barred by section 1 of the act of February 12, 1793, if not presented at the treasury before May 1, 1794, as it is a claim upon the United States for services. Chamberlain v. United States.* 17 Ct. Cl., 631.

§ 22. Pension of a deceased pensioner.- A claim on the United States for the pension due a decedent must be prosecuted by the administrator, and not by the heirs, as it is personal estate. Ibid.

§ 23. The representatives of a person entitled to a pension under the act of May 15, 1828, but who never obtained its allowance or any adjudication in his favor, have no claim for the money after his death. Thatcher v. United States,* 12 Law Rep. (N. S.), 82.

§ 24. Under a general act, like that of 1828, no person becomes a pensioner so as to leave "arrears of pension," within the meaning of the acts of congress upon the subject, until after such adjudication in his favor by the secretary of the treasury. Ibid.

§ 25. Accrued pensions not assets.- The Revised Statutes provide (section 4718) that an accrued pension shall not be considered as a part of the assets of the estate of a deceased pensioner. This provision is applicable to and governs the act of January 25, 1879 (1 Supplmt. R. S., p. 395, ch. 23), which provides for the ascertainment and allowance of "arrears of pension," but does not use the term "accrued pensions." Donnelly v. United States,* 17 Ct. Cl., 105.

§ 26. A pensioner having applied for arrears under the act of January 25, 1879, the commissioner allowed the claim and issued the usual certificate, but before payment the pensioner died. Held, that the issuing of the certificate did not create a debt against the government which survived to the administrator of the pensioner. Ibid.

§ 27. Who entitled — Acts of officers conclusive.— The whole matter of ascertaining, determining and certifying who is lawfully entitled to a pension on account of military service is confided to certain executive officers, and not to the judiciary, and no right to a pension is fixed until those officers declare it to be; and if they decide against the right there is no appeal except to congress. So held in suit brought upon a pension claim which had been rejected by the commissioner of pensions. Daily v. United States,* 17 Ct. Cl., 144. § 28. Surgeons of regiments were not included in the resolution of congress of October 21, 1780, providing that "the officers who shall continue in the service to the end of the war shall be entitled to half pay during life." Thatcher v. United States,* 12 Law Rep. (N. S.), 82. § 29. Pension agent - Bond.- The approval by the secretary of the interior of a new bond of a pension agent, without an accounting by the agent, is not such an acceptance of the new bond as will cancel the liability of the sureties on the old bond, where, upon a settlement of his accounts, it appears that at the time of giving the new bond the agent was in default. United States v. Haynes, 9 Ben., 22.

§ 30. Adopted and illegitimate children.- Under the act of March 4, 1814 (3 Stat. at Large, 103), an adopted child is not entitled to a pension; but an illegitimate child, which, by intermarriage of the parents, and acknowledgment as their child, becomes legitimatized by the law of the state in which the parents reside, is entitled to a pension if the father dies in the naval service and the mother marries again. United States v. Skam, 5 Cr. C. C., 367.

§ 31. By the act of March 3, 1819 (3 Stat. at Large, 514), a new requisite is prescribed to the validity of pensions, viz., the biennial affidavit of continued disability to be given by two surgeons. The repeal of that act in 1832 (4 Stat. at Large, 599) was prospective only, and could not restore to the pension roll any one who had been dropped from it for non-compliance with the said condition. Williams v. United States,* 10 Law Rep. (N. S.), 631.

§ 32. Navy agents. There is no such distinct office known to the constitution and laws of the United States as navy pension agent; hence it is competent for the secretary of the navy to require the navy agents to pay these pensions; and having done so, the sureties of the navy agent are responsible for the faithful performance of that service. United States v. Cutter, 2 Curt., 617.

PERILS OF THE SEA.

See CARRIERS; INSURANCE.

PERJURY.

See CRIMES.

PERPETUITY.

See CONSTITUTION AND LAWS; ESTATES OF DECEDENTS; USES AND TRUSTS.

PERSONAL PROPERTY.

See PROPERTY.

PETITION, RIGHT OF.

See CONSTITUTION AND LAWS.

PILOTS AND PILOTAGE.

See CONSTITUTION AND LAWS; MARITIME LAW.

PIRACY.

See CRIMES.

PLEADING.

See post.

PLEADING AND EVIDENCE.

See EVIDENCE.

PLEA IN ABATEMENT.

See PLEADING; PRACTICE.

PLEAS.

See PLEADING.

PLEDGE.

See BAILMENT.

PLENE ADMINISTRAVIT.

See ESTATES OF DECEDENTS; PLEADING.

POLICE POWERS.

[See CONSTITUTION AND LAWS.]

§ 1. In general.- The police power of a state extends to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property within the state, and hence to the making of all regulations promotive of domestic order, morals, health and safety. Railroad Co. v. Husen, 5 Otto, 465.

§2. Under its police powers a state may regulate the conduct of its citizens towards each other, and the manner in which each shall use his own property, when such regulation is necessary for the public good. Included in these powers is that to regulate warehouses, and in so doing to fix a maximum of charge to be made for services rendered, accommodations furnished, etc. Munn v. Illinois, 4 Otto, 113.

