dens in regard to all defenses set up to the lien, on the principle that the causes of action on the bonds, protected by established rules of law against the consequences of lis pendens, are independent of, and entirely collateral to, causes of action arising out of the lien. Stevens v. The Railroads, 4 Fed. R., 97.

§ 50. In chancery it is settled that a lis pendens is created by filing a bill and actual service of the subpoena. Fowler v. Byrd, Hemp., 213.

§ 51. The rule that all persons are bound to take notice of a pending suit does not apply to negotiable securities. Marshall v. Town of Elgin, 8 Fed. R., 783; 3 McC., 35.

§ 52. The plea of lis pendens in a foreign country is not a good plea in abatement. Lyman v. Brown, 2 Curt., 559.

$53. A purchaser of bonds for value, before maturity, who had no actual notice of any irregularity in the issuing of such bonds, or as to their invalidity, is unaffected by the pendency, at the time of the purchase, of a suit to declare the bonds invalid. Phelps v. Town of Lewiston, 15 Blatch., 131.

§ 54. An order issued by the court requiring a judgment debtor to appear for an examination touching his property, under the Ohio code, does not constitute a lis pendens so as to prevent him from mortgaging his property after service of notice upon him, but before his appearance. Gregory v. Hewson, 1 Bond, 277.

§ 55. A person who purchases property pendente lite does so at his peril, and is as conclusively bound by the results of the litigation, whatever they may be, as if he had been a party to it from the outset. Tilton v. Cofield, 3 Otto, 163.

§ 56. The rule that persons dealing with property are bound to take notice of a suit pending with regard to the title thereto, and will, on their peril, purchase the same from any of the parties to the suit, does not apply to negotiable securities purchased before maturity. Such securities are exempt from the rule, whether created before the suit or during its pendency, and whether the suit relates to their origin or transfer. County of Warren v. Marcy, 7 Otto, 96.

§ 57. Parties who by themselves or their counsel have had notice of proceedings in a federal court with reference to certain property, cannot claim to be bona fide purchasers under proceedings in a state court touching the same matter. Bill v. New Albany R. Co., 2 Biss.,

390.

§ 58. Where an attachment is properly issued, notice of lis pendens may be filed in the clerk's office. United States v. Stevenson, 1 Abb., 495.

§ 59. The pendency of a suit is not constructive notice to purchasers of negotiable paper which is the subject of such suit. Preble v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Biss., 358.

§ 60. A suit not prosecuted to a decree or judgment is not constructive notice to a person not a pendente lite purchaser. Alexander v. Pendleton, 8 Cr., 462.

§ 61. Where there are three distinct and independent suits, with an interval of one year between the first and second, and two years between the second and third, the doctrine of lis pendens does not apply. Lee County v. Rogers, 7 Wall., 181.

§ 62. A purchaser pendente lite and those holding under him are chargeable with notice, and must be considered as having purchased subject to the results of the pending suit. Nor is the title of such purchaser fortified by the fact that a decree pro confesso, by & default on the publication of notice, was made against a claimant now claiming under the ultimate decree declaring his claim invalid, and that very soon after this and before that default was set aside, the purchase was made and the deed received from one of the parties to the suit. Such purchaser was bound to know the inconclusive character of the decree pro confesso, and that by the state law such decree could be set aside by the appearance of the absent defendant, and motion to that effect, especially where such purchaser is the attorney of one of the parties to the suit. Gay v. Parpart, 16 Otto, 679.

§ 63. A creditor's bill does not create a lis pendens, operating as notice as to real estate, unless it be so definite in the description that any one reading it can learn thereby what property is intended to be made the subject of litigation, and if not thus definite it will be postponed to a junior bill which is properly drawn. Miller v. Sherry, 2 Wall., 237.

§ 64. If the person holding the legal title is not made a party to a creditor's bill, the title of a purchaser pendente lite will hold good. Ibid.

§ 65. In Louisiana lis pendens must be pleaded as in limine litis. Barras v. Bidwell, 3 Woods, 5.

§ 66. Notice to the stockholders of a corporation of the facts which constitute the alleged fraud by means of which a decree was obtained against the corporation is sufficient to conclude the corporation where the stockholders had an opportunity to intervene and defend, but did not do so. Pacific Railroad v. Missouri Pacific R'y Co., 12 Fed. R., 641.

§ 67. Where a former shareholder attends a meeting of the board of directors of a corporation, there being but four of the five directors present, and purchases property of the direct

ors, knowing that one of their number was absent, he cannot claim to be a bona fide purchaser without notice, where due notice of the meeting had not been given to the absent director as required by the by-laws of the corporation. Farwell v. Houghton Copper Works, 8 Fed. R., 66.

