The proposition that the bill was multifarious because of the misjoinder of parties and causes of action was not assigned as error in the Circuit Court of Appeals, and, therefore, might well be held not to be open. But passing that view, we hold the objection to be untenable. The acts complained of as to each defendant were of a like character, their operation and effect upon the rights of the complainant were identical, the relief sought against each defendant was the same, and the defenses which might be interposed were common to each defendant and involved like legal questions. Under these conditions the case is brought within the principle laid down in Hale v. Allinson, 188 U. S. 56, 77.

As we have stated, the Circuit Court granted a preliminary injunction restraining the defendants from illegally dealing in tickets issued on account of the United Confederate Veterans' Reunion, and before final hearing granted a second injunction restraining such dealing in like tickets issued for the approaching Mardi Gras festival. By the final decree these injunctions were perpetuated, the court declining to grant the relief sought by the complainant in relation to non-transferable tickets to be issued for the future, without prejudice, however, to the right of the complainant to seek relief by independent proceedings on each occasion when it might issue such non-transferable tickets. The Circuit Court of Appeals decided that error had been committed in refusing to grant an injunction against dealing in non-transferable tickets to be issued in the future, and directed that the decree below be enlarged in that particular. It is insisted that the Circuit Court of Appeals erred in awarding an injunction as to dealings "in non-transferable tickets that may bé hereafter issued .since it thereby

undertook to promulgate" a rule applicable to conditions and circumstances which have not yet arisen, and to prohibit "the petitioners from dealing in tickets not in esse

and is, therefore, violative of the most fundamental principles of our government." But when the broad nature of this proposition is considered it but denies that there is power in

a court of equity in any case to afford effective relief by injunction. Certain is it that every injunction in the nature of things contemplates the enforcement as against the party enjoined of a rule of conduct for the future as to the wrong to which the injunction relates. Take the case of trespasses upon land where the elements entitling to equitable relief exist. See Slater v. Gunn, 170 Massachusetts, 509, and cases cited. It may not be doubted that the authority of a court would extend, not only to restraining a particular imminent trespass, but also to prohibiting like acts for all future time. The power exerted by the court below which is complained of was in no wise different. The bill averred the custom of the complainant at frequently occurring periods to issue reduced rate non-transferable tickets for fairs, conventions, etc., charged a course of illegal dealing in such non-transferable tickets by the defendants, and sought to protect its right to issue such tickets by preventing unlawful dealings in them. The defendants in effect not only admitted the unlawful course of dealing as to particular tickets then outstanding, but expressly avowed that they possessed the right, and that it was their intention to carry on the business as to all future issues of a similar character of tickets. The action of the Circuit Court of Appeals, therefore, in causing the injunction to apply not only to the illegal dealings as to the then outstanding tickets, but to like dealings as to similar tickets which might be issued in the future, was but the exertion by the court of its power to restrain the continued commission against the rights of the complainant in the future of a definite character of acts adjudged to be wrongful. Indeed, in view of the state of the record, the inadequacy of the relief afforded by the decree as entered in the Circuit Court is, we think, manifest on its face. The necessary predicate of the decree was the illegal nature of the dealings by the defendants in the outstanding tickets, and the fact that such dealings if allowed would seriously impair the right of the complainant in the future to issue the tickets. Doubtless, for this reason the decree was made with

out prejudice to the right of the complainant to apply for relief as to future issues of tickets by independent proceedings whenever on other occasions it was determined to issue non-transferable tickets. But this was to deny adequate relief, since it subjected the complainant to the necessity, as a preliminary to the exercise of the right to issue tickets, to begin a new suit with the object of restraining the defendants from the commission in the future of acts identical with those which the court had already adjudged to be wrongful and violative of the rights of the complainant.

In Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 107, on holding a particular seizure of liquor under the South Carolina dispensary law to be invalid, an injunction was sustained, not only addressed to the seizure in controversy, but which also operated to restrain like seizures of liquors in the future, and the exertion of the same character of power by a court of equity was upheld in the cases of Donovan v. Pennsylvania Company, 199 U. S. 279, and Swift v. United States, 196 U. S. 375.

commerce.

.

