable lack of uniformity. Courts constantly enforce rights arising from and depending upon other laws than those governing the local transactions of the jurisdiction in which they sit. But we are not concerned with these considerations. In this case the statutes of the United States have enabled the owner to transfer its liability to a fund and to the exclusive jurisdiction of the admiralty, and it has done so. That fund is being distributed. In such circumstances all claims to which the admiralty does not deny existence must be recognized, whether admiralty liens or not. This is not only a general principle, Andrews v. Wall, 3 How. 568, 573; The J. E. Rumbell, 148 U. S. 1, 15; Admiralty Rule, 43; Cargo Ex Galam, 2 Moore P. C. (N. S.) 216, 236, but is the result of the statute, which provides for, as well as limits the liability, and allows it to be proved against the fund. The Albert Dumois, 177 U. S. 240, 260. See Workman v. New York, 179 U. S. 552, 563.

The second question concerns the right of the representatives of the crew to recover their claims in full. There is a faint suggestion that the mate of the Saginaw was negligent, but on this point we shall not go behind the findings below. The main objection is that the statute allows a recovery beyond the maintenance and support which were declared in The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158, 175, to be the limit of a seaman's rights against his own vessel when injured by the negligence of the master or a fellow-servant on his ship. But the question here regards the liability of the Hamilton, another vessel. The contract between the seaman and the owners of the Saginaw does not affect the case. Erie R. R. Co. v. Erie Transportation Co., 204 U. S. 220, 226. Neither does the Harter Act, even if its terms could be extended to personal injuries and loss of life. The Chatta

hoochee, 173 U. S. 540. Neither does the negligence of the Saginaw. The Atlas, 93 U. S. 302.

We are of opinion that all the claimants are entitled to the full benefits of a statute "granting the right to relief where otherwise it could not be administered by a maritime court." Workman v. New York, 179 U. S. 552, 563.

Decree affirmed.

HOLT v. MURPHY.

APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF

OKLAHOMA.

No. 61. Argued December 6, 1907.-Decided January 6, 1908.

Under the general rule of law that an entry segregates the tract entered from the public domain subject to be entered until that entry is disposed of, this court sustains the rule of the Land Department that no subsequent entry can be received after the Land Commissioner has held the entry for cancellation until the time allowed for appeal has expired or the rights of the original entryman have been finally determined.

Where the successful party in a land contest does not enforce his preference rights or take any action looking to an entry within the prescribed period, but files a waiver of his right of entry, in the absence of any findings sustaining charges of fraud as to the delivery of the waiver, this court will not, in an action commenced four years thereafter, set aside a patent issued to one who had entered the land and in whose favor the waiver was filed.

15 Oklahoma, 12, affirmed.

THIS was a suit commenced in the District Court of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, by appellant, praying that the appellees, the holders of the legal title to a tract of land in Oklahoma County, be decreed to hold that title in trust for her benefit. The District Court entered a decree in favor of the defendants, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the

Territory, 15 Oklahoma, 12, from whose decision this appeal was taken.

These facts are undisputed: On April 23, 1889, Ewers White made a homestead entry of the land. Subsequently two other parties, C. J. Blanchard and Vestal S. Cook, attempted to enter the same land. On July 16, 1889, in a contest before the local land officers, they held that all the claimants were disqualified because of entering the Territory in violation of the President's proclamation. On appeal the Commissioner of the General Land Office, on March 7, 1890, affirmed their ruling, dismissed the contests of both Blanchard and Cook, and held the entry of White for cancellation. From this decision White prosecuted an appeal to the Secretary of the Interior, who, on July 21, 1891, affirmed the decision of the Commissioner. 13 L. D. 66. During the time allowed for appeal to the Secretary from the Commissioner, and on March 11, 1890, Levi Holt, by his attorney in fact, filed a soldier's declaratory statement for the land, which was suspended by the register and receiver pending final action on the appeal. Thereafter and on November 29, 1890, before the decision by the Secretary of his appeal, White filed a relinquishment of his entry and all rights thereunder, and the defendant Samuel Murphy immediately thereafter made a homestead entry thereon.