§ 68. The knowledge of stockholders in a corporation, the former owners of the property now owned by the corporation, will not affect the corporation with notice of a lien when there are other stockholders who took stock in ignorance of the claim. The Admiral,* 8 Law Rep. (N. S.), 91.

§ 69. A notice to a stockholder, or to a party who afterwards becomes an officer in the company, is not notice to the corporation. The fact that a party receiving notice afterwards becomes an officer in the company will not make it obligatory upon him to give that notice, before received, to the company. Ibid.

§ 70. Where the president and cashier of a bank are members of an insolvent firm, and have notice, as members, of the insolvency of their firm, such notice is to be deemed notice to the bank so as to invalidate a transfer of property from the firm to the bank a few days before suspension of business by the former. Nisbit v. Macon Bank, 12 Fed. R., 686; 4 Woods, 464.

§ 71. Transfer of stock. Upon transfer of bank stock from A. to B., notice to the board of directors that B. is to hold as trustee only is notice to the bank, and precludes the banking corporation from applying the stock to its own use, for the debt of B., to the prejudice of the rights of the known cestuis que trust, unless the power to appropriate in such cases is expressly given by the charter. Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria v. Seton, 1 Pet., 299.

§ 72. Stock.— Where a corporation paid for certain mineral land in stock which was issued to the directors as paid-up stock, and it ultimately developed that gross fraud had been perpetrated between the parties to the sale and purchase of the mineral land, held, that as between the corporation and innocent purchasers of the stock in open market without notice, knowledge, or means of knowledge of the fraud, the shares of stock were paid up as shown by the books of the corporation. Foreman v. Bigelow, 4 Cliff., 508.

§ 73. An executor having bank stock devised to him in trust to pay the dividends to certain persons transferred the stock, for his own private purposes, to a third person on the books of the bank, with the assent of the officers of the same, who issued a certificate to such third person, on the faith of which he made advances and incurred liabilities for the individual benefit of the executor. Held, 1st, that such third person, having no notice of the misapplication of the money, or of the source of the executor's title, was entitled to hold the stock; 2d, that the bank which issued the certificate, having had notice that the stock belonged originally to the testator, was bound to look to the title of the executor under the will, before it permitted a transfer, and having had notice of the application of the funds to the executor's private use, was liable for the stock to the persons entitled under the will. Lowry v. Commercial & Farmers' Bank,* 3 Am. L. J., 111.

§ 74. To corporation.- Where the treasurer of a corporation was also the managing agent of the corporation, held, that notice to be given to the corporation was properly given to him instead of the board of directors, assembled for the transaction of business. New England Car Spring Co. v. Union India Rubber Co., 4 Blatch., 1.

§ 75. Commercial paper. Where bonds of a corporation, negotiable by delivery, were stolen, and sold before maturity to a bona fide purchaser without notice, held, that the purchaser took a good title to the bonds, and to the coupons which were not due, but not to the overdue coupons. Gilbough v. Norfolk & Petersburg R. Co., 1 Hughes, 410.

§ 76. The mere fact that coupons for interest upon bonds of a municipal corporation are overdue and unpaid when such coupons are purchased is not of itself sufficient, without other circumstances to put the purchaser on his guard, to charge such purchaser with notice of defenses to the bonds, especially where the record shows that the sale of the bonds, during all of the time when the coupons were maturing, was restrained by an injunctional order, which was dissolved after the coupons had become due, but before the purchase of the same. Preble v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Biss., 358.

§ 77. Notice to bankers of the loss of overdue commercial paper is binding upon them, and if they afterwards purchase such paper in the course of their business, they are liable for the value thereof to the real owners. Vermilye v. Adams Express Co., 21 Wall., 138.

66

§78. Bills of exchange drawn on the secretary of war by army officers were accepted by the former and purchased by A. before maturity. Before making the purchase, A. was informed by a public officer that there was an 'express law" prohibiting the secretary from making direct advance payment to army contractors, but that it was, and had been, "the custom of the department" to accept such bills. Held, that this was sufficient notice to A. of the illegality of the paper, to render the acceptance void in his hands. Peirce v. United States,* 1 Ct. Cl., 270.

