forms, of printing, or otherwise multiplying, publishing and vending copies of certain literary or artistic productions." And further, says the same author, "the foundation of all rights of this description is the natural dominion which every one has over his own ideas, the enjoyment of which, although they are embodied in visible forms or characters, he may, if he chooses, confine to himself or impart to others." That is, the law recognizes the artistic or literary productions of intellect or genius, not only to the extent which is involved in dominion over and ownership of the thing created, but also the intangible estate in such property which arises from the privilege of publishing and selling to others copies of the thing produced.

There was much contention in England as to whether the common law recognized this property in copyright before the Statute of Anne; the controversy resulting in the decision in the House of Lords in the case of Donelson v. Beckett, 4 Burr, 2408, the result of the decision being that a majority of the judges, while in favor of the common law right, held the same had been taken away by the statute. See Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, 656; Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U. S. 82.

In this country it is well settled that property in copyright is the creation of the Federal statute passed in the exercise of the power vested in Congress by the Federal Constitution in Art. I, §8, "to promote the progress of science and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." See Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, supra; Banks v. Manchester, 128 U. S. 244, 252; Thompson v. Hubbard, 131 U. S. 123, 151.

Under this grant of authority a series of statutes have been passed, having for their object the protection of the property which the author has in the right to publish his production, the purpose of the statute being to protect this right in such manner that the author may have the benefit of this property for a limited term of years. These statutes should be given a fair and reasonable construction with a view to effecting such purpose.

The first question presented in oral argument and upon the briefs involves the construction of $4962 Rev. Stat. as amended (18 Stat. 78; 3 U. S. Comp. Stat., 1901, p. 3411), which is as follows:

"That no person shall maintain an action for the infringement of his copyright unless he shall give notice thereof by inserting in the several copies of every edition published, on the title page or the page immediately following, if it be a book; or if a map, chart, musical composition, print, cut, engraving, photograph, painting, drawing, chromo, statue, statuary, or model or design intended to be perfected and completed as a work of the fine arts, by inscribing upon some visible portion thereof, or of the substance on which the same shall be mounted, the following words, viz: 'Entered according to act of Congress, in the year by A. B. in the office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington;' or, at his option, the word 'copyright,' together with the year the copyright was entered and the name of the party by whom it was taken out, thus: 'Copyright 18—, by A. B.'

It is the contention of the plaintiff in error that the original painting was not inscribed as required by the act, and therefore no action can be maintained, and it is insisted that the inscription upon the photogravures offered for sale is not sufficient.

It must be admitted that the language of the statute is not so clear as it might be, nor have the decisions of the courts been uniform upon the subject. In Werckmeister, v. Pierce & Bushnell Manf. Co., 63 Fed. Rep. 445, Judge Putnam held that the failure to inscribe the copyright notice upon the original painting did not effect the copyright. That judgment was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit by a divided court. 72 Fed. Rep. 54.

In the case of Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 142 Fed. Rep. 827, Judge Holt reached the same conclusion as Judge Putnam, and in the case at bar the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit approved of the reasoning of Judges Putnam and Holt and disagreed with the majority of

the judges of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.

Looking to the statute, it is apparent that if read literally the words "inscribed on some visible portion thereof," etc., apply to the antecedent terms "maps, charts, musical compo sition, print, cut, engraving, photograph, painting," etc., and the words of the first part of the sentence requiring notice to be inserted in the several copies of every edition published apply literally to the title page or the page immediately following, if it be a book.

But in construing a statute we are not always confined to a literal reading, and may consider its object and purpose, the things with which it is dealing, and the condition of affairs which led to its enactment so as to effectuate rather than destroy the spirit and force of the law which the legislature intended to enact.

It is true, and the plaintiff in error cites authorities to the proposition, that where the words of an act are clear and unambiguous they will control. But while seeking to gain the legislative intent primarily from the language used we must remember the objects and purposes sought to be attained.

We think it was the object of the statute to require this inscription, not upon the original painting, map, photograph, drawing, etc., but upon those published copies concerning which it is designed to convey information to the public which shall limit the use and circumscribe the rights of the purchaser.

As we have seen, the purpose of the copyright law is not so much the protection of the possession and control of the visible thing, as to secure a monopoly having a limited time, of the right to publish the production which is the result of the in ventor's thought.

We have been cited to no case, nor can we find any direct authority in this court upon the question. But the opinion of Mr. Justice Miller in Lithographic Company v. Sarony, 111 U. S. 53, is pertinent. The court there considered whether Congress had the constitutional right to protect photographs and negatives by copyright, and the second assignment of

error relates to the sufficiency of the words "Copyrighted 1892 by N. Sarony," when the copyright was the property of Napoleon Sarony. In treating this question the learned judge used this very suggestive language (p. 55):

"With regard to this latter question, it is enough to say that the object of the statute is to give notice of the copyright to the public, by placing upon each copy, in some visible shape, the name of the author, the existence of the claim of exclusive right, and the date at which this right was obtained."

If the contention of the plaintiff in error be sustained the statute is satisfied only when the original map, chart, etc., or painting is inscribed with the notice, and this is requisite whether the original painting is ever published or not. We think this construction ignores the purpose and object of the act, which Mr. Justice Miller has said in the language just quoted, is to give notice of the copyright to the publicthat is, to the persons who buy or deal with the published thing.

It is insisted that there is reason for the distinction in the statute between books, and maps, charts, paintings, etc., in that a book can only be published in print and becomes known by reading, while paintings, drawings, etc., are published by inspection and observation.

It may be true that paintings are published in this way, but they are often sold to private individuals and go into private collections, whilst the copies, photographs or photogravures, may have a wide and extended sale.

It would seem clear that the real object of the statute is not to give notice to the artist or proprietor of the painting or the person to whose collection it may go, who needs no information, but to notify the public who purchase the circulated copies of the existing copyright in order that their ownership may be restricted.

There does not seem to be any purpose in requiring that an original map, chart or painting shall be thus inscribed, while there is every reason for requiring the copies of editions pub

lished to bear upon their face the notice of the limited property which a purchaser may acquire therein.

This construction of the statute which requires the inscription upon the published copies is much strengthened by the review of the history of copyright legislation which is contained in Judge Putnam's opinion in Werckmeister v. Pierce & Bushnell Co., 63 Fed. Rep. 445; that legislation before the statute of 1874, in which paintings were for the first time introduced, shows the uniform requirement of notice upon copies. The apparent incongruities in the statute, in the light of its history, have grown up from enlarging the scope of the law from time to time by the introduction of new subjects of copyright and engrafting them on the previous statutes. The same argument which requires original paintings to be inscribed would apply to all other articles in the same class in the present law, as maps, charts, etc., which were formerly classed with books, so far as requiring notice upon copies is concerned.

Such original maps and charts, etc., may and usually do remain in the possession of the original makers, and there is no necessity for any notice upon them, but the copyright is invalid, as the plaintiff in error insists, unless the original is itself inscribed with the notice of copyright.

For the learned counsel for plaintiff in error says: "If the painting or like article is ripe for copyright, it is ripe for the inscription of the notice. The statute requires the inserting of notice in published things only in respect to published editions of books. The term 'published' is not used in connection with paintings, statues and the like." And it is urged there can be no such thing as an "edition" of a painting, and copies of published editions are the only copies mentioned in the statute. But this phrase survives from former statutes, which dealt only with books, maps, charts, etc. When paintings and other things not capable of publication in "editions" were introduced into the statute, the language was not changed so as to be technically accurate in reference to the new subjects of copyright.