In addition it was charged by plaintiff that after a decision by the Secretary of the Interior, in a contest between Murphy and Holt in favor of Holt, or rather in favor of his widow (as he had died in the meantime), a contract was entered into between plaintiff's attorney and the defendant Samuel Murphy, by which her attorney should deceive her as to her right in the land, and, for a pecuniary consideration received from Murphy, should file a waiver of her right of entry, and thus permit him to acquire a patent, all of which was done; that Anton H. Classen (the present holder of the legal title) and the other defendants were fully aware of what was thus wrongfully done; that the entry of Murphy appearing on the record as being unchallenged, a patent was, on January 19, 1898, issued

207 U. S.

Argument for Appellant.

to him. Subsequently the title to most of the land passed to defendant Classen, who at the time of the filing of the waiver by plaintiff's attorney was receiver of the land office of the district in which the tract in controversy is situated, and who claimed in his answer among other things that he was a bona fide purchaser and without notice of any equities of the plaintiff.

Sections 2304 and 2309, Rev. Stat., provide for homestead entries by soldiers and officers who served in the army of the United States. By § 2309 the declaratory statement of such soldier or officer may be made by an agent as well as personally, and he is allowed six months thereafter to begin settlement and improvement, whereas in ordinary cases the entryman must make affidavit of his right to enter before the register or receiver, and must commence his residence and cultivation of the land immediately after the filing of the affidavit.

Mr. John S. Jenkins and Mr. William Frye White, with whom Mr. John B. Cotton was on the brief, for appellant:

The filing of Levi Holt's soldier's declaration, statement and application to enter after the entry of record in the records of the local land office of a judgment of the Commissioner of the General Land Office holding the prior entry of White invalid, did create a preference right of entry in Holt, although his filing had been received by the local land office and suspended, pending the right of appeal of White and his contestant in accordance with the settled practice and rule of the General Land Office in force at the time and for a long time thereafter. McMichael v. Murphy et al., 20 L. D. 147, 535.

By the promulgation of the rule laid down in McMichael v. Murphy, supra, and its recognition and application through adjudged cases, a rule of property had become established, and inchoate property rights resulted, which are subject to protection by the courts, where the conditions called for by the rule were present. This being so, the courts ought to recognize the principle of stare decisis in respect to such a

Argument for Appellees.

207 U. S.

rule and ought not to disregard rights attaching while it was the law of the tribunal which had jurisdiction to determine them.

Upon White's relinquishment of his entry, pending his appeal from the judgment of the Commissioner of the General Land Office holding his entry void and for cancellation, the suspended application of Levi Holt became a subsisting entry.

Mr. J. H. Everest for appellees:

The plaintiff has not shown herself entitled to a patent to the land and her bill, therefore, lacks equity. Baldwin v. Keith, 75 Pac. Rep. 1124; Bohall v. Dilla, 114 U. S. 51; Sparks v. Pierce, 115 U. S. 408; Lee v. Johnson, 115 U. S. 48; Emblen v. Lincoln Land Co., 184 U. S. 661, 663.

The plaintiff never in fact acquired any right or equity in the land involved because the decision of the Secretary of the Interior awarding the heirs of Levi Holt the right to enter said land was erroneous and contrary to law. See Patrick v. Kelley, 11 L. D. 326; Goodale v. Olney (on review), 13 L. D. 498; Re Maggie Laird, 13 L. D. 502; Holmes v. Hockett, 14 L. D. 127; Swanson v. Simmons, 16 L. D. 44; Mills v. Daly, 17 L. D. 395; Cook v. Villa (on review), 19 L. D. 442; Walker v. Snider (on review), 19 L. D. 467; Gallagher v. Jackson, 20 L. D. 389; McMichael v. Murphy et al. (on review), 20. L. D. 535; McCreary v. Wert et al., 21 L. D. 145.

As to the defendant, Anton H. Classen, and the one hundred and twenty acres of land claimed by him, the record shows that he was an innocent purchaser after patent without notice of any of the pretended equities of the plaintiff. Colorado Coal & Iron Co. v. United States, 123 U. S. 307; United States v. Marshall Silver Mining Company, 129 U. S. 579.

The plaintiff was guilty of laches in the prosecution of her suit and should, therefore, be barred of relief in a court of equity. Wagner v. Baird, 7 How. 234; Galliher v. Cadwell, 145 U. S. 368; Johnson v. Standard Mining Co., 148 U. S. 360.