79. Where the question, whether coupons surrendered by the holder were merely sold, or delivered up for payment and cancellation, depended upon the intention of the holder, held, that intention to sell might be inferred from actual or constructive notice that purchase and not payment was being made; and that where the coupons were not paid in the usual manner, by the officers or agents of the company, at the place designated for payment, but, after examination, were sealed up in an envelope, and the holder directed to go elsewhere to get his money, which he did, and the coupons were not delivered up to the company, such constructive notice must be inferred. Duncan v. Mobile & Ohio R. Co., 3 Woods, 567,

§ 80. Fraudulent conveyances.-The rule in equity that a vendee, after notice of the vendor's fraud, is only protected as to payment made before such notice, cannot be applied in a case at law. Sousteby v. Keeley, 2 McC., 103; 11 Fed. R., 578 (FRAUD, §§ 540-42).

$81. Appointment of guardian.- Where the law authorizes the appointment of a guardian "after notice given to all persons interested," such notice is necessary to give jurisdiction, and the record must show that notice was given or the appointment will be void. Seavens v. Gerke, 3 Saw.. 353.

§ 82. Ownership of telegraph.- Where by contract a telegraph company was allowed to construct its line of telegraph wires along the track of a railroad company, such lines being under the control and operation of the telegraph company, as evidenced by the printed message blanks used, and the fact that all the telegraph business was done in the name of the telegraph company, held, that a purchaser of the railroad, at a foreclosure sale, did not acquire any title to the telegraph line as a bona fide purchaser thereof for value and without notice. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Burlington & Southwestern R'y Co., 3 McC., 130. § 83. Trustee for creditors.- Where A. gave to B. a deed of trust preferring certain creditors, holders of notes forged by him, in the expectation that if the notes were paid no prosecution would be instituted against him, held, that notice to the trustee, B., of A.'s hopes and expectations was not notice to the creditors so as to render the deed of trust void, as a contract, the consideration of which was the compounding of a felony. Brooks v. Marbury, 11 Wheat., 78.

§ 84. Exempt property.-Where goods were set apart by decree of the court as an exemption for the benefit of the family, and such goods were sold by the head of the family, in conjunction with his business partner, held, that the purchaser took no title, as he was bound to know that, by the laws of the state, such property could not be sold by the husband without the wife joining in the sale. In re Smith, 2 Hughes, 307.

§ 85. Notice to counsel.- Where A., a trust executor, through his counsel, B., paid to C. a sum of money according to the direction of the will of his testate, C. having been adjudged bankrupt and an assignee appointed more than two years prior to such payment, held, that the executor was chargeable with notice of C.'s bankruptcy, by reason of the knowledge of his counsel, B., although the executor himself had no knowledge of the bankruptcy proceedings, and the same had wholly escaped the mind of B., at the time the payment was made. Beecher v. Gillespie, 6 Ben., 356.

§ SC. Notice of insolvency.—Where A., being engaged in extensive business operations, pays an extraordinarily large discount for a loan, such fact is not notice, to the parties making the loan, of his insolvency, although commercial paper similar to A.'s was at the same time selling at high rates, if it appear that A.'s pressing need of money, by reason of his desire to hold large quantities of salable products for more favorable prices, was not inconsistent with his pretensions as a man of means. Golson v. Neihoff,* 5 N. B. R., 56.

§ 87. Innocent persons.- When one of two innocent persons must suffer, the one guilty of negligence, or who fails to use the means within his reach to acquire information which would have avoided the injury, must bear the loss. The Monte Allegre, 9 Wheat., 616.

§ 88. By-laws of a town.-One who owns real estate in a town is bound to take notice of its charter, by-laws and ordinances. Thus, where an ordinance permitted property owners to give their notes for the taxes due, thereby creating an equitable lien upon the property, held, that a purchaser of the property was liable for such equitable liens on the property which attached to it while in the hands of its former owner. Corporation of Georgetown v. Smith, 4 Cr. C. C., 91.

§ 89. Notice to a deputy marshal who performs an act is notice to the marshal himself. United States v. Bank of Arkansas, Hemp., 460.

NOTICE BY PUBLICATION.

See JUDGMENTS; WRITS.

NOVATION.

See CONTRACTS.

NUISANCE.

See CRIMES; EQUITY; TORTS; WATER-COURSES.

NUL TIEL RECORD.

See PLEADING.

OATHS.

[See AFFIDAVIT; NOTARY PUBLIC.]

§ 1. Who may administer.—A judge of a district court of the United States has power to administer oaths incident to his judicial office, or pertaining to matters arising in his own court, and hence may administer to the clerk of the United States court for his district the oath which is required by law to be made, by such clerk, to his accounts with the government. United States v. Ambrose, 2 Fed. R., 556.

