Argument for Petitioners.

207 U. S.

doubtless had the right to impose reasonable conditions upon its passengers, the right to require the production of a ticket whenever demanded, to limit the ticket as to time, and train on which it was to be used, to require it to be stamped before being used. The ticket, however, is property and a common carrier, bound to transport all seeking its conveniences, without discrimination, has no right to prohibit the sale and disposition of such ticket, because that would have been the equivalent of depriving the owner of it of an essential attribute of the property which he had acquired, and the creation of an unjust discrimination, between those seeking transportation over its lines. Mosher v. Railway Company, 127 U. S. 390, and Boylan v. Railroad Company, 132 U. S. 146, discussed and distinguished.

But assuming that the contract of non-transferability was valid, and that the original purchaser of the ticket committed a breach of contract when he disposed of it, that fact would not support an action at law against the ticket broker under the circumstances of this case. The broker did not, by fraud, force or coercion, or by malicious act, bring about such breach of contract, and the case does not therefore fall within the rule laid down in Angle v. Chicago, St. Paul &c. Ry. Co., 151 U. S. 1.

Even though the acts charged are wrongful, tortious or even fraudulent, complainant has a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law to redress such wrongs, and is not entitled to equitable relief. Hipp v. Babin, 19 How. 278; Parker v. Winnipiseogee Lake Co., 2 Black, 551; Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 13 Wall. 621; Grand Chute v. Winegar, 15 Wall. 375; Root v. Ry. Co., 105 U. S. 212; Killian v. Ebbinghaus, 110 U. S. 573; Fussell v. Gregg, 113 U. S. 555; Buzard v. Houston, 119 U. S. 351; Cates v. Allen, 149 U. S. 451; Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U. S. 146.

There was an improper joinder of defendants and of independent causes of action. The bill is multifarious and the case does not fall within the rule concerning the avoidance of a multiplicity of suits. Pfohl v. Simpson, 74 N. Y. 142; Boughton v. City of Brooklyn, 15 Barb. 375; 2 Story Eq. Jur., §§ 853, 854; Tribette v. Railroad Co., 70 Mississippi, 182.

207 U. S.

Argument for Respondent.

The Circuit Court was without jurisdiction, notwithstanding the colorable averments contained in the bill that the injury sustained in consequence of the defendants' acts exceeded two thousand dollars, there being no foundation in fact in support of such averment.

The complainant does not indicate from the record a specific piece of property actually in existence, for which the protection of a court of equity is sought. It is asking for the protection of a business not in esse, but to arise in the future, and which the court will not presume will be attacked injuriously before it comes into existence. Bank of Arapahoe v. David Bradley Co., 72 Fed. Rep. 867.

The decree of injunction awarded by the Circuit Court of Appeals, so far as it relates to non-transferable tickets, that may be hereafter issued, is in effect the exercise of legislative as distinguished from judicial power, since it undertakes to promulgate a rule applicable to conditions and circumstances, which have not yet arisen, and to prohibit the petitioners from dealing in tickets not in esse and not even in contemplation, and is, therefore, violative of the most fundamental principle of our government.

Mr. Joseph Paxton Blair and Mr. Brode B. Davis, with whom Mr. George Denegre was on the brief, for respondent:

Defendants filed no formal plea to the jurisdiction, but simply denied, in their answer, the averments of the bill in respect to the amount of damages. Under such circumstances, proof of damages was not necessary to sustain the jurisdiction. Butchers & Drovers Stock Yards Co. v. L. & N. R. R. Co. (C. C. A.), 67 Fed. Rep. 35, 40; Moffet v. Quine, 95 Fed. Rep. 201.

The legislatures of many States have appreciated the unlawful and fraudulent character of the ticket scalpers' business, and statutes have been enacted making their dealing in these tickets a violation of the criminal law in the following States, viz: Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Georgia, Maine, Texas, North Carolina, Tennessee, North

Argument for Respondent

207 U.S.

Dakota, Oregon, Montana, Florida and New York. Such laws have been held constitutional by the courts of last resort on the broad question of the right of the scalpers to buy and sell these tickets without the authority of the railroad company issuing them, in all those States in which the question has been raised, with the exception of New York. Fry v. State, 63 Indiana, 552; Burdick v. People, 149 Illinois, 600; State v. Corbett, 57 Minnesota, 345; Jannen v. State, 42 Texas Cr. Rep. 631; Commonwealth v. Keary, 198 Pa. St. 500; State v. Bernheim, 19 Montana, 512; Ex parte O'Neil, 83 Pac. Rep. 104; Samuelson v. State, 95 S. W. Rep. 1012; State v. Thompson, 84 Pac. Rep. 476.