§3. The court were inclined to regard with favor the following definition: Every law comes within the description of a regulation of police which concerns the welfare of the whole people of a state or any individual within it; whether it relates to their rights or their duties; whether it respects them as men or as citizens of the state, in their public or private relations; whether it relates to the rights of persons or property of the whole people of a state or of any individual within it; and whose operation was within the territorial limits of the state and upon the persons and things within its jurisdiction. City of New York v. Miln, 11 Pet., 102. § 4. The supreme police power of a state is one of the different means used by sovereignty to accomplish that great object, the good of the state, and is either national or municipal, in the confined application of that word to corporations and cities. Police powers and sovereign powers are the same, the former being considered so many particular rights under that name or word, collectively placed in the hands of the sovereign. Passenger Cases, 7 How., 283. § 5. The legislature having granted an exclusive right, and that branch or organ of the government possessing the police power with reference to the subject-matter of the right granted permits and acknowledges the exercise of the right as harmless, the right is so vested that neither the legislature nor the people have power to abrogate it. Crescent City, etc., Co. v. Butchers' Union, etc., Co., 9 Fed. R., 743.

§ 6. State acts in conflict with powers of congress.―The police powers of a state cannot be so exercised as to practically assume the powers conferred upon congress by the constitution. For example, a state cannot exercise its police powers over the interstate transportation of articles and subjects of commerce. Railroad Co. v. Husen, 5 Otto, 465.

§ 7. The statute of Missouri, prohibiting the importation of any Texas, Mexican or Indian cattle into the state, between the first day of March and the first day of November in each year, is not a quarantine nor inspection law, nor otherwise within the police powers of the the state, but is in conflict with that clause of the constitution of the United States ordaining that "congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states and with the Indian tribes." Ibid.

§ 8. The patent laws passed by congress do not in any way displace or restrict the police powers of a state. Hence, it is competent for a state to exact a license fee for the sale of patented articles as well as of those not patented. Webber v. Virginia, 13 Otto, 347.

§ 9. The twenty-ninth section of the internal revenue act of March 2, 1867 (14 Stat. at Large, 484), prohibiting the sale of certain kinds of oil, or oil unable to undergo a certain fire test, is plainly a police regulation, relating exclusively to the internal trade of the states, and as such can only have effect where the legislative authority of congress excludes territorially all state legislation, as, for example, in the District of Columbia. Within state limits it can have no constitutional operation. United States v. Dewitt, 9 Wall., 41.

§ 10. A state statute, providing a summary proceeding to remove intruders on Indian lands. is a police regulation and not unconstitutional. State of New York v. Dibble, 21 How., 365. § 11. State regulations of commerce are not valid as an exercise of police powers. Thus an Alabama statute, requiring steamboat owners, before leaving the waters of the state at Mobile, to file with the probate judge a written statement containing the name of the vessel, and of the owners, etc., etc., held, to be in conflict with the constitution and laws of the United States, and therefore void. Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How., 227.

§ 12. A state may exclude from its limits paupers and convicts of other countries, persons incurably diseased, and others likely to become a burden upon its resources. It may, perhaps, exclude persons whose presence would be dangerous to its established institutions. But there its power ends. Whatever is done by way of exclusion beyond this must come from the general government. That government alone can determine what aliens shall be permitted to land within the United States and upon what conditions they shall be permitted to remain. Ah Kow v. Nunan, 5 Saw., 552.

§ 13. The police power of the state extends to all matters relating to the internal government of the state, and the administration of its laws which have not been surrendered to the general government, and embraces regulations affecting the health, good order, morals, peace and safety of society. This police power may be exercised by precautionary measures against the increase of crime or pauperism, or the spread of infectious diseases from persons coming from other countries. Thus, the state may entirely exclude convicts, lepers and persons afflicted with incurable disease; may refuse admission to paupers, idiots, lunatics and others, who from physical causes are likely to become a charge upon the public, until security is afforded that they will not become such a charge; and may isolate the temporarily diseased until the danger of contagion is gone. In re Ah Fong, 3 Saw., 144.

§ 14. But the extent of the power of the state to exclude a foreigner from its territory is limited by the right in which it has its origin — the right of self-defense. Whatever outside of the legitimate exercise of this right affects the intercourse of foreigners with our people, their immigration to this country and residence therein, is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the general government, and is not subject to state control or interference. Accordingly, a statute of California preventing the landing of foreigners who are "lunatic, idiotic, deaf, dumb, blind, crippled or infirm," or who are or have been paupers, etc., held to be beyond the police power of the state, as to prohibit the landing of blind or crippled people, etc., without regard to their present ability to support themselves, is to prohibit immigration: Ibid.