§ 2. A United States consul at Mexico was appointed minister, whereupon he took and subscribed the oath required by the act of July 2, 1862 (12 Stat. at L., p. 502), before the consulgeneral of Switzerland. Held, that he was entitled to no pay as minister under the above act, as the consul-general of Switzerland had no right in the premises, and was not a proper party before whom to take the oath. Otterbourg v. United States,* 5 Ct. Cl., 430.

§ 3. A county judge having power to administer oaths may administer them in any county in the state. Voce v. Lawrence, 4 McL., 203.

§ 4. A state master in chancery is not authorized by any act of congress to administer oaths. Hence affidavits made before such master cannot be read in evidence, when offered in chancery, in a United States circuit court. Haight v. Proprietors of the Morris Aqueduct, 4 Wash., .601.

§ 5. A deputy clerk, being authorized by the court to act during the absence of the clerk, has the right to administer oaths in bankruptcy, and such oaths are presumed to be administered in the presence of the court and by virtue of its authority. United States v. Nihols, 4 McL., 23.

§ 6. Upon the presentation in evidence, in the United States circuit court for the District of Columbia, of a deposition taken in Louisiana before a person who called himself "a commissioner duly appointed by the district court of the United States for the eastern district of Louisiana, under and by virtue of the act of congress entitled 'An act for the more convenient taking of affidavits and bail in civil causes depending in the courts of the United States "" '(act of February 20, 1812), it was contended that the commissioners, under the act of 1812, were only authorized to take depositions in causes depending in their own courts, or in the district courts, under the act of 1817. Held, that the deposition might be read in evidence. Whit

ney v. Huntt, 5 Cr. C. C., 120.

§ 7. Where an act of congress requires a person claiming pre-emption rights to make oath of entry, etc., such oath, under the usage of the proper department of the government, may be administered by a state officer having power to administer oaths. United States v. Winchester, 2 McL., 135.

§ 8. Under a rule of the court ordering "that petitioners residing out of the county of W. may verify their petitions before the county clerk of the county in which they reside, and the clerks of the different counties of this district are hereby appointed commissioners to administer oaths to petitioners applying for the benefit of the bankrupt law," held, that county clerks outside of the county of W. had no power to administer oaths to persons residing outside of their respective counties. United States v. Deming, 4 McL., 3.

§ 9. A justice of the peace is not incompetent to administer the oath upon the taking of a deposition, by reason of his being deponent's counsel. Atkinson v. Glenn, 4 Cr. C. C., 134. § 10. An attachment issued upon affidavit is not insufficient by reason of the affidavit having been taken before a clerk of the circuit court in vacation, the clerk having power to administer oaths in vacation, in such cases. James v. Jenkens, Hemp., 189. § 11. Although there is no statute of the United States which expressly authorizes any justice of the peace of a state to administer an oath in support of any claim against the United States under the act of July 5, 1832, the secretary of the treasury, in order to carry into effect the authority given to him to liquidate and pay the claims referred to in such act, having established a regulation authorizing justices of the peace to administer such oaths, held, that by virtue of his implied power to make such regulations, oaths thus administered would be within the purview of the act of March 1, 1823. United States v. Bailey, 9 Pet., 238.

§ 12. Presumption.- An officer of the customs, duly commissioned, and acting in the duties of his office, is presumed to have taken the regular oaths. United States v. Bachelder, 2 Gall., 15.

§ 13. Affirmation.- A juror cannot be permitted to make solemn affirmation in lieu of oath, unless it be contrary to his religious principles to take an oath on any occasion. Bryan's Case, 1 Cr. C. C., 151.

§ 14. A juror not a quaker nor attached to any particular religious sect will not be permitted to affirm simply because he prefers affirming to swearing. McIntire's Case, 1 Cr. C. C., 157.

OBJECTIONS.

See APPEALS; EVIDENCE; PRACTICE.

OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS.

See CONSTITUTION AND LAWS.

OBSCENE ARTICLES.

[As to non-mailable matter, see CRIMES.]

An information founded on the act of 1857, chapter 63, was filed against one case of stereoscopic slides, alleging them to be indecent and obscene, and praying for their condemnation and destruction. A part of the slides were admitted to be indecent, but as to the rest the general issue was filed. Held, that those only which were found to be indecent could be condemned and destroyed. But it seems that if the information had alleged that those which were not indecent were imported in the same package with those which were indecent, proof of that fact would have authorized their forfeiture. United States v. One Case Stereoscopic Slides,* 1 Spr., 467.

OCCUPYING CLAIMANTS.

See LAND.