The contract evidenced by the non-transferable tickets described in complainant's bill is a legal contract between the railroad company and the original purchaser of such tickets, and it binds the parties thereto and limits the benefits of the contract to the use of the original purchaser only. No one other than such purchaser can become the beneficiary of the contract, and under its terms the railroad company is under no obligation to carry as a passenger any person presenting such ticket unless such person is in fact the original purchaser. Mosher v. Railroad Co., 127 U. S. 390; Boylan v. Hot Springs Co., 123 U. S. 146; Drummond v. Sou. Pac. Co., 7 Utah, 118; S. C., 25 Pac. Rep. 733. The right of a railroad company to issue such tickets is not confined to occasional events, but may be issued at any time, or continually during a season. The right is recognized in unlimited terms in § 22 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 3 U. S. Comp. Stat. 3170.

It follows, therefore, that the sale of such a ticket by the original purchaser is a violation of a legal contract, and the use of one of these tickets by a person other than the original purchaser is a fraud upon the carrier.

Such a ticket is not property in the hands of the purchaser in the sense that it can be transferred or sold by him; and trafficking in such tickets is not, and cannot be made, a legitimate business. See also State v. Corbett, 57 Minnesota, 345; Jannin

v. State, 53 L. R. A. 349; Burdick v. People, 149 Illinois, 600; Drummond v. Sou. Pac. Co., 25 Pac. Rep. 733; Cody v. Sou: Pac. R. Co., 4 Sawyer, 114; Samuelson v. State, 95 S. W. Rep. 1012.

Equity has jurisdiction to enjoin the defendant ticket scalpers from present or future interference in contracts between complainant and the purchasers of its tickets. Exchange Telegraph Co. v. Central News Co., 2 Ch. 48; Ex. Tel. Co. v. Howard Agency, L. T. Vol. 120, March 31, 1906; Am. Law Book Co. v. Ed. Thompson Co., 84 N. Y. Supp. 225; Fleckenstein Bros. Co. v. Fleckenstein (N. J. Ch.), 57 Atl. Rep. 1025; Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Mechanics' Clothing Co., 128 Fed. Rep. 800-1015; Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Brady, 134 Fed. Rep. 691; Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Temple, 137 Fed. Rep. 992; Natl. Tel. Co. v. Western Union Co., 119 Fed. Rep. 294; Garst v. Charles, 187 Massachusetts, 144; Board of Trade v. Christie Co., 198 U. S. 236; Board of Trade v. Cella Co., 145 Fed. Rep. 28; Board of Trade v. McDearmott, 143 Fed. Rep. 188; Knudson v. Benn, 123 Fed. Rep. 636; Martin` v. McFall, 65 N. J. Equity, 91; Wells & Richardson Co. v. Abraham, 146 Fed. Rep. 190.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

The points urged at bar on behalf of the petitioners as establishing that the decrees below should be reversed and the bill of complaint dismissed, and in any event the injunction be modified and restricted, are the following:

"1. The bill of complaint does not state a cause of action, either at law or in equity, against any of the defendants, even though the tickets in which they dealt are in form non-transferable, when the original purchasers disposed of them in breach of their contract with the complainant."

"2. The complainant has shown no sufficient ground for equitable intervention, since, assuming, but not admitting, that the acts charged against the defendants are wrongful, tortious or even fraudulent, it has a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law to redress such wrongs."

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"3. There was an improper joinder of defendants and of independent causes of action. The bill is multifarious and the case does not fall within the rule concerning the avoidance of a multiplicity of suits."

"4. The Circuit Court was without jurisdiction, notwithstanding the colorable averments contained in the bill that the injury sustained in consequence of the defendants' act exceeded two thousand dollars, there being no foundation in fact in support of such averment."

"5. The decree of injunction awarded by the Circuit Court of Appeals, so far as it relates to non-transferable tickets, that may be hereafter issued, is in effect the exercise of legislative as distinct from judicial power, since it undertakes to promulgate a rule applicable to conditions and circumstances which have not yet arisen, and to prohibit the petitioners from dealing in tickets not in esse, and not even in contemplation, and is, therefore, violative of the most fundamental principle of our Government."

Stated in logical sequence and reduced to their essence, these propositions assert:

First, want of jurisdiction from the insufficiency of the amount involved, want of power in a court of equity to grant relief because on the face of the' bill relief at law was adequate, and because equitable relief was improper on account of misjoinder of parties and causes of action.

Second, because the case as made did not entitle to relief, since it did not show the commission of any legal wrong by the defendants.

Third, because conceding the right to relief the remedy by injunction which the court accorded was so broad as in effect to amount to the exertion of legislative as distinct from judicial power, and hence was equivalent to the denial of due process of law.

As, for reasons hereafter to be stated, we think the contentions embodied in the first proposition as to want of jurisdiction, etc., are without merit, we come at once to the funda