last census, of about a thousand. Two ordinary modern trains of the usual passenger coaches would comfortably transport the total population of these places. The number of people who are inconvenienced by the non-stoppage of these trains is, of course, comparatively quite small. One witness, who was in the hotel and general merchandise business at Latta, said that he sent a man or two every week to meet the fast train at Dillon, because they could not take it at Latta. Other witnesses said that the demand for those particular trains, 32 and 35, was quite frequent, as many as four people a week, while others said that the inconvenience of the through trains, 39 and 40, was on account of their not being fast trains, and hence were not so pleasant as the others, 32 and 35, and did not get them in to their destination as early as the latter trains did. The demand at Latta by people desiring to go to the termination of the road, either at New York or Tampa, would naturally be mall. Some of the plaintiff's witnesses said that the demand for transportation at Latta was large, or quite large, and the inconvenience great, but a further examination of these witnesses showed that in specific details there was much lacking, and instances of inconvenience were really somewhat limited. But assuming that the number actually inconvenienced by the want of fast trains was "quite large," as said by some witnesses, it is perfectly evident the number would be small compared with the inconvenience of the much larger number of through passengers resulting from the stoppage of these trains at Latta and other similar stations in the State.

To stop these trains at Latta, and other stations like it, which could bring equally strong reasons for the stoppage of the trains at their stations, would wholly change the character of the trains, rendering them no better in regard to speed than the other trains, 39 and 40, and would result in the inability of what had been fast trains to make their schedule time, and a consequent loss of patronage, also the loss of compensation for carrying the mails, which would be withdrawn from them, and the end would be the withdrawal of the trains, because of

their inability to pay expenses. All these are matters entitled to consideration when the question of convenience and adequate facilities arises. There is no contradiction in the testimony that the company desires, so far as is fairly possible, to pay as much attention to the local demands as to the "through" claims.

Of course, it is not reasonable to suppose that the same facilities can be given to places of very small population that are supplied to their neighbors who live in much larger communities, and the defendants in error, it may be conceded, make no such demand. No one would assert that one daily train each way between New York and Philadelphia would furnish adequate facilities for the transportation of passengers. Twenty times that number of trains would be necessary, and yet one through train a day, each way, through so small a place as Latta to New York or Tampa would in all probability easily transport all the passengers desiring transportation between these places. Nevertheless, the fair needs of the locality for transportation to other local points must be considered and provided for. This, as we think, has been done.

Taking all the circumstances into consideration, as shown by uncontradicted evidence, we are of opinion that the judgment of the Supreme Court, directing a mandamus, was erroneous, and it is therefore reversed, and the case remanded to the Supreme Court of South Carolina for further proceedings therein not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed.

VOL. CCVII-22

Statement of the Case.

207 U.S.

HEATH & MILLIGAN MANUFACTURING COMPANY v.

WORST.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA.

No. 41. Argued November 7, 8, 1907.-Decided December 9, 1907.

It is within the power of the State to prevent the adulteration of articles and to provide for the publication of their composition. Legislation which regulates business may well make distinctions depend upon the degrees of evil without being arbitrary, unreasonable, or in conflict with the equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. See Ozan Lumber Co. v. Union County Bank, ante, p. 251.

This court will not limit the power of the State by declaring that because the judgment exercised by the legislature is unwise it amounts to a denial of the equal protection of the laws or deprivation of property or liberty without due process of law.

The statute of North Dakota requiring the manufacturers and vendors of mixed paints to label the ingredients composing them is not unconstitutional as depriving such manufacturers of their property or liberty without due process of law or as denying them the equal protection of the law because the requirements of the statute may not apply to paste paints.

THIS is a direct appeal from the Circuit Court for the District of North Dakota, sustaining the constitutionality of a statute of that State, requiring the manufacturers of mixed paints to label the ingredients composing them.

The statute is as follows:

"An Act to prevent the adulteration of and deception in the sale of white lead and mixed paints.

Be it enacted by the Legislative Assembly of the State of North Dakota: 1. Every person, firm or corporation who manufactures or sale or exposes for sale, or sells, within this State any white ad, paint or compound intended for use as such, shall labeł.

the same in clear and distinct open gothic letters upon a white background and show the true per cent of each mineral constituent contained in said paint, or if other than linseed oil is used in its preparation, the names of such oils or substitutes shall be shown together with the percentage thereof, and every person, firm or corporation who manufactures for sale, or exposes for sale or sells within this State any mixed paint or compound intended for use as such, which contains any ingredient other than pure linseed oil, pure carbonate of lead, oxide of zinc, turpentine, Japan dryer and pure colors, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall, for each offense, be punished by a fine of not less than twenty-five and not more than one hundred dollars and costs, or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding sixty days; provided, that any such person, firm or corporation who shall manufacture for sale or expose for sale, or sell within this State any white lead, paint or mixed paint containing ingredients other than those as above enumerated, shall not be deemed guilty of a violation of this act in case the same be properly labeled showing the quantity or amount of each and every ingredient used therein and not specified above, and the name and residence of the manufacturer or person for whom it is manufactured."

It is made the duty of the appellee in his official capacity to enforce the statute. A few days before the statute took effect (January 1, 1906) the appellants filed a bill to restrain its enforcement, and prayed a preliminary as well as a permanent injunction. A preliminary injunction was granted. It was dissolved on final hearing, and a decree was entered dismissing the bill for want of equity.

The grounds of attack upon the statute are that it offends against the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, in that it deprives appellants of their property and liberty without due process of law, and denies them the equal protection of the laws. How it is contended the statute produces these effects will be pointed out hereafter,

The stress of the case is upon paragraph 17 of the bill and the special paragraphs "A" and "B". To these paragraphs an answer was filed. The legal effect of the others was submitted upon demurrer. Upon the issue of fact formed by the answer to paragraph 17 and the special paragraphs, testimony was taken, and upon it and the demurrer to the other allegations, and the affidavit of one Professor Ladd, the case was submitted.

The bill is voluminous. It alleges that the plaintiffs are manufacturers of mixed paints and sell their respective products in North Dakota, and that each "had established an enviable reputation for its goods;" that each sold in North Dakota mixed paints containing ingredients other than those specified in the statute, which is set out. It is alleged that mixed paint has an absolutely defined meaning in the trade, and means a paint so thinned, "by admixture of the proper liquid vehicles, as to reduce it to a consistency which makes it ready for use." The term "mixed paint," it is alleged, is used in contradistinction to "a paste paint," which paint has also a well defined meaning, meaning a paint ready for use, except that it requires thinning material to give it the necessary consistency. White lead, it is alleged, is a commercial, not a scientific term, and is commonly understood to be a dry powder consisting of commercial carbonate of lead. When ground in oil to a paste consistency it is commonly called in the trade white lead in oil, colloquially referred to frequently as "white lead." In the statute these terms are used interchangeably, and are intended to denote white lead in oil, as above defined. That various compounds containing no carbonate of lead or other ingredients in addition to carbonate of lead are frequently sold in the market labeled as "white lead." And that the words "any white lead paint, or compound intended for use as such,' in the act are intended to denote a paste paint, intended as a substitute for white lead and labelled or sold as 'white lead' or 'white lead in oil,' but which does not contain any carbonate of lead or contains other ingredients in addition thereto."