Nor is there merit in the contention that the decision in New Haven Railroad v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 200 U..S. 361, 404, supports the view here relied upon as to the limited authority of a court of equity to enjoin the continued commission of the same character of acts as those adjudged to be wrongful. On the contrary, the ruling in that case directly refutes the claim based on it. There certain acts of the carrier were held to have violated the act to regulate The contention of the Government was that because wrongful acts of a particular character had been committed, therefore an injunction should be awarded against any and all. violations in the future of the act to regulate commerce. Whilst this broad request was denied, it was carefully pointed out that the power existed to enjoin the future commission of like acts to those found to be illegal, and the injunction was so awarded. The whole argument here made results from a failure to distinguish between an injunction generally restraining the commission of illegal acts in the

future and one which simply restrains for the future the commission of acts identical in character with those which have been the subject of controversy and which have been adjudged to be illegal.

Affirmed.

UNITED STATES v. R. P. ANDREWS & COMPANY.

APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.

No. 44. Argued November 8, 11, 1907.-Decided December 2, 1907.

Whether the Philippine Islands are a distinct governmental entity for whose contracts the United States is bound, not decided; but held in this case that the purchase having been made by the Secretary of War through the Division of Insular Affairs, the contract was on behalf of the United States, notwithstanding the statement that the price was to be paid from Philippine funds.

Delivery of goods by a consignor to a common carrier for account of a consignee amounts to a delivery and where a purchaser directs delivery of the goods for his account to a designated carrier the latter becomes his agent. Delivery by the consignor, and acceptance by the consignee or his agent, of bills of lading issued by a common carrier for goods, constitutes a delivery.

While the presumption of delivery of goods to the consignee by delivery to a common carrier designated by him may be overcome by express contract that the goods are to remain at consignor's risk until arrival at ultimate destination, the mere statement in a government proposal that goods are to be "F. O. B. port of destination," without designating the carrier, is not sufficient to rebut that presumption where it appears that subsequently the government directed the goods to be delivered " F. O. B. port of shipment " to a designated common carrier.

The invalidity of a contract with the United States because not reduced to writing and signed by the parties with their names at the end thereof as required by 3744, Rev. Stat., is immaterial after the contract has been performed. St. Louis Hay Co. v. United States, 191 U: S. 159.

41 C. Cl. 48, affirmed.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Argument for Appellant.

207 U. S. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Van Orsdel, with whom Mr. Charles F. Kincheloe was on the brief, for appellant:

The Philippine Islands were, at the time of the making of this contract, a distinct political territorial entity, having practically as complete a civil territorial government as had any of the organized continental Territories of the United States. The United States was therefore no more liable on this contract of the Philippine Government than it would be upon a similar contract made by the government of the Territory of New Mexico or of Arizona.

The National Government is not liable on a contract or other obligation of one of its territorial governments, or of a political subdivision of such territorial government, even though the obligation be authorized by Congress. National Bank v. Yankton County, 101 U. S. 129; Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540; Mills v. Commissioners of Hendricks Co., 50 Ind. 436.

While according to commercial usage, delivery by a vendor to the carrier is, in the absence of special agreement to the contrary, delivery to the vendee, yet no one will question the right and power of the parties to vary this rule by contract provisions requiring delivery to be made by the vendor at the point of final destination. Dunlop v. Lambert, 6 C. & F. 620-622; Pacific Iron Works v. L. 1. R. R. Co., 62 N. Y: 272. No matter how the contract in the case at bar may be construed, it called for delivery f. o. b. Manila.

As the contract called for delivery at Manila, the contractor has no right of recovery, as it is well settled that in contracts for the sale and delivery of property the risk of damage or loss of the property follows the title. Grant v. United States, 7 Wall. 331; Oil Company v. Van Etten, 107 U. S. 325, 333; McConihe v. R. R. Co., 20 N. Y. 497. The title does not pass until delivery is made according to contract. Grant v. United States, 7 Wall. 331; Pacific Iron Works v. L. I. R. R. Co., 62 N. Y. 272; Magruder v. Gage, 33 Maryland, 348; Blackwood v. Cutting, 76 California, 212. The risk is therefore in him who