for stations along this road, or to and from Clio, there was onc daily through train each way (Nos. 39 and 40), stopping at this station, and which carried passengers through to New York or Florida and intermediate stations, and they were equipped with first and second class cars, through Pullman sleepers, mail, express and baggage cars. The only objection to them was their want of speed; that they stopped so frequently they did not arrive at their destination as swiftly as trains 32 and 35. In addition, trains 32 and 35 could be boarded at Florence, a station on the same road, distant about 15 or 20 miles south from Latta, or at Dillon, a station about 7 miles from Latta. The objection made by the people of Latta to this mode of getting these trains was that if they were going north they rode south from Latta to Florence, and then boarded the train and went directly back over the same road from Florence to Latta, which they would not have to do if the train stopped at Latta. It also involved an additional cost of $1.42 above the price of a ticket from Latta to New York. If they preferred to take the train northbound at Dillon instead of Florence, then they had to drive from Latta to Dillon over what was described by a witness to be in winter "one of the worst roads that ever was made a road." It was also averred that by stopping the southbound train (No. 35) at Latta it could be there taken at 3 o'clock in the morning instead of going to Florence the night before and taking the train there at 4 o'clock A. M. the next day, and a close connection could also be made at Florence with Columbia (on a branch road), by taking train 35 at Latta at 3 A. M., so that a citizen could go to Columbia and return to Latta the same day, thus saving a hotel bill, which now had to be paid, as connections were so made that the journey could not be accomplished in one day. The people at Clio, and the other stations on the Latta Branch Railroad, were accommodated so that they could ride to Latta in time to have substantially the same conveniences in getting away from that station that the people living there had. The distance from Jersey City to Tampa is about twelve hundred miles, and the trains

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

207 U. S.

32 and 35 are among the fastest and longest continuous trains in the whole country, exceeding the distance from New York to Chicago. These trains rank with the very best trains run anywhere. They are placed on the road for the convenience of through travel, and could not be profitably run if they were slower trains.

Mr. P. A. Willcox and Mr. Frederic D. McKenney, with whom Mr. Alexander Hamilton, Mr. George B. Elliott, Mr. F. L. Willcox and Mr. Henry E. Davis were on the brief, for plaintiff in

error:

The State has no power or authority to interfere in other than police matters with fast mail and passenger trains engaged wholly in interstate commerce. Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U. S. 259; Hannibal &c. R. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100; Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446; Robbins v. Shelby County, 120 U. S. 489.

Even if adequate local railroad facilities are not furnished, a State has no power and authority to compel the furnishing of such facilities by requiring fast mail and passenger trains engaged wholly in interstate commerce to make the stops, but it can only compel additional local trains to be furnished. Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U. S. 123; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196; Wabash Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557; State Freight Tax Case, 15 Wall. 232; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275; Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713; Mississippi Railroad Commission v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 203 U. S. 335; Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485. See also Crandal v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35; Hannibal &c. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465; Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691; Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344; Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446; Pickard v. Pullman Southern Car Co., 117 U. S. 23; Wabash Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557; Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489; Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Railroad Co., 125 U. S. 465; Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co.

207 U. S.

Argument for Defendants in Error.

v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204; United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1.

The facilities provided were adequate and it would be unreasonable to require the company to convert these two fast interstate trains into local trains and to compel plaintiff in error to stop these two trains at Latta.

Mr. M. C. Woods, with whom Mr. J. Fraser Lyon, Attorney General of the State of South Carolina, was on the brief, for defendants in error:

The regulation of the accommodations afforded the traveling public is a police regulation. Gladson v. Minnesota, 193 U. S. 53; Mississippi R. R. Commission v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 203 U. S. 335.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina was warranted in deducing from the holdings of this court that the primary duty of even an interstate railroad is to its local territory, and the secondary duty is to interstate traffic. Mississippi R. R. Commission v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 203 U. S. 335; Lake Shore Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S: 285; C. C. C. & St. L. R. R. Co. v. Illinois, 177 U. S. 514. Illinois Central R. R. v. Illinois, 163 U. S. 142, discussed and distinguished.

The fact at issue having been determined by a tribunal of competent jurisdiction from which no appeal was taken, the Supreme Court of South Carolina would have been warranted in granting a peremptory writ of mandamus, as prayed for in the complaint, this being one of the instances in which this court has held that state authority may stop interstate trains.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina having granted to the railroad company the alternative of providing facilities substantially the same as those which would result from the stopping of trains 32 and 35 at Latta, the fault is with the plaintiff in error for failure to avail itself of this privilege, and therefore there has been no burden, direct or indirect, placed, by the court's action, upon interstate commerce.

MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

The questions of the validity of state statutes and orders of state railroad commissions, directing the stoppage of through interstate trains, have frequently, within late years, been before this court. The last case is that of Mississippi Railroad Commission v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, 203 U. S. 335, where the prior cases are referred to. See also Atlantic Coast &c. v. North Carolina Commission, 206 U. S. 1.

That any exercise of state authority, in whatever form manifested, which directly regulates interstate commerce, is repugnant to the commerce clause of the Constitution is obvious. It hence arises that any command of a State, whether made directly or through the instrumentality of a railroad commission which orders, or the necessary effect of which is to order, the stopping of an interstate train at a named station or stations, if it directly regulates interstate commerce, is void.

It has been decided, however, that some orders which may cause the stoppage of interstate trains made by state authority may be valid if they do not directly regulate such commerce. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285. When, therefore, an order made under state authority to stop an interstate train is assailed because of its repugnancy to the interstate commerce clause, the question whether such order is void as a direct regulation of such commerce may be tested by considering the nature of the order, the character of the interstate commerce train to which it applies, and its necessary and direct effect upon the operation of such train. But the effect of the order as a direct regulation of interstate commerce may also be tested by considering the adequacy of the local facilities existing at the station or stations at which the interstate commerce train has been commanded to stop. True, inherently considered, whether there be adequate local facilities is not a Federal question, but in so far as the existence of such adequate local facilities is involved in the determination of the Federal

question of whether the order concerning an interstate train does or does not directly regulate interstate commerce, that question for such purpose is open and may be considered by us. 203 U. S., supra.

Without stopping to consider whether, in view of the character of the trains to which the order before us related, it would not result that the order complained of was a direct regulation of interstate commerce, and testing the subject by the local facilities at the station at which the trains were ordered to stop, we think the railroad company in this case has furnished such reasonable accommodations to the people at Latta as it can be fairly and properly called upon to give, and the order to stop these trains is, therefore, not a valid one.

The term "adequate or reasonable facilities" is not in its nature capable of exact definition. It is a relative expression, and has to be considered as calling for such facilities as might be fairly demanded, regard being had, among other things, to the size of the place, the extent of the demand for transportation, the cost of furnishing the additional accommodations asked for, and to all other facts which would have a bearing upon the question of convenience and cost. In this case the company furnishes eleven different trains a day by which the people of Latta can leave that place, and among them are the daily through trains 39 and 40 for the South and North, respectively. That the inhabitants of a place demand greater facilities than they have is not at all conclusive as to the reasonableness of their demand for something more. Fault is found -here with the character of some of the local trains, in that the appointments thereof are not up to a sufficiently high standard. It is true that included in these cleven trains were some which were a combination of freight and passenger, and others which only ran between Latta and Clio, and those are described as dirty and without proper closets and drinking tanks. These deficiencies are remediable by other means than the stoppage of the two trains in question. It is to be remembered that these two places, Latta and Clio, had together a population, by the