§ 15. Each state has exclusive control over all matters pertaining to its own internal police. It can establish and regulate ferries across its rivers, control the moving of vessels in harbors within its borders, and enact health and inspection laws which, by quarantine or otherwise, may operate on persons brought within its jurisdiction in the course of commercial operations. It has the same undeniable and unlimited jurisdiction over all persons and things, within its territorial limits, as any foreign nation, where that jurisdiction is not surrendered or restrained by the constitution of the United States. All those powers which relate mainly to municipal law, or what may be called internal police, not being restrained by or surrendered to the federal government, the authority of a state in relation to these is complete, unqualified and exclusive. King v. American Transportation Ca., 1 Flip., 1.

§ 16. State legislatures have an undoubted right to make all police regulations which they may deem necessary (not inconsistent with constitutional restrictions) for the preservation of the public health, good order, morals and intelligence, but they cannot under pretense of a police regulation interfere with the fundamental privileges and immunities of American citizens. Thus where the legislature of Louisiana granted to an incorporated society the exclusive privilege of keeping cattle landings, stockyards and slaughter houses in and about the city of New Orleans, and prohibited all others from keeping such establishments, held, that the grant of such exclusive privilege violated the rights of others desiring to keep such establishments, and willing to conform to all police regulations adopted for the public health, safety and comfort, and that such grant could not be sustained under the power to make police regulations. The Slaughter House Case, 1 Woods, 21; Live Stock, etc., Association v. Crescent City, etc., Co., 1 Abb., 388. But see Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall., 36 (Const., $$ 752-801).

§ 17. As a measure of police regulation a law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors is not repugnant to the constitution of the United States. Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 7 Otto, 25.

§ 18. While a state may pass sanitary laws, and laws for the protection of life, liberty, health, or property within its borders; while it may prevent persons and animals suffering under contagious or infectious diseases from entering the state, and for the purpose of selfprotection establish quarantine, and reasonable inspection laws, it may not interfere with transportation into or through the state beyond what is absolutely necessary for its self-protection. Railroad Co. v. Husen, 5 Otto, 465.

§ 19. Persons are not the subject of commerce, and not being imported goods, they do not fall within the reasoning founded upon the construction of the power given to congress to regulate commerce, and the prohibition of the states from imposing a duty on imported goods. Accordingly, the legislature of New York, having passed an act requiring the master of every vessel arriving in New York from any foreign port, or from a port of any of the states of the United States other than New York, under certain penalties prescribed in the law, within twenty-four hours after his arrival, to make a report in writing, containing the names, ages and last legal settlement of every person who had been on board the vessel commanded by him during the voyage, held, that this act was not a regulation of commerce, but of police; and that being so, it was passed in the exercise of a power which rightfully belonged to the state. City of New York v. Miln, 11 Pet., 102.

$20. The act of New York of 1824, above referred to, being intended to protect New York

SS 21-26.

POLICY OF INSURANCE-POSTMASTER-GENERAL.

against the importation of foreign paupers, was an internal police regulation and constitutional. Ibid.

§ 21. It is not within the police powers of a state to impose taxes upon alien passengers arriving in the ports of that state. Passenger Cases, 7 How., 283.

§ 22. Miscellaneous.- A state may, under its police power, impose special assessments for levee purposes and the like. A special assessment for such a purpose is not a tax in the strict legal sense of that word, and hence it has been uniformly held that the usual constitutional provisions, requiring the burdens of taxation to be equally distributed, and requiring an equal and uniform valuation of all property for purposes of taxation, have relation to taxation for general state and county purposes, and are not limitations on the exercise of the police power, and do not inhibit special local assessments, when the fund raised is expended for the improvement of the property taxed. Boro v. Phillips County, 4 Dill., 216.

§ 23. An ordinance declaring that every male person imprisoned in the county jail, under the judgment of any court having jurisdiction in criminal cases in the city and county, shall, immediately upon his arrival at the jail, have the hair of his head cut or clipped to a uniform length of one inch from the scalp thereof, cannot be upheld either as a measure of discipline or as a sanitary regulation. Ah Kow v. Nunan, 5 Saw., 552.

§ 24. All rights granted by charter to corporations are subject to the police powers of the state when exercised in behalf of the public health or morals. The legislature cannot, by any contract, divest itself of the power to provide for these objects. Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 7 Otto, 25.

§ 25. It seems that the power to impose a license fee or tax may be supported as an exercise of the police power. Railway Co. v. Philadelphia, 11 Otto, 528.

§ 26. The legislature of a state cannot bargain away its police power. Hence a charter to a company, authorizing them to conduct a lottery for a certain number of years, is nothing more than a license to enjoy the privilege on the terms named for the specified time, unless it be sooner abrogated by the sovereign power of the state for the general good. Stone v. Mississippi, 11 Otto, 814.

POLICY OF INSURANCE

See INSURANCE.

POLITICAL QUESTIONS.

See COURTS; GOVERNMENT.

POLYGAMY.

See CRIMES; DOMESTIC RELATIONS.

POSSESSION.

See LAND; LIMITATIONS.

POSTMASTER.

See BOND3; POSTOFFICE.

POSTMASTER-GENERAL.

See GOVERNMENT; POSTOFFICE.